



WASHINGTON NOTES ON AFRICA

Reagan's Zimbabwe Policy

The Zimbabwean people fought hard during the struggle for liberation to transform white minority ruled Rhodesia into a free Zimbabwe. Today, as Zimbabwe enters its fifth year of independence—led by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party—the people's struggle for economic justice remains a central issue. That struggle, however, is facing increasing obstacles as the West, and in particular the Reagan Administration, escalates its pressures on Zimbabwe. These pressures include US support for South Africa's campaign of destabilization, US extension and withdrawal of aid, and western support for International Monetary Fund policies which threaten to entrap Zimbabwe in serious debt.

The origins of Reagan's Zimbabwe policy lie in the 1976 policies of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—policies which the Carter Administration continued. These sought a peaceful transition to majority rule aimed at undercutting the Zimbabwe liberation movements and their support from the Frontline states and retaining western economic control over the Zimbabwean economy. As Kissinger explained in 1976 in making new proposals for Zimbabwean independence: "[W]e have a stake . . . in not having the whole continent become radical and move in a direction that is incompatible with western interests. That is the issue." Carter had learned from Kissinger's unsuccessful attempts to stop the Angolan revolution that similar radical transformations and US defeats must be prevented in the region. The 1979 Lancaster House agreement, with its restrictions on land use and a constitution unamendable for ten years, was an attempt to bring majority rule to Zimbabwe while maintaining its fundamental economic reliance on South Africa and western corporate interests.

The Reagan Administration has continued this effort in its policy of "constructive engagement," emphasizing the need to stop perceived "Soviet encroachments" in the region, cripple the South African and Namibian liberation movements, and ease international pressure against the apartheid regime in South Africa. The US and South Africa have evolved a joint strategy to maintain the regional status quo by creating a *cordon sanitaire* around South Africa, pressing neighboring

states to withdraw even token support for the African National Congress (ANC) and the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), the liberation movements of South Africa and Namibia, and ensuring South Africa's continued regional economic dominance. The strategy has also included efforts to overthrow the Angolan government, or at the least, force the withdrawal of Cuban troops sent to defend Angola from South African armed incursions.

An important part of this joint policy has consisted of US acceptance of South African military attacks on the Frontline states and support for anti-government guerrillas destabilizing those countries. To destabilize Zimbabwe, South Africa has reportedly trained and equipped 5,000 troops loyal to Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the Black politician who participated in Rhodesia's "internal settlement," and some 300 former combatants of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), as well as incorporating thousands of white Rhodesians in the South African military for use in anti-Zimbabwe sabotage campaigns. South African agents have infiltrated Zimbabwe, sabotaging Zimbabwean military aircraft and ammunition dumps, blowing up rail and pipeline links with Mozambique, and assassinating ANC representative Joe Gqabi in Harare. The aim of this destabilization campaign is clear: intimidate the Mugabe government so that it remains silent on South African apartheid and regional aggression, and reduces its support for the ANC and SWAPO. Frank Wisner, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, reflected the Reagan Administration's acceptance of South African policies in late 1983, saying: "[W]e hope to keep our eye firmly on the geopolitical realities in the region—and we hope the leadership in Harare will do likewise."

Aid with Strings

The "stick" of South African destabilization has advanced in tandem with the "carrot" of US economic aid. Although the US has been Zimbabwe's largest donor, this aid reflects less a commitment to Zimbabwean development than an attempt to keep Zimbabwe tied to western interests and to neutralize Mugabe's

opposition to Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy. The Reagan Administration had hoped that making Zimbabwe a "western success story" would convince it to consent to US strategies for Namibia and South Africa. As an "informed American source" told the *Christian Science Monitor* in November 1983, Mugabe was to be Reagan's "badge of credibility on Namibia."

Mugabe, however, has consistently rejected this ploy and, despite accepting US aid, nevertheless has become increasingly critical of Reagan's "constructive engagement" policies.

- On March 18, 1981, Mugabe said that it would be "most regrettable and harmful" to US-Zimbabwean relations if "the Reagan Administration were to lend its support to the South African regime and its policies of apartheid and regional hostilities. We hope sanity will prevail in Washington."

- At the African American Institute conference in Harare in January 1983, barely one month after Pretoria's brutal invasion of Lesotho, Mugabe denounced Reagan's policy of linking Namibian independence with withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, charging that US policy had "given solace to the South African regime." "That Pretoria is now more daring and aggressive than ever before," he continued, "cannot be doubted."

