

SOUTHERN AFRICA NEWS

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PART I INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ANGOLA: AND AGGRESSION

This Issue...

is PART I of a two part series on ANGOLA. This issue focuses on two major articles which analyse: the lessons learned from U.S. interpretations of Cuba's role in Angola; and OTRAG- U.S. and western imperialists latest attempt to utilize Zaire to penetrate southern Africa with nuclear and advanced weaponry.

PART II will analyse the internal developments in Angola since the victory of the MPLA in 1975. It will specifically analyse: the economic transformation within Angola; the attempted coup d'etat; and the U.S. media's campaign to discredit Angola's revolution.

Note to our Readers...

The members of the Southern Africa News Collective would like to express our apologies for the lateness of this issue and explain both our writing and editorial policies as well as our political work so that you understand the delay.

When we originally decided to publish a newsletter, we assessed our objectives, resources and time constraints and felt that we could complete an analytical newsletter every two months. We share responsibility for carrying out the research and writing of articles. Each article goes through several major revisions from the first writing to the final copy. The collective writing process requires intense political discussions and a synthesis of ideas before the newsletter is then produced in its final form.

The collective's members are also engaged in community struggles surrounding local, national and international issues. We have a strong commitment to participate in changing the circumstances of oppressed peoples. These struggles help to clarify and develop our theory and practice. Thus our energies and time are sometimes diverted from our scheduled obligations to the newsletter.

We want to thank you for your patience and trust. We hope that this issue and forthcoming ones meet our goal of providing information which encourages discussion and catalyzes political action.

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ANGOLA: Revolutionary Lessons on International Solidarity

One of the greatest distortions in U.S. policy towards Angola is the erroneous tenet that the government of the Peoples Republic of Angola is illegitimate or not sovereign, and not representative of the people because of Cuba's role in aiding the Angolan revolution. This U.S. policy can best be described as an attempt at media oversaturation with a continuous stream of information emanating from the U.S. State Department which tends to emphasize Cuba's presence in Angola with new tabulations being released on Cuban troop strength there, with reports published that Cuban military support to the MPLA government is being slowly phased out and then stepped up and so forth. The U.S. policy line on Cuba's role has been so aggressive and pervasive that many who would normally support anti-colonial struggles have viewed the Angolan revolution with hostility, confusion and nervous speculation. The confusion about Cuba's role has been compounded by lack of concrete information, lack of objective historical analysis, and ideological immaturity. In addition, activists in this country have in their views on Angola, demonstrated the political tendency to impose their own personal interpretations on the problems and solutions of Angola's social conditions. It is for these reasons and in international solidarity with the Angolan people that the Southern Africa News Collective will attempt to concretely and objectively analyze Cuba's role in Angola; to analyze the prevailing interpretations of Cuba's role and how those views have in fact impacted on Angola's history.

An understanding of Cuba's role in Angola during and since the birth of the People's Republic of Angola must encompass an analysis of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Angola; Cuba's historical relationship with African liberation struggles and Cuba's own historic struggle against imperialist aggression.

Emergence of Sovereign Angola

When Portugal announced in 1974 that Angola would become independent in November 1975, it was with the condition that power would not be ceded to one party. On that basis, the Organization of African Unity, (OAU), began a series of meetings with FNLA/UNITA/MPLA to help them form a coalition government. But it was very clear from the onset that their widely differing histories and political objectives made such a coalition impossible. From the very beginning both UNITA and FNLA demonstrated they lacked the will to join with MPLA.

In September 1974, a secret meeting took place between UNITA, FNLA and Daniel Chipenda* with Augusto Spínola, fascist dictator head of the Portuguese government, to plan a strategy for isolating and destroying the MPLA. Soon after that meeting, the U.S. stepped-up its military assistance and sent as much as 30 million dollars worth of military and material support to the FNLA/UNITA forces.**

On August 5, regiments of South Africa's regular army first invaded Angola under the pretext of protecting the hydro-electric dam complex at Ruacana Caluaqua.

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Sovereign Angola (cont.)

By late September MPLA controlled the capital Luanda, all the major ports, both ends of the strategic Benguela railway, 12 of the country's 16 provinces. Meanwhile the imperialist forces began to amass military strength by airlifting U.S., French Belgian and German arms to South Africa/UNITA/FNLA forces near the Angolan border.

In October, the leadership of FRELIMO-Mozambique's President, Samora Machel; and of PAIGC- Louis Cabral of Guinea-Bissau met with MPLA - Agostinho Neto in Mozambique for strategic discussions on the situation in Angola. At the conclusion of the meeting, the progressive nations of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique declared MPLA as the sole and sovereign government in Angola and urged other progressive African nations to follow suit. Both countries made military commitments: Mozambique 1,500 soldiers and PAIGC 1,100. MPLA began to receive similar recognition and support from many nations.

