



ASSOCIATION OF CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
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CONTENTS

Letter from Executive Secretary	1
African Studies and U.S. Intelligence . .	2
ACCESS Report on Springbok Tour	5
ACAS Political Education and Action . . .	6
Why Optimism About a Namibian Settlement?	7
Recent Publications of Interest	8
We Say No to Apartheid Sport	9
Reagan Administration and Western Sahara	12
Summary of Solidarity Conference Papers .	14

LETTER TO ACAS MEMBERS FROM
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Dear Fellow ACAS Members,

In the fall I wrote to you on behalf of the Board urging that you join with us to revitalize the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars. It is our belief that as specialists in African Studies we are not likely to impact as individuals on American foreign policy but as a group of concerned scholars working together with other broad-based progressive organizations, we can and indeed must vigorously make our voice heard. We must challenge the Reagan administration's misdirected policies which are neither in the interest of the people of this country nor those of Africa.

During the past few months ACAS has made a number of important advances which I would like to share briefly with you. Our membership has tripled. The Research Committee is coordinating the writing and distribution of a number of "background" and "crises" papers produced by ACAS members. These will be distributed to all of you as well as to a national network of organizations concerned about Africa (American Committee on Africa, American Friends Service Committee, TransAfrica, Washington Office on Africa and the Inter-faith Center on Corporate Responsibility.) Our findings will also be sent to key Congressional members and the media. The Political Education and Action Committee is organizing a telephone tree to disseminate information quickly and to coordinate a national campaign on various issues.

Through this committee, ACAS has provided depositions and helped rally support for the Dennis Brutus Defense Campaign and we are playing a central role in trying to free Professor Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba detained in Zaire. We are also monitoring and collecting information about the massive deportation of Ethiopian students and expect to participate in an effort to block such actions. Finally, our plans for a high-quality informative newsletter to be published three times a year are proceeding well as are our efforts to organize ACAS panels at the African Studies Association and, hopefully, at the African Heritage Studies Association meetings.

In short both the Board and I are confident that ACAS can play an important role in defining progressive alternative policies toward Africa. For us to succeed we need your help and support. Please send us suggestions about the directions in which ACAS should move as well as criticisms of our initial activities and try to organize projects locally which we can help to coordinate at the national level. We, in turn, expect to increase substantially our communications with you and with the larger network of progressive organizations concerned about Africa.

Allen Isaacman
Executive Secretary

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE UNIVERSITY
AND THE INTELLIGENCE NEEDS OF GOVERNMENT:
SOME COMMENTS

David Wiley
Director, African Studies Center
Michigan State University

The following paper was presented at the annual meeting of the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges in Washington, D.C. and has been revised for a forthcoming American Council on Education Consultation on University Relationships with Intelligence Agencies.

The university community has given very little consideration to its relationship with the federal government intelligence agencies during the 1970s. Now, a series of new initiatives by the U.S. defense intelligence communities toward our universities has once again posed the issue of what should be the university's relationship with these intelligence needs of the federal government, as well as with the intelligence agencies themselves. We work in institutions of higher education which, normally, are devoted to seeking knowledge and understanding about the entire world and to service of the American community. Indeed, we cooperate, especially in the land-grant institutions, on the foundation of the principle that our universities exist to foster the intelligent service of the needs of the American peoples as well as the rest of the world.

We already serve the intelligence needs of the federal government indirectly. Our Title VI-supported National Resource Centers for the study of various world areas have educated the bulk of the national pool of scholars with foreign language and area studies training. These scholars and centers have written most of the foreign area studies texts, monographs, and articles and, thereby, provide the lion's share of the accurate scholarly knowledge on which any good U.S. understanding of the rest of the world must be built. Our foreign area and language centers are therefore national resources for the entire nation, even though we do not serve as part of the government bureaucracy. At the same time, we are members of an international community of scholars who cooperate to achieve a universal body of knowledge and understanding of Africa, of the United States, and of the global system in which we participate and to which we are linked. This knowledge is available to all who seek access to it regardless of nationality. This knowledge is developed about Africa only because of the existence of the international community of scholars -- above narrow national policies -- which allows African, American and other scholars to cooperate with each other in open conferences, empirical research, and shared teaching responsibilities in each other's institutions of higher education.

The issue of what should be our relationship to the intelligence agencies has been posed concretely by approaches of one of these agencies to several university foreign language and area studies centers and, more recently, to individual scholars in order to

propose a new partnership between those who have particular language and area studies knowledge and the agencies. In the African studies community, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has indicated a desire to develop a relationship with several of the leading African studies centers. The DIA has sought a direct tie, a public relationship, with us in order to provide funding for our centers for a wide variety of activities including travel and conference attendance of individual faculty members and the sponsoring of conferences and state-of-the-art papers and surveys concerning both African language and African social science issues. Assistance is also sought for specialized language and area training for analysts, on-call assistance for in-house studies and analyses, assistance with conferences, colloquia and workshops on specific regions, development of improved and updated bibliographies of regional literature, the preparation of improved, updated language training materials, and development and application of region-specific analysis techniques and approaches. Special emphasis was placed on the study of Hausa, Amharic, Somali, Swahili and Shona. Subsequently, the DIA has advertised in the Commerce Business Daily for expressions of interest from other individuals and institutions in the fields of history, political science, economics, geography, linguistics, cultural anthropology, social psychology, sociology, geophysical sciences, and interdisciplinary research. Research by the scholars may include studies of stability, elite groups, the social structure of a society and its ability to respond to modern conditions, and the linguistic and religious forces which drive the society. The research is to be unclassified. The DIA initiative is regarded as a demonstration program with initial funding of \$500,000 in FY 1982, possibly to increase to circa \$1.5 mill in FY 1983. Apparently, Africa is of highest priority for DIA at this time, according to the Research Monitor News.

This DIA initiative is part of a larger development in our nation as the Reagan Administration seeks \$316 mill. in FY 1982 in Department of Defense support for basic research from universities, a funding which several university presidents have supported actively in recent months. (See statements by the University of Rochester's Robert L. Sproull and Rutgers University President Edward Bloustein in this regard as reported in Science, Vol. 212, May 29, 1981.)

The directors of the ten leading African studies centers funded by the U.S. Department of Education have recently considered this matter. This included the directors from UCLA, Wisconsin, Stanford-Berkeley, Indiana, Illinois, Northwestern, Boston, Howard, Florida, Yale, and my own Michigan State. We are especially concerned because most of our institutions are under difficult financial constraints, because we could very quickly and efficiently use the money for good scholarly purposes, and because we have been consistently underfunded. Africa has never been the highest priority of the U.S. Department of Education for foreign language and area studies funding. Each year the African area centers receive approximately ten to eleven percent of all funds appropriated, totaling about \$3 million

for the entire nation's African language and area studies effort, including all Fulbright exchange programs, research, and center grants and fellowships. Thus, the entire annual federal expenditure to assist universities to comprehend the 750 languages and the culture, politics, policy, and economics of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa averages about \$60,000 per country and is spread across twelve universities.

As much as these Africanist scholars are committed to the welfare of this nation, this government, and the people of the United States, as much as we desperately need the support, and as committed as we are to an intelligent U.S. foreign policy about Africa to serve U.S. and Africa long-term interests, the African studies directors have developed a consensus that we could not accept these funds. We made this decision on the basis of our common commitments to the integrity of the scholarly process, to the maintenance of our collegial relationships with African scholars and institutions and continued research access to African nations, and to insuring the highest quality of knowledge possible about Africa.