- In August 1983, before his second trip to Washington, Mugabe denounced "constructive engagement," saying it is "a policy of acquiescence in South Africa's policy" that had encouraged South Africa "to become more aggressive" toward the Frontline states.

The Aid Cut

In addition to Mugabe's criticism of "constructive engagement," recent developments have brought US-Zimbabwean relations to an all-time low. These have included Zimbabwe's abstention on a US-sponsored UN resolution condemning the Soviet Union for shooting down the Korean airliner, Zimbabwe's denunciation of the US invasion of Grenada and its refusal to support US intervention in Lebanon and, of a lesser impact, reported human rights violations in Zimbabwe. The Reagan Administration's response—shaped by its preoccupation with East-West relations and the need to placate its domestic right-wing, was to significantly cut Zimbabwe's aid.

The current US-Zimbabwe tensions began when the Mugabe

government abstained on a UN Security Council condemnation of the Soviet Union for its shooting down of the Korean airliner. One of only two African countries sitting on the Security Council, Zimbabwe was opposed to the Cold War hysteria raised by the Reagan Administration over the incident. Since pro-western Zaire, the other African state, supported the US resolution, the Zimbabwean government abstained in order to represent more non-aligned African countries.

By conducting an autonomous and non-aligned foreign policy, Zimbabwe became entangled in the strings attached to US foreign aid. M. Peter McPherson, director of the US Agency for International Development (AID), wrote an internal confidential memorandum on October 3, 1983 to Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, urging that "a strong American response be quickly forthcoming to Zimbabwe's abstention," and that, "up to a 50 percent reduction immediately . . . is, therefore, appropriate." McPherson's memorandum responded to a September 20 letter by Eagleburger suggesting the cut.

Tensions between the US and Zimbabwe increased when the Harare government refused to fall into line behind US interventions in the Caribbean and the Middle East. When US troops invaded Grenada, Zimbabwe co-sponsored the UN resolution deploring the US violation of Grenada's national sovereignty and international law.

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Mugabe further pushed for a strong response from the leaders of the Commonwealth countries at their November 1983 meeting in India. Mugabe and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda argued that the Grenada invasion might serve as justification for the white minority regime in South Africa to again invade neighboring Frontline states. Kaunda reportedly told the conference that if the delegates failed to condemn the invasion, "You will be throwing us to the lions." The Commonwealth conference reached a compromise calling for withdrawal of US troops without condemning the US for the invasion. Mugabe and Kaunda were proven right: South Africa soon launched a new invasion of Angola, specifically citing the recent Grenada invasion as justification.

The Mugabe government and the Reagan Administration had other differences over the US intervention in Lebanon. After the bomb attack on the US Marines at the Beirut airport in November 1983, US officials in Zimbabwe planned a memorial service in Harare. No Zimbabwe officials showed up at the service. The Zimbabwe government contends it was not informed of the service. US embassy officials say they were snubbed.

Zimbabwe's UN abstention and opposition to the US interventions in Grenada and Lebanon angered conservatives in and outside the Reagan Administration. Reagan's right-wing supporters, led by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), had been urging a more belligerent policy toward Mugabe since Zimbabwean independence in 1980. Helms, who had vigorously supported white minority rule in Rhodesia and advocated slashing Zimbabwe's aid early on, was incensed after Zimbabwe's votes in the UN. Conservative groups and publications pressed hard for a US reaction. Despite the fact that the Zimbabwe government was pursuing moderate domestic policies—Mugabe refused ANC bases in Zimbabwe and was



Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe.

Photo: Margaret A. Novicki, *Africa Report*.

enacting a non-confrontational, pro-western economic program—Reagan followed the right wing advice when Zimbabwe refused to support US Cold War plans around the world.

The Reagan Administration has also been concerned about human rights violations in Zimbabwe. Incidents such as murders by the Zimbabwe military's Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland, the detention of Bishop Muzorewa, the confiscation of former Prime Minister Ian Smith's passport, and the redetention of three white airforce officers after a high court acquittal have caused consternation in the administration and Congress. Conservatives in particular have condemned any hint of violations of white rights in Zimbabwe. The Mugabe government bristles at this conservative criticism, calling it hypocritical since these critics never spoke against Smith's violations of human rights during white minority rule in Rhodesia. Many liberals in Congress are also concerned, however, and while human rights problems in Zimbabwe did not cause the aid cut, they helped create the environment in Congress conducive to cutting funds.

Although public and Congressional opposition forced a brief administration retreat in October, AID cut the fiscal year 1984 aid by almost half (from \$75 million to \$40 million) on December 19, 1983. The administration proposed a further cut to \$30 million for fiscal year 1985. The full \$75 million would have comprised the third installment of a total \$225 million three-year pledge made to Zimbabwe in 1981.

