

**APARTHEID WHITEWASH
SOUTH AFRICA
PROPAGANDA
IN THE
UNITED STATES**

BY RICHARD LEONARD



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Preface

During the past decade South Africa has become an important foreign policy focus for the United States and a significant issue for many Americans. But many Americans are not aware that the South African government has long mounted major propaganda programs in the U.S. aimed at influencing government policies and public opinion.

This study by Richard Leonard is particularly timely because a new South African president, F.W. de Klerk, elected by the white minority, 14 percent of the population, is promising to end apartheid. De Klerk has taken some significant steps, but the time has long passed for first steps and the structural basis for white minority rule is still in place. This study decodes the meaning of these new claims.

Under the pressure of black protest and partial economic sanctions the apartheid regime has made some changes. Some apartheid laws have been scrapped. ANC leader Walter Sisulu and other political prisoners have been released. Peaceful protest marches have taken place without police interference. Members of the ruling National Party, the creators of apartheid, have met with African National Congress leaders and hint that negotiations may be possible.

But despite these steps and the new, moderate image projected by the government, the basic structures of apartheid remain. The white minority controls the government and 87 percent of South Africa's territory is still allocated for whites.

Protests, divestment, and other economic sanctions from the U.S. have helped push the South African government towards change. The regime wants to loosen these pressures and control the pace and direction of change. Its propaganda campaigns and media restrictions continue to be a main weapon in South Africa's arsenal.

This comprehensive study reveals the dimensions of these multi-million dollar programs and how the apartheid government seeks to spread its message to Washington policymakers, to children in our schools, and to television and movie audiences. South Africa's propaganda campaigns use a wide range of methods, from highly-paid lobbyists, to slick movies and magazines, to covert operations.

The second chapter describes the other key element of South Africa's campaign to influence policy and opinion: its system of censorship and media control. Through these restrictions the government seeks to limit and control the information reaching the people of South Africa and the rest of the world.

This is an important study and its findings need to reach the widest possible audience. Greater awareness of South Africa's propaganda campaigns can give Americans a clearer understanding of events in South Africa. This study shows why the South African government's assurances that it is dismantling apartheid cannot be taken at face value and demonstrates the need to strengthen sanctions and other pressures until South Africa is truly free.

—Jennifer Davis
Executive Director
The Africa Fund
December 1989

Introduction

Propaganda and Media Control

In the mid-1980s, in response to unprecedented levels of domestic protest against apartheid and increasing international pressures for stronger trade sanctions, the government of South Africa intensified its propaganda efforts, especially those aimed at the United States, and imposed censorship restrictions on all news reported from within the country. In 1987-88, \$28 million was allocated to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs for "communications and image-building" programs overseas.¹ But it is difficult to estimate the total amount being spent on South African propaganda directed at the U.S. because these activities extend beyond the regime's official programs, and include efforts on behalf of its surrogates in Angola and Mozambique and the promotional activities of South African business interests.

Propaganda can be defined as the dissemination and control of information, either accurate or distorted, in order to influence policy and public opinion. South Africa uses a variety of propaganda vehicles in the United States beginning with its large official presence which includes its embassy, consulates, honorary consuls and Tourist Board offices. In addition, during the 1980s, the South African government hired more than 15 lobbying and public relations firms as its agents to promote its policies in the U.S. These agents have provided South African officials with government, business and media contacts and helped to shape and target South African propaganda for maximum impact.

South African business organizations and U.S. corporations with ties to South Africa, while criticizing apartheid and the regime's policies, have continued to support Pretoria by opposing sanctions. And in the mid-1980s the South African government got dynamic new support in the United States from right-wing religious groups that back its policies and distribute its propaganda materials. Agents for forces backed by South Africa in Angola (Unita) and Mozambique (Renamo) also generated favorable propaganda for Pretoria.

Some lobbyists for South Africa and its surrogates have top-level links with the Bush administration and the Republican party. Lee Atwater, the Republican party chairman, has been associated with Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly, the main lobbyist

for Unita, which between 1985 and 1988 received more than \$2 million for this work. The law firm of John Sears, Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign manager, became a key lobbyist for South Africa in 1981. Stuart Spencer, chief adviser for the vice-presidential campaign of Dan Quayle, served as a lobbyist for South Africa in 1982.

Tourism promotion, culture, sports, and education have also been important areas for South African propaganda, although their usefulness has been diminished by wide support for the cultural and sports boycott. More recently, the apartheid government has successfully attracted U.S. feature film production to South Africa and has secured U.S. distribution of films it has produced.

South Africa's already tight restrictions on news reporting have been greatly extended since 1985, and by reducing U.S. coverage of the crisis there have limited popular support in the U.S. for stronger sanctions and other pressures against apartheid. Thus control of the media has become a central element in the apartheid government's overall propaganda program. Although South African media control has led to concern and controversy among U.S. journalists thus far no vigorous response by major U.S. news organizations has emerged.

COVERT PROPAGANDA PROGRAMS

In 1978 and 1979 the "Muldergate" scandal in South Africa exposed a large-scale, secret international "propaganda war" being mounted by the South African regime with a budget reported to be \$50 million per year. At least 160 projects were involved, many in the U.S. Although the program as a whole was secret, some of the projects, such as the use of registered agents, were not secret in practice. Many, however, were covert and involved illegal activities, such as funneling money into elections and buying news organizations. After the secret program was uncovered, South African officials recommended that many of the projects be continued, most in secrecy.

The major collaborator in Pretoria's covert campaign in the U.S. was John McGoff, a conservative publisher from Michigan, who, with \$11.35 million in secret funds from the apartheid regime made an unsuccessful bid for the *Washington Star*. He then succeeded in buying the *Sacramento Union* using these funds, and also bought a half interest in United Press International Television News based in London for \$1.35 million. After the secret projects were exposed, McGoff was investigated by the U.S. Justice Department for failure to register as a foreign agent. Despite public reports by the South African government detailing McGoff's role, the case dragged on for years and by the time he was indicted in 1986 the statute of limitations had expired.

Two serious cases of interference in U.S. elections by South Africa were revealed by Eschel Rhoodie, the official who was in charge of the secret propaganda program. In 1976, Rhoodie alleged, nearly \$200,000 in secret funds was channeled through Sydney Baron Associates of New York, a prominent public relations firm, then registered as agents for the South African regime, to help defeat California Senator John Tunney's reelection bid. In a 1978 election, another \$250,000 was channeled through Baron Associates to help defeat Senator Dick Clark of Iowa. The Reagan Justice Department probed these allegations, but filed no charges. Rhoodie also claimed that through Baron Associates, \$110,000 was paid in 1977 to several U.S. labor leaders to ensure their opposition to an international trade union blockade of South African shipping.

These cases indicate a serious lack of concern and interest on the part of U.S. officials (in both the Carter and Reagan administrations) in investigating, exposing, and prosecuting aggressive and illegal propaganda operations by the apartheid government

aimed at subverting U.S. institutions. This failure can only have been viewed by Pretoria as an invitation to continue to mount such operations.

It is probable that in addition to its public propaganda activities South Africa has continued its covert propaganda operations in the United States. The widely distributed television film *Shaka Zulu*, for example, was produced by the South African Broadcasting Corporation, but this was not revealed by its U.S. distributors. Similarly, the sources of funding for the film *Red Scorpion*, shot in Namibia in 1988 by U.S. producers with the aid of the South African military, remained undisclosed when the film opened in the United States in early 1989.

The increase in strident, pro-South African government groups on the religious right lobbying intensively against sanctions suggests that some might have received, but not reported, backing from the regime. Also, as the allegations about Baron Associates indicate, even when agents are registered with the Justice Department, they may not fully report funding from and activities on behalf of Pretoria.

SOUTH AFRICAN PROPAGANDA CLAIMS

The South African regime use a number of propaganda claims to promote its policies. Some examples are provided below.

Claim: Apartheid is being dismantled. Many apartheid measures have been eliminated, for example: the pass laws have been scrapped, job reservation by race has ended, and black trade unions have been legalized and may carry out strikes.

The fundamental structures of apartheid remain in place, and Pretoria's new political initiatives continue to be based on racial divisions. The black majority, 86 percent of South Africa's population of 33 million, is excluded from effective political power. The white minority, 14 percent of the population, holds 87 percent of the country's territory and a monopoly on political power. The Group Areas Act maintains residential segregation. Public education, health and other government services remain segregated. The regime continues to promote the ten fragmented "homelands," where more than half of the African population lives in 13 percent of the country's territory. And by setting up local black authorities with limited powers over their segregated areas, the white-minority government reinforces apartheid divisions by race under the name of "power-sharing."

Claim: The South African government says it is willing to negotiate with black leaders who renounce violence, or seek peaceful solutions, including the African National Congress. Imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela has been offered release from prison on these terms.

Despite these claims, for many years the South African government has refused to negotiate with non-violent organizations in South Africa opposing apartheid, and instead has outlawed them and maintained apartheid by violence and repression.

The ANC turned to armed resistance only after it was outlawed in 1960 after decades of non-violent opposition to racial oppression.

More than 2,000 people were killed in protests against apartheid that began in 1984. An estimated 30,000 people have been detained without trial at various times under the state of emergency in force since 1986, including thousands of children. Detained children, as well as adults, are victims of widespread torture and ill-treatment.³

In 1986 the government rejected a proposal by the Commonwealth's Group of Eminent Persons that all parties suspend violence in order to start negotiations. The

government continued to demand that the ANC renounce armed force while the armed forces and police would operate unchecked.

In February 1988, rather than moving toward negotiations the government shut down 17 anti-apartheid organizations, including the United Democratic Front, the nation-wide coalition mobilizing peaceful opposition to apartheid and supporting the ANC.

Some government officials have suggested that there could be negotiations if the ANC agrees to suspend armed resistance. But by the end of 1989 it has made no definite proposals, nor lifted the bans imposed on peaceful anti-apartheid organizations.

In October 1989, faced with international pressures for stronger sanctions, the government released seven compatriots of Nelson Mandela from prison without conditions. Mandela has continued to turn down the regime's conditional offer of release, refusing to forswear the ANC's right of armed resistance while the regime that created apartheid continues to maintain it through violence.

Claim: The ANC is a terrorist organization dominated by communists, and supplied and controlled by the Soviets.

For years the South African Government depicted the ANC in this light. Now, even members of the National Party have acknowledged the ANC as a leading nationalist organization and have met with ANC leaders. The ANC is a broad-based nationalist organization whose ranks include communists. Its goal, embodied in the Freedom Charter, is majority rule in democratic, nonracial, unified South Africa. Polls have shown ANC leaders to be the most popular political figures in South Africa, with support from all sectors of the black population and among some whites and if free elections were held, Nelson Mandela would be elected president. Such support indicates that the ANC's decision to resist the violence of apartheid with armed force is seen by South Africans as legitimate, not as a policy imposed from outside. The ANC has received international support from many countries and organizations.

Claim: The South African government says it is dismantling apartheid and is committed to promoting new democratic constitutional structures.

The leading organizations opposing apartheid inside South Africa are demanding one person, one vote on a common voter's roll in a united, nonracial South Africa. The South African government has repeatedly refused to accept this formulation.

In outlining the political framework it envisages, the government removes the language of apartheid from its vocabulary but continues to maintain apartheid's principles. The united South Africa with one citizenship and universal franchise it proposes by the regime would be based on racial "communities" and "population groups" divided along apartheid lines. The new united South Africa would still include 10 "homelands." The democratic structures would operate within racially based "communities," not in communities and institutions set up without reference to race. National participation and power-sharing would also be based on representation by race, in an arrangement like that in which Indians and Coloureds have separate parliaments, with whites retaining control over national decision-making. Thus, despite the new language, the racially based framework of apartheid and white domination would remain.

Behind the rhetoric about new democratic structures lies the reality of the continuing state of emergency and the strong influence of the national security apparatus in running the government, with military officials playing the central roles.

Claim: Black South Africans are better off, with higher standards of living, education, and health, than people in other African countries.

This claim is inaccurate, but also irrelevant to the reality of racism and oppression in South Africa. In no other country, rich or poor, are the great majority of the people denied their fundamental rights on the basis of race. Pretoria calculates per capita income figures by leaving out people in the homelands and rural areas and using incomes of blacks working in the modern, white-controlled economy. And in the modern sector black earnings lag far behind white earnings. The Carnegie Commission study on black poverty in South Africa, published in 1989, found that in the homelands, where more than half the black population lives, poverty and malnutrition were as widespread as in the poorest countries in Africa. On a broader measure of the "physical quality of life index," including infant mortality, literacy and education, and nutrition standards, black South Africans were estimated to be worse off than people in 20 other African countries.

Claim: Economic growth, promoted by U.S. trade and investment, will promote black advancement and help erode apartheid.

A variation of this argument is made by U.S. corporations that operate in South Africa and claim that economic growth will bring "black empowerment" and pressures to end apartheid. Yet for decades South Africa has attained impressive economic expansion and industrial development — attracting investment, trade, loans and technology from the United States, Europe and Japan — while building up the apartheid system. Whites have prospered while millions of black South Africans have been removed from white areas and forced into the homelands. Much of the development took place in strategic industries that enable South Africa to increase its self-sufficiency and military power.

Some claim that because of the increased power of black trade unions, blacks will soon be able to translate their essential role in the economy into leverage to end apartheid. But under the state of emergency black efforts to use their economic power in boycotts, strikes, and other forms of protest are met by brutal repression.

Claim: Sanctions will hurt black South Africans more than whites and therefore most black South Africans oppose them.

Sanctions are supported by major South African organizations despite the risk of prosecution by the government. And these organizations and their leaders are consistently ranked as the most popular among the black majority. In addition to the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress they include the United Democratic Front (which was banned in February 1988) the religious leaders Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Reverend Allan Boesak; the South African Council of Churches; and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). COSATU has also called for corporations to negotiate the terms of disinvestment from South Africa with the unions involved.

Claim: The South African economy can withstand sanctions, and sanctions will only harden the government's resistance to change.

Partial sanctions already in effect have had an impact. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen said in June 1989, "Sanctions have had a very major impact, I believe, on the development of new thinking in South Africa." South African finance minister Barend du Plessis acknowledged sanctions pressure when introducing his budget in March 1988, saying the economy was "hamstrung by politically motivated and internationally orchestrated restrictions that distort an optimal allocation of resources."⁴ The managing director of South Africa's Trust Bank said in

June 1988 that sanctions could cost the country R30 billion (\$15 billion) by 1990.⁵ The chairman of a major South African insurance company commented in March 1988 that "financial sanctions have undoubtedly already weakened South Africa's growth potential considerably."⁶

According to *The New York Times* (July 12, 1988), economic pressures were an important factor in Pretoria's decision to negotiate a settlement in Namibia and Angola: South African economists reported that the war was costing South Africa more than \$2 billion per year. They argued that "should the war step up, the additional burden to finance it and develop complex new equipment with which to fight it could become intolerable," and that, because the apartheid army was "stretched thin" by limits of white manpower, a major mobilization to fight in Angola "would have a devastating effect on an economy already hurt by embargoes." Clearly sanctions can move Pretoria to change its policies.

Claim: The United States depends on minerals from South Africa, and a cutoff of these because of sanctions could damage the U.S. economy and threaten national security.

These claims, promoted by the South African Chamber of Mines and the South African government, apparently influenced the U.S. State Department, when it certified 10 minerals from South Africa as strategic and therefore exempt from the U.S. sanctions imposed in 1986. This exemption was also made for 1988's comprehensive sanctions legislation after corporate lobbying and a U.S. General Accounting Office report echoed the South African arguments.

A new report by a minerals economist at the University of Zimbabwe, using South African and U.S. mining data establishes that ample alternative supplies exist for most of the minerals classed as strategic and that reasonable potential alternative sources are available for the others.⁷ The report also calls the inclusion of several of the minerals on the strategic listing, including industrial diamonds, cobalt, manganese and antimony, "blatantly ludicrous" in light of alternative sources and modest U.S. imports.

Claim: South Africa is a strategic ally of the United States and the West against Soviet expansion in Africa and threats to vital shipping lanes around the Cape.

The apartheid system is in fundamental opposition to the principles of freedom and equality for which the United States and its allies claim to stand. Some of the leaders of the National Party and architects of apartheid were interned during World War II for pro-Nazi activities, and Nazi ideology fed into the ideological roots of apartheid. Soviet activity in Africa (declining in any case in recent years) cannot be used to justify South Africa's aggression against its neighbors or its repression of its own people.

Claims about threats to the shipping route around the Cape have no substance: the thousands of miles of open ocean around the Cape are no more threatened than shipping routes in oceans the world over. Using cold war propaganda, the apartheid regime has blinded some in the U.S. to the real source of destruction and destabilization in southern Africa: its own determination to maintain apartheid at any cost.

1.

South African Propaganda in The United States

SOUTH AFRICA'S DIPLOMATIC OFFICES IN THE U.S.

The South African government's significant diplomatic presence in the U.S. provides a base for its propaganda activities. In addition to its embassy in Washington, D.C., South Africa has consulates in New York, Chicago, Beverly Hills, and Houston, and honorary consuls in Mobile, Salt Lake City, Seattle, and Phoenix. A total of 236 employees (most of them South African nationals), including 80 diplomatic officers, staff these offices according to 1988 U.S. State Department figures. (For a breakdown of personnel assigned to these offices see Appendix I.) South African Information Offices are located in the consulates in New York, Chicago, and Beverly Hills. In addition, the South African Tourism Board has offices in New York, Chicago, and Beverly Hills.

Many of the activities of these offices are propaganda-related, directly or indirectly promoting the policies of the apartheid government and opposing sanctions. In Washington, D.C., embassy officials have contact with members of the administration, other government officials, and members of Congress, as well private organizations and the news media. In other cities South African officials maintain contacts with local officials, business, civic and academic groups, and the news media.