First, we are committed to the integrity, openness, and public nature of the scholarly process. Most of our institutions already have legislated against engaging in covert or classified research. This commitment also means that our classrooms and our scholarly publications are open to all who desire them; therefore, we have said to the DIA that a relationship with one of our centers would not buy them very much, even if we agreed to accept that relationship. Our services already are free or set at bargain-basement prices to all students who enroll in our classes, study in our language programs, use our libraries, and read our journals. All of these services are available to employees of the U.S. government.

Furthermore, the existence of a relationship between a particular university and the intelligence agency suggests to our African and Africanist colleague that there is covert intention, covert collaboration, and covert ends of the work, even if it is not actually the case, especially in light of the history of the past twenty years. And even an open and public relationship almost certainly will eventuate in a request in some situation for covert consultation, if not research. Intelligence relationships with our universities are a threat because of the continuing existence of programs of classified research on some campuses, of recruitment of foreign students and faculty for intelligence activities (sometimes unbeknownst to those foreign visitors) and of covert collaborations between individual scholars and the intelligence agencies. Indeed, the continued use of "academic cover" by intelligence agency employees, both on our campuses, at professional conferences, and abroad, will continue to undermine the potential for any valid and constructive public cooperation between our universities and the intelligence agencies in the years ahead.

Second, and much more important to many area studies specialists, is the importance to our university centers of our relationships

with African scholars and institutions. Here we must note that there is great variation in the universities among the various foreign area studies centers and between the distinctly different practices of foreign area and foreign policy scholars. Many who study the northern hemisphere, especially the Soviet and East Europe, have received funding from U.S. intelligence agencies for some time, both through public and covert channels. By contrast, there has been less interest in Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America among the intelligence agencies and the Departments of State and Defense. As a result of this globalist bias in our intelligence agencies, those scholars who study the southern hemisphere have received relatively little intelligence funding over the years. Because of their easy access to the countries of Africa, our scholars have frequently developed excellent relationships with African academics, universities, governments, and officials. Despite these relationships, our African colleagues frequently conjecture that an individual U.S. scholar actually is an "intelligence agent" or at least that he will share all he knows with intelligence agencies. In Africa, this perception of U.S. scholars dates from the popularity of the book Hidden Government in the 1950's, from the various other exposes of the C.I.A., and, more recently, from John Stockwell's revelations in In Search of Enemies about the C.I.A. in Angola. These questions and conjectures have sensitized the North American Africanist scholar to avoid intelligence entanglements if he or she wishes to maintain research access to Africa.

In recent years, the African governments, some of which are very fragile, have grown increasingly sensitive to the possibility of foreigners meddling in local affairs, especially intelligence representatives of Eastern Bloc and Western governments. This great fear sometimes reflects the attempt of a local politician to whip up internal cohesion with the threat of a sinister foreign intelligence villain; however, the facts are that foreign intelligence agents have intervened; there is confirmation of intervention in the affairs of Uganda to place Amin in the seat of Milton Obote and to cooperate with Amin's Bureau of State Security, in Ghana in the unseating of Kwame Nkrumah, in Ethiopia to temporarily reinforce the Selassie Monarchy, in Zambia and Mozambique in recent months, in Angola and Zaire. The U.S. now has increased military and presumably intelligence liaison with the Pretoria government. All these cases are well-known in Africa and serve to increase the sensitivity of African peoples to the bona fides and the intentions of visiting American scholars. As a result, American Africanists, by and large, and especially those in the nation's largest centers, fear greatly that these new initiatives will link them with the deeply ingrained suspicion of what Western intelligence agencies plan for Africa.

The fear of this linkage with intelligence operations in Southern hemisphere nations is not such a great concern for scholars in the large centers for foreign policy studies, as distinct from foreign area studies. This

is because the former normally do not base their scholarship on field research in the foreign countries.

Furthermore, we also strongly believe that our access to Africa and our independence from the intelligence process constitute a vital resource which is in the strategic interest for this nation, this government, and indeed, the intelligence agencies themselves. As a result of this access and because these African states are relatively open societies, the quality of our knowledge as reflected in public scholarship, is excellent. When we study the politics, economics and societies of Africa, we frequently are able to see government documents and unpublished data, speak directly with political officials, conduct surveys of the populace, and even visit remote or disaffected areas. Our colleagues who study countries with which our government has more hostile relations, are limited to such methods as reading *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, listening to Radio Moscow, and studying satellite photographs. We think it is in the best interest of everyone in this society that these relationships of trust in Africa be maintained for the sake of the quality of knowledge. We believe that scholars who become closely associated with Western intelligence agencies, even in a public way, compromise this research access in Africa. The very nature of the secret judgements and plans of the intelligence agencies, which are not open for debate, requires that even if active intervention in African affairs were to cease, it would require some period of time before the open relationships of scholars with intelligence agencies could be accepted in Africa or on our campuses.

Third, we believe that the best interests of U.S. knowledge about foreign areas are served by the open and free debate and the pluralism of information and knowledge which have usually characterized our universities. There is a very great danger that a relationship between an intelligence agency and a particular university, a center, or a scholar may become the basis for limiting our understanding of the realities of Africa and the policy options there which exist for this nation. We believe that U.S. intelligence operations and political judgements concerning Africa frequently have revealed a globalist bias, which gives scant attention to local political realities, and an inability to comprehend African social and political complexity; therefore, these efforts have resulted in choices which are not in the long term interests of this nation and its economy. Furthermore, it is the very nature of government bureaucracies to avoid criticism of and dissidence from current policy even though these are the very hallmarks of free inquiry and scholarship. Just as officials in agencies sponsoring development projects in Africa frequently do not warm to social impact analysis or projects of evaluation research, so intelligence agencies, from all the accounts we receive, do not warm to strong differences of opinion or public debate about the wisdom of their choices.

In sum, the best long-term interests of this nation, its governments, corporations, and intelligence agencies will be served if first there is a careful separation of the

intelligence process from our universities and their scholars -- both in gathering knowledge and in operations. Not only will the quality of public knowledge about foreign nations be maintained or increased as a result of continued access, but the diversity of theory and opinion in the academic marketplace will better ensure the checks and balances which U.S. foreign policy needs to avoid the myths and over-generalizations about the non-Western nations and peoples.

Finally, the strength of our public knowledge about foreign peoples and nations will be realized only if the necessary funding for such a legitimate arena of peculiarly federal government responsibility is not only saved from the current budgetary reductions but is increased to a moderately adequate level. The recent proposals to slash both the Fulbright exchange and Title VI funding will further cripple our access to and knowledge about foreign nations. At this time, we urgently need greater engagements with the foreign peoples on whom our economic and political future lies. West Germany, which has only one-fourth the population of the United States, understands better her own global future and invests approximately four times the U.S. level for foreign studies and cultural exchange. At this key time in our history, our future well-being as a nation depends on our positive and public engagement with foreign peoples and requires us to maintain the diversity of scholarship with increased resources for an enlarged effort.

In conclusion, we, as Africanists, would recommend to those in the intelligence community that they not develop particular relationships with institutions, that they not seek to maintain a "stable" of specialists who are on standby, but rather that they seek the particular knowledge and information they need from their own agency area experts, when and as they need it. A kept "stable" of scholars will not best serve U.S. intelligence interests.

ACAS RESEARCH COMMITTEE

The Research Committee is compiling a list of scholars who will produce research papers on topics of interest to ACAS members. The papers will be circulated to members and to others who share our interests. If you (or a colleague) have done/would like to do research on topics relating to U.S. policy toward Africa, please contact:

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ACCESS REPORT ON 1981 SPRINGBOK
RUGBY TOUR

Overview

ACCESS has recently completed its involvement in one of the largest anti-apartheid mobilizations in United States history. The Springbok rugby team that toured the United States was the first national South African team to come to the United States since the Davis Cup matches in Nashville in 1978 and the reaction to it was extraordinary.

