

# THE CAMPAIGN POLITICS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

The accelerating struggle of an increasingly militant African population against minority regimes has made southern Africa an important issue in the 1976 Presidential campaign. As the struggle for southern Africa comes to a head, the U.S. is formulating its response: whether to continue to back the minority regimes whose racism and repression have profited American companies; try to play a major role in determining who will emerge as new leaders and what direction their leadership will take; or foster genuine self-determination. These are the issues which underlie the campaign talk, whether the topic is U.S. intervention in Angola or paying whites to stay in Rhodesia.

American citizens have so far had little impact on what has been said about southern Africa in campaign rhetoric. The candidates have mostly responded to current news from southern Africa, but neither of them has said a word about the major uprisings that are shaking South Africa or what they mean for U.S. policy. Both President Ford and Jimmy Carter have also been silent on many specific but timely issues, such as whether the U.S. should recognize the Transkei's bogus "independence". They should be pressed to answer some hard questions:

## Questions for the Candidates

- How would you define U.S. INTERESTS in southern Africa? How do the uprisings in South Africa and the escalating war in Rhodesia affect your assessment?
- Should the U.S. WITHDRAW ITS SUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICA and tighten restrictions like Export-Import Bank policy and the arms embargo? Would you grant any concessions to South Africa for steps short of granting majority rule?
- How would you describe the role of AMERICAN CORPORATIONS in South Africa? What influence do you think U.S. investment now has, and should have, on official U.S. policy? Would your Administration place any conditions on U.S. businesses in South Africa, or advocate withdrawal of U.S. investments?
- Would your Administration withhold recognition of the TRANSKEI when it receives so-called independence from South Africa October 26? Would you support or oppose the Transkei's membership in the U.N. and International Monetary Fund? Would you consider establishing a U.S. naval base in the Transkei?
- Are there any circumstances in which you would order a COVERT CIA OPERATION or MILITARY INTERVENTION in any black- or white-ruled southern African country? Would you continue the escalating MILITARY AID to Africa?
- Will your Administration require United Nations supervised and controlled elections in NAMIBIA in which SWAPO can participate as part of any solution?
- Should the U.S. TIGHTEN SANCTIONS against RHODESIA by repealing the Byrd Amendment and closing the loophole in sanctions regulations which has allowed Mobil Oil to ship oil to Rhodesia from South Africa? Do you think the U.S. should help finance a multi-billion dollar package to encourage whites to stay in Rhodesia?
- In view of almost universal international recognition of the PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, when would your Administration recognize that government?



## Comparing the Candidates

### GENERAL POLICY

The FORD/Kissinger policy is aimed at protecting U.S. economic and strategic interests in southern Africa without being seen as an ally of racism by moderate black African states, and thus retaining tangible interests in those countries as well. Kissinger laid out an overall policy to try to meet these somewhat contradictory goals in his April 27 Lusaka speech and subsequent Congressional testimony, in which he:

- supported majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia and introduced corollary of "protecting minority rights"
- called for "moderate negotiated solutions" to avert war and "radicalization"
- called on South Africa to set time for Namibian independence and to include all political groups in negotiations leading to it
- called for "end to institutionalized inequality" in South Africa; later added "equality of opportunity and basic human rights," but not majority rule
- advocated stepped-up economic aid to black-ruled countries in southern and central Africa, and began negotiating increased military aid to Africa

This policy is now being carried out by Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy. He is focussing his crisis management on the growing armed struggle for liberation in Zimbabwe and Namibia. The key to a "solution" he sees as the leadership of South Africa and, secondarily, that of five "front-line" black-ruled countries.

CARTER told the N.Y. Times in June, "I personally agree with the recent posture taken by ... Kissinger as related to Africa." Like Ford and Kissinger, Carter:

- supports "aggressive diplomacy of peace encouraged by the United States" as over against "armed struggle sponsored by the Soviet Union"
- advocates "guaranteed majority rule, while protecting minority rights"
- urges a joint U.S.-European approach, adding that he would "let ... Great Britain play a major role in outside influence"

Unlike Ford and Kissinger, Carter:

- supports a "move toward majority rule" in South Africa itself
- therefore suggests U.S. "continue constraining our relations with South Africa"

### ON ANGOLA

The current FORD policy is in large part a response to the U.S. defeat in Angola, where the "prime /U.S./ objective /was/ to respond to an unprecedented application of Soviet power..." The Ford Administration:

- authorized over \$60 million CIA covert operation against the MPLA
- failed to prosecute any mercenaries or recruiters involved in Angola or Rhodesia
- refused to recognize the Peoples Republic of Angola
- vetoed Angola's application for United Nations membership

On Angola, CARTER:

- opposed intervention: "I would not have gone in;" CIA operation was an "excess"
- believes "Russian and Cuban presence in Angola" is "regrettable and counterproductive of peace" but "need not constitute a threat to U.S. interests"
- suggested that the U.S. might have responded to Soviet involvement with an "economic declaration of war" ending wheat sales among others

### ON SOUTH AFRICA

The FORD Administration has:

- ended South Africa's international diplomatic isolation by high-level U.S.-South African meetings for the first time since World War II
- authorized sale of six L-100's and other "dual purpose" goods; permitted South Africa to use such U.S.-supplied planes in its invasion of Angola, in border security patrols, and in moving police to quell recent urban uprisings, in spite of "end use" agreements to enforce U.S. arms embargo of South Africa



- more than doubled Export-Import Bank exposure in South Africa to \$265 million
- favored sale with Ex-Im backing of nuclear reactors and fuel to South Africa
- consistently opposed United Nations economic sanctions against South Africa

On South Africa, CARTER has made few policy statements, though the Democratic platform has many specifics (see last page). On economic interests, he said:

- "Heavy investments ... in industrial opportunities and banking" in white-ruled Africa is "possible mechanism that we might use jointly with government" to bring change, probably by urging companies to improve black working conditions
- "race relations experience" of the U.S. South could be helpful model
- economic sanctions are not needed since South Africa is so dependent on U.S.