The last week in October, the military situation began to drastically change. On October 23, 1975 a mechanized brigade of South African troops crossed into Angola from Namibia. The Brigade with the support and cooperation of UNITA began penetrating Angolan territory at the rate of more than 40 miles per day, occupying towns as they went.

On November 3, 1975, the South African/UNITA/mercenary brigade advanced to attack the Benguela railway. The South African military initiative with western backing had one objective, to encircle Luanda by the eve of independence set at November 11, 1975.

It was at this point, on November 4, 1975, that MPLA's President, Agostinho Neto requested military assistance from Cuba.

CUBA's Relationship to Angola and African Struggles

On November 5, 1975, Cuba made the decision to send troops, conventional warfare capability and technical assistance to the People's Republic of Angola. Cuba then informed the Soviet Union. Cuban pilots arrived in Luanda November 8 with a battalion of instructors for the Soviet-made conventional weapons MPLA had received. Soldiers and more military assistance were scheduled to arrive on November 27, 1975.

The decision was quick and decisive because Cuba's own revolutionary experience had developed an appreciation for the importance of international solidarity. Foreign aid has been an important element in Cuba's ability to wage continuous struggle against U.S. imperialism. Not only has the U.S. carried out a 17-year economic boycott, but it has also trained and financed counter-revolutionary, anti-Castro, Miami-based insurgents to overthrow the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs was just one U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) orchestrated

attack that was completely repelled by the Cuban people. Therefore the historical experiences of the Cuban people formed their understanding of imperialism's attack on Angola and was the reason they named that aggression Angola's Playa Giron or Bay of Pigs.

Cuba's act of solidarity with Angola is consistent with its history. In the eighteen years since the Cuban revolution, Cuba has repeatedly sent aid to liberation movements in Africa. The first act of solidarity came immediately after Cuban independence in January, 1959 in the form of aid to the independence movement in Algeria, to the National Liberation Front (FLN). In 1963, Cuba began providing material and technical assistance to FRELIMO in Mozambique; in 1965 to PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, in 1965 to the National Revolutionary Council in the Congo and in 1972, Cuba sent military assistance at the request of President Sekou Toure to repel a landing of Portuguese troops and mercenaries in Guinea-Conakry.

This kind of solidarity had been similarly expressed by the liberation movements; FRELIMO, PAIGC, and MPLA while suffering under Portuguese colonialism formed a joint military and political program to defeat colonialism. In 1965, Ernesto Che Guevara, a Cuban freedom-fighter captured the essence of international solidarity when he said: "...Aid to armed liberation struggles should be given according to the rules of proletarian internationalism, they should be delivered without any cost whatsoever, and in quantities determined by their need and availability to those people who ask for them in order to direct their fight against a common enemy. The practice of proletarian internationalism is not only a duty of those countries which are struggling to ensure a better future it is also an unavoidable necessity."

The Angolan people are now in that difficult phase of attempting transformation into a new and non-exploitative society; with that transformation encompassing social, political and economic life. It is in this phase that the most difficult tasks are struggled with and material and political support are the most vital. International solidarity in the form of help from other countries is pivotal if reconstruction and social transformation are to succeed. A war-ravaged, colonized country must rely on international allies for tools, technical assistance, food, refugee aid and services it cannot immediately produce. In this context, an assessment of Angola's internal situation hinges critically on an understanding of Cuba's military and material support.

The Anti-Colonial Struggle

For us here in America, the anti-imperialist struggle in Angola continues to be a catalyst for crystallizing problems of our internal struggle. Perhaps, the most decisive problem is our isolation from anti-imperialist struggles which distorts weakens, and confuses our attempts at expressing international solidarity. In the case of Angola, our isolation from the anti-imperialist movement, along with the lack of concrete information about the histories of the three movements which emerged in Angola, set the stage for many erroneous views of the anti-colonial struggle.

The primary contradiction for anti-colonial movements, as stated by Amilcar Cabral of PAIGC and Samora Machel of FRELIMO, is the struggle against imperialism, neo-colonialism and the vestiges of colonialism. The struggle against racist domination is one of the principle targets of the struggle against imperialism as well as all forms of exploitation. But without a fundamental revolutionary upheaval out of which the basis is laid for the transformation of the entire economic system, the state, military apparatus, and all institutions which structure the lives and educate the people, the means for the eradication of racism cannot be created.