The mobilization was not only from coast to coast but also international in scope. ACCESS initiated calls for cancellation of the tour in June and sponsored most of the early protests. Then, as it did in 1978, ACCESS joined a much larger coalition of groups that became known as the Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour (SART) coalition. By September, more than 100 groups had joined the national organization based in New York City as well as SART affiliates in Chicago, Rochester and Albany. SART worked with the participation of the African National Congress (South Africa) the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, and the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO).

The United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and many individual nations had condemned the tour. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) called for cancellation to avoid potential problems with the United States' hosting the 1984 Olympics.

The opposition to the tour at the grass-roots level was organized by the SART coalition. It grew rapidly because of several important factors:

1. Many people saw the tour as an attempt by the Reagan Administration to expand its growing alliance with South Africa. It was viewed as a vehicle for the Administration to soften the overall image of a segregated South Africa by bringing an 'integrated' team here to compete in front of American spectators.
2. More specifically, many feared that the Administration would use the presence of four members of the South African Defence Force and two policemen in the Springboks to improve the image of the brutal military forces in South Africa. This seemed especially relevant since the Administration acknowledged that one area in which it might act was that of expanded military ties with Pretoria.
3. The scandalous behavior of the Eastern Rugby Union, the tour host in the United States, increased the anger of the Americans as it became clear that South Africa was buying its way back into competition with Americans. The ERU solicited funds from more than 300 US corporations to help finance the tour. The ERU informed the corporations that sponsorship would help them inside South Africa and promised anonymity if so desired. Then it was revealed that the ERU accepted \$25,000 from Louis Luyt a few days prior to inviting the Springboks. Luyt was the acknowledged conduit for up to \$25 million spent illegally

in the Muldergate Ministry of Information Scandal. Finally, on the last day of the tour, another \$50,000 gift mysteriously surfaced. The Treasurer of the ERU didn't even know about this gift and many have speculated that either more money has already been received or had been promised. To place the \$75,000 in some perspective, the entire ERU budget for 1980 was \$5,000.

4. South Africa was clearly using rugby as part of a major international campaign to break out of sports isolation. This was in spite of the fact that rugby is the most segregated sport in the most segregated society in the world. British and Irish teams went to South Africa within the past year. The Springbok tour of New Zealand preceded the American tour.
5. As much as any other factor, that tour of New Zealand captured the imagination and attention of the American community. Prior to the arrival of the Springboks 50,000 and 75,000 New Zealanders turned out to protest against the tour. During the six-week tour, more than 100,000 demonstrated. The results were more than 1,000 arrests, many injuries and the almost total disruption of New Zealand society. The demonstrations were the most massive and militant in the history of the anti-apartheid movement. Two of the 12 scheduled matches were cancelled. Any potential propaganda value that the South Africans hoped for was destroyed. The opposite, of course, was the result.

In conclusion, it is accurate to say that while we failed in our goal to stop the tour from taking place, the mobilization that occurred once the team arrived resulted in what South African journalists called "the most humiliating tour in South African sports history."

Of the three games originally scheduled for Chicago, Albany and New York City, only the Albany game was held and that was after the entire U.S. court system overruled the Governor of New York State. Governor Carey had ordered the game to be cancelled.

Rescheduled games in Lake Geneva (Wisconsin), Evansville (Indiana), and Rochester (New York), were also cancelled. The first game was held in secret in Racine (Wisconsin). Blacks in Racine protested for the next month.

The only public game was held in Albany on September 22nd only two hours after the Supreme Court ruled the Springboks could play. Between 2,500 and 3,000 stood in a drenching rain for five hours in protest while only 300 spectators attended the tour's showpiece event.

The test match between the U.S. and South Africa was played on a farm field in Glenville, New York. There were no spectators and the President of the U.S. Rugby Union was not even told that the game was taking place.

The U.S. Rugby Union is conducting an

investigation of the Eastern Rugby Union in light of how it handled the tour and why it accepted the \$75,000 from South Africa. Although it had originally supported the tour, the USRU called the tour bad for rugby and bad for the country. A large group of almost 300 rugby players in the ERU had protested its union's policy of ties to Pretoria.

Public officials condemned the tour and South Africa in unprecedented numbers. Two hundred members of Congress voted for a sense of the Congress resolution calling for the tour to be cancelled. The top public officials in Chicago, New York City, Rochester and Los Angeles opposed the tour. The Governors of New York and Illinois joined them. Even the City Council of Newark, which had no relation to the tour, voted to condemn it in a resolution.

The extent of the media coverage of South Africa was also unprecedented. There were three national television shows on the tour and more than 300 newspaper articles. An Albany reporter wrote that "in August no one in Albany knew what apartheid was. Now we know, now we understand why the world condemns apartheid."

However, wherever the representatives of apartheid go, they bring with them the climate of violence that permeates their own country. It was true in New Zealand and it was true in the United States. There were bombings of rugby offices in Schenectady (New York) and Evansville (Indiana). A number of anti-apartheid activists were arrested and some were badly injured. While the U.S. constitution was used to protect the Springboks, SART activists, including co-convenor Mike Young, were denied basic rights after being arrested in Albany.

Richard Lapchick, ACCESS Chairperson, was again singled out for special forms of harassment as he was in 1978 when the last national team came. His apartment was broken into, one car was destroyed and the other broken into. There were numerous threats on the phone and the family had to live with bodyguards around the clock for one month. Personal security costs for the family exceeded \$3,000. Other SART activists were harassed on the phone.

In spite of this, all actions of the SART coalition conformed to the principles of non-violent, peaceful demonstrations. Attempts to intimidate SART leaders or provoke demonstrators failed in all coalition-planned actions.

SART objected to the South Africans ever coming to the United States as it supported United Nations resolutions calling for the total isolation of South Africa. SART hounded them everywhere they went. However, it chose to isolate them on their departure because SART wanted the Springboks to feel the full impact of what apartheid means to most of the American people. They departed under the full protection of 150 riot-gearred policemen. It was no small irony that American policemen were used and taxpayer dollars spent to protect the representatives of the most repressive police state in the world today.

In conclusion, we believe that such a humiliating tour - with 5 cancellations, 2 secret matches, massive protests and extensive adverse publicity - sent the Pretoria regime the appropriate message that apartheid is despised and opposed by the vast majority of the American people.

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REPORT OF THE ACAS POLITICAL EDUCATION AND ACTION COMMITTEE

The Political Education and Action Committee seeks to promote greater awareness of Africa-related issues in the United States and greater support for the struggle of the African people for freedom and development. The Committee hopes to fulfill these objectives through the campus and community activities of ACAS members, in close collaboration with the ACAS Research Committee, TransAfrica, the Washington Office on Africa, the American Committee on Africa, and other progressive groups.

Following the very encouraging response of over sixty people to our call for the formation of a political action network, the Committee is in the process of putting together a telephone tree that will be useful for action alert and mobilization throughout the country. Whenever necessary, each member of the phone tree will be expected to do one or all of the following: telephone five other ACAS members in his/her state or region, participate in letter-writing or telegram campaigns, and be available for local or regional conferences, symposia and teach-ins.

During the next three months, the Committee plans to activate the phone tree, which is soon to be sent to all ACAS members; to circulate a petition on the scholarly community's opposition to Reagan's Africa policy; and to organize teach-ins on Southern Africa throughout the country to coincide with the ACOA-initiated "Two Weeks of National Action in Support of Southern African Liberation Movements," from March 21 to April 4, 1982.

