



UNITED NATIONS

CENTRE AGAINST *APARTHEID*

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL
AND SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS*

4/77

February 1977

SPORTS BOYCOTT IN THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST APARTHEID

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[Note: This issue contains a condensed version of an article by Mr. Lapchick, published in the Journal of Sport and Social Issues, Vol., No.1, 1976.

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77-03375

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From the moment that the United States team refused to dip the American flag to King Edward VII at the opening ceremonies of the 1908 Olympic Games in London, politics has been inextricably linked with the Olympic Movement in particular and international sport in general.

The most flagrant example of the politics of international sport is the case of South Africa. The controversy surrounding the participation of South African teams in international sport also marked the shift of major concern in the politics of international sport from ideology to a new factor: race and racism. This shift was, to a large extent, influenced by the rise of non-Western nationalism in general, and of African nationalism in particular.

The adamant refusal of the South African Government to permit integrated teams to represent their country, that is, the extension of apartheid into sport, has led to intensive global pressures and protests. In spite of those protests, South Africa was permitted to continue its international competition until 1970 when it was dismissed from almost all of the international sports federations and, most importantly, from the Olympic Movement itself. 1/

Apartheid, as the official Government policy, was introduced by the Nationalist Party after its victory in the 1948 election. Laws were gradually introduced to affirm the social system that had already evolved in South Africa since the Union was formed in 1910. Likewise, apartheid in sport only became "official" after the Nationalist Party's victory in 1948. Up to that point, it was the sports bodies themselves that had maintained the social system of segregation in sport. 2/ Since 1948, the Government has gradually taken control of sports policy. By the early 1960s, the pretense of independent sports bodies was dropped and policies emanated from the highest governmental offices, including that of the Prime Minister. In 1966 a Ministry of Sport was created to handle sports issues as they had become more complex.

When Prime Minister Vorster suggested that an integrated team from New Zealand might be permitted to enter South Africa as part of his "Outward Policy," a national election had to be called for in 1970. 3/

1/ See: The Times (London), 16 May 1970; Guardian (Manchester), 16 May 1970; Sunday Times (London), 17 May 1970; and Observer (London), 17 May 1970.

2/ Based on personal correspondence between Oscar State and T. Rangasamy, 13 May 1946.

3/ It should be noted that South Africa has also prohibited integrated teams from other countries from competing in South Africa. The 1970 New Zealand rugby team was the first integrated team ever to compete in South Africa. Prior to that time, numerous New Zealand rugby teams had come with no Maori players despite large protests in New Zealand in the 1950s and 1960s (see Richard Thompson, Race and Sport [London, Oxford, 1964]). A British cricket team that included Basil D'Oliveira, a former Cape Coloured cricket star, was personally banned by Prime Minister Vorster (See Basil D'Oliveira, The D'Oliveira Affair [London, Collins, 1969]; Peter Hain, Don't Play with Apartheid [London, Allen and Unwin, 1971], and Chris de Broglie, South Africa: Racism in Sport [London, Christian Action Publications, 1970]). Finally, Arthur Ashe, the black American tennis star, was also personally banned by Vorster from competing in the 1969 and 1970 South African Open. Numerous other less publicized examples could be given.

Although most observers of South African life were aware of the obvious fact of racial discrimination in South African sport, the international sports decision-making bodies, led by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), chose to allow South African teams to continue to compete. The decisions of these bodies in general, and of individual nations in particular, at times have seemingly been motivated by some means other than strictly sports criteria. In fact, these decisions, as well as internal sports decisions in South Africa, often seem as motivated by racial, economic and political factors as by sports factors.

As sport has become more and more important to the public and to leaders, it has become more and more apparent that politics has become an integral and growing, if unwelcome, part of sports, with significant repercussions both for the future of international sport and for the relations of the nations involved. The question of race and international sport is no small part of the politics of international sport.

The general purpose of this article will be to analyze how South Africa has used sport in its foreign policy and how the international sports community has responded to the reality of apartheid sport. Special attention will be paid to the role of the IOC and its response to apartheid sport.^{4/}

The importance of sport in South Africa's foreign policy

Several factors converge to make South Africa's sports image important to her wider overseas image.