**ON RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA** The FORD Administration has:

- called for repeal of the Byrd Amendment but failed to lobby for it
- so far has not prosecuted Mobil Oil or tightened sanctions regulations in face of evidence that Mobil has sold oil to Rhodesia from South Africa since 1966
- will compensate Mozambique for closing border with Rhodesia - \$10 million
- vetoed June, 1975 Security Council resolution condemning South African occupation of Namibia as threat to the peace, which would have justified sanctions
- supported January Security Council Resolution 385 demanding South African withdrawal from Namibia by August 31, calling for U.N. supervised and controlled elections; dropped call for UN "control" of elections in April Lusaka speech

On Rhodesia and Namibia, CARTER has made only one statement: "The U.S. should move immediately toward using leverage on South Africa to encourage the independence of Namibia and the beginning of majority rule in Rhodesia."

## How to raise the Issues

**WHY IT IS IMPORTANT** First, it is important to impress the candidates that there are many groups which back majority rule in southern Africa and which insist that the U.S. help that goal and not block it. Second, by pressing a candidate to be more specific about southern Africa policy, you may help define the limits of what he thinks of as politically acceptable when he takes office. Here are some suggestions for local activity during the campaign:

**QUESTION THE CANDIDATES** Attend any public meetings with the candidates where there will be questions from the floor; ask specific questions on southern Africa. If the candidates speak to a selected audience, find allies within that group to do the same. Plan your questions in advance and be sure to station people so they can speak quickly. Possible questions on pages 1 & 2.

**DEMONSTRATE** Work with a coalition in your community to demonstrate concern about southern Africa when the candidates appear. Agree on several general, clear demands; make your presence visible (eg. "Support Genuine Majority Rule in South Africa," "End U.S. Support for Vorster and Smith," "Jobs at Home, Not 'Aid' to White Rhodesians"). Be sure to contact press in advance.

**DON'T IGNORE CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES** Use the above approaches with them too. Also try to arrange a delegation to talk with local candidates about southern African issues, and to get a commitment on specific points.

**PASS ON THE INFORMATION** Please let us at the Washington Office on Africa hear what you learn about Congressional and Presidential candidates' stand on Africa. This will help a lot for lobbying next year.



# Excerpts from the Party Platforms

## REPUBLICAN PARTY

"...Our friendship for the African countries is expressed in support for continued peaceful economic development, expansion of trade, humanitarian relief efforts and our belief that the entire continent should be free from outside military intervention..."

"We support all forces which promote negotiated settlements and racial peace. We shall continue to deplore all violence and terrorism and to urge all concerned that the rights of tribal, ethnic and racial minorities be guaranteed through workable safeguards. Our policy is to strengthen the forces of moderation... We hope that the Organization of African Unity will be able to achieve mature and stable relationships within Africa and abroad."

"The interests of peace and security in Africa are best served by the absence of arms and greater concentration on peaceful development. We reserve the right to maintain the balance by extending our support to nations facing a threat from Soviet-supplied states and from Soviet weapons."

## DEMOCRATIC PARTY

"...We must adopt policies that recognize ... the inevitability of majority rule on that continent."

"The first task is to formulate a rational African policy in terms of enlightened U.S.-African priorities, not as a corollary of U.S.-Soviet policy. Angola demonstrated that we must have sound relations with Black Africa and disassociate our policies from those of South Africa to achieve the desired African response to Soviet expansionism in Africa. Our policy must foster high-level U.S.-African communication and establish a sound basis for dealing when crises arise."

"The next Democratic Administration will work aggressively to involve black Americans in foreign policy positions, at home and abroad, and in decisions affecting African interests..."

"Our policy must be reformulated towards unequivocal and concrete support of majority rule in Southern Africa, recognizing that our true interests lie in peaceful progress toward a free South Africa for all South Africans, black and white... We should support the position of African nations in denying recognition to "homelands" given pseudo-independence by the South African government under its current policy of "separate development".

"The Republican Administration's relaxation of the arms embargo against South Africa must be ended, and the embargo tightened to prevent transfers of military significance, particularly of nuclear material. The U.S. government should not engage in any activity regarding Namibia that would recognize or support the illegal South African administration, including granting tax credits to U.S. companies doing business in Namibia and paying taxes to South Africa. Moreover, the U.S. government should deny tax advantages to all corporations doing business in South Africa and Rhodesia who support or participate in apartheid practices and policies."

"The U.S. government should fully enforce the U.N.-ordered Rhodesian sanctions, seek universal compliance with such measures, and repeal the Byrd Amendment."

"Efforts should be made to normalize relations with Angola."

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