Among key officials at the South African embassy in Washington, D.C., are representatives of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, whose activities include promotion of South African mineral sales, the country's leading export, in U.S. markets. South Africa faces increasingly strong mineral and energy sanctions, including the international oil embargo, restrictions on imports of South African uranium and coal, and U.S. legislation to impose comprehensive sanctions, which would have a serious impact on South African mineral exports. Mineral and energy officials cultivate a range of contacts with U.S. government agencies and mining and energy companies, attending meetings and conferences and visiting mines, plants, and research centers. They also arrange itineraries for South African visitors from these industries. As noted, one of

Pretoria's main propaganda claims has been the dependence of the U.S. on South African minerals.

In 1988, South Africa appointed a new religious liaison, to its U.S. Embassy, Dr. Abraham Luckhoff, to develop contacts between the South African government and local religious groups. Luckhoff is a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa who has studied in the United States.

Numerous publications are available through Pretoria's diplomatic offices including the government-produced South Africa Yearbook and South African Forum (formerly South Africa Digest), bulletins on specific issues, and glossy publications stressing South Africa's tourist attractions, economic development, and the interracial cooperation claimed by the regime. Free loan films on various propaganda themes are also distributed by South Africa's diplomatic offices, which develop mailing lists of individuals, organizations, and businesses that are sent propaganda materials on a regular basis.

Diplomatic offices also distribute materials from other sources, such as publications by the South African Forum, a South African business organization partly financed by government contracts, which has run "fact-finding" trips to South Africa for local U.S. officials.

A March 1988 mailing by South Africa's new ambassador to the United States, Pieter Koomhof, featured a 1987 article from *Forbes*, the U.S. business magazine, touting South Africa's ability to withstand sanctions. Included in the mailing, which was part of a campaign to reach 280,000 people on the embassy's U.S. mailing lists, was a questionnaire inquiring about the recipients' attitudes toward South Africa. Koomhof's accompanying letter declared that much antagonism toward South Africa "is based on the widely held misperception that my government remains committed to preserving apartheid," and noted that more than 50 discriminatory measures had been abolished since 1980. For Koomhof this was an old theme: in a speech in 1980 in Washington, D.C., he declared that "apartheid, as you know it in the United States, is dying in South Africa." Black South Africans, familiar with Koomhof's frequent assurances of dramatic changes under way when he was a cabinet member, nicknamed him "Promises."

During the Reagan 80s, South African officials and their lobbying and public relations agents could count on a receptive hearing from U.S. conservatives and conservative organizations, including Reagan administration officials and conservative members of Congress. Conservative think-tanks with ties to the Reagan administration, such as the influential Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, the Institute for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University were often receptive to Pretoria's policies and claims, and the greater conservative influence in the U.S. media during the Reagan era was to Pretoria's advantage in projecting its propaganda.

AGENTS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT

U.S. lobbying and public relations firms serve as key vehicles for disseminating propaganda in the U.S. for the South African government and South African corporate interests. These firms must register with the U.S. Justice Department and report activities on behalf of foreign principals and funds received from them. In 1988 the South African regime spent more than \$3 million for agents in the U.S., up from some \$2 million in 1985. The regime also spends approximately \$1.5 million annually for tourist promotion in the U.S., which is part of its propaganda program. South African business interests spent at least \$500,000 for U.S. agents in 1988. Also in 1988, at least \$1.5 million per year was spent for agents for surrogate forces backed by Pretoria: Unita of Angola and

Renamo of Mozambique (see below p. 14). Thus in 1988 almost \$7 million was spent in the United States promoting South Africa's interests.

Agents for the South African government who had registered with the U.S. Justice Department as of mid-1988 are listed below:

The law offices of John P. Sears have received the largest fees of the registered agents for South Africa since they were retained in 1980 — \$500,000 annually, plus expenses. John Sears was Ronald Reagan's campaign manager in the 1980 presidential election, and as a result was able to provide the apartheid regime with access to the highest level officials in the Reagan administration and Congress. In addition to arranging meetings with senators and representatives on legislation, the firm has helped prepare speeches and articles for the South African ambassador in Washington, compiled guest lists of Americans to meet South African officials at social functions, and advised South African officials on the U.S. political scene.

Philip J. Hare worked for South Africa as a partner at the Sears office focusing on legal matters before setting up his own office in April 1987. Hare is originally from South Africa. After becoming an American citizen in 1980 he continued to operate as an agent of the apartheid government. He reported receiving \$90,000 in fees and \$10,000 for expenses for a six month period in 1987 for services provided to the South African embassy, along with \$22,500 from the South African government.

Riley & Fox, Inc. became agents for the South African government in 1986 and for the South African Chamber of Mines in 1987. Riley & Fox is a successor to another of South Africa's main lobbyists, Smathers, Symington, and Herlong, originally hired in 1980 at a rate of \$330,000 in fees and expenses. The main partners in the firm were prominent Democratic party figures; after the departure of Symington in 1985 the firm became Smathers, Hickey and Riley. In 1988 Riley & Fox had a contract with the South African regime for \$405,000 per year in fees and expenses, and one with the South African Chamber of Mines for \$39,000 per year. Riley & Fox often plays an information gathering role for the apartheid regime, obtaining documentation (particularly related to sanctions and divestment) from offices in Washington and around the United States, as well as helping to arrange meetings and social functions for South African officials.

International Public Affairs Consultants, Inc. is the firm of William A. Keyes, a black American who made news when he was hired by South Africa in 1985 at a rate of \$390,000 per year in fees and expenses. Keyes, a former Reagan aide, has focused on trying to promote South Africa's ties with black Americans, particularly those interested in doing business there. Keyes is a cofounder of a conservative political action committee that contributed to the 1984 campaign of Senator Jesse Helms, a strong supporter of the South African regime. Before he was hired, Keyes traveled to South Africa as a guest of the South Africa Foundation, meeting with Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha. He has also set up trips to South Africa by black American journalists, as well as educational exchanges, and aided black South Africans with university education in the United States.

United International Consultants signed a two-year contract in 1985 with the South African government worth \$780,000 in fees and expenses. The firm was set up by Michael Hathaway and Joan Baldwin, both conservatives with long experience in Washington. They concentrate on congressional lobbying as well as fighting divestment measures at the state and local level. As a Senate aide and later a committee staff director Hathaway was a strong supporter of South Africa's claim to be an essential source of strategic minerals for the United States. Joan Baldwin was on the staff of the Senate Republican Policy Committee and also served in the Nixon administration.

In 1985, Hathaway expressed his support for the Botha regime by saying, "I want to help stop this trend of dumping on someone who's pro-U.S. and anti-Soviet."⁸ He claimed the only alternative to the Botha policies was "a bloody revolution and a Marxist dictatorship." Hathaway also warned that he would generate opposition among voters to those favoring divestment and sanctions: "There's a price to pay for attacking South Africa," he said. As lobbyists for South Africa, Hathaway and Baldwin court key congressional staff people during frequent meetings and restaurant meals, arrange meetings with Senators for South African officials, assist members of Congress in preparing speeches and provide them with material to insert in the Congressional Record, monitor the news media and counsel the South African ambassador on rebuttals.

Pearson & Pipkin, Inc., first contracted in 1985, is another new lobbying firm hired by South Africa that has close ties to the conservative New Right. Their initial contract at a rate of \$180,000 per year with \$15,000 in expenses has increased, with the 1988 contract now at \$300,000 per year and \$40,000 in expenses. Ronald Pearson is a former national board member of the conservative Young Americans for Freedom and worked as a congressional aide to two conservative Republicans. He has also served as executive director of the Conservative Victory Fund, a political action committee which helped to finance the campaigns of more than 75 conservative candidates in 1984, and Pearson & Pipkin have provided consulting services to the fund. The firm's lobbying work for South Africa has focused on the House of Representatives.

Thomas A. Bolan, a lawyer and consultant based in New York City, is chairman of the East Side Conservative Club of New York. He became an agent for South Africa in 1987, with a one-year contract through March 1988 for \$300,000 with an additional \$15,000 for expenses. In New York he arranged meetings for the South African Consulate General with news executives, journalists, and political figures (mainly conservatives), as well as with Rupert Murdoch, the international publishing magnate and owner of the Fox Television Network, and with New York State Treasurer Edward Regan, who has opposed divestment legislation in the New York State legislature.

Mary Kathleen Rothschild, a new registered agent based in Chicago, was hired in 1988 to aid the South African Consul General there in contacting local members of Congress, and state and local officials, and in promoting economic and cultural links with South Africa. Her initial contract was for \$80,000 in fees and expenses per year.

Transkei, Washington Bureau was set up several years ago in an unsuccessful bid to gain diplomatic recognition of Transkei "independence." It lobbies for U.S. economic aid and for exemption from U.S. sanctions against South Africa. Its expenses were \$550,000 for the year ending March 1988.

Namibia News Bureau was set up in 1987 by veteran Republican operatives Marion H. Smoak and Carl L. Shipley. It is apparently a successor to the U.S.-Namibia (Southwest Africa) Trade and Cultural Council, which the two operated from the early 1980s on behalf of the South African-backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). In the early 1980s Smoak and Shipley developed a "hit list" of members of Congress opposing Pretoria's policies and targeted them for election defeat.⁹ Their main effort was an unsuccessful smear campaign against Rep. Howard Wolpe of Michigan, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa. With the DTA defunct, Smoak and Shipley became agents for an organization known as Transcontinental Consultancy Ltd., which has offices in Windhoek and Johannesburg, and also in Europe, and was set up to support the South African-controlled regime in Namibia. The Namibia News Bureau received \$90,000 for fees and expenses in the last half of 1987.

AGENTS FOR UNITA AND RENAMO

Unita in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique are supported by Pretoria as surrogates in its campaign of regional aggression and destabilization. Both are represented in the United States by lobbyists and public relations firms. With backing from the Reagan administration and conservatives in Congress, Unita's heavy lobbying campaign gained Congressional approval in 1985 for "covert" U.S. military support from the Central Intelligence Agency.

Lobbying and propaganda for Unita has drawn on cold war themes in condemning Cuban support for Angola, while ignoring that Cuba's involvement came in reaction to South African aggression and minimizing the extent of Unita's dependence on the apartheid regime. Unita has been trained, armed, supplied, and shielded by South Africa's military and until the cease-fire signed in December 1988 some of the heaviest fighting was carried out by South African forces, which invaded and occupied large areas of southern Angola. One rationale for U.S. military aid to Unita was to make it less dependent on South Africa. But in fact U.S. aid strengthened Pretoria's position by promoting Unita attacks in eastern and northern Angola, where it has also attacked ANC camps. The Bush Administration has continued to provide military aid to Unita in 1989.

In Mozambique, South African support of Renamo continues despite the 1984 Nkomati Accords barring such intervention, leading to a widening pattern of terrorism and destruction. However, Renamo backers among conservatives in the United States have been unable to generate significant support in the administration or Congress for U.S. aid. A report released by the Department of State in April 1988 holding Renamo responsible for killing 100,000 civilians in Mozambique dimmed prospects of Renamo gaining official U.S. backing.

Lobbyists and public relations firms on the payroll of Unita and Renamo have been active in trying to gain support from local elected officials and church leaders. In 1987, for example, Unita representatives were able to arrange meetings with the chairman of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and with the Alabama Conference of Black Mayors.

1. Agents for Unita

Unita, U.S.A. has represented Unita in the U.S. since 1980. It also includes the **Free Angola Information Service, Inc.** and the **Free Angola Foundation**. The foreign principal of these organizations is Unita, based in southern Angola under the wing of South African forces. Whether the funds for this office have come from South Africa or other sources is uncertain. Funding for this office averaged less than \$100,000 per year in the period between 1980 and 1985, but increased to nearly \$160,000 in 1986, when Unita leader Jonas Savimbi visited Washington. Spending for lobbying and public relations reached \$355,000 in the last six months of 1986, and totaled nearly \$900,000 for 1987.

Among the companies and individuals working for Unita's Free Angola Information Service (see Appendix II) some carry out lobbying and publicity activities in Washington, including **TKC International**, congressional lobbyists (at \$300,000 per year); **Clarence McKee**, another lobbyist (paid \$87,000 in 1987); **Kenneth Barry Schochet**, legal services (paid \$78,000 in 1987); and **Griffin Communications**, publisher of Unita's *Kwacha News* (paid \$21,000 in 1987).

Other Unita agents hired through the Free Angola Information Service target promotion of Unita at the state and local level, mainly in the South. These efforts appear to have been especially concentrated in the states and districts of members of Congress serving on the intelligence committees that have approved covert funding for Unita. With

a 1987 contract of \$180,000, **Government Relations International**, which is headed by a black American clergyman, Reverend Maurice Dawkins, has tried to build up a network of support for Unita among black groups in Texas, Arizona, Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, and Mississippi. **American Expressions, Inc.**, with a 1987 contract of \$135,000, is based in Memphis, Tennessee. Two other offices, **NAP International, Inc.** and **National Media International**, based in Alexandria, Virginia, were paid \$100,000 each — apparently directly by Unita — for six months in 1987 for public relations and media consulting targeted at Texas and Oklahoma.

Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly, Inc., which has been described by *The Wall Street Journal* as “the capital’s hottest power broker” because of its close ties to the Reagan administration is a heavyweight among Unita’s lobbyists.¹⁰ The firm successfully combines lobbying, law, public relations, and campaign consulting in one office. In 1988 they had a \$600,000-per-year contract with Unita. Several principals in the firm were key operatives in the 1984 Reagan presidential campaign. Lee Atwater, one of the partners, was campaign manager for George Bush’s 1988 presidential campaign and now serves as national chairman of the Republican Party. The firm has ties to the Democratic party as well: Peter Kelly is a former Democratic party finance chairman and did fund-raising for Governor Michael Dukakis’s presidential campaign.

Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly orchestrated Jonas Savimbi’s 1986 U.S. trip, when he met with top administration officials, congressional leaders, and news media executives, and gained a reported \$15 million in covert U.S. military aid. During the first half of 1988 alone the firm reported more than 500 contacts with members of Congress on behalf of Unita. Savimbi visited the United States for a second time in June 1988, again meeting top officials, though attracting less media attention. His visit was dogged by protests organized by the American Committee on Africa and other groups that spotlighted Unita’s ties to South Africa. However, Congress was reported to be considering aid to Unita of up to \$40 million for the coming year.

2. Agents for Renamo

Thomas D. Schaff, Jr. has been registered as an agent for Renamo since 1986, operating the Mozambique Research Center in Washington, D.C. Because the public file on Schaff with the Department of Justice was not available, the extent of his funding is not known. *The New York Times*, however has reported that his office space and travel expenses are provided by Free the Eagle, Inc., a conservative lobbying group, and that he has received half of the \$72,000 contributed to Renamo between 1986 and 1988 by a conservative supporter, James U. Blachard III.¹¹ Another \$15,000 was given by Freedom, Inc., whose director, Robert V. MacKenzie, was a member of both the Rhodesian army and the South African army, where he trained Renamo members in 1980 and 1981. Schaff is a former agricultural missionary in Zimbabwe and pre-independence Rhodesia. Renamo’s U.S. representative, also a registered agent, is **Luis B. Serapiao**.

SOUTH AFRICAN BUSINESS LOBBIES IN THE U.S.

Agents for South African business in the United States emphasize their opposition to apartheid, but they stand with the regime in opposing divestment and sanctions. For decades South African business leaders have argued that economic growth will erode apartheid and that sanctions would hurt black South Africans the most. Yet the government has met internal pressures for change with escalating violence and repression culminating in the present state of emergency.

South Africa Foundation (SAF) is the most prominent South African business lobby in the United States. The SAF spent nearly \$300,000 on its office in Washington during 1987, an increase of about \$100,000 over spending in 1985 and 1986. The SAF describes itself as the diplomatic arm of South African business. Despite efforts to dissociate itself from the government, in 1986 the SAF appointed Kurt von Schimding, a career diplomat who has served as South Africa's ambassador to the United Nations, as its new director-general. The SAF has 3,300 individual members and 1,600 corporate members, but most of its R2.3 million (\$1.2 million) annual budget comes from a few top individual and corporate members.

The SAF has long maintained a high profile in Washington, its representatives lobbying congressional and administration offices, testifying at hearings, speaking to business groups and other organizations, distributing literature, and arranging "fact-finding" trips to South Africa for influential Americans. In 1987 and 1986 SAF-sponsored visitors to South Africa included a delegation of members of Congress and their spouses and aides, a senatorial staff group, a group of corporate executives, a group of black business and civic leaders, and individual academics, professionals and journalists.

SAF influence is indicated by a report in a South African magazine that John Chettle, the SAF's former Washington director, was "the most effective foreign lobbyist in Washington" and had "amassed an astonishing network of the capital's most powerful opinion-makers and officials."¹² Chettle now works with the law firm Freedman, Levy, Kroll & Simonds as agent for the South African Chamber of Mines (see below). Washington columnist Jack Anderson has reported that "South Africa Foundation representatives have had little trouble meeting big shots in the Reagan administration, including Cabinet members, high State Department officials, White House speech writers and CIA officers."¹³

Freedman, Levy, Kroll & Simonds registered in 1988 as agents for the South African Chamber of Mines, with fees of \$73,000 for the first quarter of the year, and in 1987 as agents for Unifruco, the association of South African fruit producers, in 1987 with fees of \$31,000. These accounts are handled by John Chettle, the former director of the South Africa Foundation's Washington office. To buttress its lobbying for the Chamber of Mines in opposition to sanctions against South African coal, the law firm commissioned a study by **Wharton Econometrics** and hired the New York public relations firm **Rubenstein, Wolfson & Co.** to publicize it. The Wharton study claimed that sanctions against coal had actually cost U.S. coal producers \$250 million between 1985 and 1987. An editorial headlined "Voodoo Econometrics" in the *Journal of Commerce* (May 5, 1988) spotlighted the interests behind the study, commenting:

Propaganda masquerading as a "study" by the Chamber of Mines of South Africa should earn that country's coal mining industry the loss of any standing in the current congressional debate on anti-apartheid economic sanctions....

The Chamber of Mines report sheds no light on the impact of South African coal embargoes on the U.S. coal industry. It does, however, suggest that international sanctions are bringing pressure to bear on South Africa's apartheid system. Why else—in the world of international coal trade—would South African companies hire a consulting firm to benefit their U.S. competitors?