The State Department denies there was any political motivation for the aid cut, saying it stemmed from overall Congressional reductions in AID allocations. Yet, Zimbabwe was obviously singled out. No other country received such an extensive cut. As Rep. William Gray (D-PA) told the *Washington Post*: "There was enough money to do \$75 million for Zimbabwe if they had wanted to."

Prime Minister Mugabe, in a December 23, 1983 press conference, called the cuts "extremely objectionable." "We are not on sale and will never be on sale to the highest bidder," he said. "We treasure our sovereignty and independence, so much

Despite promises, there has been no US economic aid for land purchases or resettlement.

so that we would rather be without a single cent from any source if securing aid meant selling or compromising our sovereignty."

Cuts in economic aid to Zimbabwe come at a time when Zimbabwe and the rest of Southern Africa are suffering from the worst drought this century. The drought, which has drastically reduced food supplies, has already lasted two years and may continue for two more. Six million people have been affected by the drought in Zimbabwe and Botswana alone. Zimbabwe has also been inundated with more than 60,000 Mozambican refugees fleeing the drought.

The aid cut further illuminates the Reagan Administration's lack of support for the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), the Southern African regional body attempting to break South Africa's economic stranglehold through regional development programs. The Reagan Administration has refused direct grants to SADCC, forcing the Frontline states to rely on bilateral assistance as the US contribution to SADCC projects. Since US assistance is very modest as is, a severe cut in aid to Zimbabwe sends a clear signal to Africa that the US wishes SADCC to fail.

US Zimbabwe policy cannot be separated from US policy toward the entire Southern African region. Even before the aid cut, the Reagan Administration refused funds for Mozambique,



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an important SADCC country because its port facilities can help land-locked Zimbabwe lessen its dependence on South Africa. By politicizing aid and injecting the Cold War into Southern Africa's struggle for development, the Reagan Administration has undercut SADCC, increasing South African economic hegemony over the region. US aid to countries in Southern Africa like Zimbabwe has been intended to tie those states to the West and keep their economies dependent on South Africa.

No Aid for Land

Other aspects of the US aid program for Zimbabwe are equally troubling. One-half to two-thirds of US aid consists of the Commodity Import Program (CIP), which grants or loans Zimbabwe funds to buy US capital equipment and raw materials. Although this aid is welcomed by the Zimbabwe government, critics are concerned that the CIP may benefit US exporters more than Zimbabwe.

CIP is designed to open up the Zimbabwe market for US exports, even if they are inappropriate to Zimbabwe's development needs. By encouraging imports instead of long-term local production, the CIP may strengthen the recipient country's dependency on expensive imports, rather than its future economic self-sufficiency. Prime Minister Mugabe reflected these concerns in a 1982 *Africa Report* interview: "One does get a degree of inflexibility in commodity aid programs and we have been requesting various countries to modify such aid. A country may tie us down to importing its commodities..."

Frequently forgotten about US economic aid to Zimbabwe, however, is that *none* of the money is for land purchases or resettlement, despite US promises made before independence. At independence an estimated 1.2 million displaced people needed to be resettled. Under Rhodesian white minority rule, 4.3 million Africans—over 98 percent of the population—lived on 41 percent of the land. The other 39 percent of the land was owned by some 5,000 white farmers who produced 90 percent of the country's agricultural exports. The new Zimbabwean government had the extremely difficult task of satisfying popular demands for land while maintaining the high levels of agricultural production needed to feed the population and continue earning export revenues.

As Zimbabwe enters its fifth year of independence, it has resettled only some 25,000 to 35,000 families, substantially below the government's own targets. A major obstacle has been the constitutional stipulation that white land owners be compensated—the "willing-seller, willing-buyer" restriction on land redistribution placed on the new government at Lancaster House. According to Zimbabwe government officials, during the independence negotiations, the US and Britain convinced

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US Assistance to South Africa

US government aid to South Africa for fiscal years 1984 and 1985 will amount to nearly \$15.5 million, more than in any recent period. While no direct government-to-government aid is proposed, the programs were described by a State Department official as "part and parcel of constructive engagement." The aid is "intended to help [Black South Africans] gain additional bargaining power for when the time comes to make their presence known in determining the future of South Africa," he said.

Yet, as one South African educator said in response to plans for US assistance, "We would have to presume the Americans would not pose something that would not be acceptable to the South African government." Indeed, the programs proposed do nothing to foster fundamental change in the repressive apartheid system.