First of all, as South Africa has become increasingly condemned in international political circles because of her apartheid policy, acceptance by the international sports community has become increasingly important to that sports-mad country. Within South Africa the illusion is created - and used by the Government - to tell South Africans that, yes, the international community really does accept us in spite of United Nations resolutions. When South Africa was temporarily accepted for the 1968 Olympics (they had not been allowed to participate in the 1964 Tokyo Games), the reaction in South Africa was one of joy. Reg Honey, South Africa's delegate on the IOC, praised South Africa's friends in the international community for their understanding of South Africa's position.^{5/}

^{4/} Since the study focused on historical and contemporary phenomena, a combination of documentary sources, newspaper surveys (South African, British and American), personal interviews, and survey of the attitudes of the national olympic committees was used to complete this work.

These sports leaders were thus able to tell the South African people that the opinion on South Africa, even in black Africa, was not as bad as it was being portrayed in the foreign press.

Internally, the Nationalist Party members used the readmittance as a justification for the Prime Minister's "Outward Policy." Part of that policy were the "concessions" made -- which will be described later -- to the IOC in Teheran in 1967. One Member of Parliament said:

"Nothing succeeds like success. Nationalists are supporting Mr. Vorster enthusiastically now for the simple reason that his politics work. The preliminary reports we have received from the constitutencies show that the tide of popular opinion is suddenly swinging strongly behind the outward-looking policies. Our people now know what it all means." 6/

The concessions that had been made were as follows: South Africa would send a mixed team to the Mexico Olympics and all would march under the same flag and wear the same colours; South Africans of different racial groups could compete against each other at the Games; a non-white olympic committee would be formed and each racial group would designate its candidates for selection; and, finally, a liaison committee of whites and non-whites would be formed, under Braun's chairmanship, and would make the final selections. 7/

On the basis of these concessions and the readmittance of South Africa to the Games, The Times (London) emphasized how important sport had become as a lever for diplomacy; that sport was the number one weapon of the outside in its attempt to change apartheid. 8/ A New York Times editorial called the concessions "revolutionary." 9/

But a legitimate question would seem to be whether world opinion changed South Africa's attitude or whether South Africa changed world opinion of apartheid? Many South Africans clearly felt the latter was the case. An editorial in Die Volksblad (Bloemfontein) summed up this view of the role of sport in South Africa's foreign policy with its comment that:

"Every international sports success of South Africa is a blow against our sports and political enemies." 10/

6/ Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 18 February, 1968.

7/ Star (Johannesburg), 22 March, 1967.

8/ Editorial, The Times (London), 17 February, 1968.

9/ Editorial, New York Times, 22 February, 1968.

10/J. Drysdale and C. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1969-70, p. B287.

When the South Africans sent their rugby team to Britain in 1969, Die Burger (Cape Town) said that the rugby team had an extraordinary responsibility to influence British public opinion in favor of South Africa. 11/

In reality, the answer to the above question would be that there is some truth in both propositions.

Obviously, if the Government could point to representative groups of black athletes and sports officials who adhere to the policy of apartheid sport, then the legitimacy of protests overseas would be seriously diminished.

There had been two important non-racial protest movements in South African sport: the South African Sports Association (SASA), formed in 1959, and its successor, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC), formed in 1963. 12/ Since blacks were not allowed in any white sports associations, all black sportsmen were members of SAN-ROC when the South Africans were banned from the 1964 Olympics.

It was at that point that the Government realized that it had to split the non-racial sports movement. It did this in two ways. First, it arranged for the formation of black associations that would be affiliated to the white associations in their respective codes of sport. Although such affiliation was clearly one of a subordinate status (the new black bodies never carried more than 10% of the vote), many blacks joined because of Government promises of international competition -- as representatives of black South Africans -- as well as promises of improved facilities and better coaches. However, it must be made clear that all concessions were strictly within the policies of apartheid at home.