The teach-ins are to focus on three major issues: (1) U.S. support for apartheid as part of the so-called constructive engagement strategy, with particular emphasis on U.S. sales to the South African military; (2) the Namibian independence issue; and (3) the South African-led destabilization of the independent states of Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. It is our hope that these teach-ins will be followed by letters of concern and other appropriate lobbying efforts directed at U.S. policymakers.

- Nzungola-Ntalaja and Chris Root

By Gerald J. Bender, ACAS member and associate professor of international relations at the University of Southern California. (Reprinted from the New York Times.)

LOS ANGELES — The Reagan Administration is optimistic about its diplomatic efforts to reach a Namibian settlement with a two-track policy — an approach that depends on both South African and Angolan cooperation. Yet while both tracks are considered equally necessary, the Administration has until now essentially ignored the Angolan track. Why then is there so much optimism that an internationally recognized Namibian settlement is imminent?

The Administration began its search for peace in Namibia (or South-West Africa, as it is also known) with the belief that there was only one track to a settlement and that it ran directly to South Africa. Pretoria, however, insisted that Washington lay a second track, running through Angola. As long as 10,000 to 20,000 Cuban troops remained in Angola, South Africa warned, Pretoria could not contemplate withdrawing its troops from Namibia. And without such a withdrawal there could be no settlement, Pretoria maintains.

So Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. fashioned a two-track policy. America began to negotiate with South Africa and is ready to take necessary steps to ensure South African cooperation on Namibia. Washington also intended to negotiate with the Angolan Government, in Luanda, with the aim of ensuring its cooperation not only on a Namibian settlement but also on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and on American assistance in promoting unity between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.), the ruling party, and Unita (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), an opposition party led by Jonas Savimbi.

Thus far, the South African track has borne considerable diplomatic traffic. Almost monthly meetings have been held between high-level American and South African officials to spell out a *quid pro quo* — what Washington is prepared to offer in exchange for Pretoria's cooperation on Namibia. The exact content of these talks has not been publicly spelled out, but apparently Mr. Haig is convinced he has won South Africa's cooperation, and has predicted a settlement for 1982.

Progress has been considerably slower on the Angolan track. By late September, only one brief and superficial conversation had taken place between senior American and Angolan officials. An excellent opportunity for discussions was lost in early September when the Angolan Interior Minister, Alexandre Rodrigues — better known by his *nom de guerre*, "Kito" — spent 10 days in New York City as head of his country's delegation during United Nations debate on Namibia. Kito, one of the three most important Angolan

leaders, has been Angola's chief negotiator on Namibia in recent years. Yet Mr. Haig gave strict orders that no one from the Administration was to meet with him. The same order went out when Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge replaced Colonel Rodrigues as head of the delegation.

These and other refusals to meet with the Angolans raised concern and some anger among the four other members of the Western Contact Group (Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada), which is coordinating negotiations. They have repudiated Washington's linking of the Cuban and South African withdrawals because they do not believe that Luanda can, or should, agree to send the Cuban troops in Angola home before Namibian independence rather than after a settlement, as the M.P.L.A. promised.

At the meeting of the Contact Group foreign ministers in New York in late September, Mr. Haig, therefore, could not report that he had met with Angolans. He was strongly admonished by the other ministers, who warned him that if America was intent on negotiating with Angola, it should get on with it. As a result, he hastily arranged a meeting with Mr. Jorge, who was packing his bags to return home. Although both Mr. Haig and Mr. Jorge reported that the meeting went well, the subject of Cuban withdrawal was not even broached. Nor was it brought up by Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, when he returned from Luanda in November to meet Mr. Jorge and Angola's President, José Eduardo dos Santos, along with other Contact Group delegations.

By contrast, Mr. Haig has made considerable progress along the South African track toward a settlement. Frequent and substantive talks between Washington and Pretoria have been justified on the ground — as Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, the chief delegate to the United Nations, put it — that "we believe that the chance for influencing governments is better if we have reasonably good relations with them." Why has this logic been limited to South Africa and not extended to Angola? Does the Administration have different principles for white- and black-ruled countries in Africa?

One of the most highly touted and controversial strategies in the Administration's Namibia policy has been its insistence on taking into account "South Africa's legitimate security concerns and needs." Pretoria's concerns are indeed considerable — fears of Cuban troops in Angola; Soviet influence on Swapo (the South-West Africa People's Organization), the principle Namibian liberation movement; and a determination to limit the number of African troops in any United Nations peacekeeping force during the transition to Namibian independence. The Administration argues that

you can't expect South Africa to make concessions that it believes will greatly jeopardize its security. On this point there is broad agreement in the United States and Africa.

The same logic has not been applied to the Angolan side of the equation. Not only did the Administration refuse to discuss Angola's "legitimate security concerns and needs," but, on the contrary, it has gone out of its way to unnecessarily exacerbate Luanda's fears. Attempts to repeal the Clark Amendment, which prohibits American military aid to any faction in Angola, the refusal to condemn South Africa's frequent and large-scale invasions of Angola, Central Intelligence Agency meetings with factions and governments that oppose the M.P.L.A., and the highly publicized December visit to Washington of Mr. Savimbi, Unita's leader, are only some of the ways in which the Administration has increased, not decreased, Angola's security concerns. Moreover, the State Department's decision to grant Holden Roberto, former leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (F.N.L.A.), a visa to visit the United States early this month will clearly be viewed in Angola as yet another threat. Mr. Roberto, who first attracted C.I.A. aid in 1961, was the American favorite during the Angolan civil war in 1975-76.

The Administration justifies these decisions on the basis of "principle," ignoring their effect on Angola's perceptions of our aims. In this respect, President Reagan has merely emulated the errors of his two predecessors, who also demanded that Luanda send the Cubans packing while signaling America's intention to aid Unita — thus laying the groundwork for exploiting the M.P.L.A.'s vulnerability after a Cuban withdrawal.

The Administration has demonstrated extraordinary sensitivity to the security problems South Africa would face after a pullout from Namibia, but it has shown only calloused indifference to the security problems a Cuban withdrawal would present for the Angolan Government.

Luanda has maintained that it is served only by enough Cubans to guarantee its security needs. In fact, the number of Cuban combat troops has been reduced from roughly 30,000 in 1976 to around 10,000 last fall. (The number was reported to have increased to 12,000 to 15,000 after South Africa's recent invasions.) Given the importance that the M.P.L.A. attaches to the Cubans for enhancing its security in the face of South African attacks, the United States must find some way to alleviate Angolan fears about how it would defend itself from South Africa after the Cubans departed.

Certainly, the Reagan Administration will have to offer a better guarantee than its word that the South Africans will not attack again. The United

States does not possess enough leverage over Pretoria to prevent it from attacking Angola or any other black state in Southern Africa.

What is needed now is some imaginative thinking in Washington on how America can help fill the security gap that a Cuban withdrawal would produce in Angola. Is the Administration prepared to send SAM missiles, Awacs, or other military hardware that could be used to deter South African attacks against Angola? Success in Namibia may ultimately depend on finding a satisfactory answer to the question of Angola's security concerns, but it is not clear that Mr. Haig has seriously considered this or related complex issues. How many Cubans must be withdrawn before a settlement, for example, and would this number include military and civilian personnel? If it applied only to the military, would it include combat and noncombat troops and those in Cabinda province protecting Gulf Oil's operations? These and many other difficult questions must be solved before there can be any progress along the second track.

South Africa has made it clear that progress on Namibia will grind to a halt if America fails to deliver a satisfactory Cuban withdrawal. This, in effect, gives Pretoria "an American card" to play whenever it wishes to stall negotiations, enabling it to blame any breakdown on the United States' failure to make sufficient progress in negotiating a Cuban departure. South African leaders are calm about Namibia because they know the United States has not really begun to negotiate with Luanda.