Riley & Fox, in addition to serving as agents for the South African government (see above), were also hired by the Chamber of Mines in 1987 to aid in its campaign against sanctions, with a contract of \$39,000 per year in fees and expenses.

Southern African Forum, which gets some of its funding from services provided to the South African government, is based in Johannesburg and does not have a U.S.

office, nor is it represented in the U.S. by registered agents. It has, however, been playing an increasingly important lobbying and propaganda role: its literature is distributed in the United States by the South African embassy and consulates, and it has worked with South African diplomatic offices in setting up fact-finding trips to South Africa for U.S. state legislators and others who influence policy and public opinion. The Southern Africa Forum was set up in 1980 by its chairman, Raymond D. Ackerman, head of Pick N Pay supermarkets and a prominent South African business leader. Many of its activities are similar to those of the SAF, particularly in opposing sanctions and divestment. The Southern African Forum primarily represents Afrikaner business interests, however, while the South Africa Foundation has been backed mostly by English-speaking business leaders.

Local protest and controversy developed over a fact-finding trip to South Africa sponsored by the Forum for eight Indiana state legislators in June 1988. Opponents argued that the free trip—set up by an organization that opposes sanctions and divestment—would influence legislators considering divestment legislation.¹⁴ Protests also developed over a similar trip by Oregon legislators in 1982, since those involved were considering divestment measures.

Agents for the South African gold industry, the **International Gold Corporation, Ltd. (Intergold)** organization, based in New York, was an affiliate of the now defunct International Gold Corporation Ltd. of South Africa, the international marketing organization for the South African gold mining industry. Intergold was disbanded in 1986 and a successor, the **World Gold Council**, was formed in 1987. This organization, with an annual budget of more than \$50 million, has member companies from several countries but is under the effective control of South African mining interests, according to the newly formed World Gold Commission, which aims to promote international sanctions against South African gold sales.¹⁵ In the mid-1980s Intergold's U.S. office engaged in an extensive lobbying campaign, joined by lobbyists for the South African regime, to try to block legislation barring the sale of South Africa's Krugerrand gold coins in the United States. This effort failed when Reagan enacted the ban under congressional pressure in 1985.

The South African gold mining industry is tightly regulated by the South African regime, which handles most of its international gold bullion sales. Exports of gold account for approximately 40 percent of South Africa's annual foreign exchange earnings, making it the country's most strategic product. To finance its promotional activities in the U.S. the corporation provided large-scale funding to its affiliate in New York, amounting to \$23.2 million in 1985 and \$5.2 million in the first half of 1986. **Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Johnson & Hutchinson**, a Washington law firm, hired by Intergold's New York office to lobby against the Krugerrand ban, was paid \$393,000 between 1983 and 1985. The law firm hired **Peter Teeley**, former press secretary to Vice President George Bush, at \$5000 per month to advise Intergold, as well as the lobbying firm of former Senate sergeant-at-arms Howard Liebengood, **Gold & Liebengood**, for \$10,000 per month. During this period Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Johnson & Hutchinson donated \$20,000 to the Conservative Caucus Foundation, a major New Right organization, and Intergold also reported a \$5000 contribution to the same organization in 1986. **Rubenstein Wolfson & Co.**, a New York-based public relations firm, received payments of \$469,000 from Intergold between 1983 and 1986.

Two other Washington, D.C., firms hired as agents for South African business interests are **Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue**, who registered in 1986 as agents for the South African Sugar Association, and **Busby, Rehm, Leonard, P.C.**, who registered in 1987 as agents for the Ferro Alloy Producers Association of South Africa.

U.S. CORPORATIONS AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SANCTIONS

Divestment and selective purchasing measures, shareholder resolutions, and sanctions legislation in Congress have increased the pressure on U.S. corporations to stop doing business in South Africa. In response to these campaigns, a number of U.S. corporations in South Africa, through such organizations as the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa, the Signatory Companies to the Statement of Principles (the Sullivan Principles), and the U.S. Corporate Council on South Africa, have made high-profile public statements against apartheid. They have called for steps such as lifting the state of emergency, dismantling apartheid laws, legalizing the ANC and other banned organizations, releasing Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, and negotiations on "power-sharing" in South Africa.

Despite these statements against apartheid, however, both U.S. companies that maintain investments in South Africa and those that have sold subsidiaries there continue to oppose sanctions. Thus, on this issue the corporations are aligned with the South African government and this has helped to bolster the government's propaganda campaigns. The corporations argue that sanctions will hurt black South Africans by eliminating jobs and ending projects that assist the black community and programs under the Sullivan Principles that promote advancement of black employees. They also claim that sanctions will not mount effective pressure toward ending apartheid.

Opponents of sanctions have also argued in the name of "black empowerment" in South Africa for increased U.S. business activity there, and some black Americans have lobbied in Washington against sanctions on this basis. (see below).

1. "Withdrawal" - New Corporate Camouflage

Withdrawal from South Africa — the sale of their South African subsidiaries by U.S. corporations — has become a new maneuver many corporations use to try to camouflage their business links to South Africa. Over the past three years more than 160 U.S. corporations have sold their subsidiaries in South Africa. But despite the publicity concerning their withdrawals, virtually all of these corporations are continuing their business in South Africa through distribution and licensing agreements with their former subsidiaries. Although many of these companies justified their operations in South Africa by following the Sullivan Principles, many of those withdrawing have made no stipulation that their former subsidiaries continue the program. For the most part the terms of sale of subsidiaries have been worked out with white South African business executives, while black employees, unions, and organizations representing the black majority have no role. One response to this is an initiative by the Chemical Workers Industrial Union in South Africa calling for corporations to negotiate the terms of their withdrawal with black trade unions and then to end all business with South Africa.

2. The Signatory Companies: The Sullivan Principles Without Sullivan

For a decade the Sullivan Principles have been cited by U.S. corporations as their main justification for doing business in South Africa. But in 1987 Reverend Leon Sullivan himself announced his support for full economic sanctions against South Africa until apartheid is ended. Sullivan said that he had changed his position that after a decade's effort to use the principles to promote the elimination of apartheid, because the South African regime remained determined to resist fundamental change.¹⁶ Yet the signatory companies with subsidiaries remaining in South Africa, numbering 82 at the end of 1988, have continued to claim that the principles are effective and to oppose sanctions.

Even in terms of their main objectives of promoting equality in the workplace the principles have had only a limited impact. Although training and advancement of black employees have increased in the corporations that follow the principles, higher level supervisory, management, and executive positions remain largely filled by whites. Community assistance efforts are overshadowed by the vast inequities of apartheid. In 1985 and 1986 Reverend Sullivan called on the signatory companies to carry out "corporate civil disobedience" against apartheid. The response was slight and the "disobedience" mainly limited to sponsoring advertisements and meetings with officials to call for an end to apartheid and the state of emergency.

The principles have failed to confront the most important aspects of corporate ties to apartheid. For example, a recent study found that between 1977 and 1985 U.S. corporations paid at least 50 times more in taxes to the South African government than they spent for programs under the Sullivan Principles.¹⁷ With the state of emergency in force since 1986, apartheid rule is directly maintained by the violence and repression of the military and police forces; but U.S. corporations continue to supply the regime with strategic products such as computers and other high-tech equipment, oil and other petroleum products, and motor vehicles. And South African security laws can compel U.S. corporations located in South Africa to set up militias and secretly to supply goods and services to military, police, and arms manufacturing agencies.

3. Shell Oil's Neptune Strategy and "Post Apartheid" South Africa

One argument corporations use in opposing sanctions is that economic growth will help to erode apartheid and that what is needed, rather than the negative pressure of sanctions, is planning for a "post apartheid" society. This claim ignores the pattern of economic development under apartheid, which has increased the prosperity of the white minority and the military and strategic power of the regime. It also fails to spell out how this erosion will take place under a regime determined to maintain control by force, as evidenced by the state of emergency that has been in force since June 1986.

The most prominent example of the "post apartheid" approach is the secret plan known as the Neptune Strategy launched by Royal Dutch/Shell Company's consultants, Pagan International of Washington, D.C., to try to defuse the international boycott of Shell over its strategic role in South Africa. Pagan International is a consulting firm that specializes in helping corporations bolster their images in the face of international protests. A 256 page Pagan report describing the Neptune plan was obtained by the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility in 1987.¹⁸

The focus of the Neptune Strategy is the attempt to justify Shell's role in South Africa by claiming that the corporation's operations there are necessary to train black managers, entrepreneurs, and technicians for "post apartheid" South Africa. In order to weaken the boycott, Pagan launched a major program to engage anti-apartheid groups and other organizations in "post apartheid" planning designed to divert attention from boycott and divestment efforts toward "productive channels." Pagan operatives set up contacts with a variety of organizations, particularly church bodies, in an effort to turn them away from support for the boycott. Among those contacted were the Church of England, the Dutch Council of Churches, and U.S. church leaders.

The Neptune plan also called for creating an "ombudsman" to function as an intermediary between Shell and organized labor to calm protests and explore points of mutual concern, with the goal of weakening union support for the Shell boycott. Universities were another target, with "post apartheid" programs that Shell would help finance proposed for the University of Notre Dame and Georgia Institute of Technology.

Negotiations for the Shell-sponsored Institute for the Study of Post-Apartheid Problems at Notre Dame in 1988 met with protest on the campus.

The Neptune plan included an operation to gather "intelligence" about Shell boycott supporters, directed by a Pagan staff member Arion Pattakos, formerly an analyst with the U.S. Defense Department. Pagan arranged to have agents pose as reporters to interview boycott activists and collect information on the "personal characteristics" of boycott leaders.

Pagan was also involved in setting up the "International Conference on South Africa in Transition" in 1987, again with a "post-apartheid" focus, hosted by the Baruch Business School of the City University of New York. The conference program listed participants from major corporations, including Shell, Mobil Oil, Ford Motor Co., R.J.R.-Nabisco, E. I. Du Pont, Colgate-Palmolive, and Monsanto; South African officials, academics, and trade unionists; and U.S. organizations, including those supporting the Shell boycott and divestment. But when the role of Pagan and Shell in promoting the conference was exposed, many participants from South Africa and the U.S. withdrew.

4. Corporate Lobbying Against Sanctions

When legislation for comprehensive sanctions against South Africa was pending in Congress in 1988, including the Wise amendment to prohibit federal oil, gas, and coal leases to oil companies doing business in South Africa, a coalition of U.S. corporations launched a major lobbying drive to oppose sanctions. The corporate coalition was formed by the Washington, D.C.-based National Foreign Trade Council, and solicited contributions of \$5000 each from corporate supporters. About 20 corporations were among the initial supporters, including Union Carbide, Chevron, Texaco, Mobil, Dresser Industries, Johnson & Johnson, CBI Industries, Combustion Engineering, and Caterpillar Tractor.

At a fee of \$150,000 plus \$75,000 in expenses for six months, the coalition hired former Indiana Senator Birch Bayh, a liberal Democrat and partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm Rivkin, Radler, Dunner and Bayh, to lead the lobbying in Congress. Bayh said his efforts would aim to show that U.S. corporations don't support apartheid, that "many are on the cutting edge of reform," and have been "standing up to the regime."¹⁹ Robert Taft, an Ohio Republican with the firm of Taft, Stettinius and Hollister, lobbied against sanctions for a New York company importing aluminum products from South Africa.

Representatives from several corporations, including Sal G. Marzullo, a Mobil executive and chairman of the Industry Support Unit of the signatory companies (the 82 U.S. corporations in South Africa backing the Sullivan Principles), joined in opposing new sanctions at hearings in June 1988 before the Senate Subcommittee on Africa. Marzullo reiterated the themes U.S. corporations put forth to support continued business in South Africa, arguing they help "empower black South Africans" for "long-term political change" and also warning of the "danger of a bloody revolution that destroys everything of value."²⁰ But while citing corporate appeals to the regime to remove apartheid and negotiate with black leaders, Marzullo gave no indication of how the corporations would promote "long-term change" when leading anti-apartheid organizations are effectively outlawed and the state of emergency continues.

5. Shell Leads the Lobbying Against Oil Sanctions

In 1988 oil industry giants, led by Shell, mobilized their most intense lobbying efforts against the Wise oil sanctions amendment to the Senate sanctions bill. Shell claimed that it might forgo business in the U.S. rather than cut its South Africa ties and

that this could cost the United States 10,000 jobs and a loss of 90 million barrels of oil. Shell hired the firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Haurer and Feld, whose partner Robert Strauss is former national chairman of the Democratic party. According to one congressional aide, Shell "lobbied like crazy" against the measure.²¹ Mobil recruited William Coleman, secretary of transportation in the Ford administration and a prominent black lawyer with the firm of O'Melveny & Myers in Washington, D.C., to testify and lobby against the measure. The British embassy wrote to key members of Congress warning that if sanctions affected British companies (Shell and British Petroleum), Britain would bar U.S. oil companies from North Sea oil leases.

In October 1988 it was revealed that Caltex Petroleum, a joint operation of Texaco and Chevron that operates in South Africa, had spent at least \$30,000 to pay for a trip to the United States by Zulu chief Gatsha Buthelezi, a well-known opponent of sanctions.²² Buthelezi gave one speech in Cleveland in August but his other engagements were canceled.

The oil companies' efforts succeeded in August when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee excluded the Wise amendment from the sanctions bill. Although the comprehensive sanctions bill was passed by the House of Representatives, the Senate bill was not brought to a vote in 1988 because of conservative opposition.

6. "Black Empowerment" as an Argument Against Sanctions

"Black empowerment" arguments against sanctions and disinvestment are being promoted by several organizations and lobbyists. They claim that sanctions will hurt black South Africans the most and the best way to eliminate apartheid is to aid black education and economic development projects. The most prominent supporter of this rationale is the **Coalition on Southern Africa (COSA)**, a group of "black religious leaders, businessmen and educators...", founded to, in their own words, provide an independent base of private support for South Africa's majority population and to help foster a democratic, non-racial post-apartheid South Africa.

COSA opposes sanctions and disinvestment as "counterproductive" to ending apartheid and has made its views known in letters to President Reagan and the members of Congress.

The South African *Financial Mail* and columnist Jack Anderson reported that COSA was the brainchild of Raphael Pagan, founder of Pagan International, which developed Shell Oil's Neptune Strategy (see above), and Robert Brown, a black public relations executive from North Carolina, whose clients include companies doing business in South Africa. In 1988, Brown angered many South Africans by claiming he had power of attorney to represent the name of imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela.

COSA has been a major project of Mobil executive Sal Marzullo. Anderson and the *Financial Mail* reported Marzullo raised \$1.2 million for COSA from corporations like Mobil, Control Data, Combustion Engineering, Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer and Caltex. According to the *Financial Mail*, COSA's aim was "to fund black political organizations in Soweto and other urban centers with the emphasis on finding leaders and groups who could serve as an alternative to the ANC." The paper alleged that only 5 percent of the funds targeted for black empowerment projects actually made it to South Africa. The rest allegedly went to consulting fees in the U.S.

J. Morgan Hodges, executive director of a company called Chris/Mor Productions in Washington, D.C., sent a 10-minute videotape to members of Congress in June 1988 with a letter identifying himself as a black American opposed to sanctions. Hodges registered in 1988 with Congress as a paid lobbyist but did not indicate the source of his funding. In his letter he claimed to be a lifelong registered Democrat who had traveled

to South Africa to gain information and found that most black South Africans oppose sanctions. The video included statements by Gatsha Buthelezi and others opposing sanctions, and the letter promised a second video, "Black Businessmen Speak Out," also opposing sanctions.

Operation Heartbreak. In June 1988 a group of black children from a local Washington, D.C. school distributed 858 black dolls to all Congressional offices and the White House as part of a campaign called Operation Heartbreak that was designed to seek aid for South African children hurt by "U.S. sanctions, ANC manipulation and/or South African government entrenchment."²³ Contacted afterward, officials at the school indicated that they had not realized that their students were being used in an antisandictions lobbying campaign. The organizers of Operation Heartbreak have not been identified.

THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT

The religious right in the United States has become one of the most prominent and influential sources of support for the South African regime and its policies. While conservative religious groups have denied receiving direct support from the South African government, the message they present echoes positions proclaimed by Pretoria. In some cases leaders of groups on the religious right have traveled to South Africa as guests of the South African Tourist Board or South African Airways. An article in the *San Francisco Examiner* in 1986 described how U.S. fundamentalists are "courted by Pretoria's public-opinion airlift":

South Africa and its supporters are waging a campaign to influence U.S. public opinion by flying fundamentalist Christian leaders and their congregations to South Africa. Also under way is a drive to bring people from Christian broadcasting networks to South Africa, and to aid them in producing segments favorable to the government.

The media effort has continued even after state-of-emergency restraints have vastly limited access for foreign as well as South African journalists. Taken together, the outreach campaign reflects the hope that while unlikely to sway majority opinion in the United States against apartheid, South Africa might generate a more vocal grass-roots lobby in the United States for its policies.²⁴

An official at the South African Embassy in Washington, D.C. acknowledged that South African Airways, "out of their own initiative," has always invited people on public relations tours, and that recently, they have specifically targeted a number of evangelicals in that regard. "These people are inherently conservative and agree with many of the approaches we have in South Africa. This is a healthy point of departure. People go to South Africa as Christians with a healthy desire to find out how they can help us out. That's a touchstone."²⁵ The official indicated that this new trend was sparked by a trip to South Africa by Reverend Jerry Falwell in 1985; after his return Falwell encouraged other evangelicals to go there also.

The evangelical movement in the U.S. has two branches: fundamentalists, such as Falwell, who believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible, and pentacostals, who believe in redemption through possession by the holy spirit. Despite doctrinal differences, however, these groups have shared a supportive attitude toward the South African regime and a commitment to influencing U.S. policies. Many of the publications and video materials they distribute call for their supporters to lobby Congress and the administration to oppose sanctions, to support the policies of the South African regime, and to condemn the ANC and the UDF as agents of communism and instigators of violence

and terrorism. In addition to campaigning in the United States, some evangelical groups have set up offices in South Africa or supported South African organizations that follow their doctrines.