The race and class distinctions which are a consequence of the economic structure of colonialism are the most important aspects of Angola's history to examine. In the colonial era, Angola was divided by class, race and the imposition of Portuguese and western culture. Stratification by color distinctions such as mullato, mestico, and assimilado were fundamentally class distinctions, for each group had a certain set of class privileges in relationship to their color in order to draw them into an alliance with colonialism.

The rejection of the role of protector of the interests of colonialism and imperialism, the rejection of the privileges one gained for this cooperation, and the rejection of Portuguese-western culture, were crucial in the development of a liberation movement that could not only overthrow the colonial regime but who could also carry out the transformation process to reconstruct a society to serve the interests of the Angolan workers and peasants.

This is why it is crucial to know the character of the three movements that emerged because they reflect class differences that came as a result of Angola's history as a Portuguese colony.

Political Character of the Three Movements

The history of FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and its leader, Holden Roberto, can be characterized by the following facts:

- The movement was originally UPNA (Popular Union of Northern Angola) a tribal movement to reclaim and reunite the people of northern Angola with southern Zaire in an old African kingdom (the Bakongo Empire of the 15th Century) with Holden himself as King.
- In 1958, at the All African Peoples Conference in Ghana, under pressure from Sekou Toure and other African leaders, Roberto renamed UPNA to UPA in order not to appear tribalistic.
- It had been discovered that while employed by the Guinean diplomatic service while seeking to gain international contacts, Roberto worked for the CIA as early as 1962 without the knowledge of Sekou Toure the President of Guinea.
- In 1962, the organization's name was changed finally to FNLA in order to reflect a more broad front.
- The party platform of FNLA never addressed the fundamental source of the oppression of Angolan people, imperialist domination or capitalist development and expansion.
- In 1971 OAU support for FNLA was rescinded after three commissions travelled to Angola and found that the only combat FNLA engaged in was the massacre of MPLA cadres along the Zaire border.

The history of UNITA is much shorter and UNITA itself was the least known of the three movements. However, it can be characterized by the following facts:

- UNITA was formed in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi who broke away from FNLA using the Ovimbundu people as a tribal base in the southern region of Angola.

- In late 1969 UNITA struck an alliance with the Portuguese and imperialist corporations like Lonrho and the Anglo-American Corporation, both giving money and a private plane to UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi.
- Soon afterwards UNITA established ties to the CIA and by 1975 Savimbi was seen openly with several key CIA officials in Zaire.
- UNITA's manifesto used nationalist and progressive rhetoric but took no clear stand against imperialism.

The history of MPLA can be characterized by the following facts:

- MPLA was created in 1956 as a result of merging the party of the United Struggle of Africans and other nationalist organizations in Angola.
- In 1960 Agostinho Neto and several other influential leaders most of them assimilationists and urban workers were jailed as reprisal for their work to end colonialism.
- February 1, 1969, MPLA announced the beginning of armed struggle.
- 1961 - 1966, the OAU held a series of meetings of reconciliation for MPLA/FNLA but FNLA never attended.
- In 1968 MPLA was recognized by the OAU; that it had liberated one-third of Angola's territory, establishing embryonic forms of state structures that would assure the development and leadership role of workers and peasants in a new Angolan society.
- MPLA took an anti-imperialist position from its inception.

The inability to analyse the differences between the three movements was basically due to a lack of information and a lack of ideological clarity. Therefore, many people in this country were confused, embarrassed and angered by Cuba's decisive move to provide assistance to MPLA. As a result of that confusion and anger there was a critical lack of support and understanding of the Angolan government and its guiding party, the MPLA.

Basically, there are four views which characterize the way in which liberal and progressive people in this country continue to view the situation in Angola. For the Black community, the confusion over Cuba's role was intensified by uncertainty about which movement was the correct movement to support. It is critical for us to analyse these views in an attempt to clarify which ones contribute support to the Angolan people's struggle and which ones aide imperialist aggression, so that we can advance our ability to act in international solidarity to support progressive societies.

The Cultural Nationalist's position while hesitantly recognizing the People's Republic of Angola, still calls for a unity government which would incorporate UNITA. The Nationalist support of UNITA was based on several major assumptions:

- The primary world-wide contradiction is race and without the defeat of white supremacist ideology, no system, communist, socialist, or capitalist makes a difference.
- Race is seen as a unifying force for all Black people and class distinctions are not recognized as factors which may override broader racial interests.
- The struggle is not to transform the system but to rid it of whites, so that Black people can develop the kind of system they choose. In Angola the struggle was viewed as simply an anti-colonial struggle and not a struggle for socialist transformation.