Educational Assistance and Leadership Training

The majority of the \$15.5 million will go to educational and skills-oriented training programs for Blacks both inside and outside South Africa. The Training for Disadvantaged South Africans program, slated for \$4 million in both 1984 and 1985, currently provides scholarships for 169 students in the US through the Institute of International Education's South Africa Educational Program (SAEP), 17 students with the American African Educational Foundation (AAEF), and 21 students under the auspices of Aurora Associates, a Washington-based, minority-owned consultation firm.

Both Aurora Associates and SAEP rely on the respected Educational Opportunities Committee (EOC), an organization in South Africa headed by South African Council of Churches leader Bishop Desmond Tutu, to select students for the scholarships. The US Agency for International Development (AID) administers funding for both Aurora and SAEP. AAEF, however, relied on the US Embassy and US Information Agency (USIA) personnel in selecting its students. While it received no funding for additional students in 1984 or 1985, AAEF's program is still administered by USIA. This reliance on US personnel for choosing the students and its relationship with USIA has made many people question the Reagan Administration's objective in using AAEF.

Critics suggest the Reagan Administration's intent in financing these students is more to promote "constructive engagement" than to help Black South Africans acquire educational training. These doubts surfaced again when, in December 1983, students from all the programs were invited without prior consultation to meet with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker and US Ambassador to South Africa Herman Nickel. The students voted to boycott the meeting, although nine students, unaware of the others' actions, did meet with Crocker and Nickel.

The students protested to AAEF and SAEP officials that they did not want their scholarships politicized. (Aurora Associates did not participate, though several Aurora students attended.) In addition, the students feared that their credibility within the South African Black community would be jeopardized by the meeting, as it would appear that they condoned US policy in South Africa. The nine students who met with Crocker and Nickel strongly condemned "constructive engagement." The Reagan Administration's attempt to push its policy on the students was thus thwarted by their solidarity with the liberation struggle in South Africa.

A further \$2.15 million will go to the University Preparation Program, a voluntary tutorial program in South Africa admin-

istered by the USIA in connection with the Consulting Group, Inc., of San Diego, California. The program is designed to assist Black students to prepare for university entrance. The program and its author, Consulting Group president Kenneth Majer, have come under fire for failing to seriously challenge apartheid education, designing inappropriate and inadequately evaluated materials, and lacking plans for implementing the program. The Consulting Group has also tended to bypass community-backed organizations such as the EOC and the Committee on Higher Education. It has, instead, established links with Kwazulu homeland official educational institutions, the white-led Urban Foundation and the Inkatha-backed African Teachers Association (ATASA). Though Majer insists every effort has been made to reflect the wants and needs of the Black community such backing for the program never materialized. Although the problems still remain, funding has been continued—and significantly increased for 1984 and 1985.

Questions have also been raised about a new aid program for the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC) to train Black business leaders in South Africa. A large number of NAFCOC members are wholly based in the "independent homelands," not recognized by any country except South Africa. While NAFCOC wants an end to restrictions on Black business and declares there is an "eventual necessity" to scrap apartheid, it is in the good graces of the South African government. Though actual administration of the grant has not yet begun, \$3 million has been slated for NAFCOC in 1984 and 1985.

Another program consists of an \$875,000 grant to the AFL-CIO-affiliated African American Labor Center (AALC) for South African Black trade union leadership training. The AALC South Africa program, now in its first year of US funding, was begun in February 1982 to "close the wide gap" between Black and white South African workers. A September 1982 delegation to South Africa led by AALC Executive Director Patrick J. O'Farrell and AFL-CIO International Affairs Director Irving Brown was spurned by some independent, Black trade unions. These unions criticized the program's over-emphasis on leadership training to the detriment of rank-and-file members. A September 12, 1982 article in the Johannesburg *Sunday Tribune* cited fears among Black unions that the AALC program "could serve American investment interests" rather than the long-term needs of South Africans. The article reported the delegation's visits with South African government officials and concluded: "Government sources believe that... for the moment the needs of both governments coincide and the AALC will be allowed some access" (emphasis added).



"Why Don't They Lift Themselves Up By Their Own Bootstraps Like We Did?"