The images of several leaders of the religious right have recently been tarnished by scandals, and their impact on the U.S. political scene has been reduced. Nonetheless, evangelical organizations continue to have a strong base of followers who can be mobilized to support their campaigns on South Africa.

1. South African Government Backs Conservative Black Religious Groups

In order to attract support from evangelical churches in the United States and in other countries, and to deflect criticism from the mainstream churches, the South African regime has promoted **Bishop Isaac Mokoena** of the **Reformed Independent Church Association** in South Africa. He is the only black South African to be awarded the Decoration of Meritorious Service by the South African government. Although he has claimed to represent 4.5 million black South Africans, a South African academic authority on independent churches says, "Bishop Mokoena is talking nonsense by claiming he can speak in behalf of four million blacks in South Africa. He represents only a small group of a few thousand."²⁶

Nonetheless, Mokoena has attracted wide attention in the United States. In 1986 and 1987 he was introduced to the evangelical movement at the annual conventions of the National Association of Religious Broadcasters (NAB), whose affiliated networks cover the United States and reach around the world by satellite. Bishop Mokoena told the press at the 1986 convention that he opposed sanctions against South Africa, saying, "I have come to appeal to you to speak to your Congressman, speak to your Senator, ask him to offer some words of encouragement to the President of the United States to step up investments, not only within the present areas of South Africa, but also in the homelands." The message evidently reached the White House, with President Reagan referring to the bishop in a news conference in August 1986: "I don't know whether I pronounce his name right, but he's the leader of some 4.5 million Christians there and all of them are deadly, deadly opposed to sanctions."²⁷

In August 1988 the newly formed **National Christian Development Fund of South Africa**, a conservative black religious group announced a campaign against U.S. sanctions. The goal of the campaign is to get signatures from one million South Africans, mainly blacks, on petitions against sanctions and divestment, to deliver to the U.S. Congress. The fund also announced plans for a 10-day advertising campaign in the U.S. to air a 45-second television advertisement opposing sanctions and divestment. The campaign would cost \$2 million and would be cosponsored by another black conservative group, **Jesus Christ for Peace in South Africa**.²⁸ The source of funds for these projects has not been revealed.

2. The Religious Right and South Africa

The individuals and organizations noted below have supported policies of the South African government and its propaganda efforts in the United States.

Jerry Falwell traveled to South Africa in mid-1985 at a time of widening protest and repression when pressure in the United States for sanctions was increasing. Falwell's reaction was to call Bishop Desmond Tutu, who had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, "a phony" (a comment he retracted after getting heavy criticism) and to urge that Americans support South Africa by buying Krugerrands. Falwell claimed that during his visit no black South African he met had advocated using sanctions or other financial pressures for reform. He also sent out a fund-raising appeal for his Moral

Majority organization stating: "Communist terrorists are openly threatening to kill me and my family because of my campaign to prevent the Soviet Union from taking over the vital sea lanes and naval bases of South Africa."²⁹

Jimmy Swaggart, described as the most popular American evangelist in South Africa, has set up an office in South Africa and a store selling his pamphlets, tapes, and records. His shows have been carried widely by the government-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) television. He also helped to fund a new Assembly of God Bible college near Cape Town, which was granted a charter by the government only after the director signed a statement denouncing the World Council of Churches. Swaggart described South Africa as being reviled around the world because it is so godly. A group of black evangelicals in South Africa, reacting against Swaggart and other American evangelicals, has said that such leaders "come here to South Africa in the midst of our suffering and pain, even unto death, and announce that apartheid is dead."³⁰

National Association of Religious Broadcasters (NRB). The South African Tourist Board (Satour), the government's tourism agency, had a booth at the convention of the National Association of Religious Broadcasters in 1986 and 1987, inviting participants to visit South Africa. A delegation from the NRB traveled to South Africa at the invitation of a group of South African religious broadcasters, with expenses paid by "an anonymous group of South African businessmen."³¹ On the trip they interviewed Chief Gatscha Buthelezi and Bishop Mokoena.

Full Gospel Businessmen's Fellowship International, which funds religious networks, has promoted other NRB trips to South Africa with assistance from the South African Tourism Corporation. The trips were publicized on Christian television stations around the United States by a 30 minute video on South Africa. The close ties of the Full Gospel Businessmen to the Reagan administration provided an added benefit to the South African government.

Pat Robertson, another prominent television evangelist whose failed bid for the Republican party nomination for President in 1988 showed the limits of the national appeal of the religious right, has also developed close ties with South Africa. Robertson was close to the Reagan administration and is reportedly a personal friend of former National Security Council staff member Oliver North. During a meeting with George Bush in December 1988 Robertson appealed to the president-elect to tell the South African regime that he was pleased with its progress in ending apartheid. According to *The Citizen* of South Africa (December 3, 1988), Robertson set up a television station to carry his Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) in Bophuthatswana, a black "homeland" in South Africa, which would only have been possible with the permission of the South African government. Three progovernment black South Africans appeared on Robertson's **700 Club** television program in the United States in 1986, and South Africa has its own branch of the **700 Club** for Afrikaners. Robertson has also backed South Africa's regional policies, beaming his CBN signal to Namibia and sending a video team into Mozambique with a commando unit from South African-backed Renamo.

Trinity Broadcasting Network, based in California, has been given permission to set up a television station in South Africa, in the Ciskei homeland, with arrangements assisted by the South African "ambassador" to Ciskei. Trinity has hosted members of the cabinet of Ciskei, who traveled to southern California to appear on the network.

Biblical News Service (David Balsiger). In 1987 Biblical News Service (BNS) produced 525,000 free copies of a special issue of its *Family Protection Scoreboard* magazine entitled "South Africa: A Nation on Trial." Sent to various public figures around the United States, including members of Congress, federal officials, mayors,

black elected officials, newspaper editors, religious leaders, and local pastors, the issue contains a series of articles supporting South Africa's policies and describing the ANC, the United Democratic Front, and the South African Council of Churches as supporters of communism, Marxism, violence and terrorism backed by the Soviet Union. An editorial by publisher David W. Balsiger denies that the magazine is a "lackey" for the South African government and claims that it does not support "institutionalized apartheid"; the magazine is billed as "educational and non-partisan."

The magazine suggests a number of responses to "South Africa-bashing" in the United States, and offers various possibilities, including tours to South Africa; free subscriptions to the South African Digest put out by the South African Bureau of Information; nine films and videos on South Africa, including five produced by the South African government; a speakers bureau; and free copies of the magazine for public leaders in areas "where sanctions, divestment, or disinvestment are being debated."

While there is no indication in the magazine of how its estimated \$300,000 production costs were funded, some funds were evidently provided by the South African Tourism Board, whose centerfold insert describing trips to South Africa, with a sweepstakes offering a free trip, is the only advertising. A 1988 issue of the *Scoreboard* on the presidential campaign was distributed with a press release disavowing former links with the Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church, which suggests that the Unification Church could have been a source of funding in 1987 when the South Africa issue appeared. The press release also stated that the campaign issue, produced by Balsiger's National Citizens Action Network (see below), had been supported by Mott Media, a religious textbook publisher.³²

Balsiger has made trips to South Africa, Namibia, and the area of southern Angola that has been occupied by South African-backed Unita forces. He has indicated that one of the trips was financed by the South African Foreign Affairs Department.³³ All but four of the 26 writers contributing to the *Scoreboard* had also traveled to South Africa.

RAMBOC (David Balsiger). David Balsiger has listed himself as president and founder of RAMBOC (Restore a More Benelovent Order Coalition), a right-wing coalition that claims to include "275 U.S. national and regional educational, ethnic, public affairs, religious and veterans organizations reaching more than 40 million Americans." (None of the organizations are identified.) The mailing of the *Scoreboard* on South Africa was done by RAMBOC; its address is a post office box in Costa Mesa, California.

National Citizens Action Network (David Balsiger) Yet another organization set up by David Balsiger, who is listed as its founder-president, the National Citizens Action Network sent a mailing in June 1988 to members of Congress opposing the Dellums comprehensive sanctions bill. The mailing argued that comprehensive sanctions would hurt black South Africans and included *Listen to Our Voices*, a 12 minute video, that featured interviews with black South Africans opposed to sanctions. The letter claimed that the organization "networks with nearly 300 national and regional educational, ethnic, political, public affairs, religious and veterans' organizations" (again, none identified) and that it shipped \$250,000 in seeds and baby food to South Africa for distribution in "75 black townships hit hardest by sanctions and disinvestment." But major organizations providing aid to black areas in South Africa, such as Catholic Relief Services and the South African Council of Churches, have reported that they have not heard of Balsiger's group or any such relief work.³⁴ The National Citizens Action Network has headquarters in Washington, D.C. (a post office box address) and an office

(also a post office box address) in Costa Mesa, California. The organization has indicated that it has received support from a religious textbook publisher, Mott Media.

About My Fathers Business, based in Kentucky, has been distributing free copies of a video tape called *The ANC - A Time for Candor*, which is also offered by the Biblical News Service. The video focuses on two scenes filmed by television news cameras, the burning of a girl and the killing of a soldier from Ciskei by angry crowds in African townships, along with interviews with a South African, Craig Williamson. The video lays responsibility for the gruesome violence on the ANC, without indicating that the incidents took place at emotionally charged funerals for victims of government forces, nor that Williamson was until recently a major in the South African Security Police, serving as a spy and head of anti-ANC operations.³⁵ A booklet and action kit accompanying the video urges viewers to write to senators, representatives, and newspaper editors asking them to watch the video and express outrage over the 1987 meeting between ANC President Oliver Tambo with Secretary of State George Shultz. An issue of *Clarion Call*, a publication put out in South Africa by Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha organization is also included. By June 1987 10,000 copies of the video, offered through a toll-free telephone number, had been distributed. There is no indication how this video was made or funded.

Lawrence Patterson, a conservative financial adviser based in Cincinnati, Ohio, circulated copies of the *Family Protection Scoreboard* issue on South Africa, which includes an article by him. Patterson warned readers of plans by the ANC "to set up cells right here in the United States — maybe in your hometown!" and alerted them to the need to "save our friends in South Africa from domination by a Trilateral-Soviet conspiracy."

The McAlvany Intelligence Adviser, a newsletter, edited by Donald S. McAlvany in Denver, Colorado, offers analyses of "global economic, monetary and geo-political trends which impact the gold and precious metals markets and is explicitly Christian, conservative and free market in perspective." The issue of July 1986 is devoted to the theme of "Revolution and Betrayal: The Accelerating Onslaught Against South Africa." The newsletter suggests that readers "first get mad" and then write members of Congress and the administration to "protest our sellout of South Africa." The newsletter suggests various material for further reference, starting with a booklet on the ANC put out by the South African regime, and including publications by conservative groups in South Africa. McAlvany, who says in his newsletter that he has traveled to South Africa more than 20 times in recent years, was cited in an Associated Press report of July 14, 1988 from South Africa as having suggested in a speech during a visit there that Archbishop Desmond Tutu be eliminated, a statement that he subsequently retracted.

Council on Southern Africa. The McAlvany newsletter mentions that this organization, set up by McAlvany, was producing a documentary film based on his trips to South Africa, Namibia, Ciskei, and Angola. The council was also said to be organizing a trip to South Africa for 60 business and political leaders in cooperation with the Conservative Caucus, a leading U.S. conservative organization.

TOURISM PROMOTION

Tourism promotion is the responsibility of the **South African Tourism Board (Satour)**, a government agency, which maintains offices in 14 countries, including three in the United States, in New York, Chicago, and Beverly Hills. Tourism advertising and

promotion give the apartheid regime an opportunity to convey a positive, friendly image of South Africa, emphasizing attractions such as game parks and beaches.

Satour cooperates with the South African embassy, consulates, and lobbyists in arranging tours, often free, for politically important groups, such as members of Congress, state and local officials, business organizations, and also groups on the religious right. Satour also maintains a Congress Bureau to help attract business and professional conventions, fairs, and meetings to South Africa, an operation that promotes trade and investment as well as tourism.

In November 1986 the South African government launched a \$1 million, one month tourism campaign in the United States with a specifically political message to "come see for yourself" that things are not so bad in South Africa, despite press reports about the state of emergency. Satour's U.S. representative Peter Celliers claimed the expensive campaign, which also offered discounted prices, was needed to combat "unbalanced media reports."³⁶

Tourism's political importance is closely tied to its economic importance. According to Celliers, tourism has been South Africa's third largest generator of foreign exchange. Although precise figures on foreign tourism spending were unavailable, in 1985, using Cellier's figures, spending by international and domestic tourists was approximately \$450 million, and the industry employed 500,000 people.

The November 1986 promotion campaign was prompted by declines in foreign tourists of 10 percent in 1985 and 35 percent in 1986, indicating that tourism to South Africa had been significantly hurt by the state of emergency. Total foreign tourists reached a high of 730,000 in 1975 before the Soweto uprising, climbed back over 700,000 in 1980 and 1981, but by 1986 had fallen below 300,000. More than 70,000 tourists from the U.S. went to South Africa in 1984, but this fell by 25 percent in 1985 and the decline continued in 1986.

The November tourism campaign used full-page advertisements run three to five times in newspapers in 14 major U.S. cities, as well as three insertions in a number of national weekly magazines. It aimed to attract nature enthusiasts in the 24-35 and 55-and-over age groups by claiming that they could see natural attractions and avoid areas of "contention." The ad campaign was put together by the Johannesburg office of **Saatchi & Saatchi Compton Worldwide**, which is based in London.

In another 1986 promotional effort, Satour sponsored a trip to South Africa by 60 U.S. travel agents, picking up some of the group's expenses. Satour officials hoped the travel agents would "tell their customers back home that U.S. press reports of South African violence are exaggerated and that it's safe — and fun — to vacation here." However, a visiting U.S. reporter commenting on the promotional tour found many white South Africans "obsessed by the unrest," talking of leaving the country, and fearful of the future, with one woman expecting "a bloodbath and a mass exodus" and others dismayed at the extent of press restrictions.³⁷

Satour's budget for U.S. tourist promotion in 1985 was \$1.5 million, and its activities included representing South Africa at governmental, business, and social functions and promoting tourism to South Africa through films, slides, newsletters, radio and television. Eleven free films on South Africa were distributed in the U.S. on behalf of Satour and the South African embassy and its consulates by **Public Service Audience Planners, Inc.** of the U.S., which was paid \$88,000 for its services in 1985.

In addition to its own offices in the United States, Satour has also hired Peter Celliers of **Ellis Associates** in New York, who was paid \$77,000 for his work in 1987, to assist with its promotions. Celliers is registered with the U.S. Justice Department as an agent for Satour. His work focuses on U.S. journalists, mainly in travel, nature, and

hunting, but in other fields as well. Celliers' activities on behalf of Satour in 1987 included scores of contacts with journalists, editors, and media and business organizations. In this capacity he was involved in screening tourism and travel related journalists and photographers seeking Satour's assistance for travel to South Africa. In the last half of 1987 alone Satour sponsored or assisted 21 U.S. journalists making trips to South Africa, the most prominent being contributors to major nature publications such as *Audubon*, *International Wildlife*, and *National Geographic*. Such coverage, which highlights natural attractions and avoids political issues, attracts tourists and brings favorable images of South Africa to millions of readers.

CULTURE, ENTERTAINMENT, AND SPORTS

The South African government promotes and publicizes culture, entertainment, and sports contacts to try to project favorable images of the country, convey propaganda themes, and gain international acceptance and legitimacy. Because of the pressures of international protest and boycotts, the apartheid government usually cannot directly promote contacts and events, but instead supports them in other ways, providing subsidies for sports organizations that endorse government policies, for example, and providing tax refunds for businesses sponsoring events with participants from overseas.

The South African regime has recently been successful in producing films for international distribution, and attracting U.S. film producers to South Africa as a location for shooting films, which in turn brings U.S. actors and crews to the country.

Many artists, entertainers, and athletes support the cultural and sports boycott of apartheid, refusing to perform or compete in South Africa while apartheid continues. Nor will many cultural and sports organizations in the United States invite participation by government-sponsored organizations or individuals from South Africa who have not rejected links with apartheid. The boycott has thus denied the apartheid government propaganda opportunities and has been an important source of pressure for the elimination of apartheid.

1. Feature Films

Red Scorpion was filmed in Namibia by U.S.-based producers with the assistance of the South African Defense Force. Reports in the United States in January 1988 about the making of *Red Scorpion* led to immediate protest.³⁸ Loosely based on the career of Jonas Savimbi, leader of the South African-backed Unita forces in Angola, *Red Scorpion* was shot using tanks, trucks, jeeps, mortars, and troops supplied by the South African Defense Force. In addition the producers hired two active-duty South African army officers as consultants and used the studios of a South African army media center in Windhoek.

Red Scorpion was produced by a company called Moonrose Productions, headed by Jack Abramoff, who is also executive chairman of the International Freedom Foundation, a conservative organization, that has an office in Washington, D.C. and in South Africa and Israel as well. The Iran-contra hearings disclosed that Abramoff had had regular meetings with Colonel Oliver North when North served on the National Security Council staff.³⁹ In 1987 the foundation placed an advertisement in the conservative *Washington Times* criticizing the visit of ANC president Oliver Tambo to Washington to meet Secretary of State George Shultz.

Asked whether in addition to providing the assistance of its military forces the South African government had invested in the film, Abramoff said only that funds had come from "normal film investors." The reported \$8 million budget is low by current

U.S. standards, an indication of the extent of the support extended by the South African military. The producers discussed distribution rights with Warner Brothers, the major U.S. media multinational, which claimed that it had "declined to be involved even before they decided to shoot in Namibia." The film was distributed in 1989 by Shapiro Glikenhaus Entertainment.⁴⁰

In the film the Swedish actor Dolph Lundgren, who has been based in the U.S., plays a Soviet agent sent to assassinate the Savimbi figure, played by a South African actor; other leading roles are played by actors from the U.S. The film was written by an American, Arnie Rosen, and directed by another American, Joe Zito.

