

Apartheid's Contras: Rural Terrorism and Mozambique's Struggle for Survival



Photo: AIM

Victim of the Homoine Massacre carried out by Renamo terrorists

FACTS:

- As many as one-third of Mozambique's 14 million people are at risk of famine in 1988.
- The principal cause of this human tragedy is not drought but war, instigated and directed by South Africa.
- South Africa's brutal contra army—the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR, or Renamo)—specifically targets civilians, development projects and social services, destroying peasant villages, clinics, schools and even food relief convoys. Massacres and terrorism are deliberate policy.
- Mozambique's transport routes are vital, as an alternative to South Africa, for the landlocked countries of southern Africa such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi.
- The South African government says it has stopped supplying the MNR, but the group still gets weapons and ammunition from South Africa by parachute drops and by sea as well as over the land border.
- The U.S. government has supplied food aid to Mozambique and has resisted far-right proposals to support the MNR. But the U.S. government has not put effective pressure on South Africa to stop its proxy war against Mozambique.

Deep Roots of War

Mozambique became an independent country in 1975, after a decade of liberation war. In the 1960s the colonial power Portugal had refused even to consider independence, and brutally repressed peaceful protest. At Mueda, in 1960, over 600 peasants were slaughtered while demonstrating for independence. The Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) was formed in exile in 1962. Reluctantly concluding that peaceful protest and diplomacy were futile, the Mozambican nationalists decided to fight for independence.

Portugal's regime, a fascist dictatorship at home, mounted wars of counter-insurgency in the colonies. Allied with white-ruled Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa, Portugal held off independence until the 1970s. But in 1974 Portuguese officers disillusioned with the unending wars overthrew the fascist regime, and negotiated with the African liberation movements for independence of the colonies, which also included Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome.

Many white settlers fled Mozambique, fearing Frelimo's plans for equality and development in the interests of the majority. Among them were hard-core supporters of the previous regime, and blacks as well as whites who had served in the secret police and special counter-insurgency commando units, notorious for atrocities.

Even before Mozambique's independence, Zimbabwean guerrillas passed through Frelimo-controlled areas to fight against the white-minority regime in Rhodesia. **Ken Flower, chief of Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organization, built a network of Mozambican informers, including deserters from Frelimo, in parallel with the Portuguese secret police. He called it the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR, or Remano).**

In 1976, independent Mozambique complied with United Nations sanctions against white-ruled Rhodesia, closing its borders to Rhodesian trade. The Frelimo government also granted sanctuary to the Zimbabwean guerrillas led by Robert Mugabe. In retaliation **Rhodesia launched air and commando raids, striking at refugees, Mozambican civilians and economic infrastructure as well as military targets.** They killed thousands of civilians. Mozambique suffered over \$550 million in damages. Rhodesian elite paratroopers trained the MNR recruits, and led them on commando raids.

Some of these white-led recruits were deserters from Frelimo, such as Andre Matsangaiza, the MNR's first military commander, and Afonso Dhlakama, his successor. Both had briefly served in the Mozambican army before being arrested for corruption, later escaping to join the Rhodesians. The Secretary-General of the MNR was white Portuguese settler Orlando Cristina, a key figure in the colonial secret police and a founder of the elite commando units of black and white Mozambicans used in the war against independence.



Photo: AIM/Joel Chiziane

Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano.

South Africa Builds a Monster

In 1980, when white Rhodesia fell and Zimbabwe gained its independence Mozambique hoped for peace. However, the MNR was transferred to South African control, its headquarters shipped "lock, stock and barrel" from eastern Rhodesia to the northern Transvaal in South Africa. This secret contra army became the major instrument in South Africa's war against Mozambique.

At times South Africa mounted openly announced raids on Mozambique, killing both South African refugees and Mozambicans. South Africa military officials claimed that Mozambique harbored bases of the South African liberation movement, the African National Congress. In fact, Mozambique and the other Frontline States supported in principle the ANC's struggle against the apartheid regime. But they also knew it was impossibly dangerous to allow bases so close to South Africa. The most that Mozambique and other countries directly on

South Africa's borders did was to accept South African refugees, and not look too closely at whether they were on their way to or from guerrilla training in more distant states.