John Fischetti for the Chicago Daily News

Other Aid

On November 17, 1983, Congress approved \$1.5 million for aid to human rights groups in South Africa during 1984 and 1985, to be administered by US AID in blocks of up to \$10,000. Congress mandated the aid for "grants to nongovernmental organizations... promoting political, economic, social, juridical and humanitarian efforts to foster a just society... and to help victims of apartheid." Originally proposed by Sen. Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), guidelines were added at the insistence of House Democrats. Recipients must show community support and reflect "the objective of the majority of South Africans for an end to the apartheid system." No governmental or government-controlled institutions qualify. To date, no recipients have been named. It remains to be seen, however, whether institutions which would meet the criteria would accept money from the US government. It also remains to be seen if hand-picked trade unions or groups which the US government may want to promote will be included.

The US Embassy in Pretoria will have the authority to disburse an additional \$530,000 during 1984, and a similar figure in 1985. Most of this money is earmarked for small-scale rural development projects, including some in "non-independent" homelands. Some \$255,000 of this funding is slated for emergency drought relief, up from \$55,000 in 1983.

These programs fit well into the "constructive engagement" policy because they attempt to promote a Black middle class in

South Africa which will have more of a stake in the present system. The problems of South Africa, however, will not be solved "if only the Blacks had a little more education." This is bootstrap Republicanism transferred to apartheid South Africa.

In sum, the programs do nothing to foster fundamental change. Money for "education" inside South Africa means money for separate-and-unequal, racially segregated institutions that are among the cornerstones of apartheid. It lets the South African government off the hook for even minimal expenditures on Black education, allowing Pretoria to divert these funds for the military and police.

These programs do nothing to foster fundamental change in South Africa.

In fact, the Reagan administration has decided not to fund respected United Nations programs to assist the victims of apartheid. By instead choosing to "cultivate" South Africa's racist government, the Reagan Administration has made even more difficult the international efforts to dismantle apartheid and establish a just and free society for all South Africans. ■

Export Administration Act Still Pending

Congress OKs DC Divestment

On March 8, 1984, District of Columbia Mayor Marion Barry signed into law the District's divestment bill, passed by the Washington, DC city council on October 4, 1983 and under Congressional review since last November. Restrictions in the Home Rule Act regulating Washington's local government structures gave Congress the opportunity to veto the bill, which removes the city's funds from banks and corporations doing business in or with South Africa and Namibia.

That opportunity was seized by Rep. Phil Crane (R-IL), an opponent of both District of Columbia self-determination and economic sanctions against the racist South African government. Crane introduced a "resolution of disapproval" the day the divestment bill was transmitted to Congress from the city council. According to Home Rule procedures, Congress can veto District legislation if both houses pass a "resolution of disapproval" within thirty legislative days (that is, when at least one house is in session).

Extensive hearings were held in the House Subcommittee on Fiscal Affairs of the District of Columbia Committee on January 31. Opponents of the divestment measure did not dwell as much on the effect of divestment on South African apartheid as on whether the city council had the authority to control the public employee pension fund which is to be divested, and whether the pension fund would lose money after divestment. Several witnesses testified that the pension fund would not lose money (pointing to examples around the country of similar state and local divestment actions which *gained* money), and that the people of Washington, D.C. had just as much right to divest as the people in any other part of the country. One witness pointed to the irony of Congress trying to infringe upon the autonomy of the District government—representing a population that is over 70 percent Black—and the related issue of US support for the white minority regime in South Africa. Witnesses speaking in favor of divestment included Mayor

Barry, City Council Chairman David Clarke, Councilman John Ray (the bill's original sponsor), Philadelphia Councilwoman Joan Specter who sponsored that city's divestment bill, and many financial experts. Rep. Crane chose not to testify in support of his resolution of disapproval before the subcommittee, saying he had a "scheduling conflict." The subcommittee voted 6 to 2 in favor of the District bill.

On February 7, the full committee voted 10 to 2 to reject Crane's resolution. Supporters of DC divestment were: Reps. Ron Dellums (D-CA), Mickey Leland (D-TX), Fortney Stark (D-CA), Mervyn Dymally (D-CA), Michael Barnes (D-MD), Walter Fauntroy (D-DC), Romano Mazzoli (D-KY), Stewart McKinney (R-CT), and Thomas Bliley (R-VA). The dissenting votes were cast by Reps. Stan Parris (R-VA) and Marjorie Holt (R-MD).

The District of Columbia joins many other cities and states around the country which have also passed divestment legislation. Santa Cruz, California divested in November, 1983, and there are at least twenty-nine other states and cities considering similar bills. In particular, New York City and Maryland recently held hearings on divestment bills, and substantial action can be expected in Illinois, Pennsylvania and Florida, among other states.

