



## POLICE STATE STABILITY - 1966:

Since November 1965 the Minister of Justice has had the legal power of Preventative Detention. The results of arbitrary laws are: 3,000 Africans in "restriction", 800 in "detention", and 1,700 "in jail" for various political offenses. 70 prisoners are under sentence of death.

The Law and Order Maintenance Act and the Unlawful Organization Act forbid African gatherings, political meetings and demonstrations. The major African political parties ZAPU and ZANU are outlawed. The press has been heavily censored; reports of Americans who support Smith, still look conspicuous between the white spaces of censored material.

## U. K. AND RHODESIA - 1965-66:

On November 11, 1965, Ian Smith unilaterally declared independence from Britain (UDI).

Before UDI, Britain had repeatedly offered independence to Rhodesia. The only demand that was made of the white Government of Rhodesia was that there be some provision in the Rhodesian constitution eventually to enfranchise the black majority. This Rhodesia consistently refused. The sole reason for the rebellion was to keep in power and preserve for perpetuity the present minority, racist government.

Smith even rejected the face-saving proposals of early December, 1966, proposals which would have ensured a white majority for eight to twelve years. Wilson then withdrew all compromises and opted for NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority Rule).

Ian Smith: "I can in all honesty claim that I am not an advocate of majority rule" ... Newsweek, December 19, 1966.

Harold Wilson: "It is now clear that he [Smith] is a prisoner of some very racist and Fascist-minded people" ... in Parliament, Dec. 20, 1966.

Ian Smith: "We will never negotiate with Britain while Mr. Wilson is in his present position because he is waiting for us to reach the position of one-man-one-vote and this will not happen in my lifetime or in Mr. Wilson's lifetime" ... New York Times, December 23, 1966.

## U. N. ACTION ----- SANCTIONS

### 1. "The Right To Intervene"

- a) No single nation has formally recognized the Smith regime as a legal state.
- b) On UDI all the self-governing powers held by Rhodesia, reverted to Britain.
- c) Therefore Britain is now responsible under the U.N. Charter relating to non-self-governing territories.
- d) Britain sought U.N. assistance; after the Security Council determination of a threat to the peace, U.N. intervention is now in any case legal.

### 2. "A Threat To The Peace"

The threat to the peace inherent in the Rhodesian situation lies in Rhodesia itself. There are great risks of violence involved in the suppression of the fundamental rights of 94% of the population. Further, white minority rule cannot fail to incense black Africans to the North, Africans who themselves for many years suffered the sleights and indignities of colonial domination.



### 3. "Implementation Of Sanctions"

1966 'voluntary'

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
Rhodesia exports	\$400 million	\$224 million
Total U.S. imports from Rhodesia (official)	\$11.2 million	\$10 million
(N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1966 [estimated])	\$ 15 million	\$ 19 million)
U.S. imports included: Tobacco	\$ 0.6 million	\$0.9 million
Chromite	\$ 4.9 million	\$4.0 million
Pig Iron	nil	\$3.2 million

### 4. "Disruptive Economic Effects"

Shortages of foreign exchange, GNP dropped 15%, consumer spending is down, unemployment is up, sugar, cotton and auto industries are in crisis.

### 5. "Disruptive Political Effects"

- a) A Reconstruction Party is reported forming in opposition to Smith. The group is centered on prominent business and professional men. (New York Times, January 16, 1967.)
- b) Lord Malvern in January, 1967 organized a petition to request that Smith reopen negotiations with the British. 4,000 people signed.
- c) There are grumblings in South Africa about Rhodesian intransigence. In December, Die Burger, the influential Afrikaner paper, suggested a unilateral abolition of U.D.I. The article was censored in Rhodesia newspapers.

### 6. "Sanctions Loopholes"

- a) OIL -- Rhodesia is receiving all the petroleum it needs. Oil, from the Shell, B.P., Caltex and Mobil refineries in South Africa comes across the border either at Beit Bridge or by rail through Mocambique. Normal Rhodesian oil consumption is only 8% of South Africa's consumption and the refineries in South Africa have recently increased capacity, so that supplying Rhodesia is no hardship.
- b) ZAMBIA -- The skeletons of colonialism remain in Africa: Zambia's communications are directed southward through Rhodesia. If Zambia cuts off trade with Rhodesia she faces economic strangulation.

### 7. "Sanctions Proposals"

- a) Vigorous enforcement of mandatory sanctions, e.g., payment for Union Carbide chromite stockpile now held in Mozambique should be blocked; Friends of Rhodesia fund-raising in the U.S. for Smith should be prohibited.
- b) If sanctions are not effective in the next few months, undertake an air lift for Zambia to enable her to cut trade with Rhodesia.
- c) The U.S. and U.K. Governments should immediately cause Caltex, Mobil and Shell - B.P. to cease and desist refining and selling petroleum products in South Africa, as long as South Africa supplies Rhodesia.

## STRENGTHEN SANCTIONS

"We will not support policies abroad that are based on the rule of minorities on the discredited notion that men are unequal before the law."

*---President of the United States on the 1966 anniversary of the O.A.U.*

"A failure to resolve the Rhodesian crisis with justice to the African majority would inevitably strengthen the hand of extremism, violence and racism in the heart of Africa."

*---Ambassador Goldberg, letter to Washington Post, January 8, 1967*

## OUR PARTICIPATION

The American opposition to sanctions is well organized. Led by Senators Eastland (Miss.) and Fannin (Ariz.), backed by Congressmen Utt (Calif.), Younger (Calif.), and Gross (Iowa), the anti-sanctions group is packing the Congressional Record with speeches and resolutions. Thus, the Rhodesia lobby in Washington, D.C. comprises the inevitable Southern Democrats and ultra-conservative (anti U.N.) Republicans. But it is sad that Senator Dirksen's office is quietly campaigning for the Eastland resolution to recognize the Smith Government and resume trade with Rhodesia. The lobby is reinforced by a national press surprisingly ignorant and impatient.

The most likely effects of a successful Rhodesia lobby might be:

- 1) The Administration will ignore all other Southern Africa issues and resist tightening sanctions, at least until late 1968;
- 2) Ian Smith will derive moral support from American sources to prolong his struggle;
- 3) Certain U.S. trading companies might be persuaded to test the legality of U.N. action.

IT IS OUR DUTY TO ORGANIZE AND COMBAT the racists and illusionists of the Rhodesia lobby.

- 1) Make up delegations to visit Washington in March, April or May in order to lobby your elected representatives and other key Congressmen.
- 2) Persuade organizations to write the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- 3) Invite your Congressman to speak on the issue when he is next in the district.
- 4) Write your Congressman.
- 5) Write your local newspaper.

*Yesterday's issue is today's war; to combat tomorrow's conflict is our duty today.*