- Each of the three movements in Angola were seen as legitimate movements which waged armed struggle in the interests of the Angolan people and represented tribal interests.
- MPLA was seen as dominated by intellectuals and mulattoes and the formation of other liberation forces was a consequence of the "real African people" being excluded from MPLA leadership.
- The OAU precisely because it was predominantly Black would work in the interests of the Angolan people.
- When backed in a corner a liberation movement should seek assistance from any source the CIA, South Africa or mercenaries.
- UNITA created social institutions which relied on African communalism as a basis for improving the quality of life for the peasants and workers.

The "Superpower" analysis is advocated by groups which support the People's Republic of China's position on the Soviet Union. Much of the thought can also be seen in the Cultural Nationalist position. Their support of UNITA was based on:

- The "Three World" theory of the late Chairman Mao which saw the Soviet Union as a social imperialist, far more menacing a force in the Third World than the USA, and saw western imperialism as no longer the primary enemy of the people of southern Africa.

IMPORTANT READING!!

MOZAMBIQUE SPEAKS: SAMORA MACHEL

SPEAKS:

"The Party and the State must take the necessary measures to ensure that our elections are a school for the education and political formation of our people.... We differ absolutely from the electoral forces of the bourgeoisie, where the citizen's participation in political life is limited to the formality of depositing a voting card in an urn every few years.."

Selected from President Samora Machel's speech to "The First People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Mozambique." The pamphlet includes the speech of President Machel to the 32nd Session of the United Nations, October 3, 1977.

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U.S. Views (cont.)

- The Soviet Union because of its economic domination of Cuba was able to use Cuban troops instead of her own to solidify her sphere of influence in Africa.
- The struggle for spheres of influence between the United States and the Soviet Union forced the massive arming of each of the factions in Angola.
- The Soviet Union was seen as principally responsible for forcing the U.S. to arm FNLA/UNITA because it was the first to give massive military aid to MPLA.
- The assumption that the struggle was an internal one and should have been resolved by the Angolan people and not through the arming of one group of Africans against another.
- Implicit in this assumption is the view that class differences do not emerge among African people and therefore to aid one group and not another is anti-African.
- MPLA is not seen as the legitimate representative of the Angolan people and therefore without recognized sovereignty could not call for Cuban or Soviet aid.

The view of the State Department/CIA is very similar to the "Superpower" analysis but goes further to label Cuba as the New Colonialist in Africa. The State Department presents views which have the following assumptions:

- The "motive force of history", the force which creates and produces the profound changes in history, emanates from decisions of states rather than from the masses of people.
- Cuba's presence is seen as backing unpopular leadership, which Cuba, as the Soviet Union's puppet, feels should come to power, regardless of the will of the Angolan people.
- According to the State Department, the Cubans come as advisors but stayed on as soldiers, imposing their will on African problems and disrupting stable situations.
- That a "unity" or coalition government was desirable and would allow for the upward mobility of a small Angolan middle-class that could man the bureaucracy and protect the interests of multi-national corporations doing business in Angola.

- That African people are incapable of making firm decisions without the assistance of a foreign power.
- The civil rights version of U.S. democracy as articulated by Andy Young is the desired form of government in the Southern African region.
- If a progressive government were allowed to come to power in Angola, the impact would be the acceleration of the liberation process in Zimbabwe, Namibia and ultimately South Africa.

The Anti-Imperialist view defined aid to MPLA as an act of solidarity which meant the difference between the defeat of the Angolan revolution or its consolidation and victory. The anti-imperialist view has several assumptions:

- U.S. imperialism is seen as the greatest enemy of the people of Southern Africa and in fact the Third World.
- The FNLA/UNITA alignment had U.S. imperialism giving them massive military assistance along with enlisting the support and intervention of both Zaire and South Africa to try to halt the revolutionary struggle and replace it with a neo-colonial state structure.
- MPLA assessed as the only liberation movement in Angola whose position on the nature of struggle and the type of society they wanted to build that was consistently anti-imperialist and that saw socialist revolution as the only means to transform society.
- MPLA was seen as the liberation movement which consistently waged armed struggle throughout the entire country.
- Viewed as a sovereign state, the People's Republic of Angola, led by MPLA, had the right to request aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union because the struggle against Zairean and South African troops presented the challenge of conventional warfare while their experience was in guerilla warfare.
- Assessed that Cuba's actions as principled acts of proletarian internationalism were in line with Cuba's historical relationship to African liberation struggles.

Lessons from the Angolan Experience

Having analysed the internal conditions in Angola preceding Cuba's military assistance to MPLA, Cuba's history of assistance to anti-imperialist struggles particularly in Africa, the histories of the three movements and having reviewed the four positions articulated in the U.S.; it is clear that only Cuba's role as defined by the anti-imperialist view could have resulted in the defeat of imperialist aggression in Angola. The other views would have denied the Angolan people the critical support they needed to consolidate the struggle for national liberation.