In other sanctions-related news, the four South Africa-related provisions passed by the House of Representatives last October as part of the Export Administration Act are still pending. The Senate passed its version of the Act, with no South Africa-specific language, on March 1. A House-Senate conference will negotiate the final version. National mobilization in support of this legislation has been tremendous. However, continued pressure needs to be placed on members of the Senate Banking Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, whose members will be selected for the conference committee to resolve this issue. ■

Reagan Violates Arms Embargo

The Reagan Administration has systematically violated the mandatory United Nations arms embargo by issuing licenses for US military technology to South Africa. This has been documented in a report issued recently by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) based on data obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

From 1981 through 1983, the Reagan Administration issued licenses for \$28.3 million in equipment on the State Department Munitions List. That figure contrasts with \$18.6 million exported over the thirty year period of 1950 through 1980. Commodities with specific military applications are "designated as arms, ammunition, and implements of war" and placed on the State Department's Munitions List. It covers equipment from missiles and tanks to fuses and flak jackets. The arms embargo, made mandatory by the UN Security Council in 1977, prohibits the sale of "arms or related materiel" to South Africa.

According to Tom Conrad, researcher at the AFSC and author of the report: "Rather than outright sales of large weapons systems, exports by US corporations consist to a great extent of the building blocks of modern weaponry—components, unfinished sub-assemblies and other technology that can be easily submerged in large wholesale transactions."

The State Department admitted that it had issued the export licenses but contended that the equipment was for civilian use and thus did not violate the arms embargo. It contended that the exports consisted of encoding devices for use by banks and navigational equipment for South African Airways. Only in one instance, said the State Department, was a sale approved for military equipment—electronics equipment for howitzers and naval craft. In that case, the transaction was carried out fraudulently and the guilty parties were convicted and sentenced to prison terms.

The State Department response is misleading. First, the arms embargo prohibits the sale of military equipment "to South Africa"—not just the South African government. The Carter Administration interpreted the embargo in this way. In 1978, the State Department issued \$4.6 million worth of Munitions List licenses for sales to South Africa, followed by \$25,000 in 1979, and no sales in 1980. In addition, Olin Corporation, the first US corporation to be prosecuted for violations of the arms embargo, was convicted for selling Winchester rifles to private dealers in South Africa. Thus even if the equipment was intended for private users, its export would still violate the embargo.

Second, the "private users" in South Africa that receive this military equipment often have extensive government ties. While the documents obtained do not list the end-users of this equipment, William Robinson, Director of State's Office of Munitions Control, admitted that the recipients included two government-run installations, the National Physical Research Laboratory and the National Institute for Aeronautics and



Wasserman for Los Angeles Times Syndicate.

Systems Technology, both of which do classified military research for the South African government.

VAX Computer to Pretoria

These Munitions List exports are in addition to the highly sensitive equipment on the Commerce Department Commodity Control List being exported to South Africa. While the exact dollar amount of these exports is unavailable, Reagan rescinded Carter Administration controls prohibiting any exports to Pretoria's military and police in 1981. A provision in the pending Export Administration Act would reinstate those controls for one year, if it becomes law.

While "constructive engagement" allows these exports to assist South Africa's internal repression and external aggression, the Reagan Administration is working hard to stop similar exports to the Soviet Union. Under "Operation Exodus," the US Commerce Department and Customs Service are spending millions stopping high-technology exports to Moscow.

One case aptly shows the Reagan Administration's intent. In mid-1983, "Operation Exodus" stopped a Digital Equipment Corporation VAX 11/782 computer from reaching the Soviet Union. The computer was exported in separate components to Sweden and West Germany, where parts of it were seized. According to Customs officials, the computer was on its way to Moscow. What was little mentioned was that the computer reached Western Europe by way of South Africa.

This computer is highly sophisticated and, according to William Green of the US Customs Service, can be used for "missile guidance" systems and for "keeping track of troops and weapons." Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger echoed this assessment calling it "state-of-the-art computer hardware and software that would have supported and accelerated Soviet military modernization programs. Had the Soviets received this particular shipment, . . . they would have been able to produce faster, more accurate and more destructive weapons, and this computer system has a configuration that's identical to a number of highly classified American systems."

If the VAX computer can do all that for the Soviets, it must be able to do the same for the South Africans. But that has not been a concern at all of the Reagan Administration. Indeed, the computer reached South Africa under a valid export license issued by the Commerce Department.