The Government had already imprisoned Dennis Brutus, the inspiration behind the founding of the non-racial movement, for trying to go to Baden-Baden for the IOC meeting while he was under banning orders in South Africa. 13/ His successor, John Harris, was arrested for sabotage -- unrelated to SAN-ROC activities -- in 1964. 14/ Harris was convicted and executed. Dennis Brutus maintains that this was the end of the non-racial movement inside South Africa. 15/ Indeed,

11/ Ibid.

12/ Now called the South African Non-Racial Open Committee.

13/ New York Times, 22 September, 1963.

14/ Muriel Horrell (ed.), A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa: 1964, (Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations, 1965), p. 32.

15/ Statement by Dennis Brutus, personal interview, 27 March, 1973.

until SAN-ROC was reconvened in 1966 in London, under the leadership of Brutus and Chris de Broglio, white South Africans had a free ride in the international sports community.

But the question still remains: were black South Africans who remained behind and joined the affiliated associations allowed any choice, that is, could they demonstrate against sports apartheid without fear of severe reprisals? To answer this, we must look at what the consequences were for those who led the non-racial movement while it existed in South Africa: sports facilities were withdrawn to the point of yielding an effective end of that sport on a non-racial basis -- such was the case in football (soccer); 16/ black athletes were denied the possibility of international competition without first affiliating with the segregated bodies; 17/ travel documents were withdrawn from officials who represented non-racial sport; 18/ banning orders were issued for some non-racial leaders (Dennis Brutus, Wilfred Brutus and George Singh); 19/ some leaders were arrested (Dennis Brutus, Wilfred Brutus and John Harris); 20/ and imprisoned (Dennis Brutus and John Harris); 21/ or were, finally, forced into exile (Dennis and Wilfred Brutus, Omar Cassem, Chris de Broglio and Reg Hlongwane). 22/ In addition, numerous outstanding black athletes have been forced to compete overseas as a result of not being able to compete at home. 23/ Finally, after black spectators began to show their approval for every foreign team competing against white South African teams, they were systematically banned as spectators unless they applied for and received a Government permit to attend a specific event. 24/

16/ See: The World (Johannesburg), 5 August 1966; Editorial, The World, 29 August 1966; and Post (Natal), 6 November 1967.

17/ See: Star (Johannesburg), 19 August, 1963; and Post (Natal), 25 August 1963.

18/ See: Horrell (ed.), Survey: 1955-56, p. 227; Thompson, op.cit., p.22; and The Times (London), 4 December 1959.

19/ See: New York Times, 29 January 1962; Cape Argus (Cape Town), 16 September 1967; and "The African Football Confederation Memo on South Africa," 1 November 1967.

20/ See: New York Times, 22 and 23 September 1963; The Times (London), 31 May 1963; Cape Argus (Cape Town), 16 September 1967.

21/ See: New York Times, 22 September 1963; Cape Argus (Cape Town), 16 September 1967; and Horrell (ed.). Survey: 1964, pp.32, 93-94.

22/ See: Personal correspondence between Chris de Broglio and Jeremy Thorpe, MP, 18 July 1966; statement by Chris de Broglio, personal interview, 18 March 1970; statement by Omar Cassem, personal interview, 22 March 1970.

23/ Richard Lapchick, "The politics of race and international sport; the case of South Africa," (Westport, Greenwood Press), p. 10.

24/ See: The Times (London), 2 September 1955; 28 December 1957; and 1 February 1958.

It can readily be concluded that blacks did not, in fact, have the option to protest apartheid sport without very serious personal and collective repercussions. The knowledge of such repercussions severely weakens and, perhaps, destroys the argument of the South African officials that the blacks who do cooperate with the system are the ones who are representative of the black population in South Africa.