In attacking Mozambique, South Africa not only wanted to force the Frelimo government to police the South African refugees passing through its territory. By blaming Mozambique and its Soviet ties for resistance inside South Africa, they also diverted attention from the internal roots of the conflict over apartheid. South Africa also aimed at making a negative example of a progressive non-racial African state, and at disrupting the plans for economic independence of the nine-member Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Mozambique's ports are crucial for the interior states such as Zimbabwe and Zambia. Without these routes those countries would depend almost totally on transport through South Africa, and would find it virtually impossible to support international sanctions against Pretoria. These tacit objectives became the primary responsibility of the MNR.

Colonel Cornelius (Charles) van Niekerk, who had served as South African liaison to the group, became in effect its new commander. Captured documents show that van Niekerk directed the MNR to attack rail lines from Beira and Maputo to Zimbabwe. Meeting with MNR leader Dhlakama in October 1980, van Niekerk promised to provide large supplies of arms and ammunition, as well as instructors "who will not only teach but also participate in attacks." The MNR's operations, at a low ebb for some months, soon expanded from central Mozambique to the north and south.

Responsibility for leading and supplying the group was given to Five Reconnaissance Regiment, headquartered at Phalaborwa in the northern Transvaal in South Africa, just 40 miles from the Mozambican border on the other side of Kruger National Park. **These South African special forces include blacks as well as whites, veterans of the counter-insurgency wars in Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique as well as South African nationals.** Some are stationed at MNR bases inside Mozambique, supplied by helicopter, parachute drops and sea landings. Others train new recruits at Phalaborwa and surrounding camps, or run liaison and supply operations using third countries. Sophisticated communications gear ensures regular coordination.

According to a white South African soldier who served as administrative aide to van Niekerk—and secretly passed information to Mozambique before being arrested in 1984—the black MNR commanders were paid salaries of over \$250/month (*ten times* the average urban wage in Mozambique). A large proportion of the MNR's lower ranks are recruited with varying degrees of coercion among illegal Mozambican migrant workers in South Africa, or kidnapped in attacks inside Mozambique. Thousands of boys, some as young as 11 or 12, have been forced into MNR training camps, often after being compelled to kill



Photo: AIM

Burying the dead: the Homoine massacre

The witness to such horror comes from Western journalists and relief workers as well as Mozambicans, and it is overwhelming. A few recent examples:

- Lino Manuel says he watched MNR guerrillas "kill one child by smashing her against a tree because she had been crying." (*Newsweek*, August 24, 1987)

- "Then I saw the bandits shoot six or eight women who had huddled together on the sidewalk, some of them with small children strapped to their backs." (Mark van Koeving, Mennonite agricultural worker who witnessed the Homoine massacre)

- Less than two weeks after 11-year-old Alfredo Carlos Mbulo watched antigovernment guerrillas hack his family to death with machetes, they had forced him into guerrilla training himself. "I didn't like training," said Alfredo, who said he was kidnapped the same night his parents and two brothers were murdered. "But those who wouldn't train were beaten." (*Washington Post*, January 5, 1988)

relatives or neighbors.

The MNR systematically targets social services and the peasants' own food production, in addition to vital economic infrastructure. They burn rural schools and clinics to the ground, kill or mutilate teachers and nurses. They incinerate civilian passenger buses and food relief convoys. They loot villages, forcing those alive to carry the goods to MNR bases. South Africa supplies the bands with arms, but rarely with food, so that they have to pillage to survive.

This campaign, escalating steadily from 1981, has created chaos in many areas. Together with drought in

1983-84, this led in some rural zones to such desperation that other bands of armed men, not necessarily linked with the MNR, sprang up, using violence for profit or for survival. On occasions, even government soldiers, supplied irregularly and inadequately, turned to banditry. **But the sustained violence depends above all on the infusion of South African supplies, and on the MNR's hard core of professional soldiers. Whenever Mozambican defense and recuperation efforts seem to be taking off, South Africa escalates the violence.**

schools destroyed or forced to close. **According to a study by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), by 1985 over 80,000 Mozambican children a year were dying from the direct and indirect effects of the war.** Mortality rates for children under five had risen to 375 per thousand, among the highest in the world.

At the small town of Homoine in July 1987, the MNR killed 424 people, including patients in the town hospital, pregnant women and new-born infants. The incident received more publicity than most because of the numbers,

Excerpts from the State Department Report on Mozambique:

"Those who have served as porters reported uniformly that discipline on these forced marches is extremely harsh. Those who cannot keep up, who rest without authorization, drop their burdens or refuse to continue, are routinely beaten very severely, sometimes until they are dead. Over half of those who served as porters said they were eyewitnesses to cases of porters beaten to death or executed for the reasons described above."