Clearly, when we look at which imperialist forces were the enemies of the Angolan people, we see U.S. multi-national corporations as well as the consortiums financed by the U.S., West Germany, and South Africa which controlled the development of the natural resources of Angola. The defeat of Portuguese colonialism was impeded because of the critical diplomatic, financial and military assistance Portugal received directly from the U.S. and also through NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). In fact, Portugal was only the colonial administrator for the U.S. and its NATO allies. In return for administering Angola to protect and maximize their profits, the U.S. under the Nixon-Kissinger administration gave Portugal 450 million dollars to stabilize her domestic war-ridden economy and through NATO funnelled huge arms supplies that enabled Portugal to continue to wage the colonial war in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

Therefore, to assess the critical enemy of the Angolan people as the Soviet Union is ahistorical because it denies the relationship of the U.S. as the principle supporter of Portuguese colonialism.

However, if the assumption is made that the Soviet Union is the imperialist force that poses the greatest threat, then this camouflages the pivotal differentiation between

MPLA as the progressive liberation movement and UNITA and FNLA as anti-colonial movements which would have settled for a neo-colonial arrangement in Angola. It is not a coincidence that both Savimbi and Roberto sided with U.S. imperialism; it was the consequence of their incorrect political analysis of the transformation process and their own class interests.

The failure to distinguish the differences between the three movements within the Black activist community was the result of our sometimes self-imposed isolation from the international solidarity movement and our attempts to define the struggle in Angola based on our analysis of our own internal struggle for liberation.

As we groped for ideological clarity on how to define the objectives of our struggle here, our inability to define the economic aspect of our struggle that dealt with the contradictions of capitalism and imperialism left us vulnerable to the rhetoric of UNITA which had the same muddled analysis. Both analysis relied principally on the race analysis and the restoration of the tenets of African communalism to resolve the question of how to restructure society.

Our renewed interest in supporting African liberation was a result of the resurgence of intense struggle for liberation here and our re-identification with Africa based primarily on ancestry and cultural ties. However we failed to place primacy on support based on agreement with their political direction and programs. This tendency was spoken to by Amilcar Cabral in 1972 when he addressed African-Americans, "naturally if you ask me between brothers and comrades what I prefer, if we are brothers, it is not our fault or responsibility. But if we are comrades, it is a political engagement. Naturally we like our brothers, but in our conception it is better to be a brother and a comrade.... if we are brothers we have to realize the responsibility of this fact and take clear positions about our problems in order to see if beyond this condition of brothers we are also comrades."

Clearly history has proven us wrong. As we look back on Angola and the role Cuba has played, we must acknowledge that Cuba had a more intense relationship with African liberation struggles (18 years). Relying on the lessons it had learned from its own revolution in which it had to address the questions of the nature of economic transformation, the process of socialist transformation and race/class divisions, Cuba could more definitively analyze the ideological differences between the forces in Angola. As a result of this, the Cuban people understood the necessity for international solidarity with MPLA from providing material support (food, clothing and medicines) to training technicians doctors and teachers, to training military cadres, to providing

weapons and finally sending combatants, many of whom would give their lives.

We must further acknowledge the limitations that our own circumstances place on us in terms of basing our definition of the ideological differences between the movements on our concrete experiences. We did show international solidarity through political support (boycotts, demonstrations) and material support (i.e., raising money, clothing and medicines). However our struggle, while progressive, had not developed a clear revolutionary ideology, and we are now in the process of confronting the complex issues of the nature of the economic transformation of our society as well as class and race divisions.

IMPORTANT FILM IN THE MAKING.... - THE WILMINGTON TEN -

A critical film is being produced by filmmaker Haile Gerema which focuses on the case of the WILMINGTON TEN, but which has a much greater impact in showing how the case of the Wilmington Ten is not an unusual circumstance but is part of the continuing legacy of African-americans struggle in the U.S.

According to filmmaker Haile Gerema:

"We began describing the innocence of the Wilmington Ten but soon discovered the film went beyond this aspect to show how the black family had been responsible for rearing children psychologically strong to fight racist aggression. The film puts into historical perspective the struggle in the U.S. without slogans. It shows the political transformation of the mothers in particular who in most cases become more militant than their imprisoned sons. The film reflects how the struggle of the Wilmington Ten is a product of generations of African-american struggles..."

This film is a crucial tool as a political film to help raise consciousness about political repression and ways in which to struggle against this continuing wave of repression. The production of the film has been temporarily slowed because of financial difficulties. We urge you to make contributions to aid in the completion of the film.