This brings us back to the Teheran "concessions." For black South Africans the only thing that really mattered was what would the concessions do for them inside South Africa? The answer came in no uncertain terms from Prime Minister Vorster in April of 1967 as he explained the concessions to his Parliament:

"I therefore want to make it quite clear that from South Africa's point of view no mixed sport between whites and non-whites will be practiced locally, irrespective of the standards of proficiency of the participants . . . we do not apply that as a criterion because our policy has nothing to do with proficiency or lack of proficiency. If any person, locally or abroad, adopts the attitude that he will enter into relations with us only if we are prepared to jettison the separate practicing of sport prevailing among our people in South Africa, then I want to make it quite clear that, no matter how important those sports relations are in my view, I am not prepared to pay that price. On that score, I want no misunderstanding whatsoever . . . in respect of this principle we are not prepared to compromise, we are not prepared to negotiate and we are not prepared to make any concessions." 25/

Thus, the internal ban on mixed competition was completed. It meant the effective end of the career of Papwa Sewgolum, the leading Indian golfer, after several years of indecision. He had been the only non-white allowed to compete in white events. -- although this "privilege" had been gradually removed since he won the Natal Open over Gary Player and 112 other whites in January of 1963. This was a significant decision as South Africa had received widespread international criticism after it forced Sewgolum to receive his trophy in the rain. The trophy was handed through a window in the clubhouse where the 113 white participants were being served drinks by the Indian servants. 26/

25/ Hansard Report, (Columns 3959-3964), 11 April 1967, in Report of the IOC Commission on South Africa, pp. 67-69.

26/ The Times (London), 29 January 1963.

This was, perhaps, aparth-id sport's most pathetic moment.

Vorster's statement also dashed the newly aroused hopes of other black athletes. Vorster then went on to the question of black spectators:

"In the second place our attitude in respect of sport is that attendance of members of one group takes place by way of permit, if at all. . . provided that separate facilities are available and as long as it does not result in situations which are conducive to friction and disturbance." 27/

In the light of these two parts of Vorster's speech, it became obvious to all who cared to examine the situation that sports apartheid in South Africa, had, in fact, been strengthened. However, because of the international concessions --- most notably, the sending of an integrated team to the Olympics --- right wing MPs and members of the Opposition in South Africa, as well as several leading South African newspapers, criticized Vorster for making radical concessions. In quick response to such interpretations, Vorster announced on the following day:

"If there are people who in any way believe or think that it can be inferred from my speech that all barriers will now be removed, then they are making a very big mistake." 28/

As Frank Braun announced the "concessions" in Teheran to the IOC, Vorster was telling South Africans:

"I feel compelled to warn sports administrators to read my policy statement on sport very carefully and not to raise expectations that cannot be fulfilled." 29/

Four months later, even the matter of sending a mixed team to the Olympics was cast into doubt by Minister of Sport Waring. Even while the IOC investigating team was in South Africa, Waring

27/ IOC Report, p. 69.

28/ The Times (London), 13 April, 1967.

29/ Eastern Province Herald (Port Elizabeth), 6 May, 1967.

announced:

"Our policy is separate sport and if the demand is made upon us -- a political demand -- that we must change our pattern of sport and mix it, we are not prepared to pay the price. We are quite prepared that our non-whites should take part in the Olympic Games. We will pick a white team and a black team." ^{30/}

With all of this information in hand, the white-dominated IOC voted to allow South Africa to compete in the 1968 Olympics. The IOC apparently chose to ignore the fact that absolutely nothing had changed for blacks in South African sport. This decision not only united the African and most other nations in opposition to South African participation, but almost destroyed the Olympic Movement in the process.

The Africans knew that virtually the only place that South Africa was vulnerable was in her international sports relations. An editorial in the Ugandan Government newspaper, The People (Kampala), summed up this position:

"Here is a field in which Africa does not need to plead, cajole or threaten other powers to take action against apartheid: we can act decisively ourselves . . . the South Africans do not consider it minor . . . What is our policy toward this infiltration . . . If we wish to accept their offers -- baited hooks, they have been called -- let us say so openly . . . Unless we face these serious problems, they are going to be a serious threat to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Once South Africa gets a hold inside the OAU, that is the beginning of the end of our anti-colonialism stand." ^{31/}

The African nations had formed the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA) in December of 1966. One of the first things they did was to pass a resolution calling for a boycott of the 1968 Olympics if South Africa was allowed to participate. ^{32/} This boycott threat was reiterated on the day before Vorster's "concessions" speech in Parliament in April and again in December. ^{33/} Therefore, the

^{30/} Cape Argus (Cape Town), 16 September, 1967.