"Another function of the young girls and adult women is to provide sex to the combatants. From refugee reports it appears that these women are required to submit to sexual demands, in effect to be raped, on a frequent, sustained basis."

"Attempted escape from a [RENAMO] control area is often treated as a capital crime. . . . When individuals make successful escapes, wives and children left be-

hind may be executed in retribution."

"The 169 refugees who arrived at their current locations in 1987/1988 reported roughly 600 murders . . . of civilians principally by RENAMO combatants and RENAMO police in the absence of resistance or defense. The refugees provided eyewitness or other credible accounts about these killings which include shooting executions, knife/axe/bayonet killings, burning alive, beating to death, forced asphyxiation, forced starvation, forced drownings, and random shooting at civilians in villages during attacks."

For a copy of the Gersony Report, call the State Department Public Affairs Office, (202) 647-7577, or write Department of State, Public Affairs Office, 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20520.

Sowing Terror and Destruction

The toll of the MNR assault, on top of the colonial legacy of underdevelopment and the cost of the Rhodesian war, has been enormous. Economic production grew by 3% a year from 1978 to 1981. But between 1981 and 1985 it declined abruptly, by more than 8% a year. Since 1986, bolstered by new economic policies and international aid, there has been a slow recovery. But the tea and sugar industries have been virtually destroyed, only two of five crucial rail routes have been kept open, and rural trade is paralyzed in many areas. The total cost of South African destabilization added up to over \$6 billion by 1986, almost twice the country's foreign debt.

Mozambique's program of rural health won international acclaim in the late 1970s. By 1987, the Health Ministry reported, 484 rural clinics had been destroyed, about one-third of those built since independence. Hundreds of medical workers have been killed. The education system, which had begun to make inroads in Mozambique's pre-independence illiteracy rate of over 90%, suffered hundreds of teachers killed, and more than 2,000

and because there was an American eyewitness, an agricultural worker who survived by hiding in a shed. But virtually every Mozambican family can tell stories of similar incidents experienced by relatives or friends. On October 29, 1987, the MNR attacked a convoy of passenger buses and food relief trucks, killing over 200 people, many burned alive in the buses.

A consultant's report prepared for the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Affairs in April 1988 concluded that **the MNR had probably murdered at least 100,000 civilians over the previous two years.** The report, by consultant Robert Gersony, is based on three months of interviews (January-March 1988) with almost 200 refugees and displaced persons in camps in Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa. It is the first to be based on systematic individual interviews with such a large and dispersed set of eyewitnesses. Gersony interviewed randomly selected individuals at 25 camps for refugees and for displaced persons. Those interviewed came from 48 different districts in Mozambique, from all parts of the country.

The refugees overwhelmingly attributed the murders

and other abuses to the MNR. About 3% of killings were attributed to government soldiers and 3% to "unknown parties." There was no pattern of large-scale abuse by government troops, all the reports referring to shootings by individual soldiers. The report stresses that the interviewees were very positive about their identification of the perpetrators, thus contradicting the view of some analysts that much of the violence in Mozambique is due to unaffiliated "bandits" not tied to the MNR.

In MNR-controlled areas the local population was used to grow food and for portage, with death or severe punishment the penalty for the uncooperative, the weak, or those attempting to escape. The MNR undertook no political mobilization, and, according to the report, **"the only reciprocity provided by Renamo (MNR) for the efforts of the civilians is the possibility of remaining alive."**

Plausible Deniability?

Since Homoine, MNR atrocities have gained increased attention in the Western press. But the reports often play down the responsibility of South Africa. South African officials say they have nothing to do with the MNR. Visiting journalists sometimes say Mozambique has not

presented "convincing proof" of South African involvement.

It is true that there is no recent "smoking gun" evidence, such as a supply plane shot down, or captured documents more recent than mid-1985. **But there is irrefutable evidence that the South African Defense Force was involved from 1980 through 1985, despite their public denials. More recent evidence gives ample reason to doubt South African denials now.**

South Africa's takeover of the MNR in 1980 is confirmed by documents captured in 1981 and by Ken Flower, the Rhodesian intelligence chief who handled the transfer. South African Defense Force Corporal Roland Hunter revealed details such as monthly helicopter shipments of arms and the existence of at least three training bases in South Africa. (*Africa News*, December 21, 1987). His MNR "petty cash" account of \$125,000 reveals something of the scale of the operation.