Until the United States starts down the second track by entering into realistic talks with the Angolan Government, there should be less optimism and more concern over the future of a Namibian settlement.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

THE PLIGHT OF BLACK WOMEN IN APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA, Dept. of Public Information, United Nations, NY 10017.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. UNESCO House, Paris. Report of conference cosponsored by UNESCO and the Organization of African Unity.

PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES. Dept. of Public Information, United Nations.

OBJECTIVE: JUSTICE. A U.N. review dedicated to the promotion of justice through the self-determination of people, the elimination of apartheid and racial discrimination, and the advancement of human rights. Price \$1.50. U.N. Dept. of Public Information, NY 10017.

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS. All the following are available from the U.N. Center Against Apartheid, United Nations, NY 10017.

THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICAN COAL IN THE BENELUX COUNTRIES, by Ruurd Huisman. Number 13/81.

SECOND SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CRIMES OF THE RACIST AND APARTHEID REGIMES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. (Number 14/81)

NO TO CONSCRIPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMED FORCES, by Committee on South African War Resistance. (Number 16/81)

THE FINANCING OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME, by Rev. David Haslam. (No. 17/81)

BRICKS IN THE WALL. (Studies in international financing of South Africa) (Number 15/81)

ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA: AN UNLIKELY ALLIANCE? by Rosalynde Ainslee (Number 20/81)

ROLE OF BANKS IN STRENGTHENING SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY, by Terry Shott (No. 21/81)

THE ARMS EMBARGO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID, by Kader Asmal. (Number 23/81)

PUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTER AGAINST APARTHEID, 1976-1980. Lists all publications available. (Number 3/81)

RESOLUTIONS ON APARTHEID ADOPTED BY THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN 1980. The texts of resolutions and the record of votes are reproduced in this issue. (Number 4/81)

WE SAY NO TO APARTHEID SPORT

by Richard Lapchick and
Franklin Williams

(Originally published in
Crisis Magazine)

A rugby team visited the United States in September and American sports and part of American society may never be the same again. By insisting on the tour taking place, a handful of rugby officials has jeopardized the future of all the best American athletes and brought the foreign policy motives of the Reagan Administration into serious question.

Sports enthusiasts might wonder how an athletic event could provoke such reaction. Sports, after all, is an everyday, ordinary event. When your opponent is the national team of South Africa, however, all bets are off because sports is viewed in an extraordinary context in South Africa. It is a tool of foreign policy abroad and a domestic pacifier inside South Africa for whites and the few blacks willing to be coopted into the brutal apartheid system of racial segregation and domination. However, for the black people who demand non-racial principles in sport, the response of the regime is the same as for those who go on strike in factories, who protest inferior education or who try to keep their families together in the face of the forced removals policy of the state. For them, it means harassment, intimidation, arrests, bannings, the withdrawal of passports, or forced exile. Only last year, we sat in the offices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund with M.N. Pather, Secretary-General of the non-racial South African Council on Sport. Within months of his return to South Africa, his passport was confiscated by the police. No other SACOS official can leave the country. South Africa knows that they would speak the truth to the world about apartheid sport and how the regime uses it to its advantage. The regime does not want us to listen to the M.N. Pather of South Africa. Instead, they send us men like Erroll Tobias, the colored (mixed ancestry) rugby player and Abie Williams, the colored manager of the Springbok rugby team.

As protesters gathered their forces at every stop in New Zealand and the United States, events inside South Africa served to reinforce their opposition to the tour. In August, South African police arrested 2,000 women and children in Nyanga who were trying to live with their husbands and fathers. It is illegal to live together as families in urban South Africa. A few weeks later, the South African Defence Force (Army) invaded the independent African nation of Angola. When the Security Council held an emergency session to condemn this blatant act of aggression, the United States broke even with its European allies and cast the only veto.

The United States Government conveniently ignored the fact that four members of the

Springbok team come from the Defence Force that invaded Angola and that two others came from the same police force that arrested the women and children. Visas were issued because the State Department claims it does not interfere in private arrangements. The US-led Moscow Olympic boycott could hardly be recalled by State and when it was, it was referred to as an "exception". However, the State Department denied entry to three Cuban members of a trade delegation because their country had troops in Angola. Apparently invading Angola is acceptable, while helping to support the Government of Angola, recognized by all countries but the United States, is unacceptable. Racists are welcome, Communists are not. That is the message that the Reagan Administration is beaming around the world. The message is welcomed in few places. Black African nations are bristling while South Africa is ecstatic with its new friend.

It is no accident that Abie Williams and Erroll Tobias were the principal spokesmen for the 36-man Springbok group. It is in the interest of South Africa to project a softened image of apartheid to the people of the United States. If Reagan wants the American people to believe that South Africa should be our friend, then such a softened image of apartheid is important for him to project. What better way to accomplish this than to have an "integrated" South African team come to the United States to play in a sports event. The American people could thus see coloreds and whites, soldiers, police and civilians all under the cloak of "sportsmen" in the best athletic tradition.

So Williams and Tobias held press conferences everywhere to tell the American people what South Africa is really like. They said that while there were some problems left, South Africa was moving in the right direction and making good evolutionary progress. They said that anti-apartheid groups did not understand South Africa. They said that the fact they were associated with the national team of South Africa proved their point.

When asked if they could vote, they said no! When asked if they could live where they wanted to, they said no! When asked if their children could attend the school of their choice, they said no! In fact, no was the answer to all questions about what they could do inside South Africa. The bottom line was that they could not even socialize with white team members when they returned from their two-month journey away from apartheid.

Ignored in the whole process was the fate of black sportsmen and women inside South Africa. There were 236,000 black rugby players who were not even considered for the Springbok team because they are members of non-racial unions. Tobias didn't bring up the fact that the Government spends more than 180 times more per capita on white athletes than on blacks for facilities, training, coaching and equipment. Williams didn't mention that sports at the club level,

where more than 99% of blacks compete, are totally segregated. Neither commented when asked why the colored captain of the national non-racial team was arrested in August because he tried to watch a black rugby game without a permit in a black township in Port Elizabeth. Tobias and Williams were not sent to discuss these things. Suddenly they were answering, "We are sportsmen, not politicians." But sports, like all other aspects of life in South Africa, are thoroughly bound up with the repressive machinery of the apartheid state.

No other sports controversy has so dominated the international scene as that of South Africa's apartheid sports policy. The International Olympic Committee has not allowed South Africa to play in the games since 1960. The IOC's position is that it is South Africa that has brought politics into sport by creating a sports system based on race. When pushed on why South Africa is singled out in a world where repression abounds, the IOC maintains that South Africa is the only society in the world that has institutionalized racism in its Constitution.

For those who might wonder if supporting the call of civil rights and anti-apartheid groups to isolate South Africa in sport would put them in a unique position, then the following points should be considered. In addition to being the only nation barred from the Olympic movement, South Africa has been barred from competition in no less than 22 international sports federations. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Declaration Against Apartheid in Sport in 1977 without a dissenting vote. The Declaration calls for an end to all individual and team sports contacts with South Africa and suggests means for governments to make the Declaration an effective instrument. The General Assembly has passed numerous resolutions supporting the Organization of African Unity's call for the total isolation of South Africa in sport. The UN's Centre Against Apartheid instituted a Register of Sports Contacts with South African in May 1979. The Register, popularly known as the "UN Blacklist", is a record of all sports contacts with South Africa and is used by many governments that place sanctions against those who compete with South Africa.