Red Scorpion has drawn strong protests. Theo Ben-Guirab, SWAPO's United Nations representative, called for the film to be "condemned, boycotted, and black-listed." Randall Robinson, executive director of TransAfrica in Washington, D.C., said: "That this propaganda film would come to the American screen as legitimate entertainment is shocking." Arthur Ashe, co-chairman of Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid, stated, "We would oppose any participation by an American, especially a black American, in a film project in which the South African government is a part. If you have part of the South African Army as extras, its hard to see the film as anything less than an endorsement of South Africa's policies."

Shaka Zulu produced in South Africa by the government-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was widely distributed in the United States, despite many protests. Aired as a 10-hour miniseries on television stations in more than 30 cities around the U.S. in 1986 and 1987 and accompanied by heavy advertising and promotion, the film presents a violent, primitive picture of the 19th century Zulu leader.

Shaka Zulu has been distributed in the United States by Harmony Gold, a new company based in Los Angeles, which made a considerable effort to hide the film's links to the South African regime. When the miniseries was being broadcast, the distributor provided "study guides" for use in schools. *Shaka Zulu's* ties to the apartheid regime and the project's goals were made explicit by a member of the South African parliament in 1984 when the \$24 million film went into production:

Even at this early stage, however, so much interest is being shown in the project that all indications are that it will be financially profitable. I think the most important statement that should be made here is that it could also place South Africa in the forefront of the international film industry. It is with regard to this aspect that I want to pay tribute to the SABC, This is probably going to be its biggest attempt up to now, and it is also an attempt which means a great deal to South Africa, especially as far as its image abroad is concerned. The presentation of such a film as a product of South African television could also be successful abroad, I believe.⁴¹

When protests arose in the United States over the film, Harmony Gold's chief executive, Frank Agrama, claimed that his company had actually supplied most of the funding. Yet a brochure put out to promote the miniseries in the United States stated that it was "produced by SABC-TV" and was prepared in South Africa. An advertisement for the film in a London trade publication carried the SABC-TV label and logo and the address, telephone, and telex for its Broadcasting Centre in Johannesburg.⁴² The film is among the South African films being distributed in the U.S. by Modern Talking Picture Service, Inc., (see below).

The airing of *Shaka Zulu* led to protests in several U.S. cities, including Los Angeles, Detroit, and St. Louis, where two demonstrators were arrested in front of the offices of the television station showing the film.

Modern Talking Pictures Service, Inc., based in New York City and Florham Park, New Jersey, is registered with the U.S. Department of Justice as an agent for Global News Service of Johannesburg, which has been identified as receiving funds from the SABC. Modern Talking Pictures is registered as an agent for a number of foreign governments in addition to South Africa. It describes itself as "the world's largest distributor of free-loan audio-visual material and distributor of sponsored films," which reach two million U.S. audiences. In addition to *Shaka Zulu*, Modern Talking Pictures Service distributes other South African films from Global News Service of Johannesburg, including: **White Gold**, **Reed Dance**, **Rourke's Drift Mission**, **The Rich on Safari**, **Africa's Miracle Eye Doctors**, **Operation Hunger**, and **Kimberley's Past Relived**. These films convey the images of the country that the South African regime prefers the world to see: adventure films feature tourist attractions; historical films give the perspective of European settlers which emphasize African tribalism, and documentaries show humanitarian projects to aid Africans.

Promoting Film Production in South Africa. Under a front-page headline "South African Pic Boom Is No Secret — Moral Stigma is Weaker Than Lure of Coin" an article in *Variety*, the U.S. entertainment industry newspaper, of June 22, 1988 declared:

Nobody likes to admit it, but independent film production is booming in South Africa. The reason is simple: the government there has made it very profitable for wealthy South Africans to invest in filmmaking, which, in turn, has created a sizeable pool of ready financing.

Thus, despite the United Nations' cultural boycott, the U.S. trade sanctions and the moral stigma associated with doing business in South Africa, the lure of relatively easy financing has proved too tempting for many producers to resist.

The article noted various U.S. film companies involved in projects in South Africa: **The Cannon Group** has made several films in South Africa: **Going Bananas**, **American Ninja**, **Journey to the Center of the Earth**, and **Mercenary Fighters**. Cannon International also distributes four other films made in South Africa by producer Harry Alan Towers: **Platoon Leader**, **Gor**, **Dragonard**, and **Master of Dragonard Hill**. Avi Lerner, who handles Cannon's business in South Africa, when asked how the films were financed, said, "I cannot tell you this. We don't want the whole world to know how we finance pictures, otherwise we'll have too much competition."

Toron Films, also heavily involved in film production in South Africa, is reportedly owned by Sol Kerzner, described as "Mr. Big" in South Africa, who has investments in the Sun City resort-casino in Bophuthatswana and other gambling casinos and hotels in the homelands. Toron has been involved in **Act of Piracy**, **Options**, and **Steel Dawn**, which was shot in Namibia.

Cue Films has shot **Murphy's Fault**, and **Scavengers** in South Africa, which were released by Triax Entertainment. The company may have made two other films in South Africa, but declined to mention titles. An executive commented, "Titles of films are an embarrassment for us and to disclose them may jeopardize sales." **Lars International Pictures** was filming **Nukie** in South Africa in June 1988. In addition to **Platoon Leader** for Cannon, **Breton Films**, Harry Alan Tower's company, has produced **Skeleton Coast** and **River of Death** in South Africa. **BSB Entertainment** produced **Committed** and **Bottoms Up** in South Africa, and **Avatar Film Corp.** produced **The Crystal Eye** in South Africa.

While many of these films were apparently shot in South Africa mainly for financial reasons, they created significant links for apartheid South Africa with the U.S.

film industry and offered ways for Pretoria to gain major propaganda opportunities, as it did with *Red Scorpion* and *Shaka Zulu*.

2. Culture and Entertainment Contacts

South African promoters continue to try to bring U.S. entertainers to the Sun City resort in Bophuthatswana, one of South Africa's ostensibly independent homelands, often with the offer of extremely high fees. While the resort claims to operate on a nonracial basis, it serves mainly white South Africans looking for gambling, entertainment, and prostitution. And while Bophuthatswana is advertised as an independent state, it is in fact a creation of apartheid. The Sun City/Artists United Against Apartheid project, organized in 1985, united popular artists in a pledge not to perform in Sun City or elsewhere in South Africa under apartheid. Fifty-four performing artists contributed their work to a record album, video, book and documentary opposing apartheid, which raised some \$500,000 for anti-apartheid projects. As a result of the campaign, the number of U.S. artists performing in South Africa under the auspices of apartheid-linked organizations declined considerably.

According to *Variety* (June 22, 1988), "Despite the rush to film in South Africa, and despite the fact that many American actors, producers and directors have been trekking there to work, many others have adamantly refused to do so." The actor Kenneth Tigar placed an advertisement in *Daily Variety* in March 1988 "appealing to all other actors in our industry to unite in refusing to accept work in South Africa." The Associated Actors and Artistes of America, the organization through which all U.S. performers unions are affiliated with the AFL-CIO, is on record, according to *Variety*, as "strongly opposed" to American entertainers performing in South Africa so long as its "inhumane and vicious practice" of apartheid is in effect. Nevertheless, two of the body's four member unions, the Screen Actors Guild and the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, have opposed listing foreign artists who perform in South Africa because of their own negative experience with blacklisting.

3. Sports Contacts

South African sports organizations have played an important role in promoting Pretoria's image abroad. As a result, participation by U.S. athletes in sports events in South Africa and participation in U.S. events by South African athletes who have not rejected links with South African sports organizations that operate within the apartheid system have inspired protests and boycotts in the United States.

Despite these protests, some sports links with South Africa continue, mainly in professional tennis and golf, and in September 1988 a group of U.S. track and field athletes competed in South Africa. According to the Register of Sports Contacts with South Africa for 1987, compiled by the U.N. Centre Against Apartheid, eight South African golfers played on the 1987 U.S. Professional Golfers' Association tour and 25 U.S. golfers participated in South African tournaments. Twenty South African tennis players played in the U.S. Tennis Circuit that year and 42 U.S. tennis players participated in the South African Tennis Open. Also in 1987, 14 professional boxers from the U.S. fought in South Africa. Other sports that brought contact between the United States and South Africa included body building, bridge, gymnastics, motor racing, squash, and surfing.

The U.S. Olympic Committee supports the International Olympic Committee's ban on sports contacts with apartheid South Africa, but despite protests, the U.S. Olympic Foundation, which was created by the U.S. Olympic Committee to provide funds for

Olympics-related amateurs in the United States continues to hold investments in companies doing business in South Africa.

EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS

The South African government distributes glossy propaganda materials, publications, and films to U.S. schools and libraries at no cost. An even more serious problem is how South African propaganda has influenced how the country and the region are portrayed in U.S. textbooks.

1. South African Propaganda Influences in U.S. Textbooks

A 1984 analysis of the treatment of South Africa in U.S. textbooks examined 19 textbooks and five yearbooks that are frequently used as sources of information in school libraries.⁴³ The survey found that the depiction of South Africa in most of the texts and almanacs contained elements that were misleading, inaccurate or racist. Although Africanist scholars in the United States have raised this issue with textbook publishers and cautioned against relying on information distributed by the apartheid government, problems persist. The article highlighted a number weaknesses in the texts and almanacs:

- Textbook definitions of apartheid were inadequate and incomplete. A few texts used terminology similar to the regime's, emphasizing "separation of population groups." While more of them mentioned white supremacy, they generally failed to discuss economic exploitation and the mechanisms of political domination.
- Discussions of economic development were divorced from discussions of apartheid, and participation in the modern economy was often attributed only to whites.
- Photographs and other visuals reinforced the "developed land" image and generally neglected scenes of black poverty. Nor did they depict the unequal distribution by race of land, income, and services.
- Language and terminology were a continuing problem, with a tendency to use marginalizing or perjorative terms such as "nonwhite" and "non-European," "native" and "Bantu."
- History was presented in a lopsided and distorted manner, with whites cast in major roles and Africans assigned bit parts. A few texts repeated the myth that Europeans and Africans arrived in the area that is now South Africa at the same time. The history of black resistance and protest against white domination tended to be muted or ignored.
- South Africa's bantustans, the so-called homelands, were rarely depicted for what they are: in the words of the article, "cheap labor pools, human dumping grounds, containment camps and propaganda props."
- Little attention was given to South Africa's police state. Many texts overlooked or treated only mildly the violent and ruthless suppression of opposition and the police apparatus used to enforce apartheid.
- Texts tended to emphasize the economic dependence of neighboring African states on South Africa, while ignoring the South African policies of aggression and destabilization that have cost these countries billions of dollars and sought to cripple their efforts to achieve greater economic independence.
- Most texts ignored U.S. economic links with South Africa, such as investment, trade, and bank loans, and the ways these links have strengthened the South African regime.
- Many texts presented apartheid "as an immutable force, immune to change from within or without." Black resistance, the liberation movements, and the rising

international pressures against apartheid got little treatment. Nor was there much information presented on opposition to sanctions by the United States and other Western powers.

2. South African Propaganda in School Libraries

South Africa has an extensive program of sending free pamphlets, magazines, and other materials to school libraries around the United States. The following account, which accompanied the study cited above, provides a disturbing description of how South African propaganda is directed into the educational system in the U.S. In one case, within weeks of a new school's opening in Massachusetts, when the library shelves were still generally empty, the librarian began receiving the magazine *Informa*. The report then described the situation as follows:

"This publication of South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs and Information is sent to schools all over the U.S. free and unsolicited. I knew such materials were in many schools, but hadn't realized just how well-organized and sophisticated the distribution system is!

Many teachers do not realize that *Informa* — and other, similar materials — come from South Africa, nor do they always know that they come unsolicited. When I do workshops, librarians often tell me with pride that, "Yes, we have one magazine in our library on Africa." It is usually *Informa*.

Informa, and its companion publication *Panorama*, are lavish, slick, glossy productions, always with Black people on the cover. They contain articles on development, family life, and industry in South Africa. The stress has always been on African activities, with frequent photos of blacks and whites working together. Recently, however, the emphasis has been on life in the bantustans, the so-called "homelands" where Africans have been forced to live by the South African government.

Another widely circulated piece of propaganda is the filmstrip and cassette kit entitled "Mosaic of Progress" from the South African Department of Information. The African Studies Center at Indiana University has written an excellent teaching guide and critique of this misleading filmstrip.

All such materials should be used with considerable care, though one local teacher has a creative solution. After teaching a unit on South Africa, she distributes *Informa* and uses it as a lesson in propaganda.⁴⁴

A recent issue of a publication for U.S. librarians cites a report on this issue about school libraries in Canada, where the situation is similar.⁴⁵ The teacher "was amazed to discover that many secondary school libraries contain copies of the propaganda magazines *South African Digest* and *South African Panorama*." The librarians told him that "they had been coming for years" or that "they are free and we don't have much money for materials anymore." The teacher also found that students generally depended on these materials for projects they were working on.

In addition to the feature films promoted by the South African regime, the South African embassy and consulates in the U.S. and the South African Tourism Board offices offer a number of short, free-loan films to schools and other organizations which pay only for return postage. Distribution of these films is handled by Public Service Audience Planners, Inc. based in California. (For a list of the films distributed, see Appendix 1.)

2.

The Impact of South African Censorship and Media Control in the United States

MEDIA RESTRICTIONS

South African censorship and media restrictions serve to control the dissemination of information about conditions and events in the country. Thus, like propaganda, they manipulate the image of South Africa in order to influence public opinion and the policies of governments abroad.

Although the South African government has greatly extended censorship and media control since it declared a state of emergency in parts of the country in June 1985, the news media in South Africa have operated under significant restrictions for several decades. Even before the state of emergency, provisions of some 100 laws affected news reporting, necessitating the publication of a reference book for journalists, *The Newspaperman's Guide to the Law*, and putting lawyers at the elbows of editors in many newsrooms. The main laws involved, such as the Internal Security Act, the Defense Act, and the Publications Act, restricted reporting on the police, defense, official secrets, and oil supply, among other subjects and prohibited quoting banned persons or "promoting the aims" of banned organizations.

Since 1985 the South African government has imposed increasingly tight media restrictions. The restrictions are vaguely worded and arbitrarily enforced. They have two broad aims:

- They seek to limit and control the information and images that reach the people of South Africa and the rest of the world documenting the upsurge of protest and resistance to apartheid and their brutal repression by the regime under the state of emergency.
- They seek, by intimidating, inhibiting and stifling the news media, to encourage the media to censor themselves and accommodate to the policies of apartheid in order to

avoid repression or, in the case of foreign reporters and news organizations, expulsion from the country.

The main elements of the restrictions were summarized in a statement at congressional hearings in March 1988 by John Oakes, former senior editor of *The New York Times*, testifying on behalf of the Committee to Protect Journalists:

1. No print or broadcast journalists or news photographers or camera crews may be within sight of "unrest," the government's term for protests of all types, and actions by security forces to suppress them.
2. No news or comment concerning "unrest" or security force actions may be printed or transmitted without official authorization.
3. No "subversive statements" may be printed or transmitted. "Subversive statements" is a catch-all phrase that includes advocating opposition to the authorities or military conscription, conveying the aims of outlawed organizations, promoting strikes, and supporting sanctions against South Africa.
4. No systematic or repeated publication of "revolution-supportive" material is permitted.
5. No unauthorized reports on conditions of detainees, or on strikes, boycotts or other forms of nonviolent protests, or on "unlawful local political structures," such as street committees, may be printed or transmitted.⁴⁶

These restrictions were further tightened in June 1988 when the state of emergency was extended into a third year and news agencies and their staffs were required to register with the government, which has the power to withdraw registration and shut them down. Exemptions were allowed for 13 major international news agencies.

The Committee to Protect Journalists has compiled a chronology, "Attacks and Restrictions on the Press in South Africa, June 30, 1985-June 25, 1988," which includes some 175 events, including both government media restrictions and specific incidents of repression. A detailed summary of censorship and media restrictions by the regime during this period, based on this chronology, is provided in Appendix 3.

During this period, 14 foreign journalists were expelled from South Africa, including six journalists working for U.S. news organizations: David C. Turnley, *Detroit Free Press* photographer; Steve Mufson, stringer for *Business Week* and *Elseviers* of the Netherlands; Alan Cowell, correspondent for *The New York Times*; Richard Manning, bureau chief for *Newsweek*; Wim de Vos, CBS News cameraman; and Ray Wilkinson, Nairobi bureau chief for *Newsweek*. In addition, in 1987 alone, the South African government denied 186 applications by foreign journalists to visit the country.

The chronology cites 14 incidents of arrest or detention involving more than 40 individual journalists working for U.S. news organizations; the incidents often included smashed cameras and confiscation of film or video cassettes. One foreign journalist was killed during the period: George De' Ath, a cameraman for Independent Television News of London died after being attacked by government-backed vigilantes at the Crossroads settlement on June 10, 1987. An associate accused the police of delaying efforts to save De' Ath, and his killers have not been apprehended.

South African journalists continue to bear the brunt of the regime's repression. As of the end of June 1988 four South African journalists were being detained without trial, including Zwelakhe Sisulu, editor of the *New Nation*, who has been held for more than a year and a half. At least 25 South African journalists, a majority of them black, were

detained without trial between June 1985 and June 1988, and a number of others were arrested and tried for violating media restrictions.

The South African regime has suspended the *New Nation*, *South*, *Grassroots*, and *Saamstaan* under the press restrictions. In late 1988 the *Weekly Mail* was ordered closed for a month, and individual issues of many newspapers have been banned and seized.

As the anti-apartheid movement mounted Defiance Campaign protests against segregated elections in September 1989, the government unleashed a new wave of oppression against the news media. More than seventy newspaper reporters, photographers and television crews were arrested while covering protests.