^{31/} Editorial, The People (Kampala), 1 April, 1967.

^{32/} SCSA Resolution Concerning South Africa, Bamako, December 1966.

^{33/} See: The Times (London), 10 April, 1967; and Star (Johannesburg), 14 December 1967.

IOC had no reason to believe that the African nations would participate if the South Africans were readmitted.

On the eve before the Report of the IOC Commission was published in Grenoble, the African National Congress (ANC) broadcast an appeal on Radio Tanzania about the Olympics: "It is in the sphere of sports, the arts and culture that South Africa can be made to feel the full weight of international moral indignation against apartheid It is a cynical act of hypocrisy even to suggest that they will march under the same flag and sing the same National Anthem when they are prohibited from doing so inside South Africa. The test of whether there is race discrimination or not against the black people in South Africa can only be demonstrated by what happens inside South Africa We appeal to all men of good will, fair play and justice to exclude the white South African sports from the Olympic Games." 34/

As the decision neared, Frank Braun was constantly informing the press of how the people of South Africa accept and support the prevailing political and social order in South Africa. This brought on the wrath of the normally agreeable non-white newspaper, Post (Natal). In an editorial, it criticized Braun's statements:

"It is an arrogant, incorrect and political assumption to say that the population of South Africa supports the prevailing political and social order. Mr. Braun might be speaking for the majority of the white population of this country. But he cannot -- and should not -- pretend to speak for the majority of all people here. Non-whites are just as anxious to see the South African flag flying at the Mexico Games -- but not at the price of having to say we support apartheid and all the agony it has brought." 35/

In spite of it all, the IOC went ahead and voted South Africa into the 1968 Games. But the IOC got more than they anticipated. They knew that they would be boycotted by the 32 members of the SCSA. However, they apparently did not understand how far politics and race had permeated the sports world.

34/ ANC, Commentary #12, 30 January, 1968.

35/ Editorial, Post (Natal), 11 February, 1968.

With the full weight of the Supreme Council having been shown, the IOC was forced to reverse its decision.^{36/} It did so by a wide margin: ⁴⁷ for South Africa's exclusion, 16 for South Africa's participation, and 8 abstentions. ^{37/}

Prime Minister Vorster underlined the racist attitude that the black African nations had been talking about all along with his reaction to the reversal:

"If what has happened is to be the pattern of how world events are going to be arranged in the future, we are back in the jungle. Then it will no longer be necessary to arrange Olympic Games, but rather to have tree-climbing events." ^{38/}

But the Africans had already gained a new sense of confidence in their own power. They continued to press. In May of 1970 they were partly responsible for the cancellation of the 1970 South African cricket tour of Britain -- along with the militant opposition in Britain itself -- by their threat to pull out of the 1970 Commonwealth Games. It was the British Government itself that cancelled the tour as Home Secretary Callaghan called it a threat not only to the Commonwealth Games, but also to Commonwealth relations in general.^{39/} This was another example of how politics, race and sport had become intertwined.

However, it was the week before that the Supreme Council had its greatest triumph at the IOC meeting in Amsterdam. It had been expected that the IOC would vote to keep South Africa out again in 1972 but would not expel it from the Olympic Movement itself. ^{40/} But the Africans wanted more than this, and they presented 8 charges against South Africa in the light of its apartheid sports policy.^{41/} This, combined with Frank Braun's abrasive presentation to the IOC, defeated the South Africans who were expelled from the Olympic Movement by a vote of 35 to 28, with 3 abstentions. All press accounts expressed great surprise that the Africans had gathered such strength. ^{42/}

^{36/} SAN-ROC, News and Views, 20 March, 1968.

^{37/} IOC, Newsletter #8, May 1968, p. 150.