The full extent of US-South African military collaboration is still unknown. But with highly sophisticated computers and Munitions List military equipment being exported and high level military and police contacts continuing, military support for the white minority regime is an important part of Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy. When asked in 1981 what was to become of the arms embargo under Reagan, a State Department official assured that it was "as solid as the Rock of Gibraltar." That rock crumbled fast. ■

NEWSBRIEFS

Clark Amendment Violations

The Clark Amendment, the 1976 law which forbids US covert or overt military assistance to UNITA or other groups in Angola, is being violated. According to an October 10, 1983 *Newsweek* article on the CIA, "training, arms, and financial assistance are given to the military forces in Angola."

This assertion was backed up by a January 22, 1984 *London Observer* article which claimed that US and South African envoys held "secret meetings" to discuss plans to supply arms to the Pretoria-backed UNITA in a joint effort to destabilize the Angolan government. The article was based on a confidential memorandum smuggled out of Zaire. The US Embassy in London called the document a "forgery."

The leaked memorandum also stated that an adviser from the Israeli military mission in Kinshasa was present at the meeting. Israeli military advisers are now in Zaire's Shaba province bordering Angola. The *London Times* reported last year that a 60-ton shipment of Israeli weapons "which docked in the Zairean port of Matadi in May did not find its way to the Zairean army," implying that Israeli military assistance to Zaire is being diverted to UNITA. During the Angolan civil war, the CIA funnelled arms and supplies to UNITA and the FNLA through Zaire.

The Reagan Administration's attempt to repeal the Clark Amendment in 1981 was thwarted by Congress. The law, however, does not seem to deter this administration. "Material help is not dependent on nor limited by the Clark Amendment," said UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in January 1982. "A great country like the US has other channels . . . the Clark Amendment means nothing." ■



Mozambique-South Africa Pact

Mozambique and South Africa have announced their intention to sign a formal security agreement. The announcement followed talks on February 20, 1984 between high-level delegations led by Major General Jacinto Soares Veloso, Mozambican Minister for Economic Affairs, and South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha.

Mozambique has been a staunch critic of the South African government and its racist apartheid system, and a strong supporter of the African National Congress (ANC), the South African liberation movement. However, because of its weakened internal situation and continuing South African destabilization, the Mozambican government felt the necessity to lessen regional tensions.

The South African military has made several raids into Mozambique in the last few years and trains, equips, and funds the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), a guerrilla group which has brutally attacked Mozambique's rural population. The MNR has also sabotaged several critical economic targets in Mozambique, whose economy has been faltering due to severe drought and colonialism's legacy. The proposed agreement, which, according to Pik Botha, "will not allow any form of subversion" against either government, should give

Mozambique some breathing room.

It is unclear how long it will last, however. Since the details of the pact have not yet been worked out, it is unclear what will be conceded by either side. Mozambique has said it will not renounce the ANC, but the pact will probably include restrictions on ANC operations in Mozambique. Although curtailing of South African support for the MNR is probable, a spokesman for the guerrilla group said it would fight on regardless of any pact.

Mozambique has also improved its relations with the US, which reportedly played a large role in bringing South Africa and Mozambique together. Maputo has for the first time appointed an ambassador to the US, Valeriano Ferrao, and Washington has sent Ambassador Peter Jon de Vos to Mozambique after three years without such representation. The results of any improved relations or non-aggression pacts remain to be seen. ■



New Congressional Group Acts in SA Detention

A bipartisan group of 13 Senators and 90 Representatives established a new Congressional caucus on December 5, 1983 that will "watch out for [human rights] activists around the world who are physically threatened" because of their efforts. The Congressional Friends of Human Rights Monitors, a project initiated by Rep. Tony P. Hall (D-OH) in cooperation with Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch and the Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights, will send letters and telegrams on behalf of its members in emergency human rights cases.

The group's steering committee, composed of Rep. Hall, Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), Mark Hatfield (R-OR), Claiborne Pell (D-RI) and Dave Durenburger (D-MN), and Rep. James Jeffords (R-VT), will pursue a "non-ideological" policy to protect persons in all nations. The new group will work with the existing Congressional Human Rights Caucus and the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Human Rights.

One of the first cases to be considered by the Congressional Friends of Human Rights monitors is that of Fr. Smangalis Mkhathshwa, general secretary of the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference and co-patron of the United Democratic Front. Fr. Mkhathshwa was detained on October 30, 1983 after speaking at a prayer meeting at Fort Hare University in the South African "homeland" of Ciskei.

In a January 25, 1984 letter, the new caucus urged South African Prime Minister PW Botha's "personal intervention with the Ciskei authorities to release Father Mkhathshwa without conditions and allow him to continue his peaceful activities on behalf of human rights of black and white South Africans."