Journalists and others have protested the regime's repression of the media, but despite the determination of some journalists to challenge the restrictions, particularly the alternative press in South Africa such as the publications cited above, the measures have had a clear impact in curbing coverage of the country's crisis by both South African and foreign news media.

THE IMPACT OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. REPORTING FROM SOUTH AFRICA

An article in *The New York Times* on November 3, 1985, the day after the South African regime barred filming and photographing at scenes of "unrest," indicated that television coverage of protests and repression (prior to the restrictions) had had a strong impact in the U.S.: "In the last nine months South Africa has penetrated the American consciousness in a way it rarely has during a quarter century of racial strife in that country. Significantly this turnabout has coincided with sustained and vivid coverage of South Africa by American television."

The article went on to compare the impact of the coverage in the United States, which had included images of "funerals, riots, overturned cars aflame and armored vehicles rolling through the black townships," with that of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War. The powerful images of protest and repression had helped spur an upsurge of campus activism for divestment and moves toward sanctions in Congress.

Within two months, another report in *The New York Times* (December 29, 1985) found that the South African curbs on reporting protests had worked: "The South African Government must be pleased," said Michael Gavshon, a CBS producer in Johannesburg. "The level of intensity of interest is not so great, and they feel somewhat more secure that pictures of overt violence have been wiped from the screen." The article noted that while August and November were the two most violent months of 1985 in South Africa, U.S. networks had carried 61 stories from South Africa in August on their evening news programs and only 30 in November.

The television journalists interviewed for the article rejected the claim of the South African government that the presence of news cameras triggered violence, noting that 90 deaths in black townships were reported in November 1985, after the restrictions had been imposed, compared with a monthly average of 60 during all of 1985. Although news executives indicated that they tried to compensate for the restrictions by providing more background, in-depth reporting, they also admitted that in the absence of live pictures of confrontations the immediacy and impact of television coverage dropped.

The nationwide state of emergency and tighter restrictions on reporting declared in June 1986 brought increased pressures on journalists. A number of U.S. journalists were detained for alleged violations of the restrictions and several were expelled from the country.

In a *Washington Post* article of June 14, 1986, reporters and news executives described how their coverage was curbed. "It's getting harder and harder to cover everything in South Africa," said Howard Stringer, CBS News executive vice president. CBS correspondent Allen Pizzey commented that the South African government "considers damn near everything from criticism to graffiti to be subversive." Although U.S. networks could get footage and reports of protests and security force actions from black South African freelancers, network executives were unwilling to risk expulsion for using it. "Even if we used the work of a freelance person who provided the footage, there's a restriction against broadcasting it," said Jerry Lamprecht, general manager of foreign news at NBC. Television crews, said CBS's Stringer, cannot use footage filmed by blacks: "If we do, we'll be flown out of the country."

After the June 17, 1986 ban on live satellite news transmissions *The New York Times* (June 19, 1986) reported increasing pressure for self-censorship. "All three American news networks, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and other news organizations now have lawyers in their South Africa news bureaus reviewing tapes before they are transmitted, trying to be certain that the reports fit the guidelines." Peter Jennings, ABC news anchor, warned that "at some point we're going to have to make a judgment as to whether the value of having a reporter on the ground is the equivalent of having to play by this insidious set of rules."

The Wall Street Journal in an August 5, 1986, report followed the activities of an NBC television crew to describe how "TV crews must constantly practice self-censorship — or risk jail or deportation." "Since you can't film any security officer, including a traffic cop," the camera operator commented, "we could sit here and watch them killing people and couldn't do a thing." The article also noted that the ban on "subversive statements" meant that "a wide range of interview subjects became taboo, including any advocacy of sanctions against South Africa, any favorable mention of the African National Congress and reporting on strikes."

NBC correspondent Mike Boettcher claimed that despite censorship the network was still carrying many stories from South Africa, but more "analytical" ones: "We may have less stellar pictures, but I think this makes us do better stories." The report, however, cites a stark example of self-censorship that occurred when an NBC crew interviewed Winnie Mandela: "Looking into Mr. Wasserman's lens, she demands sanctions and says that because of the present state of emergency, 'the crisis in our country has deepened.'" Minutes after the interview NBC's lawyer arrived and advised against using the call for sanctions. NBC bureau chief Heather Allan agreed, "because it isn't news — Mrs. Mandela has said the same thing many times before." The network also cut Mandela's accusation that security forces had shot babies in the head.

Reviewing the impact of South Africa's media control after further restrictions were imposed in December 1986 and its correspondent expelled, *The New York Times* (March 1, 1987) reported that "many news executives say pressure from the South African Government on news organizations has muted reporting from South Africa and made it more cautious." Although they note that other factors had contributed to the reduction in coverage, the news executives admitted that "reporting from South Africa had been severely affected by the threat that coverage the Government deems unacceptable can lead to expulsion."

The article documented the decline in news coverage both in newspapers and on television, noting for example that *The New York Times* had carried 45 articles from South Africa with 16 on the front page in June 1986, but only 24 articles with one on the front page in January 1987. Similarly, NBC covered South Africa on 26 evening news broadcasts in June 1986, and on only 6 in January 1987. The article noted: "The principal

objective of these restrictions was to keep anti-apartheid conflicts off American television. South African officials and television news executives say these restrictions have been almost totally effective."

The article also noted that journalists and human rights organizations in South Africa disputed the contention of South African officials that the press restrictions reduced "unrest," and charged the government with becoming "more violent at putting down opposition."

RESPONSE OF THE U.S. NEWS MEDIA

Although U.S. news executives have condemned South Africa's web of media restrictions and admitted the extent of their impact, most have argued that it is better for their reporters and new bureaus to continue to report from South Africa, pushing the limits of the restrictions as far as possible, rather than to challenge the restrictions directly and risk expulsion. Others, however, criticized the media for inadequate coverage and express concern that news reporting under the restrictions of the apartheid regime conveys a misleading picture of events in South Africa to Americans. Several journalists have called for U.S. news organizations to withdraw from South Africa and use alternative sources to provide information now curbed by the regime.

Richard M. Cohen, former chief of political coverage at CBS, has called for the Western news media, specifically U.S. television networks, to leave South Africa and use footage and reports smuggled out of the country. In an opinion article in *The New York Times* (August 31, 1987) Cohen wrote:

The American consciousness about South Africa, I believe, was formed and maintained by the constant images of brutal repression in many forms: the image of the padded, faceless policeman, club raised; the image of a black youth with fear covering every inch of his face as he throws a rock. These were constant and common images, and now they are missing....

These images are no longer on American television because we cannot broadcast them, for fear of being expelled from South Africa. We play an insidious game of video appeasement with the government. Walk up to the line. Don't cross it. Show as much as you think you can get away with, never more.

While we compromise to keep our credentials in South Africa, we no longer truly cover events as we used to. As a result, Americans' passion for that story, identification with the human struggle and the underdog have receded.

In an article nine months later in the *New Republic* Cohen found the situation unchanged: "The western press, which once took chances and defied authority regularly, now often cowers in the corner, neutralized by fear of angering the government and being told it has broken the law and must go."⁴⁷ Cohen repeated his call for the news media either to withdraw and use "private video" sources to cover South Africa or at least to push harder against the restrictions.

Danny Schechter, a television producer who has been active in reporting on South Africa, most recently as executive producer of *South Africa Now* (see below), argues that even with the restrictions the U.S. media can still cover key aspects of the South African crisis, but usually does not.⁴⁸ Examples include the nature of apartheid and its economic roots, the stake of U.S. companies in the system, and the regime's Total Strategy and militarization; the state of emergency and its major abuses, such as the torture of children; the nature of the South African resistance, particularly the ANC, and the issue of "black-on-black violence"; the debate over U.S. sanctions; and the impact

of South Africa's destabilization on the frontline states: Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola.

In another article, Schechter cites the contention of Mark Swilling, a South African researcher, that the television networks' focus on violence in the townships in the period between 1984 and 1986 was misleading, although not in the fashion the South African government has claimed. "There was a whole range of organization in the townships which were never focused on, which were the organizations of women, unemployed youths and youth congresses, workers, trade unions who all had more sophisticated strategies."⁴⁹ Schechter therefore argues that while violent confrontations were considered newsworthy by U.S. networks and had a strong impact on U.S. viewers many significant aspects of the South African crisis and anti-apartheid resistance were inadequately covered even before media restrictions were imposed.

In "South Africa: Where did the Story Go?" Schechter concludes that, with few exceptions, at the television networks "the story is on the back burner."⁵⁰ He quotes a CBS correspondent in South Africa who indicates that the government's restrictions are only part of the problem: "Right now, our news organizations pay lip service to being interested in South Africa, and certainly claim they are interested in the analytical stories. But they are not making the air. They are simply being eclipsed by other events." Schechter notes the political impact of the reduction in coverage: when viewers don't see the story, legislators and policy-makers don't hear about the issue. He cites the view of the *Washington Report on Africa*, that the lack of media coverage has affected the prospects for legislation for tougher sanctions: "Congressional aides on both sides of the issue agree that curtailed press coverage from South Africa has already been an important, if not decisive, factor."

Pressures against the news media continue. In the *Columbia Journalism Review* South African journalist Pippa Green reports that "the police are targeting the media to a far greater extent than they used to, often arresting reporters before anyone else."⁵¹ In April 1988, when 60 women protested outside the Chamber of Mines against legislation to curb black trade unions, several television crews were present. "When the police moved in they went straight for the press to arrest them, without paying attention to the women. The press has become the first casualty," said an American TV network producer cited by Green. In June 1988 a South African cameraman for ABC filmed a small protest by women from the Black Sash organization against the scheduled execution of the Sharpeville Six, Green reports. But as the police arrived, he stopped filming and left to avoid assault and arrest and was unable to film the arrest of the protesters.

Green notes that 51 news stories from South Africa appeared on CBS in the first three months of 1987, but only 17 appeared in the first three months of 1988. And while the South African authorities have justified the media restrictions by claiming that media coverage provoked "unrest," Green points out that the restrictions became more stringent even as disturbances declined.

DOCUMENTARIES ON THE DETENTION AND TORTURE OF CHILDREN

The circumstances surrounding three documentaries focusing on the state of emergency and detention and torture of children in South Africa illustrate both pressures against the media and the danger faced by those who speak out about the violence of the regime.

In 1985 independent producer Sharon Sopher traveled to South Africa and without official authorization interviewed black leaders about the children who had been victims

of torture and violence committed by soldiers and police. At one point she and her crew were detained by soldiers. Her film *Witness to Apartheid*, which won several awards and was nominated for an Academy Award, was aired on public broadcasting stations, but it was not picked up by the major commercial networks in the U.S. One of the film's witnesses, Dr. Fabrian Ribeiro, was later assassinated at his home by masked gunmen. No arrests have been made in connection with the murder.

A CBS documentary, "*Children of Apartheid*," first broadcast in December 1987, was filmed by CBS's local South African crews. It includes interviews with children who had been jailed and tortured and contrasting interviews with Zindzi Mandela, daughter of Nelson Mandela, and Rozanne Botha, daughter of President P.W. Botha. Broadcast was delayed for six months while a South African lawyer reviewed the film; "a line" was removed for fear that it was illegal under South African restrictions and that the CBS crews would face reprisal by the government.⁵²

Not long after the documentary was broadcast, the police picked up and interrogated Godfrey Sicelo Dhlomo, a teenager who had appeared in the film and told of having been tortured. Five days later his body was found, shot in the head, in Soweto. His mother said he had been hiding from the police because they had said they would kill him. The police denied this and claimed Dhlomo had told them he had been coached by the interviewers about what to say. CBS denied the allegation, and Dhlomo's coworkers at the Detainees' Parents Support Committee said he had told them he had not been coached. South African officials also charged that the film's correspondent, Walter Cronkite, and producer, Brian Ellis, had violated regulations by entering the country on tourist visas and failing to get work permits.

A CBS crew at Dhlomo's funeral in February 1988 could get only limited coverage of what was described by *The New York Times* (February 7, 1988) as "one of the most emotional and politically charged" events in Soweto since the state of emergency was declared in June 1986. The CBS report explained that they couldn't show what Dhlomo's friends had said about him, nor how they had filled his grave, nor how the police has teargassed people outside the Dhlomo family house. While demonstrators at CBS headquarters in New York protested the lack of coverage, CBS correspondent Martha Teichner said, "We thought it was an effective piece." Journalist Pippa Green comments that "in the strange world of South Africa today, an effective piece of television has become one that tells us what it cannot show."⁵³

CBS has maintained a low profile on the situation. In March 1988 Walter Cronkite and Brian Ellis withdrew at the last minute from congressional hearings on South African media control. CBS did not follow up on Godfrey Dhlomo's death, nor on more than 20 similar unexplained deaths of militant black youths cited in the South Africa press. On May 20, 1988, South African Minister of Home Affairs Stoffel Botha, who enforces the emergency restrictions against the press, condemned "media terrorists" in a statement before the white parliament, but exempted CBS from his attack. He cited a "letter of apology" from CBS News president Howard Stringer, which Botha said, "regretted that it had not been meticulous in complying with South African procedures regarding foreign media" in making *Children of Apartheid*.⁵⁴

The BBC has also been pressured by Pretoria for a recent documentary, *Suffer the Children*, on detention of children in South Africa. South African officials charged that they had not been interviewed about the allegations made in it and threatened to close the BBC's offices in South Africa. This threat was made shortly before the BBC was to broadcast worldwide the June 1988 London concert honoring Nelson Mandela's 70th birthday, which was also protested by Pretoria. Although the BBC did carry the concert,

with performers condemning apartheid, the political content of the broadcast was toned down.

CENSORSHIP OF THE MANDELA 70TH BIRTHDAY TRIBUTE

The Nelson Mandela 70th Birthday Tribute, a major rock concert protesting his 26 years of imprisonment by the South African regime, was held in Wembley Stadium near London on June 11, 1988. A soldout audience of 72,000 attended, and the concert was beamed by the BBC to an estimated one billion viewers in 63 countries around the world. The BBC toned down the political aspects of the concert. The tape-delay version that was broadcast in the U.S. by the Fox Television Network and Westwood One, which carried the concert on radio, was radically censored with most of the political content and comments removed. Before the concert the South African regime had protested the broadcast and threatened to close the BBC's South African offices. A group of Conservative MPs also threatened to bring an injunction to halt the broadcast because of its political aspects.

The BBC broadcast did include comments by a number of performers condemning apartheid and the South African government, although it provided no real background about Mandela and the apartheid system. A videotaped statement from Winnie Mandela was not shown—supposedly because of time constraints, although the concert was more than six hours long. Nor was a smuggled statement from Mandela himself read.

The Fox Television Network and Westwood One broadcast cut almost all political comment so that, in the words of a *New York Times* reviewer (June 14, 1988), "The program worked itself into odd contortions, including an attempt to make the concert seem as apolitical as a birthday party, even if the birthday party was for one of the world's most visible political prisoners."

The Fox and Westwood One broadcast even dropped Mandela's name from the title of their broadcast, calling it simply "Freedomfest." In an opinion article in *The New York Times* (June 24, 1988) rock performer Steven Van Zandt, or "Little Steven," an organizer of Artists United Against Apartheid who had performed in the concert, complained:

Whatever the reasons, the show was neutered, the issue downplayed and the message muzzled. Celebrity gossip substituted for informational segments and inane chatter depoliticized the coverage.... Comments that I made calling South Africa a terrorist state and urging sanctions were heard and seen in Britain—but somehow did not get across the Atlantic. Harry Belafonte, Whoopi Goldberg, and Peter Gabriel, among others, made political statements that were beamed around the world, but zapped in America.

Van Zandt charged that the American producers "trivialized the event by deleting virtually every reference to the political situation in South Africa," and in the process "censored free expression by many of the participants and probably helped to lower political consciousness more than raise it." According to Van Zandt, the companies that carried the U.S. transmission apparently "decided that Americans were not interested in learning more about apartheid. When I asked Fox for an explanation, a spokesman said it was company policy not to comment on such matters." According to one report, Fox and Westwood technicians, officials from Coca-Cola, which was one of the U.S. sponsors and still does a large business in South Africa, oversaw the transmission.⁵⁵ Fox president Jamie Kellner defended the network's version of the concert, saying that the

political messages in the songs were broadcast and denying that Coca-Cola was involved in the editing.

RACISM IN THE U.S. NEWS MEDIA

Three conferences on South Africa's media restrictions, sponsored by the Nieman Foundation and the African-American Institute, have been held since 1985, with the third, in London in 1988, also sponsored by the Association of British Editors.⁵⁶ The conferences brought together journalists from the United States, South Africa, and other countries to discuss how the tightening restrictions have affected the press in South Africa and foreign reporters there. During the discussions, controversy arose over how the U.S. media cover South Africa and whether news organizations should withdraw rather than submit to manipulation and control by the apartheid government.

The conference also raised questions about racism as it affects the U.S. news media.⁵⁷ Neither the U.S. television networks nor the U.S. press have stationed black reporters from the U.S. at their news bureaus in South Africa, although black correspondents have reported from South Africa on trips there. One American editor commented that his publication had been told unofficially by the South African government that they would not allow a black U.S. journalist to be based in the country as a correspondent. Thus the South African government has apparently succeeded in imposing apartheid on the U.S. news media, which have acquiesced to its racist policies.

Les Payne, a black journalist who is assistant managing director of *Newsday*, told the 1988 conference that because of his paper's coverage of the Soweto uprising in 1976 and 1977, the South African regime had a policy of refusing to allow reporters, editors or photographers to enter the country as long as Payne worked at the paper. After six *Newsday* reporters had been denied visas to South Africa, the paper was told of this "Payne policy."