Even South Africa's major allies have taken a stand. Both the Gleneagles Agreement of the Commonwealth nations and the agreement reached by the European Economic Community were negotiated by the heads of state of both groupings. They call for governments to take every practical step to discourage sports contacts between their countries and South Africa. The Carter Administration, under pressure from anti-apartheid groups, began to discourage sports exchanges in 1977. In his four years as President, only one national sports team from South Africa came to play in the United States.

That was in March 1978, when the South African Davis Cup team came to play the US team in Nashville, Tennessee. Many groups, led by the NAACP and ACCESS, the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society, staged the largest anti-apartheid

protests in the history of the United States. The 6,000 demonstrators outnumbered spectators by 3:1. One month later the South Africans were suspended from playing in future Davis Cup competitions by the International Tennis Federation.

South Africa had tried and failed dismally to break out of its sports isolation. It was crucial for them to do so since investment and loan monies from the United States were gradually drying up after the murder of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko in police custody in September 1977 and the banning of the major opposition spokespeople in October 1977. Anti-apartheid activities in the US peaked in that year in beating back the South African initiatives. Thus the loss in tennis was a major blow. Even the \$72 million spent illegally in the United States and Europe by the Ministry of Information of South Africa could not stem the flow of anti-apartheid sentiment.

However, the climate is very different in 1981 with Reagan, the Prime Ministers Thatcher in Britain and Muldoon in New Zealand. Overt support for South Africa has given great comfort to the Pretoria regime in spite of the fact that it has recently undertaken their widest range of political repression since 1977. More than 200 student, church and union leaders have been arrested since May 1981.

Is it an accident that the Springboks have come here at this time? We think not. We believe it is a deliberate policy of the government to test the waters in a sport that has no constituency in the United States. Rugby seemed like a "safe" sport for the test.

Although Reagan would not say no to the Springboks, the American people did. Within hours after the Boks touched down at JFK airport on July 16th as they transited to New Zealand, the Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour Coalition was formed at a meeting held at the Organization of African Unity Headquarters in New York City. By the end of September, there were more than 100 groups in the coalition in New York, Chicago, Albany, Rochester, and Los Angeles. The people in those cities were all directly affected by the tour.

Los Angeles is the scheduled site for the 1984 Olympics. The African nations made clear that if the tour took place then a boycott of the Olympics was possible. New York City, Chicago, Albany and later Rochester were planned as the sites for the rugby matches with the Springboks.

The militant and hostile reception that the Springboks received in New Zealand sparked both interest and expectations in the United States. Protests mounted. First, Mayor Koch cancelled the game scheduled for New York City, citing the threat of violence instead of any opposition to apartheid.

Then it was revealed that the Eastern Rugby Union, the hosts for the tour, had accepted a \$25,000 gift from South African Louis Luyt. Luyt was acknowledged by his own government as the key financial conduit for the Ministry of Information during the scandal that eventually toppled the Government

of Prime Minister John Vorster. The gift was received a few days before the invitation was issued. A second \$50,000 gift from South Africa to the ERU was revealed during the tour.

Key U.S. political figures came out against the tour. 200 members of Congress voted for a resolution opposing the tour. Mayors Koch and Bradley of Los Angeles called for the denial of visas. They were joined by William Simon, the former Nixon and Ford Cabinet member. Simon is now President of the U.S. Olympic Committee. Governors Hugh Carey of New York and James Thompson of Illinois condemned the tour. The Congressional Black Caucus in Washington and the New York State Black and Puerto Rican Caucus were opposed to the tour.

Protestors were everywhere. More than 100 picketed at Los Angeles International Airport at 1:30 a.m. when the team transited through Los Angeles. They were followed everywhere they went in Chicago. More than 800 had demonstrated in Chicago a few days before the team arrived. Finally, the Chicago City Council passed a resolution saying that the Springboks were not welcome in Chicago.

Rugby officials then moved the game to Lake Geneva, Wisconsin. As soon as the news became public, town officials had the game cancelled. The same thing happened in Evansville, Indiana. Finally, the Springboks crept out of the Chicago Athletic Club during the early morning hours on Saturday and drove to a park in Racine, Wisconsin. Town officials were not notified and local residents poured out of their homes once they learned that it was the South African team that was playing. Two people were arrested when they tried to disrupt the game. Nearly 400 black residents went to a town meeting to express their anger that the game had taken place there. It was the first time that a South African rugby team had been forced to play a game in secret.

New York Governor Carey had ordered the Albany game to be cancelled due to the threat of violence. However, the Eastern Rugby Union went to court and obtained an injunction which was upheld in two separate appeals.

The final appeal was denied less than one hour prior to game time. The confusion about whether or not the game would be played, a drenching day-long rain storm, the explosion of a bomb at the ERU headquarters in Schenectady, New York early on the morning of the game, and the arrest of four protest organizers all combined to reduce the size of the demonstration. However, in spite of all the problems, between 2,500 to 3,000 stood in the rain for five hours to protest the game. Only 300 spectators came and they were outnumbered by more than 8:1. Organizers mobilized locally by the NAACP and more than 30 other groups and regionally by the Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour Coalition (SART), considered the protest to have sent a clear message back to Pretoria: most of the American people are not fooled by South Africa's token integration and are appalled by apartheid.

The last match was scheduled to be played on Saturday, the 26th at a secret site within 150 miles of Albany. SART had organized car pools in nine cities within that radius. Protestors were to be on stand-by at 7 am. However, ERU President Tom Selfridge took the teams to farm field in Glenville, New York on Friday night at 5:30. This was "the big game" between the USA and South Africa. Selfridge did not inform the several hundred people who had come to Albany to see the game. He did not even tell the President of the United States Rugby Union whose team was playing. As a result, no one saw the game. It was yet another blow to South Africa's prestige.

That evening the President of the U.S. Rugby Union held a press conference to criticize Selfridge for his unilateral actions. Individual rugby players had been coming out against the tour for several weeks. Now the chief of US rugby has called for an investigation within the rugby community. South African correspondents have said that this was "the most humiliating tour in the history of South African sport". Since President Reagan would not stop the team, the American people once again rose to the occasion and let the South Africans know that they were not at all welcome in the United States.

But there were costs. American athletes now face sanctions in future sports competition. A climate of violence existed in the United States surrounding the tour. Wherever the representatives of apartheid go, they bring with them that climate of violence that permeates their own country. It was true in New Zealand and it was true in the United States. The position of the SART coalition was that it could confront the Springboks with peaceful, non-violent protest. In spite of numerous attempts to intimidate SART leaders and to provoke demonstrators, all actions planned by the coalition conformed to those principles of peaceful, non-violent protest.

The South Africans should never have been allowed to enter the United States. We should be upholding the resolutions of the United Nations that call for the total isolation of South Africa. We wanted them to feel the full impact of the scorn of the American people and therefore ignored them when they left from JFK Airport. They departed under the heavy protection of 150 riot-clad police, even though it had been announced that there would not be a single demonstrator at the airport. It is no small irony that American policemen were used and taxpayer dollars spent to protect the representatives of the most repressive police state in the world today or that the American court system was used to grant them a constitutional right to play when the vast majority of their own South African countrymen have no constitutional rights at all.

The Springboks should never have come. Now that they have left, we say that no other South African team should ever return to the United States until apartheid has been eradicated.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN WESTERN SAHARA
by Richard Knight
American Committee on Africa

The struggle for self-determination and independence continues in Western Sahara under the leadership of Polisario. King Hassan of Morocco, unable to defeat Polisario and facing increased political problems at home, has turned to the United States for help, which the Reagan administration seems more than willing to provide.

Background

Western Sahara was colonized by Spain in the late nineteenth century, but widespread resistance prevented full control from being established until 1934. Opposition to Spanish rule continued in the 1950s and 60s and on May 10, 1973, Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el Hamra and Rio de Oro) was formed to intensify the fight for independence. Ten days later armed struggle began.