CONTRIBUTIONS SHOULD BE SENT TO: IMANI KAZAANA
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OTRAG: NUCLEAR PENETRATION of SOUTHERN AFRICA

The Republic of Zaire, one of Africa's largest countries, bordering Angola, Tanzania and Zambia, has turned over one-tenth of its territory, an area the size of the state of Arizona, to a West German research company called OTRAG (Orbital Launch and Rocket Corporation).¹ The company will not only occupy the uranium and copper rich southeastern Shaba Province, but it will also have sovereignty over the territory for a 24-year period. Furthermore, OTRAG will have the option to remove people from the land to utilize the natural resources and to destroy the environment without any legal responsibility to the Zairean people.

The OTRAG/Zaire relationship was cemented in a secret contract signed March 26, 1976, and published the summer of 1977.² The contract has devastating implications for the liberation struggles of southern Africa. It extends the arms advantage of western backed regimes in the area like Zaire and South Africa. By gaining access to nuclear and advanced technological capability, Zaire, aided by OTRAG, poses a real military and psychological threat to the anti-colonial struggles of the area, and it poses a particular threat to the guerilla capability of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and SWAPO of Namibia. While some of the frontline States are developing conventional war capability, their weaponry is in no way comparable to the sophisticated military capability planned for Zaire due to its association with OTRAG. Because of its presence in Zaire, OTRAG has unlimited surveillance and overflight capabilities to both monitor and subvert the liberation movements of southern Africa.

Recently in a speech before the World Peace Council's Bureau meeting in Washington, D.C., Angola's Ambassador to the United Nations, Elisio de Figueiredo, noted that the OTRAG/Zaire/South Africa connection is substantial and made possible through support from Western imperialism. Ambassador Figueiredo said, "...It is not being overly insister to see the connection between OTRAG activities and the nuclear program of the racist regime of South Africa. Pretoria's nuclear installations in South Africa and in the Namibian territory occupied by it and its

development of nuclear technology could never have been launched without help from its imperialists friends. The presence of OTRAG's nuclear facilities and those of South Africa pose a serious threat to our people, and especially to Namibia and the other liberation movements in southern Africa..."³

Shaba Province, now occupied by OTRAG, was recently the scene of an attempted liberation struggle. The Congolese National Liberation Front (former Katangese exiles) launched armed struggle to reclaim all of Zaire from the repressive western backed regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko. They were repelled when Mobutu called in French and Egyptian-backed Moroccan military forces to secure the territory. This area is one of the richest in the world, and its natural resources include tremendous quantities of uranium, needed for the development of nuclear energy, copper diamonds, cobalt and gold.

According to the OTRAG/Zaire contract, the German company is to develop space technology, weather satellites, missiles and to perform air tests. The terms of the agreement provide that Mobutu's government receive foreign exchange equivalent to \$50 million in U.S. dollars annually, small arms deliveries from the West German government, an experimental reconnaissance satellite, plus a 20% discount on other missile technology. While we are unable to reproduce the OTRAG/Zaire contract in full the following represent some examples of its content:

- OTRAG's right of usage comprises the right to make use of the territory without any restriction for the purposes of sending projectiles into the atmosphere and into space, whatever kind and type they may be, particularly carrier missiles, as well as all measures which OTRAG deem to be directly, indirectly or otherwise pertinent to this.
- OTRAG has the right to construct surface and underground works of whatever kind (in particular launching ramps, power plants, observation and measurement posts, tele-communications and radar installations and production of any kind).

Implications of OTRAG

Africa presence in Zaire, and its West German counter-part the B.N.D.* jointly initiated the project. According to Szulc, not only did the CIA give political direction to OTRAG's negotiations with Zairean government officials, but they helped recruit American scientists for the project. Szulc confirms that the West German government is secretly testing and producing the cruise missile and the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) in Zaire. The cruise missile is to date the most technologically advanced and accurate of U.S. missile hardware. It has its own engine and guidance system which can hit targets with extreme precision and versatility, since the cruise can launch missiles from air, sea or land.

Evidence of the U.S. backing the rearmament of West Germany demonstrates the sinister role of the U.S. in arms proliferation on a worldwide scale. One of the big obstacles in the current SALT II discussions (Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement) between the United States and the Soviet Union is the U.S.'s failure to acknowledge that they are breaking the SALT I agreement by developing air-to-surface missiles such as the cruise. The U.S. continues to argue that the limitation on air-to-surface missiles does not include the cruise missile but only refers to the ballistic missile. The possibility of ground-launched cruise missiles based in Europe and submarine-launched cruise missiles represents a serious threat to the Soviet Union because they are hard to detect and highly accurate.