U.S. correspondents were criticized at the conferences for being unwilling to cover black areas, or when doing so for relying on black South African reporters, without giving them credit for their work. Some American news executives questioned the objectivity and professionalism of black South African journalists, but they had not raised such questions about white South African journalists. While white South African journalists have been hired by the U.S. media as stringers, no black South African journalists have been hired for such positions.⁵⁸

Although in recent years 25 black South African journalists have received advanced training in the U.S. as Nieman fellows at Harvard University, apparently none have been employed as full-fledged reporters or stringers by major U.S. news organizations. Black South African journalists have knowledge of the black community and access to it that white journalists do not, but they are rarely given the credit or status this warrants and their resources are inadequately used by U.S. news organizations. (The experiences of black South African reporters have been graphically portrayed in a recent book by William Finnegan, *Dateline Soweto*.)⁵⁹ The conference also heard complaints that some U.S. correspondents still tend to identify the apartheid regime as among the Western, "civilized" nations. White correspondents from the U.S. tend to be cut off from black South Africans, living in segregated white areas and having social contact mostly with white South Africans. Thus it is easier for them to identify, whether consciously or not, with white South Africans and harder for them to understand and interpret for Americans the life of the black majority under apartheid.

ALTERNATIVE TELEVISION COVERAGE: "SOUTH AFRICA NOW"

A new response to the shrinking coverage of South Africa on U.S. television networks is *South Africa Now*, a weekly half-hour show distributed on the Public Broadcasting System and cable stations nationwide with 1.5 million viewers. The show is produced by Globalvision, Inc. of New York as an educational project of The Africa Fund.

South Africa Now aims to provide wider coverage of South Africa and southern Africa generally, and also to prod the main networks to improve their coverage by demonstrating the depth and variety of programming that can be created, even on a minimal budget. Drawing on journalists working inside and outside South Africa, including a number of South African journalists, the show has used footage of protests from South Africa of the kind that the major networks are wary of using for fear of having their correspondents expelled. For example, the show has carried stories on the detention and torture of children and the work of black journalists in South Africa, interviews with Archbishop Tutu and the chief labor negotiator for the Anglo-American Corporation, and clips of South African government propaganda films.

"INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA" — GOVERNMENT-SUPPLIED "NEWS"

An indication of the success of *South Africa Now* is a "news" program from South Africa started in 1989 and currently being carried in the United States by the International Television Network. The half-hour weekly show is produced by Global News Service of Johannesburg, which has received funds from the government-controlled South African Broadcasting System (SABC), as well as contracts from the South African embassy in Washington. The director of Global News Service is a former SABC executive.

Although it does not credit any South African government backing and conceals its sponsorship, the new show's ties to the regime are evident. It features current reports produced by the SABC with SABC correspondents, but does not identify the stories as SABC material.

The approach of the show is one-sided. Many of its reports aim to show how South Africa is instituting "democracy" and have included speeches by government leaders, such as the new president, F.W. de Klerk, without comments by anti-apartheid organizations or critics of the government.

Commenting on the new programs, *South Africa Now* director Carolyn Craven said: "Pretoria's censorship practices are an indication that they understand the power of the media; this show is a sign that they are trying to move from a defensive posture to the offensive. *Inside South Africa* has no redeeming journalistic values, but it is dangerous because it aims at whitewashing apartheid in the guise of news. We think it is a demonstration of our impact for the South Africans to spend millions trying to counter *South Africa Now*."

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON MEDIA RESTRICTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Hearings of the Subcommittee on Africa of the U.S. House of Representatives, on March 15 and 16, 1988, highlighted questions concerning the response of U.S. news organizations to South African censorship and media restrictions. The first day of the

hearings focused on the details of the restrictions and their impact on the media. John Oakes, of the Committee to Protect Journalists, South African editors Irwin Manion and Ameen Akhalwaya, South African journalist Allister Sparks, who reports for *The Washington Post*, and media specialists Leonard Sussman of Freedom House and John Phelan of Fordham University testified.

Sparks described how the South African government uses the media restrictions to intimidate foreign journalists, with warnings that it will expel those violating the vaguely worded restrictions. Journalists may be given visas and work permits for no more than three months, and are subjected to delays when requesting renewals. Correspondents may be warned that their reports are viewed as "unbalanced," putting them under pressure to produce stories favorable to the regime "in order to achieve a spurious 'balance' which has nothing to do with journalistic ethics and everything to do with appeasing an intimidator." Sparks also said:

By far the most effective foreign censorship has been of, and through, television. By the simple expedient of keeping the cameras away from the scene of the action, Pretoria has largely succeeded in getting the South African story off the television screens of the world—and the United States.... Pretoria has correctly identified television as the volume button on the national amplifier of foreign policy issues. Turn that down on any particular issue and the issue itself will die down in the national consciousness—and the press, which in the TV age tends to piggyback rather than create the waves of popular sentiment, will follow the curve.

On the second day of hearings, dealing with the response of the U.S. media to the restrictions, most of the scheduled witnesses withdrew, including CBS special correspondent Walter Cronkite and producer Brian Ellis of CBS; Richard Manning, former *Newsweek* bureau chief in Johannesburg; commentator Hodding Carter; and witnesses from National Public Radio and the Center for Foreign Journalists. Representative Howard Wolpe, chairman of the subcommittee, in a statement on the withdrawals, commented:

What has happened is part of a larger phenomenon that became apparent as the African Subcommittee organized these two days of hearings. The principal reason for the withdrawal of most of today's witnesses and for the decision by a number of other journalists not to appear seems to be the fear that if they testify publicly about the realities of working in South Africa, these individuals would put themselves and the media organizations that employ them at serious risk of retaliation by the South African government.

In numerous conversations with the staff of the Africa Subcommittee, journalists with South African experience and a familiarity with how the press restrictions have altered U.S. coverage responded in roughly the same fashion. They acknowledged, as witnesses testified yesterday, that South Africa's manipulation of the press threatened the survival of South Africa's independent press and has succeeded to an important degree in inducing self-censorship by the foreign press. The result, in their opinion, was that the level of U.S. coverage of South Africa, especially on television, has deteriorated substantially, while the content and quality of coverage in print has shifted insidiously to reflect more and more the perspective of the South African government....

These events are extremely alarming. They suggest that South Africa's manipulation of the U.S. press penetrates well beyond South Africa's border. It extends right into Capitol Hill. The consequences, in terms of media self-censorship and interference with Congress's ability to understand the South African government's influence on the U.S. media, are deeply disturbing....

This experience reinforces my view that there must be some official responses to this situation which raise the costs which the South African government must bear if it is to repress its own media and interfere with the flow of information to the United States.

One U.S. journalist who did testify on the second day of hearings, Kenneth Walker, now coanchor of NBC's *USA Today*, argued: "The true source of the problem of news coverage inside South Africa rests not with the press restrictions. I submit that the U.S. news media have used those regulations to return to the indifference that had long characterized their South African coverage." Walker also raised the issue of complicity by U.S. news executives with South African racism:

Newsweek's chief of correspondents, Bob Rivard, has acknowledged publicly what other news executives have acknowledged privately and what black American journalists have suspected for years: and that is that the white-minority regime has long exercised a veto over the race of U.S. journalists based inside South Africa. Allowing the South Africans to bar the stationing of black American journalists in South Africa makes the U.S. companies accomplices in apartheid, and, in my view, puts them in violation of American law.

Also, Mr. Chairman, while a number of U.S. news organizations employ white South African journalists who report in their own name, to my knowledge not one utilizes a black South African journalist in that capacity. That reality, combined with the assignment of only white Americans to be based inside South Africa, virtually guarantees inadequate coverage in a society as rigidly segregated as South Africa's.

Walker also stated that U.S. television networks have distributed video cameras into private hands in the black townships in order to circumvent the regime's restrictions on reporters, "but they resolutely refuse to use that video." Like former CBS news executive Richard Cohen, he argued that "if U.S. news organizations cannot operate inside South Africa in the way they have led the public to believe U.S. reporters operate, then they should get out," and that to do otherwise "is a fraud on the American people."

At the hearings Representative Mike Lowery testified concerning the extensive propaganda role of the South African embassy, consulates, Tourist Board offices, and the South African Broadcasting Corporation in the U.S., as well as of the lobbying activities of registered agents for South Africa. Lowery proposed amending the comprehensive sanctions bill then before Congress to include measures to respond to South African repression against the U.S. news media by shutting down and restricting a number of official South African offices and activities in the U.S. The amendment finally added to the sanctions bill, however, was limited to closing several South African consulates, but the bill was not passed.

STUDIES OF THE IMPACT OF SOUTH AFRICAN MEDIA CONTROL ON NEWS COVERAGE AND PUBLIC OPINION

The "Report on South African Censorship and Information Management," commissioned by the Canadian Department of External Affairs,⁶⁰ released January 1988, includes analysis of the impact of Pretoria's policies on television and press coverage of South Africa in North America and on public opinion trends concerning South Africa. A study of the effects of South Africa's restrictions on U.S. press coverage and public opinion by Eleanor Singer and Jacob Ludwig was published in *Public Opinion Quarterly* in 1987.⁶¹ The findings of these studies are summarized below.

1. Impact on Television Coverage

The study of the impact of South African restrictions on television coverage in the Canadian report covers the period July 1985 through August 1987.⁶² It examines the impact of the three main measures that tightened media restrictions during that period (November 2, 1985; June 12, 1986; and December 10, 1986) on the volume and prominence of South African news carried by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the three major U.S. networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC.

The study found that the media restrictions of November 1985 and December 1986 had apparently "been largely effective in reducing the time and prominence afforded South African issues within nightly national newscasts following their imposition." The June 1986 restrictions, however, had little effect, with "high volumes of minutes and number of stories, all given prominent placement, appearing well into August."

In weighing the impact of censorship measures, the study examined the volume, prominence, and origin of news items for a period of four months before and after each of the three key dates when tighter restrictions were announced.

In the four months after November 2, 1985, the number of items on the three national U.S. networks on South Africa fell from 413 to 186, a 54 percent decline. Most of the items in the period before November 2, 1985, were aired in the first quarter of a newscast, while after that date most were in the second quarter, with the number aired in the second half of a newscast increasing considerably.

In the four months after June 12, 1986 the number of news items on South Africa increased by 60 percent compared to the four months before, from 151 to 378. The number of items aired in the first quarter of a newscast increased significantly.

In the four months after December 10, 1986, the number of news items on South Africa declined by 71 percent, from 218 to 64. The prominence of South African newscasts also dropped sharply, from concentration in the first and second quarters of broadcasts to concentration in the second and third quarters.

The study's findings contradict the South African government's claim that the presence of news cameras caused violence, and the report notes that the media restrictions had been successful in reducing coverage of continuing turmoil:

Based upon a review of events within South Africa, a strong case can be made for the suggestion that baseline levels of civil unrest, violence and political dissent have at the very least remained constant, and indeed, likely increased in the country over the 26 months under review. Yet an examination of coverage reveals that the ongoing reality of South Africa's turmoil was not reflected in the coverage. Whether due exclusively to the impact of the government restrictions, or in part as a result of other media-related factors, changes in coverage patterns after the imposition of press restrictions are, in large measure, in keeping with the objectives of those restrictions.⁶³

Similarly, Singer and Ludwig write: "Clearly, the data do not lend support to the official contention that the presence of cameras and tape recorders at protest events is an important source of violence, and that banning them would reduce the level of violence."⁶⁴ Singer and Ludwig also found that although the death toll in protests continued at relatively high levels after the November 1985 media ban, U.S. media coverage had declined during this period and thus "tended to drop below par" after the restrictions were imposed, indicating that there was inadequate coverage of protests.

2. The Impact on Print Coverage

The study of the impact of South Africa's media restrictions on press coverage in the Canadian report focused mainly on the six months before and after the November 2,

1985 restrictions.⁶⁵ Because the November 2 restrictions barred television and photographic coverage of unrest, they might have been expected to affect broadcast media more than print media. The study indicates, however, that the level of U.S. press coverage of South Africa was lower in the six-month period after the November 2 restrictions than in the six-month period before them. This conclusion is based on the number of articles appearing in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Boston Globe*, *The Miami Herald*, and *The Chicago Tribune*, and on the number of stories carried by the Associated Press wire service. The study also notes, that the level of press coverage, having peaked in August and September 1985, had begun to decline by October 1985, suggesting that the November restrictions were not the only factor involved in the reduction in coverage. Singer and Ludwig report similar findings. The Canadian report also notes that during all of 1985 and 1986, after the decline in press coverage in the last quarter of 1985 and the first quarter of 1986, press coverage increased again and reached a high for the entire period in the third quarter of 1986. This period followed the imposition of new media restrictions on June 10, 1986, but was also a period of significant repression and protest.

3. U.S. Public Opinion and South African Media Restrictions

The Canadian report includes a survey of trends in public opinion about South Africa in Canada, the U.S., Australia and the U.K.⁶⁶ Using Gallup Poll data, the survey sought to identify public opinion trends both before and after the advent of media censorship. The report notes: "The role of public opinion is critical in fostering international efforts concerning anti-apartheid policies. Public opinion can be a motivating factor in governments' approaches to anti-apartheid policies."

On the question of "awareness and interest in South Africa's racial policies," the study found the level of Americans aware of events in South Africa fell from 63 percent in August 1985 to 56 percent in October 1985, where it remained almost unchanged through September 1986, after the imposition of media restrictions in November 1985 and in June 1986. The study notes that like other national Gallup polls, the U.S. poll asks questions on issues in the public mind; the U.S. Gallup Poll had not asked questions on awareness of South Africa since September 1986, which itself indicates the lack of interest in South Africa.

The study of the U.S. notes:

Even before the imposition of censorship, considerable confusion concerning South Africa existed in the public's mind. The degree to which inaccurate information can gain acceptance by the public is illustrated by a Gallup poll undertaken in the United States in August 1985 which found that only 48% of the individuals surveyed recognized that blacks in South Africa did not have the right to vote.⁶⁷

The survey observes that "censorship will undoubtedly make it more difficult to correct these misperceptions." Among those in the United States who followed events in South Africa very or fairly closely in the March 1986 poll, 49 percent said they felt that the number of racial protests had decreased (14 percent) or stayed the same (35 percent) during the previous few months. In fact, as the study points out, a considerable number of protests and violent incidents took place during the period between November 1985, when the first media restrictions were imposed, and March 1986. Thus, "Partly as a result of press censorship, this level of violence in South Africa was not perceived by most Americans surveyed as representing an increased level of racial protest. This indicates that the public tended to react more to the level of media coverage given to the protests rather than to the level of protest activity itself."

The survey found that despite South African media restrictions, support for "more government pressure of the South African Government to end apartheid," rose among Americans who followed events in South Africa: while 47 percent favored more pressure in October 1985, 55 percent favored more pressure in September 1986.

Singer and Ludwig, also using Gallup data, found a decline in sympathy for black South Africans from 59 percent to 50 percent from August 1985 to October 1985, a period when media coverage declined. From October 1985 to March 1986, U.S. sympathy for black South Africans rose to 64 percent despite lower media coverage, indicating that protests in the U.S. and the debate over sanctions could have influenced U.S. opinion.

Appendix 1

South African Diplomatic And Tourism Offices In The U.S.

DIPLOMATIC OFFICES

South African Embassy

Washington, D.C.

107 employees, including 35 diplomatic officers

Office of the Scientific Counselor

Washington, D.C.

Consulate General and Information Office

New York, New York

53 employees, including 16 consular officers

Consulate General and Information Office

Chicago, Illinois

20 employees, including 8 consular officers

Consulate General and Information Office

Beverly Hills, California

28 employees, including 9 consular officers

Consulate General

Houston, Texas

21 employees, including 8 consular officers

Honorary Consul General

Mobile, Alabama

Honorary Consul

Salt Lake City, Utah

Honorary Consul
Seattle, Washington

Honorary Consul
Phoenix, Arizona

TOURISM OFFICES

South African Tourism Board
Chicago, Illinois

South African Tourism Board
New York, New York

South African Tourism Board
Beverly Hills, California

Source: U.S. Department of State

FILMS DISTRIBUTED IN THE UNITED STATES

The following films are distributed for the South African Embassy, Consulates, and Tourism Board Offices at no cost to the user by Audience Planners, Inc., which has offices in New York City, Chicago, and Calabasas, California.

The Story of South Africa
African Powerhouse
Half-Way to Everywhere
Images of South Africa
Lifeline
More Than an Investment
Namibia
Sports in South Africa
Gold
The Vital Link
Visions of Gold

Appendix 2

Registered Agents In The United States For South African Interests

REGISTERED AGENTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

Agent/Activity/Fee

Principal

Thomas A. Bolan
New York, New York
Lawyer; Chairman, East Side Conservative
Club of New York City
Registered 1987 as consultant and lobbyist;
arranges contacts for South African officials
with U.S. public officials and news media.
1987-88 contract: \$300,000 per year; \$15,000 expenses.

Republic of South Africa

Philip J. Hare
Washington, D.C.
Registered 1987; serves as general
counsel to the South African Embassy.
Worked for South Africa in the office of
John P. Sears; withdrew to open own office.
1987-88 contract: \$90,000; \$10,000 expenses.

Republic of South Africa

International Public Affairs Consultants
McLean, Virginia
William Keyes
Registered 1985 to lobby for closer
U.S.-South Africa ties.
Contract: \$360,000 per year; \$30,000 expenses.

Republic of South Africa

Donald G. Johnson

Washington, D.C.

Works with Riley & Fox and United International Consultants; compiles statistics on news articles on South African issues and information people traveling to Africa.

Fees January, 1986-March, 1987: \$42,250.

Republic of South Africa

North American Precis Syndicate

New York, New York

Andrew J. Lazarus, President

Distributed news releases to U.S. newspapers on behalf of South Africa.

Fees, February-July 1986: \$96,265.

Republic of South Africa

Pearson & Pipkin, Inc.

Washington, D.C.

Ronald W. Pearson and Robert R. Pipkin, Jr.

Represents interests of South Africa to U.S. government officials.

Contract: \$300,000 per year; \$40,000 expenses.

Republic of South Africa

Marilyn Edith Perry

Distributes videotapes of a TV interview with South African Counsel General.

Fees: not indicated.

Republic of South Africa

Riley & Fox, Inc.

Washington, D.C.

Albert A. Fox, Jr. and Stephen F. Riley

Registered April 1986; successors to firm of Smathers, Hickey & Riley as principal Washington lobbyists for South Africa.