By 1975, Spain was ready to end its formal colonial rule, but both Morocco and Mauritania were now laying claim to Western Sahara. As a result of these claims, the United Nations sent a mission to the area. It reported that the people of Western Sahara were "categorically for independence and against the territorial claims of Morocco and Mauritania" and that Polisario was the dominant political force.

Polisario rejected the Spanish agreement with Morocco and Mauritania, declaring it illegal because it denied the people of Western Sahara the right to self-determination. On February 27, 1976, one day after the Spanish withdrawal, Polisario declared the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic and continued armed resistance. Over the next three years Polisario grew in strength, making the war more costly to its adversaries. In August 1979, Mauritania sued for peace and withdrew from Western Sahara. Morocco promptly extended its claims to include the area formerly claimed by Mauritania, and the war continued.

Morocco is determined to hold on to Western Sahara for both political and economic reasons. The war draws attention away from political and economic problems at home and builds the nationalist and patriotic image of the monarchy. There are also large phosphate reserves located in the Western Sahara at Bu Craa, just 58 miles from the coast. A by-product that can be extracted from the phosphate is a form of Uranium, U-238, which can be used to make fuel for nuclear reactors. Exploitable oil and iron deposits are also thought to exist in the area.

US Policy

US policy toward the region has long been centered around close military ties with Morocco, but the Carter administration maintained a position of neutrality on the issue of Western Sahara.

Recent Reagan administration moves appear to signal a significant shift in policy. In early November 1981 a 23-member military delegation visited Morocco and the battle zones in Western Sahara.

This U.S. mission marks a significant new public commitment to Morocco and its territorial claims. In the past, despite evidence to the contrary, the State Department had claimed that US-supplied weapons were unrelated to the war in Western Sahara and basically not useful to Morocco in the conflict.

The Reagan administration's policy of escalating support for Morocco is consistent with its overall foreign policy. In the past there have been US military bases in Morocco and the US Navy regularly uses Moroccan ports. The US sees King Hassan as an ally in need and fears that if Morocco loses in the Sahara the King may lose his throne.

Another factor in the US government's attitude toward Polisario stems from its cold war policies toward the Soviet Union. Many Soviet-aligned countries have supported Polisario diplomatically and several, including Cuba, have recognized the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. Polisario obtains arms from both Algeria and Libya, and the administration's view of Libya's Col. Muammer Qaddafi as a pro-Soviet terrorist leader must inevitably affect its attitude.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig has shown a particular sympathy for Morocco. In one of his official acts, he approved the sale of 108 M-60 tanks to Morocco.

President Reagan's policy differs from President Carter's more in degree than in approach. Carter was restrained by members of his own party in Congress who were opposed to arms sales or at least to the use of US-supplied arms in the Sahara. The strongest opponent was former Senator Dick Clark, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa. However, Clark was defeated in his re-election bid in 1978 and congressional concern over events in Iran and Nicaragua weakened opposition to arms sales. Carter moved ahead with significant sales of military equipment and aircraft to Morocco in 1979. Congressional opponents of the sale did get from Carter a vague agreement that delivery of the arms would be contingent on unidentified "progress" in peace negotiations. The Reagan administration, which does not face any of the same political problems, has eliminated this criteria.

The War

The US military mission visit to Morocco came just weeks after a major battle in Western Sahara on October 13th. Polisario won a significant victory over Morocco at the garrison town of Guelta Zemmur. Survivors of the 2,000-strong Moroccan garrison were forced to flee to the mountains until reinforcements came. In the fighting around Guelta Zemmur, Polisario shot down five aircraft, two of which, a C-130 Hercules transport and an F-5 fighter plane, were US-supplied.

Morocco was particularly upset by the loss of the aircraft because of the importance of reconnaissance flights and air support in battle. Claiming that the aircraft were shot down with Sam 6 or Sam 8 missiles, Morocco implied the presence of non-Saharawi in Polisario's forces by arguing that the use of these missiles was beyond the technical expertise of Polisario. Morocco also claimed that Polisario used Soviet-made T-54 tanks. However, journalists who visited the area were unable to find any evidence of Morocco's claims, despite the fact that Morocco said that Polisario had been able to carry the destroyed tanks off the battlefield.

The battle at Guelta Zemmur shows Polisario's continued military strength. As a result of the attack Morocco has withdrawn from Guelta Zemmur and Bir Anzaran, both key outposts in the southern part of Western Sahara.

Most of Morocco's forces in Western Sahara, including those withdrawn from Guelta Zemmur and Bir Anzaran, are now behind a 400-mile wall of sand. In the past year Morocco has built the wall around what it calls the "useful" Sahara. Essentially the wall is designed to protect the capital of Western Sahara, El Aaiun, the city of Smara and the phosphate mines at Bu Craa. But the wall is more than just sand. There are forts every few miles and the wall is equipped with sophisticated electronic equipment. Moroccan forces remain in only a few towns outside the wall.

Negotiations

King Hassan has not confined his struggle against the Polisario to the battlefield. In a dramatic diplomatic move at the OAU heads of state meeting last June, the King announced that Morocco would accept a "controlled referendum" to determine the future of the area. That move succeeded in keeping the OAU from admitting as a member the Polisario-formed Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, despite the fact that it is recognized as the official government of Western Sahara by over half the organization's member states.

The OAU has consistently supported self-determination for Western Sahara, although the issue is a sensitive one as it involves inter-African conflict. Morocco had previously rejected a referendum proposed by a special OAU committee set up to study the issue of Western Sahara. But Morocco has become increasingly isolated on the issue while Polisario's support has continued to grow.

There is some question as to whether Morocco will go through with its offer. James M. Markham of the New York Times reported from Morocco in July, "Few well-placed Moroccan or Western diplomats here believe that the King has any intention of allowing a referendum that would challenge Morocco's long-standing claim to the phosphate-rich desert." It appears that Morocco is stalling for time, perhaps having taken a lesson from South Africa. South Africa agreed to an election in Namibia in 1978, but has been able to put off implementation for more than three years.

On August 24-25 the OAU Committee established to implement the ceasefire and referendum called for at the June summit, met in Nairobi. The Committee decided that the referendum "shall be one of self-determination which will enable the people of Western Sahara to express themselves freely and democratically on the future of the territory" and that the choice to be put to voters will be "independence, or integration into Morocco." King Hassan, on the other hand, had announced only a week earlier that the referendum "must only be a confirmation of the return to the mother country."

In other decisions the committee decided that the referendum should be conducted by the OAU and the UN, and that "for a fair and impartial interim administration supported by civilian, military and police components shall be set up." Moroccan and Polisario forces would be confined to bases and a UN peace-keeping force would be present.

Morocco, while declaring itself satisfied with the plan, has refused to negotiate directly with Polisario on a ceasefire. Polisario has declared itself ready to start negotiation at any time. Morocco's refusal to negotiate with Polisario has been seen as a stalling tactic and many observers wonder whether Morocco will ever allow implementation of the plan. Lacking a ceasefire, Polisario has pushed ahead with its military activities.

Morocco's Internal Problems

Morocco has significant internal problems, making it increasingly difficult to sustain the high cost of the war. The war leaves little or no money for development and a continuing drought has devastated the economy of the country. To make matters worse, the price of Morocco's main export, phosphate, has declined while its import bill, especially for oil, has risen significantly.

Because of the drought Morocco lost half of its last grain crop and the outlook for the current crop is no better. Farmers have been forced to slaughter their livestock because of lack of grazing land, causing long-term damage to the economy. An estimated 1,000 people a day are leaving the countryside for the cities, creating a large unemployed, disaffected, urban population.