The long-range air, land and sea versions of the cruise missile are expected to be operational before 1980. NATO countries are reportedly pressing for long range cruise missiles being based in Europe in order to bolster their deterrent capacity. Britain and France have already initiated production of the cruise missile. Following World War II, West Germany was forbidden, by the 1954 Treaty of Brussels, to produce guided missiles, strategic bombers and nuclear weapons on German territory. Unable to develop advanced missilery on its own territory, West Germany is instead doing it clandestinely in Africa with the support

- If OTRAG so demands, it has the right to evacuate all other persons from the territory and keep them away from it. But it is up to the Zaire government to take and enforce all measures necessary to assure the security of the territory, including evacuation of any so-called undesirable persons OTRAG names (edited for clarity).
- OTRAG bears no responsibility for harm caused to the environment by the manufacture and transport of missiles in the atmosphere and in space.
- Zaire's right to receive its annual fee is conditional. Before OTRAG is obligated to pay it, Zaire must first have paid OTRAG for services received under the contract. Furthermore, payment to OTRAG must be equal to or greater than the amount of the annual fee owed to Zaire by OTRAG. Payment to OTRAG must be in a currency other than that of Zaire which requires that Zaire draw upon its already limited foreign exchange. Finally, OTRAG is not obligated to pay Zaire an annual fee until the end of the first year following a successful firing of a missile. (edited for clarity).
- OTRAG has exclusive responsibility and total discretion to discipline OTRAG personnel and their families all of whom are exempt from Zaire law.
- OTRAG is allowed to permanently close all air space over the leased territory to all aircraft other than those of OTRAG or the Zaire government.
- No observation in writing or photography can be taken of the OTRAG area without OTRAG's permission.

Although OTRAG poses as a private enterprise, there is growing evidence that both the United States and West Germany are backing the OTRAG project with financial and technological support. In a recent article analyzing the role of the U.S. in the rearmament of West Germany, Tad Szulc says that the CIA, which has its largest

of the U.S. So, while we read in the press that the U.S. bemoans the obstacles in the SALT II discussions to limit strategic arms development, what is actually going on is the continual arms imbalance which favors the NATO alliance. Also, while the U.S. vehemently opposes the presence of Cuban troops in Africa its role in rearming West Germany is camouflage, such that the American public is led to believe that Cuban troop presence is the menace while the U.S. and her allies develop nuclear arsenals capable of massive destruction.

This land treaty arrangement between OTRAG and Zaire may well signal the initiation of policy of forcing mineral-rich developing countries into relinquishing territorial sovereignty of strategic areas in exchange for financial aide, in much the same way that food is used as blackmail to gain policy alignment from food-poor Third World countries. This is the "debt-trap" of neo-colonialism where even the illusions of territory independence are reversed. Zaire is a good example of a Third World country caught in the "debt trap". Zaire is estimated to owe 400 million dollars to private U.S. banks and approximately 2 billion to international finance institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Citibank of New York is reportedly having trouble finding backing for a 250 million dollar loan for Zaire to repay interest on its outstanding debts to banking institutions.

This is the era of administrative imperialism where the U.S. can engage in political and military destruction of countries without direct U.S. military presence or involvement. In the particular case of Zaire, the U.S. engages in administrative imperialism because it uses Zaire as a client state to attempt to cause political and military destabilization in a progressive neighboring state like Angola. Increasingly, the U.S. government has begun to aggressively sell technological projects to debt ridden Third World countries like Zaire, Chile, Egypt and the Sudan in order to generate just enough capital so that these governments can then afford advanced weapon systems.

Not only are these countries able to maintain control over a geographical region due to their technologically superior armament, but they are also able to quell any political dissent domestically with the increased weapons capability they purchase from the U.S. This practice has been described as "technofacism" when the advanced technological development of western countries is used to provide reactionary regimes with the capability to implement political repression inside their own countries and political control in strategic and resource-rich regions of neighboring countries.⁶

While we must be clear that the U.S. and NATO allies are the principal enemies of the people of southern Africa, President Mobutu and members of his government cannot be ignored as agents of imperialism. They are making a choice based on their class interest to continue to flourish in personal wealth and comfort with the status and prestige of their offices. They are betraying the interests of the people of Zaire by creating conditions for the re-colonization of Zaire. While the majority of the people live in poverty conditions without education, adequate housing and health care, Mobutu continues to make decisions in the interests of multi-national corporations and western imperialism. Mobutu and his collaborators have consistently made choices to align with imperialism as their histories demonstrate. Mobutu was part of a CIA-backed plan which ended in the murder of the Congo's progressive nationalist premier, Patrice Lumumba. Mobutu is estimated to have received more than 150 million dollars from the CIA for illegal covert operations. In addition, Mobutu supports CIA and South African-backed factions such as FNLA, UNITA and FLEC that are armed to fight against the development of socialism in the Peoples Republic of Angola. Mobutu is not the victim. The people of Zaire are the victims of imperialism.