In March 1984 Mozambique and South Africa signed a non-aggression pact known as the Nkomati Accord, in which each pledged to give no support to armed actions against each other. While declaring continued political support for the African National Congress, the Mozambican government limited the organization to a small diplomatic presence in Maputo. The treaty, which many in Africa criticized as too great a concession to South

Mozambique, on the east coast of Africa, is almost twice the size of California and has a coastline of over 1500 miles. It borders Swaziland, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania. The population is approximately 14 million people.


Parts of Mozambique were colonized by the Portuguese over four centuries ago. But Portugal conquered the whole territory only in the late 19th century. Under Portuguese colonialism Mozambique's economy depended on the export of migrant labor to South Africa and Rhodesia, on the ports serving those two countries, and on the production of a small number of cash crops, such as tea, sugar, coconuts and cashews.

In 1964 the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) began a war for independence, which was achieved in 1975. Already one of the most underdeveloped countries on the continent, Mozambique has seen its new hopes for development frustrated by constant war.

Mozambique's first President, Samora Machel, was killed in a suspicious airplane crash in South Africa on October 19, 1986. South African officials blamed the crash on pilot error, but Mozambique says the principal cause of the crash was almost certainly a false radio beacon which diverted the plane from its normal flight path to a mountainous area on the Mozambican-South African border.

Machel's successor, President Joaquim Chissano, is a veteran of the liberation war, who served as foreign minister since 1975.

SOUTHERN AFRICA



Africa, won much-needed diplomatic support for Mozambique in western Europe and the United States. But it did not end the war. Just before the signing, South Africa infiltrated as many as 1,000 new recruits and tons of new supplies into Mozambique. **The South African military, in direct violation of the treaty, continued its supplies to MNR.**

On April 25, 1985, speaking in parliament, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha for the first time officially admitted that South Africa had trained and supplied the MNR. But he said aid had stopped after Nkomati. Five months after Botha's speech, Mozambican and Zimbabwean troops took the central MNR base at Gorongosa, capturing tons of arms and documents revealing visits by Botha's own deputy, and air drops such as one with 26 tons of supplies in August 1984. Botha then admitted "technical violations" of the treaty.

According to the London-based Africa Confidential (December 2, 1987), South African special forces still direct and supply the MNR. Testimony from Mozambique confirms this judgment. A few examples:

- Eyewitnesses to an attack on Ulongue, in November 1986, said it was led by three whites, one speaking Portuguese and two others English with a South African accent.
- Jaime Juliao Mondlane, arrested in Mozambique in March 1987, admitted being employed by South African military intelligence to recruit for MNR among Mozambican refugees.
- Three cargo parachutes dredged from a lagoon in Inhambane province in June 1987, each 90 feet in diameter and with a capacity of 2.5 tons, had been used for an airdrop in May. In all, Mozambican sources reported ten airdrops in Gaza and Inhambane provinces in May and June. These supplies preceded the escalation of massacres in the area in late 1987, by MNR groups with new uniforms and weapons.
- Simao Leque, captured in September 1987, admitted being at the base from which the Homoine massacre was launched. He said they regularly received supplies from South Africa by helicopter.

More evidence has come from MNR members who have recently accepted a Mozambican government amnesty.

"Friend Commander Charles, we are already out of war material, mainly in the central and southern zones. . . . We would like to remind our friends of the promise they made us to continue to help us secretly." — From the President of Renamo to Friend Commander Charles, June 16, 1984.

"The Secretary-General and two of our men with 26 tons of supplies will jump from August 1, 1984 in the Drop Zone to the east of Inhaminga where the last drop of the volunteer took place in March 1984." — From Commander Charles to the President of Renamo.

MNR intelligence officer Luis Tome, for example, described South African landings of supplies by ship between Beira and the Zambezi River in late 1987. And former MNR commander Modesto Sixpence told of supplies of explosives arriving in 1987 in Macossa district near the Beira Corridor.