^{38/} The Times (London), 25 April, 1968.

^{39/} Guardian (Manchester), 22 May, 1970.

^{40/} Star (Johannesburg), 14 May, 1970.

^{41/} African NOC Charges against SANOC, Addressed to the IOC Amsterdam Session, May 1970.

^{42/} See: The Times (London), 16 May, 1970; Guardian (Manchester), 16 May, 1970; Sunday Times, (London), 17 May, 1970; and Observer (London), 17 May, 1970.

South Africa's historical relationship with the IOC

With all the evidence and, seemingly, the vast majority of world opinion against South Africa, it would almost seem more appropriate to ask why the South Africans were permitted to remain in the Olympic Movement until 1970 -- even though they completely violated all Olympic Principles on race and sport ^{43/} -- rather than how could they be expelled in 1970.

Perhaps the best explanation is that the IOC has been dominated by representatives from white member nations who did not oppose South Africa's continued good standing in the Olympic Movement.

The IOC, according to its own publication, Olympism, is a self-recruiting élite. Membership on the IOC is a result of election by existing IOC members. The statement that:

"It is customary to favor nationals of countries with a long Olympic tradition behind them,"

is reminiscent of the grandfather clause in the post-Reconstruction era of the South in the United States.^{44/} The custom was a convenient way of excluding representatives from nations that were colonies during the period when "a long Olympic tradition" could have been formed. In fact, the first two representatives from Africa were white men: Reg Alexander of Kenya and Reg Honey of South Africa.

The 1960s, during which 61 per cent of the representatives from black member nations of the IOC were admitted, only meant a minor change in the racial composition of the IOC. The representatives from the non-white countries had only 33 per cent of the voting power on the IOC in 1970. To achieve their 67 per cent control, it was necessary that 11 of the white nations represented on the IOC had two or more representatives.

Moreover, of the national olympic committees (NOCs) without an IOC representative -- which, in effect, means they are powerless -- only 12.4 per cent were from white nations while 87.6 per cent were from non-white nations. ^{45/}

^{43/} See: IOC: Rules and Regulations (Lausanne, IOC, 1972).

^{44/} Monique Berlioux, Olympism (Lausanne, IOC, 1972), p.8.

^{45/} All figures compiled from the official Olympic Directory, 1969 (Lausanne, IOC, 1969).

Sixty-eight per cent of the white nations polled were not opposed to South Africa's participation. However, 98 per cent of the non-white nations opposed South Africa's participation without complete sports integration in South Africa. Thus, it can be seen that the South African issue developed along strict racial lines.

It is also intriguing to note the exceptions to the more or less strict racial groupings. The full 32 per cent of the white nations who opposed South Africa's participation were from the Socialist countries, perhaps implying that their attempted alignment with the third world extends into the realm of sports. The only third-world country that did not oppose South Africa was Malawi. 46/

It must come as a shock to some naive sports enthusiasts to recognize the extent to which race and politics have become a part of the world of international sports. However, the world of international sport in the 1970s is a far cry from that envisioned by Baron de Coubertin, the man who rekindled the Olympic Movement to help bring world peace in 1894. It is now much more like George Orwell's view of international sport, as reported in the New York Times:47/

"It is bound up with hatred, jealousy, boastfulness, disregard for all rules and sadistic pleasure in witnessing violence -- in other words, it is war minus the shooting."

The world catches up with South Africa

However, the fact remained that in May of 1970 a full two-thirds of the IOC membership came from white nations. Obviously, many of these members had to vote against South Africa in May. What were the factors that caused them to change positions so very dramatically?

Three key factors can be singled out: the militant international opposition to sports apartheid, with its home in Britain, made South Africa's traditional allies less likely to support her due to threats to peace at home; South Africa's refusal to allow Arthur Ashe, the black American tennis star, to compete in the South African Open, at least temporarily cost South Africa the support of the United States; and, as has already been pointed out, the African nations, now with the backing of the other third-world nations as well as that of the Socialist countries, realized their own power to destroy the system of international sport as it is known and employed it to the fullest extent.