Fr. Mkhathshwa was tried on March 7 on charges of "terrorism" and addressing a banned meeting. He was cleared on all charges and released. The charges carried a potential death penalty. ■

Reagan's Zimbabwe Policy, *continued*

the Patriotic Front to accept this restriction by promising extensive aid to buy white lands. As Dr. Elleck Mashingaidze, Zimbabwean Ambassador to the UN and the first ambassador to the US, recently explained: "[T]he American government, the Carter Administration then... made financial commitments to assist the new government of Zimbabwe to deal with the question of land..." The US State Department denies, however, that such promises were made. Nonetheless, no US assistance to buy white lands has been forthcoming.

Britain has been almost equally reluctant to fund land resettlement. Indeed, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher recently threatened to cancel all resettlement aid. As the *Economist* reported: "Britain would like to restructure future aid to Zimbabwe away from the present land resettlement program, placing greater emphasis on manpower training programs, and commodity aid schemes."

This US-British refusal to assist land redistribution is causing tremendous hardship for millions of Zimbabweans and has the deliberate effect of keeping Zimbabwe's economy in white hands. Landlessness has undoubtedly created some of the dissidence now seen in Matabeleland and has sparked widespread squatting across the country. As the *Washington Notes on Africa* predicted in spring 1980: "If money is not forthcoming, Mugabe will either have to ignore the constitutional requirement for compensation and risk isolation from western credit or ignore the demands of the landless poor." Any move on the part of the Mugabe government to refuse compensation will be the result of broken promises by the US and Britain.

The IMF Squeeze

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has proven one of the most reliable tools to maintain the West's grip on the Zimbabwean economy. World-wide recession, low mineral prices, drought, South African destabilization, and increased demand for imports have caused balance of payments problems for the new government. The Zimbabwean Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning, and Development, led by Bernard Chidzero, has opted for traditional, short term solutions provided by commercial banks, the World Bank, and the IMF. Many fear, however, that this short term remedy will mortgage Zimbabwe's economic future to the West as it falls deeper into a debt trap and is forced to abandon its program for socialist development.

Zimbabwe has gone to the IMF twice for assistance. In April 1981, the IMF authorized Zimbabwe to draw \$45 million on its initial credit line. The Mugabe government urgently needed this money to offset balance of payments problems caused by South Africa's withholding of 24 locomotives which prevented Zimbabwe from exporting large amounts of its bumper maize harvest.

Another \$336 million IMF loan was arranged in late 1982—this time with strings attached. (As a country borrows more from the IMF, the Fund can insist on changes in domestic economic policies.) Under IMF pressure, Zimbabwe devalued its dollar by 20 percent, froze wages, and raised the price of certain staple foods. Chidzero's 1983-84 budget, announced on July 29, 1983, introduced further austerity measures. These included a boost in the sales tax from 16 percent to 18 percent; lowering the threshold for who pays income tax; removing subsidies on dairy, wheat and maize products; a decrease in

government spending on low cost housing and land resettlement; a freeze on government expenditures for education and health; and a cut in demobilization pay programs for ex-combatants.

The IMF-induced austerity budget will only exacerbate Zimbabwe's current economic and social tensions since it hurts working and poor people the most. While South African destabilization and ZANU-ZAPU antagonisms have contributed to dissident activity in Matabeleland, ZANU's failure to implement 1980 election promises has played a role as well. Although significant progress has been made in education, health, housing, and raising minimum wages, a government freeze or decrease in these expenditures due to IMF pressures is sure to create more dissatisfaction. The dissident problem will be exacerbated by the creation of a new core of unemployed—ex-combatants whose pay has been cut and soldiers forced to leave the army—with no source of income and extensive military experience. Instead of helping Zimbabwe alleviate these problems, US-backed IMF policies are squeezing Zimbabwe tighter and tighter.

The combination of IMF squeeze, western politicization and cuts in aid, and South African destabilization is causing severe hardship and growing social unrest in Zimbabwe. That this is happening against the backdrop of military aggression against Mozambique and Angola and subsequent "ceasefire" schemes cannot be forgotten. Indeed, it appears as if the "carrot" now being extended to Mozambique and the "stick" used against Zimbabwe is an attempt to split the Frontline states in an effort to achieve US and South African objectives in the region. Thus it would not be surprising to see a rise in South African destabilization of Zimbabwe. As Michael Clough of the US Naval Postgraduate School wrote recently: "In Pretoria, reduced [US] support for Mugabe could be interpreted as a signal that the West would not be opposed to South African support for anti-Mugabe forces." Such a policy will only promote further turmoil and instability. ■

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