Most prominent among the defectors is Paulo Oliveira, former chief spokesperson for the organization. Stationed in Lisbon, he relayed information from the MNR's Phalaborwa headquarters to the western press. At a March 1988 press conference in Maputo he said South African military links continued, and referred to a Lisbon visit to set up new communication equipment by van Niekerk, promoted from colonel to brigadier since his appearance in the Gorongosa documents.

According to Zimbabwean white businessman Eddie Cross, top South African officials say privately that such activities—as well as regular radio communications between MNR bases and South Africa—are "unauthorized." Asked point blank by a South African journalist in July 1987 whether South Africa supported the MNR, Pik Botha said, "I don't know. I can say with a clear conscience that I don't know."

The Foreign Minister may be lying, or maybe he doesn't want to know. But even the U.S. State Department has cautiously concluded that "Pretoria still provides critical command and control, communications and intelligence support." **South African denials are credible only for those who want to believe them.**

Some South African businessmen and diplomats say—and apparently believe—that it would be better for South Africa to stop aiding the MNR and redevelop pragmatic economic ties for use of Mozambican ports, electricity and migrant labor. But they are clearly unwilling or unable to control the dominant military voices in Pretoria.

Strategies for Survival

Some outside observers say Mozambique's economic problems and strife are due primarily to Marxist policies and to mistakes of the Frelimo government. The MNR, they say, should be taken as a genuine opposition movement, its leaders brought into the government through a negotiated settlement. They argue this would bring peace and an opportunity for economic recovery.

This superficially attractive perspective is misleading in several respects. It exaggerates the MNR's capacity to provide a political alternative or to bring peace. It ignores the primary cause of the continuing war: the South African military. And it ignores the Frelimo government's demonstrated willingness to accept criticism, correct mistakes, offer amnesty to MNR fighters and explore any realistic prospect for ending the conflict by diplomacy.

Of course the Frelimo government has made mistakes. Mozambican leaders are candid about this, and some even say that a genuine opposition movement could have

gained much popular support. They cite such factors as the party's dogmatic opposition to religion in the early years, the failure to support peasant agriculture while wasting money on large state farms, and the sluggish and unresponsive bureaucracy. But, they add, **the MNR's terrorism has convinced people that if they have any hope at all, it is with the government.**

The MNR are no alternative not only because they have no credible political leadership or program, but also because they have little capacity to stop the war. Mozambique has offered an amnesty to those willing to return to society, and many are accepting the offer. But as long as the South African military refuses to give up the war, it can always find new recruits—by force or bribery—among a desperately poor population of 14 million.

In this context, Mozambique struggles to hold on. Given the odds against them, the fact of survival itself and the willingness to carry on year after year are eloquent testimony to the spirit of the Mozambican people and the capacity of the Frelimo leadership.

The central difficulty is less one of policies than of the material and managerial capacity to implement them. Widespread popular discussion preceding the Fourth Party Congress in 1983 raised many of the key questions, particularly the neglect of the peasant sector from which most Mozambicans gain their livelihood. Constitutional revisions underway since the 1986 People's Assembly elections are designed to enhance popular participation. Despite the enormous destruction, the Mozambican government has never lapsed into a purely "relief" mentality. **The relief effort must be accompanied by restoration of health and educational services and by new development projects, officials stress. But this all depends on resources and on security.**

In the economic sector, the centerpiece of the government's strategy is the Economic Recovery Program, involving drastic devaluation of the currency, liberalization of prices (except on basic foodstuffs), improving the efficiency of state companies and giving more leeway to the private sector. With IMF and World Bank approval, Mozambique has won rescheduling of about \$800 million in foreign debt on comparatively favorable terms. External aid pledged to Mozambique in 1987 came to about \$700 million.

The program has improved food supplies for the cities and towns, coming largely from surrounding "green zones." Key transport routes, such as the Beira Corridor, are being improved and defended. But the farther away from the cities and provincial capitals one gets, the more the problem is the availability of any goods at all. Goods from outside depend on secure transport, and peasant production depends on security.

The Mozambican army, with the aid of Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops, does defend strategic zones; the MNR has managed to hold only one district capital out of 120. An army reorganization in 1987, and new training from Britain and other countries, has brought improve-



Photo: AIM/Antonio Muchave

Schoolchildren, Zambezia Province

ment in some areas. But consistent defense of this area twice the size of California, much of it easily accessible to South African helicopters, planes and naval craft, would be difficult even for a well-equipped, well-trained army. To have a chance, Mozambican determination must be matched by outside resources.