46/ The information was gathered in a survey completed in the spring of 1970 in which the NOCs were asked for their position on South African participation in the Olympics. .

47/ New York Times, 4 October 1959.

It took until May of 1970 for the MCC -- the body responsible for cricket in Britain -- to cancel the 1970 South African cricket tour of Britain. The MCC did this after an incredible amount of mismanagement and under extreme pressure from the Wilson Government. The tour had become a major political issue between Wilson and Opposition leader Heath, and had begun to arouse the passions of Britain's non-white population.

The meaning of the 1970 tour cannot be separated from the meaning of the cancelled 1968 British tour of South Africa. For both, the decisive issue was clearly racial. In 1968 Prime Minister Vorster refused to allow an integrated British team to enter South Africa. Basil D'Oliveira, the Coloured South African cricket star then playing in Britain because he was not allowed to play in his own land, was the center of the controversy. As a result of public pressure, the MCC was forced to cancel the tour after they themselves had seemingly tried to exclude D'Oliveira to avoid a confrontation with Vorster. Vorster's decision was clear:

"We are not prepared to accept a team thrust upon us by people whose interests are not the game, but to gain certain political objectives which they do not even attempt to hide. The team as constituted now is not the team of the MCC but the team of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the team of SAN-ROC . . . Leftist and liberal politicians had entered the field of sport and wanted to use it to suit their own purposes and pink ideals."48/

In spite of this humiliation, the MCC voted to go ahead with plans for the 1970 tour. This resulted in the formation of the Stop the Seventy Tour Committee (STST) under the leadership of a 19-year-old South African exile, Peter Hain. Ironically, it was Peter Hain, then a mere 15, who had delivered the eulogy for John Harris, the executed leader of SAN-ROC.49/ STST spontaneously decided to use the 1969-70 Rugby Tour of South Africa in Britain as a show of strength. It was quite a showing: Hain and STST brought out more than 50,000 demonstrators, resulting in 400 arrests and much panic in Britain.50/

The MCC finally responded by shortening the tour from 28 to 12 matches in 11 instead of 18 weeks. 51/ As the date for the tour opening came nearer, many anti-apartheid groups -- moderates and radicals --

48/ The Times (London), 18 September, 1968.

49/ Statement by Peter Hain, personal interview, 14 April, 1970.

50/ The Times (London), 29 January, 1970.

51/ Ibid., 23 February, 1970.

increased their pressure to cancel the tour. As has already been stated, the Supreme Council announced it would boycott the Edinburgh Commonwealth Games in July if the tour went on, which could have resulted in an all-white Games.^{52/}

When the MCC refused to respond to the threats of the demonstrators and the SCSA, the Government moved in, led by then Home Secretary Callaghan, who asked the MCC to withdraw its invitation. He explained:

"We have particularly in mind the possible impact on relations with other Commonwealth countries, race relations in this country, and the divisive effect on the community. Another matter for concern is the effect on the Commonwealth Games. ^{53/}

Thus, the South Africans virtually forced the British Government to move on this issue instead of cancelling themselves. This entire episode, which dragged out over three years, had a definite effect on the IOC vote in May.

Another factor with a similar effect was what has become known as the Arthur Ashe affair. The affair took place at the highest levels of Government in both the United States and South Africa. The facts of the story are quite clear.

Ashe applied for a visa to compete in the South African Open on 15 December 1969. On the same day, Secretary of State Rogers arranged for representations to be made to South Africa's Ambassador in Washington by Assistant Secretary of State Newsom, as well as to South Africa's Foreign Minister in Pretoria by US Ambassador Roundtree. Roundtree later met with Prime Minister Vorster on behalf of Ashe. Vorster assured him that he would take up the matter with his Cabinet, which he did.

On 27 January, Vorster and Foreign Minister Muller summoned Roundtree to tell him that the decision had been reached to deny the visa. They maintained that Ashe had political motives behind his trip. ^{54/}

Ashe later summed up their decision before the United Nations when he told delegates that the South Africans "did not want me because I am not white." ^{55/}

^{52/} Guardian (Manchester), 24 April, 1970.