Contract: \$360,000 per year; \$45,000 expenses.

Republic of South Africa
(See also Chamber of
Mines, below)

Kathleen Rothschild

Glencoe, Illinois

Registered in 1988 to lobby state and local officials for closer ties between South Africa and the U.S.

1988 contract: \$72,000; \$8,000 expenses.

Republic of South Africa
Consulate General,
Chicago

Law Offices of John P. Sears

Washington, D.C.

A principal lobbyist since 1980; provides legal advice, arranges meetings with U.S. officials; opposes economic sanctions in Congress.

1987-88 contract: \$410,000 per year;
\$20,000 expenses

Republic of South Africa

Smathers, Hickey & Riley

Washington, D.C.

Contacts with U.S. officials, mainly lobbying against sanctions; advised South Africa on U.S. foreign and domestic policy (see Riley & Fox).

1985-86 contract: \$300,000 per year.

Republic of South Africa

United International Consultants

Washington, D.C.

Michael Hathaway and Joan Baldwin

Counsels South Africa on domestic policies impacting on South Africa; arranges meetings between South African and U.S. officials.

1987-88 contract: \$360,000 per year; \$30,000 expenses.

Republic of South Africa

Public Service Audience Planners

Calabasas, California

Promotes and distributes films on behalf of South Africa.

1984-85 fees: \$27,153 (SA Embassy); \$61,007.72 (SA Tourist Corp.).

Republic of South Africa;
South African
Tourist Corporation

Global U.S.A., Inc.

Washington, D.C.

Meetings with administration officials and members of Congress; distribution of brochures to TV and radio stations.

1986 fees: \$112,500.

Bophuthatswana

(Republic of South Africa)

Transkei, Washington Bureau

Washington, D.C.

Seeks support for agricultural, health and education programs; has lobbied for exemption from sanctions against South Africa.

Expenses, year ending March 1988: \$551,400.

Transkei

(Republic of South Africa)

Ellis Associates

New York, New York

Peter J. Celliers

Distributed tourism videotape to television producers and personalities; advised travel and nature writers and photographers on trips to South Africa.

For year ending October 1987: \$77,000.

South African Tourist Board

South African Tourist Board

New York, New York

Conducts publicity campaigns to encourage tourism to South Africa. Represents South Africa at government, business, and social functions.

1985 disbursements: \$1,513,400.

South African Tourist Board

Modern Talking Pictures Service, Inc.
 New York, New York
 Guilford Kater
 Distributes South African films in the U.S.:
Shaka Zulu
White Gold
Rourke's Drift Mission
The Rich on Safari
Africa's Miracle Eye Doctors
Operation Hunger
Reed Dance
Kimberley's Past Relived

"No compensation received directly from foreign principal."

Global News Service
 Johannesburg, South Africa
 (receives funds from the
 government-controlled
 South African Broadcasting
 Corporation)

AGENTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S SURROGATES: UNITA AND RENAMO

Agent/Activity/Fee

Principal

Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly, Inc.
 Washington, D.C.
 Lobbyists with top-level access in the Reagan
 administration; coordinated 1985 and 1988 U.S.
 visits of Jonas Savimbi.
 Contract: \$600,000 per year.

Unita

Unita, U.S.A.
 (Also: Free Angola Information Service;
 Free Angola Foundation)
 Washington, D.C.
 Jardow Meualia, president
 Office representing Unita in the U.S.; lobbies
 and contracts for other lobbying and publicity activities.
 Receipts from foreign principal 1986: \$159,161.
 Receipts from foreign principal 1980-1986: \$522,204.
 Disbursements 1987: \$899,697.

Unita

American Expressions, Inc.
 Memphis, Tennessee
 Met with government agencies, press, etc.
 Registered in 1987
 1987 contract: \$135,000.

Free Angola
 Information Service
 (Unita)

Government Relations International
 Washington, D.C.
 Maurice Dawkins, president
 Promotes Unita with black organizations and
 leaders: media, clergy, politicians, business,
 labor and civil rights groups, retired black
 military officers; targets Texas, Arizona,
 Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, and Mississippi.
 1987 contract: \$180,000 per year.

Free Angola
 Information Service
 (Unita)

Griffin Communications Vienna, Virginia Publicity services, publishes <i>Kwacha News</i> 1987 fees: \$21,211.	Free Angola Information Service (Unita)
Clarence V. McKee, Esq. Washington, D.C. Lobbying activities. Fees and expenses 1987: \$87,847.	Free Angola Information Service (Unita)
Kenneth Barry Schochet Washington, D.C. Works with Free Angola Information Service. 1987 fees: \$78,000.	Free Angola Information Service (Unita)
NAP International, Inc. Alexandria, Virginia Nicholas Panuzio, president Public relations targeting Texas and Oklahoma. 1987 fees: \$100,000 (6-month period).	Unita
National Media International, Inc. Alexandria, Virginia Joel Danke Media consulting service, targeting Oklahoma and Texas. 1987 fees: \$100,000 (6-month period)	Unita
TKC International, Inc. Washington, D.C. Jonathan Bair Slade Lobbyists, met with 76 members of Congress; coordinate with Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly. 1987 contract: \$300,000.	Free Angola Information Service (Unita)
Keefe Company International Washington, D.C. Public relations. 1986 fee: \$100,000.	Free Angola Information Service (Unita)
Namibia News Bureau Washington, D.C. Marion Smoak, Carl Shipley Registered in 1987 to disseminate information on Namibia; previously lobbied for the South African regime in Namibia through the U.S.-South West Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council and aggressively campaigned against anti-apartheid members of Congress. Fees and expenses, June-December 1987: \$90,784.	Transcontinental Consultancy Ltd., Windhoek and Johannesburg

Thomas D. Schaff, Jr.
 Mozambique Research Center
 Washington, D.C.
 Registered in 1986 to lobby and disseminate information supporting Renamo.
 File not available; receives part of \$36,000 per year support for Renamo from U.S. conservative James U. Blanchard III; \$15,000 contribution in 1988 from Freedom, Inc., whose director, Robert V. MacKenzie, joined the South African Army and trained Renamo members, 1980-81 (*New York Times*, May 22, 1988).

Renamo

Luis B. Serapaio
 Washington, D.C.
 Registered as Renamo's representative in the U.S.
 File not available.

Renamo

REGISTERED AGENTS FOR OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN INTERESTS

Agent/Activity/Fee

South Africa Foundation
 Washington, D.C.
 Represents South African business interests; lobbies U.S. officials; arranges trips to South Africa for U.S. officials and businesspeople; carries out speaking engagements and TV and radio interviews.
 1987 expenditures: \$292,000.

Freedman, Levy, Kroll & Simonds
 Washington, D.C.
 Registered 1988; John Chettle, former director of the South Africa Foundation's Washington office, joined firm-lobbies against sanctions for the South African mining industry and fruit exporters.
 Chamber of Mines, 1st quarter fees 1988: \$72,900.
 Unifruco 1987 fees: \$31,066.

Riley & Fox, Inc.
 Washington, D.C. (see above)
 Registered 1987 to lobby for the Chamber of Mines.
 1987-88 Contract: \$26,000 per year; \$15,000 expenses.

Principal

South Africa Foundation,
 South Africa

Chamber of Mines of
 South Africa
 Unifruco,
 South Africa

Chamber of Mines of
 South Africa

Rubinstein, Wolfson & Co. New York, New York Public relations firm retained 1988 by Freedman, Levy, Kroll & Simonds to publicize study by Wharton Econometrics on adverse impact on U.S. of coal sanctions against South Africa. Retained by International Gold Corp., 1983-84. Chamber of Mines fee: not indicated. International Gold Corp fees, 1983-84: \$469,500.	Chamber of Mines of South Africa
International Gold Corp., Ltd. New York, New York Promotional office for South Africa gold producers; promotes purchase of Krugerrands and other gold products. For year ending December 1985: \$23,259,549. For 6 months ending June 15, 1986: \$5,257,000.	International Gold Corp., South Africa
Gold & Liebgood, Inc. Washington, D.C. Lobbied against ban on Krugerrands. 1985 fees: \$51,189.	International Gold Corp., South Africa
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Washington, D.C. Retained to lobby against ban on Krugerrand sales. 1985 fees: \$174,701.	International Gold Corp., South Africa
Busby, Rehm, Leonard, PC Washington, D.C. Registered in 1987. File not available.	Ferro Alloys Producers South Africa
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue Washington, D.C. Registered in 1986. File not available.	South African Sugar Association

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act Records

Appendix 3

South African

Media Restrictions:

November 1985-June 1988

November 2, 1985. Under the powers authorized by the July 20 state of emergency all camera crews, photographers, and radio reporters are barred from areas of unrest under the state of emergency. Print reporters are required to obtain police permission to enter emergency areas and agree to police escort.

June 12, 1986. President Botha declares a nationwide state of emergency, which includes wider media restrictions:

- Filming, photographing or tape recording in areas of actions by security forces in areas of unrest without permission of the police are barred.
- Journalists are banned from publishing any statements deemed "subversive," including those encouraging opposition to the government, criticizing military conscription, promoting the aims of outlawed organizations, encouraging disinvestment, sanctions or other foreign actions against South Africa, and encouraging strikes, demonstrations, or civil disobedience.
- The authorities may seize copies of publications deemed to contain a subversive statement.
- Journalists are barred from reporting names of detained persons without official permission.
- Official information about unrest will no longer be provided by the police, but by the newly established Bureau for Information.

June 16, 1986. All reporters are banned from black townships and any other area of unrest, and they are barred from disseminating "any comment on or news in connection with any conduct of a [security] force or member of a force." This order was withdrawn on August 20, 1986 and reimposed on September 3, 1986.

June 17, 1986. Live satellite transmission of news by foreign broadcast media is banned. Since transmission must be delayed, news organizations become liable for any statements made in transmissions that violate the emergency restrictions.

June 18, 1986. The ban on reports on security force actions is extended to include six of the ten tribal homelands. Not included are those classified as independent: Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda.

September 3, 1986. After a court challenge to the June 12, 1986, media restrictions, new regulations are decreed by the Police Commissioner under terms of the Public Safety Act of 1953:

- No one may "announce, disseminate, distribute, take or send any comment on or news in connection with any security action" without official permission.
- Journalists are banned from being "within sight of any unrest, restricted gathering, or security gathering."

December 11, 1986. Claiming that South Africa is under a "revolutionary onslaught," President Botha issues wider restrictions on the media:

- News or comment, unless authorized or taken from parliamentary proceedings, is barred concerning security force actions, details of planned "restricted gatherings" or remarks made at such gatherings, the success of boycotts or pressures to enforce them, operations of "unlawful" local political structures (such as street committees or "peoples courts,") remarks by people under government restriction orders if they are thought to endanger public order, and the circumstances or treatment of people under detention.
- Making or reporting "subversive statements" without authorization is barred; "subversive statements" include any that undermine compulsory military service or encourage participation in any unrest, boycotts, civil disobedience, resistance to authorities, restricted gatherings or the operations of unlawful political structures.
- News organizations must submit articles they judge might be affected by these restrictions for approval by a new censor's office.
- Blank spaces in publications indicating censorship are barred.
- Journalists and photographers are entirely barred from any scene of unrest.
- Any publication may be banned for up to three months at a time or seized if deemed to contain subversive material.
- Statements made about detainees in court prior to a verdict or made by members of parliament not on the floor of parliament may not be reported.

The penalties for violation of the restrictions remain those of July 20, 1985. (Key aspects of these restrictions were overturned by a court ruling in April 1987, but were reimposed on June 11, 1987.)

January 8, 1987. The police commissioner forbids newspapers from publishing reports or advertisements deemed to further the cause of "unlawful organizations." The previous day several newspapers had carried advertisements by the UDF calling for legalization of the ANC.

January 29, 1987. A new government decree authorizes the police commissioner to ban publication of "any matter." The police commissioner then:

- bars advertisements that "defended, praised, or endeavored to justify unlawful organizations' campaigns, projects, programs or actions";
- widens the definition of "subversive statements" that may not be quoted by the media to include those calling for participation in or support of "campaigns, projects, programs or actions of violence or resistance against...the authority of the state" by any unlawful group.

June 11, 1987. The nationwide state of emergency is renewed, and the media restrictions of December 11, 1986 which had been weakened by a court ruling in April, are strengthened, including:

- the ban on media presence and firsthand coverage of unrest and the actions of security forces to quell unrest;
- the broad prohibitions on reporting "subversive statements."

August 28, 1987. Under the new press regulations declared under the state of emergency the home affairs minister assumes the power to suspend or impose prior censorship on publications. He may do this if after a series of warnings he deems a publication guilty of systematic or repeated publishing of matter:

- "promoting or fanning" revolution, acts of "unrest," or the breaking down of public order;
- stirring up feelings of hatred or hostility in the public toward a local authority, security force, population group or section of the public, or promoting the image or esteem of any unlawful organization;
- promoting the establishment or activities of structures for subversive purposes, such as opposing the government or military conscription, promoting the aims of unlawful organizations, or encouraging disinvestment or sanctions;
- promoting other subversive activities, such as boycotts, civil disobedience, stay-aways, or strikes;
- threatening public safety or order, or "causing a delay in the termination of the state of emergency."

The Minister established a "media relations directorate" to assist him in determining what is "revolution-supportive" in the media.

January 15, 1988. Under an amendment to the press regulations of August 28, 1987, the home affairs minister:

- need not provide grounds for moving to close or censor a publication beyond listing the items to which he objects; is not required to give notice of proposed action against a publication under the regulations, or to provide any hearing in connection with its action.

June 10, 1988. President Botha renews the state of emergency for another year, declaring that "there still exists a revolutionary climate in the country." Existing media restrictions are extended and new restrictions added:

- A new element is compulsory registration of those in the "news agency business." Such agencies and their staff must register with the government, and those found to contravene press restrictions may be shut down and individual journalists banned. Thirteen major news agencies are exempted including the Associated Press and United Press International of the U.S. Also apparently exempt are correspondents who work exclusively for a single news organization and are employees of that organization.
- Restrictions on reporting of unrest, security force actions and "subversive statements" remain in force. The definition of "unrest" is broadened to include "any conduct which constitutes "sedition" (i.e., opposition to the government or resistance to lawful authority).

A ban on publication of calls to boycott or impede elections is added to the types of "subversive statements" prohibited, with registered political parties exempted. This is clearly aimed at elections for black officials scheduled for October 1988.

- Publications appearing less frequently than monthly may be suspended for up to six months at a time.

- Publication of statements by leaders of banned organizations is prohibited if they could be seen as threatening public safety or the maintenance of order, or as delaying termination of the state of emergency.
- Publications appearing less often than monthly, as well as television, film, or sound recordings may be seized by the minister of police or the minister of home affairs if either believes the material promotes revolution, breakdown of public order, or hatred toward authorities.

Source: Committee to Protect Journalists, "Attacks and Restrictions on the Press in South Africa: July 30, 1985-June 25, 1988," New York, New York, 1988.

NOTES

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3. *The Observer*, September 27, 1987; "Free South Africa's Children: A Symposium on Children in Detention," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No.1, pp. 1-108.
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5. *The Citizen* (South Africa), June 6, 1988.
6. *Windhoek Advertiser* (Namibia), March 16, 1988.
7. Paul Jourdan, "U.S. Mineral Dependence on South Africa: Exploding the Myths," University of Zimbabwe, Harare, August 1988.
8. Anne Newman, "Pretoria's U.S. Lobby Tied to 'New Right,'" *Africa News*, December 16, 1985.
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12. *Financial Mail* (South Africa), March 15, 1985.
13. *The Washington Post*, February 15, 1984.
14. *Indianapolis News*, March 14, 1988.
15. *Metal Bulletin* (U.K.), June 9, 1988.
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18. *The Observer* (U.K.), October 4, 1987; "Secret Plan to Undercut Boycott Backfires," *Boycott Shell Bulletin*, United Mine Workers of America, No. 9, Fall 1987; Diane Bratcher, "The Neptune Strategy: Shell Battles Its Antiapartheid Critics," *The Corporate Examiner*, Vol. 16, No. 7, 1987.
19. *The Wall Street Journal*, April 28, 1988.
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21. *Journal of Commerce*, August 5, 1988.
22. *The Plain Dealer*, Cleveland, Ohio, October 28, 1988.
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24. *The San Francisco Examiner*, August 17, 1986.
25. *Ibid.*
26. Larry Kickham, "How U.S. Evangelicals Bless Apartheid," *Penthouse*, March 1988, p. 118.
27. Cited in *Ibid.*
28. *The Citizen* (South Africa), July 20, 1988; *The Star* (South Africa), August 31, 1988.
29. Kickham, "U.S. Evangelicals."
30. *Ibid.*
31. *The San Francisco Examiner*, August 17, 1986.
32. *The New York Times*, October 16, 1988.
33. Pippa Green, "Apartheid and the Religious Right," *Christianity and Crisis*, October 12, 1987, p. 327.
34. "Fact Sheet: The South African Disinformation Campaign," National Council of Churches, July 1988.
35. Pippa Green, "Apartheid and the Religious Right," p. 327.
36. *Newsday*, November 12, 1986.
37. *Advertising Age*, October 7, 1986.
38. *The New York Times*, January 9, 1988.
39. *The Observer* (U.K.), October 9, 1988.

40. *Variety*, June 22, 1988.
41. House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), South Africa, May 10, 1984, column 6253.
42. *Los Angeles Times*, November 21, 1986.
43. Brenda Randolph-Robinson, "The Depiction of South Africa in U.S. Textbooks," *Interracial Books for Children Bulletin*, Vol. 15, Nos. 7 and 8, 1984, pp. 3-14.
44. Jo Sullivan, "What the Mail May Bring," *Interracial Books for Children Bulletin*, Vol. 15, Nos. 7 and 8, p. 8.
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Richard Leonard, a writer and researcher, has worked as a consultant to the Africa Fund, the United Nations and other organizations. He is the author of *South Africa at War* (Lawrence Hill, 1983) and has written numerous articles on U.S. corporate involvement in South Africa.

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