Mozambique's Foreign Policy

The dominant note in the foreign policy of Mozambique has been independence. **Defining itself above all as a non-aligned African state, striving to build socialism at home and to support liberation for all of Africa, Mozambique has also been consistently pragmatic in seeking cooperative ties of mutual benefit with both East and West.**

In the southern African region, Mozambique has played a leading role in the political alliance of Frontline States and in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The Frelimo government not only supported the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe, but also facilitated the negotiations leading to Zimbabwe's independence. Frelimo has consistently said it supports the African National Congress in South Africa, politically, diplomatically and morally. But it has also recognized that Mozambique's geography and economic dependence require pragmatic relations with South Africa, and make support for the ANC's guerrilla war a practical impossibility. With other Frontline States, Mozambique has called for comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa by the western powers, the countries with the economic clout to implement them.

Mozambique has sought to balance aid relationships with a variety of countries. In the first years after independence those ties were closest with the Soviet Union and its allies, with China, with Holland and with the Scandinavian countries, all of which had aided Frelimo before independence. Mozambique regarded the NATO

countries which had supported Portuguese colonialism with some suspicion. The U.S., which mistakenly regarded Mozambique as a Soviet client, gave little aid.

Since 1982 Mozambique has made major efforts to develop closer relationships with Western countries. It is now a member of the World Bank, and has strong ties with the European Economic Community as well as the British Commonwealth. Mozambique now gets military aid from Britain, Spain and Portugal as well as the Soviet Union, and the European Economic Community has recommended that all aid donors provide non-lethal military aid to help protect relief and development projects. Among the major aid donors are the Soviet Union, Italy, Sweden and the United States.

What is the U.S. Role?

The U.S. Congress barred development aid to Mozambique in 1977, despite appeals for international compensation for Mozambique's losses in imposing Rhodesian sanctions. The Reagan administration also barred food aid in 1981, after Mozambique expelled several alleged CIA agents accused of passing information to South Africa. The "constructive engagement" policy of tilting to South Africa encouraged escalation of South African aggression against Mozambique, but there is no evidence of U.S. government support for the MNR.

Since 1983, the Reagan administration has responded to Mozambican efforts to improve relations. The U.S. facilitated the diplomacy leading to the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique, and has provided a limited amount of development aid as well as food aid to the country. **The State Department has criticized South African support for the MNR and confirmed reports of MNR atrocities.**

Far-right critics in the Republican party, with some supporters in the administration, have denounced this policy, calling for a cutoff of U.S. aid to Mozambique and for U.S. support for the MNR "freedom fighters." With the support of Republican Senate leader Robert Dole, Senator Jesse Helms held up the appointment of a new U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique for months in 1987, demanding a U.S. policy more favorable to the MNR.

Despite all the revelations of MNR atrocities, **lobbyists for the MNR are continuing a campaign to raise private support and to change official U.S. policy.** Groups like the Conservative Caucus, Heritage Foundation, Free the Eagle, the Mozambique Research Center and Freedom Inc. continue to put out propaganda against the Mozambican government. Key activists include a former mercenary who helped to train the MNR originally, and religious conservatives who falsely claim the Mozambique government is persecuting the churches.

But even the pragmatists in the Reagan administration have not delivered on their promises to Mozambique. Aid has been restricted by right-wing elements in Congress. And, while Washington has criticized South Africa's violation of the Nkomati Accord, it has not put strong pressure on South Africa to stop its war and has opposed comprehensive sanctions that could punish and deter South African aggression.

Additional copies of **Apartheid's Contras: Rural Terrorism and Mozambique's Struggle for Survival** are available for \$1.00 each for 1-10; 75¢ each for 11-50; 50¢ each for over 50 copies. (Add 35% for postage). Another resource available from WOAEF is **Renamo: Rural Terrorism at Work**, a one-page fact sheet, available for 25¢ each for 1-10, 15¢ each for over 10 copies (add 35% for postage).

What You Can Do:

- Oppose any far-right efforts to support the MNR.
- Support private efforts to aid Mozambique, through national agencies such as OXFAM, Church World Service and Africare, and through the Mozambique Support Network.
- Support increased U.S. aid for priority development projects in Mozambique and other Frontline States.
- Demand comprehensive U.S. sanctions against South Africa.
- Organize material aid campaigns for the people of Mozambique.

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