^{53/} Ibid., 22 May, 1970.

^{54/} All facts are based on the testimony of Oliver S. Crosby, an official State Department spokesman, before the Sub-Committee on African Affairs of the House of Representatives on 4 February, 1970.

^{55/} United Nations Unit on Apartheid Papers, United Nations, April 1970, Hearing of Mr. Arthur Ashe, p. 3.

The humiliation, not only of Ashe but of high State Department officials, finally forced the United States to act in leading the move to suspend the South Africans from the Davis Cup. Like the British, the United States was left with no choice as a result of South African actions. The case was so clear-cut that even Australia, which along with Britain and New Zealand was South Africa's principal international supporter, voted against South Africa at the Davis Cup meeting. 56/

By 1970, no less than 89 nations had become actively involved in the dispute over South Africa's right to international competition. As has been noted, many of the decisions on whether or not to compete against South Africa have been made at the very highest levels of Government. Just as international competition has meant success for South Africa, a rejection of such competition has had the opposite effect. This can be judged, in part, by the severity of the verbal attacks levied against those who rejected South Africa in international competition (such as the attacks on the IOC in 1963, 1964, 1968 and 1970, and those on the British Government in 1970 after the cancellation of the cricket tour). But, more importantly, it can be judged by the calls for change in policy by South African whites as their sports isolation was nearly complete in 1970.

Post-isolation blues: a setting for change?

Beginning in December of 1969, with total sports isolation in sight, three important South African officials called for major policy changes in sport. 57/ When isolation was not only in sight but was a fact in May of 1970, the calls from white sportsmen and officials were not only for reform but for sports integration. 58/ It took isolation to get these sportsmen to talk about multi-racial sport. These sportsmen and officials were left with no alternative as a result of the actions of the international sports bodies: if they wanted to resume competition, the cost would clearly be the elimination of apartheid from sport.

Whether or not these calls for integration have led to any significant changes is open to serious debate. Obviously there is importance in the calls themselves. The 1973 South African Games were integrated. In November, Arthur Ashe competed in the South African Open and the black light-heavyweight champion Bob Forster, fought Pierre Fourie, a white man, in South Africa.

56/ Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 24 March, 1970.

57/ See: Natal Mercury (Durban), 16 December, 1969; and Guardian (Manchester), 14 December, 1969.

58/ See: Guardian (Manchester), 25 May, 1970; and Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 25, 26, 27, 28, and 30 May 1970.

However, integration in sport is far from being a reality in 1976. Until there is multiracialism at the club level in sports, any "breakthrough" at the national level can only be interpreted as a gesture to get South Africa back in the good graces of the international sports world. This is not necessarily meant to belittle the gestures: they are important. But the reality of life in South African society in general, and sport in particular, remains unchanged.

As long as this is true, South Africa's international critics will continue to attack the Government in the field of sports. The essence of that attack was summed up in an editorial in the Sunday Times (Johannesburg) on 31 May 1970, shortly after the IOC decision:

"South Africa's critics have simply discovered that sport is the most useful weapon they have yet found with which to beat us and while it is the sportsmen who are the sacrificial victims -- they are being ostracized and deprived of the right to participate in world sport -- the main target of attack is the racial policy of South Africa, or, to put it more precisely, the racial policy of the Nationalist Party."

The summer of 1976, saw a major effort to complete the isolation of South Africa. The United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid decided to recommend that all Governments impose sanctions against any national teams competing with racially-selected sports teams from South Africa.

More than 30 African nations boycotted the Olympic Games in Montreal rather than compete against New Zealand. This was because New Zealand had sent a rugby team to South Africa that summer.

In August, the Federation Cup tennis series (the women's equivalent of the Davis Cup) was boycotted by several nations. The International Lawn Tennis Federation is essentially the only major international sport body that allows South Africa to compete.

It is simply a reality that the boycotts and threats will continue as long as South Africa practices apartheid in sport.