Conclusion

The Reagan administration appears committed to support for Morocco, which it regards as a reliable friend and ally in an unstable region. In this context US fears that King Hassan may not be able to hold on to his throne under the dual pressures of economic collapse and the loss of the Sahara seems to be moving Washington into a more active role against the Polisario-led struggle for independence. Thus although the US continues to declare support for OAU efforts towards a peaceful solution in Western Sahara, it is in fact supporting Moroccan efforts to achieve a military victory over Polisario and crush the legitimate struggle of the population for self-determination.

WORKING PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE
ON SOLIDARITY WITH THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE
OF THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. NEW
YORK, OCTOBER 9-11, 1981.

- summarized by Christopher Oladosu Gidigbi
University of Minnesota

1. U.S. Dollars in Southern Africa --
Breaking the Links
- by Jennifer Davis, et al.

The superstructure of apartheid was constructed largely as a response to the needs of the first major industrial investors in South Africa who were predominantly British and European. Because the apartheid system worked so well for these investors, the economy expanded rapidly. The wealth produced by these investors was shared along racial lines. The average white/black per capita income ratio is 11:1.

Foreign capital has played a central role in the growth of this super-exploitative economic system. It has steadily grown over the past decades. U.S. direct investment in South Africa has grown dramatically over the past fifteen years. (Presently it is about 1 percent of its world-wide foreign investment total.)

These years of maximum economic growth and investments were also years of intensifying political repression for the black majority in South Africa. The U.S. economic link with South Africa is only fueling an already aggravated case of suppression. It is time to cut these links, to stop the loans, end the investments, cut all trade.

The rationale for disengagement clearly lies in the criticisms of the so-called Sullivan principles. A lot of local, state, national and international movements have started campaigning for divestments. Their strategies clearly lie in trying to stop the flow of technology, capital and military supplies to South Africa by the American oil grants.

What can we do?

Consumers and shareholders should put pressure on Caltex, Mobil and others to withdraw from South Africa.

Pressure should be put on the U.S. government to remove its veto of a mandatory U.N. security council oil embargo of South Africa.

Oil and shipping workers should pass information to SWAPO and ANC on companies involved in supplying embargoed oil to South Africa.

The U.S. banks will have to face more pressures to force them to change their sympathy towards apartheid. (17 pp, \$2.50)

2. U.S. Military, Nuclear and Intelligence
Links with Apartheid
- by Dr. Ronald Walters.

"In South Africa ... it is not our task to choose between Black and White," Chester Crocker, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. Yet the choice has already been made and the Reagan administration has clearly aligned itself with the apartheid

regime in South Africa. This alignment is clearer in the area of cooperation between military and intelligence agencies from the U.S. and South Africa. In March of 1981, just three months after the Reagan administration came to Washington, an audience was granted to the head of South African military intelligence by Jean Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency helped start and train a South African Bureau of Security and regularly shares information with the apartheid state. The U.S. and South Africa have cooperated in the silver mine network monitoring much of Southern Africa. South Africa assisted the CIA in the support of its mercenaries for operations in the Congo in the early 1960's; worked with the CIA in 1975 in the Angolan invasion; and, most recently, U.S. mercenaries work for the South African defense forces in Namibia.

Yet perhaps the most alarming aspect of Western collaboration with apartheid comes in the area of nuclear collaboration. Undoubtedly, the most destructive aspect of South Africa's military strength is its possession of a nuclear weapon capability.

South Africa could not have developed its military, nuclear, or intelligence gathering capacity without the active assistance of the U.S. and other Western powers. The evidence is clear and it is vital that the U.S. liberation support movement take an active stance against Western collaboration with apartheid. (8 pp., \$1.25)

3. The Killing Business: Mercenaries in
Southern Africa
- by Dr. Robert Schwarc

"(The) practice of using mercenaries against movements for national liberation and independence is punishable as a criminal act and that the mercenaries themselves are outlaws," U.N. General Assembly Res. 2548 (XXIV), December 1969.

Under U.S. law, it is illegal for any U.S. national to recruit or enlist in the services of a foreign power or to leave the U.S. with the intention of so enlisting. To date, no individual mercenary who has fought in Africa, has been known to have done so, has been either charged or indicted in the U.S. for any mercenary related activities, in direct violation of the law.

The U.S. government has never been officially at war with Mozambique, Zaire, Angola, Zimbabwe or Namibia; yet it is a known fact that U.S. nationals are participating in conflicts in these countries, contrary to law. Recruitments of mercenaries have reportedly taken place at several locations in the continental U.S.

The Committee of Concerned Citizens on Mercenary Activities was organized in May 1979 with the aim of exposing the activities of Soldier of Fortune magazine and its associates.

Points of action recommended in order to help curb the South African armed forces and

their mercenary activities against the oppressed South Africans are:

- A national tour should be conducted composed of civilians from Zimbabwe and Angola who have been the object of repeated aggression by mercenaries.

- An international legal commission should be organized to investigate mercenary activities in Southern Africa.

- The U.S. should play an active role in monitoring mercenary activities around the world. (5 pp. 75c)

4. The Struggle to Isolate South African Sports

- by Richard E. Lapchick

South Africa has increasingly turned to bilateral sports relations as a result of being barred from most international sports competition. In the U.S., tennis became the first target of the sports anti-apartheid movement because the first major contacts in the U.S. were the Davis Cup tournaments in 1977.

Other sports have been targets for protests and sometimes disruption since the 1977 Davis Cup competition. Boxing, amateur golf, and rugby are prominent on the list of this movement.

Network television and individuals have yielded to the pressures of various anti-apartheid movements that are campaigning to isolate South African sports contacts in the U.S.

South Africa, on the other hand, is pouring millions of dollars into big-time sports promotion to lure American athletes to go there to compete. This makes the task of stopping contacts all the more difficult.

Private sponsorship and government funding play a major part in aiding the government-recognized white establishment bodies maintain firm control over sports in South Africa.

Rugby in South Africa closely reflects the racist politics of the white minority. Therefore, by outlaying large sums of money to influence rugby administrators and players, it is confident that it will break out of isolation.

It is crucial that all anti-apartheid forces take immediate action to counter this apartheid maneuver. (12 pp. \$1.50)

5. Boycotting Cultural and Entertainment Events: Achievements, Problems and Recommendations

- by Micheal Beaubien

The United Nations resolution 2396 (1968), the final declaration of the International Conference on the European Economic Community (EEC) and apartheid (January 1979); the World Conference of Youth and Students in Solidarity with Peoples, Youth and Students of Southern Africa. The above listing of pertinent resolutions and declarations is only a partial list. Other international organizations and conferences which have passed similar resolutions include the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement and the

International Committee Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa, among others.

Organizations which have been active on the national level in maintaining cultural boycotts would include: the American Committee on Africa; National Anti-Imperialism Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation (NAIMSAL); TransAfrica; the Congressional Black Caucus; and Operation 3-3-3 Cultural Boycott. The above is also a partial listing.

Recommendations include:

- Establish a national working group composed of interested organizations to coordinate activity and to develop a national strategy.

- Launch a national media campaign directed primarily at national Black publications, local Black newspapers and local radio stations.

- Create an outreach program for cultural organizations, and all unions of cultural performers which would include advertisements in all union publications.

(5 pp., 75c)

6. Bibliography on U.S. Policy towards Southern Africa

- by Kevin Danaher of Institute for Policy Studies (14 pp. \$2.25)

7. Building the Anti-Apartheid Movement

- by Lockwood, Collins, et al. (14 pp. \$2.25)

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