background notes: OTRAG

POLITICAL ACTION FOLLOW - UP

Notes: Zaire

1. OTRAG (Orbital Transport and Missiles Ltd.).
 2. For complete text see: "A Secret Document from Zaire," Journal of Palestines Studies, VI, Summer 1977. (The contract was made in December 1975 and finalized in March 1976.)
 3. Speech presented to Bureau of World Peace Council conference, Dialogue on Disarmament and Detente, January 25-27, 1978, Quality Inn, Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C. Write Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Angola to the United Nations, 747 3rd Avenue, 18th floor, NY, NY 10017.
 4. Szulc, Ted. "Germany Rearms," Penthouse, March 1978.
 5. NY Times, December 17, 1977 as referenced in Facts and Reports, Vol. 8, January 11, 1978. (Press cuttings on Southern Africa). Holland Committee on Southern Africa. Da Costastraat 88 Amsterdam, Holland.
 6. Counter-Spy. Technofascism: Technology News Brief, Vol 3, December 1976, P. 53.
- * B.N.D. is the West German intelligence agency comparable to the C.I.A. of the U.S.

Each Issue, we will have a Column entitled POLITICAL ACTION. This column will focus on activities that jointly, we can work on to impact on key situations in Southern Africa.

This column FOLLOW-UP is to report to you on the type of response we received on our Political Action campaign. Look for it in our next issues, to keep abreast of the campaign to gain a public hearing on the CIA activities in Zaire.

LEND US YOUR SUPPORT: SEND YOUR LETTER/MAILGRAM TODAY AND DON'T FORGET TO SEND US A COPY

background notes: ANGOLA

*Daniel Chipenda was originally a member of MPLA who defected and later joined FNLA. He is credited with playing a crucial role in arranging the economic and military alliance between FNLA, UNITA and South Africa.

** The New York Times, January 20, 1976, reported that the U.S. military supplies to pro-west factions was purposely devalued 4 to 10 times. In the House Intelligence Committee report suppressed by the White House the official estimate of \$32 million was closer to \$125 to 150 million.

Cuba Update, Center for Cuban Studies, Number 1, April 1977

Cuba's Foreign Policy: Proletarian Internationalism, Center for Cuban Studies Newsletter, Winter 1976, Volume 3 Number 3-4

African Agenda, Volume 5 Number 1 December-January, 1976

The Guardian, November 23, 1977, 33 West 17th Street, N.Y. 10011

COMBAT COVERT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

The purpose of our political action column is to pinpoint tactics which we can use to restrain U.S. government and multi-national corporate aggression in southern Africa.

This issue crystallizes two major tactics of U.S. imperialism to destabilize Angola. First, there is an attempt to isolate Angola from progressive countries such as Cuba and the Soviet Union. Secondly, the U.S., through the CIA and its NATO allies, is laying the foundation for regional military control over southern Africa.

In researching the articles on imperialist aggression against Angola we found that a feature of the operations of "administrative imperialism" is its unobtrusive character. Without the presence of U.S. troops, deployment of aircraft and tanks, very little of the U.S.'s military activities in southern Africa are visible. They will remain invisible to the American people unless we organize a campaign to expose the U.S.'s role in recruiting mercenaries, sales of military hardware, and all other covert activities.

One of the most effective tactics to bring public attention to OTRAG/Zaire is to demand a Congressional hearing. Although many of us may view a congressional hearing as a feeble expression of political solidarity with the struggle in southern Africa, the evidence shows hearings are effective in special cases where there are covert activities by either corporations or intelligence agencies. For example, General Electric's sale of a nuclear reactor to South Africa was halted when both Representative Charles Diggs and Senator Dick Clark held congressional hearings. Organizations and liberal forces within Congress were able to use these hearings to create an atmosphere in direct opposition to General Electric's proposed sale of the nuclear reactor to South Africa. General Electric dropped their plan when pressured by the Carter administration because it was clear that the publicity of the sale would expose the political contradiction of the Carter Administration's international posture on majority rule in Southern Africa.

While congressional hearings are not a decisive blow against imperialism, they also have the potential of de-classifying and publicizing information so that we become more informed on the scope and methods of covert operations in southern Africa. Furthermore, hearings have the potential of creating the circumstance for activists to raise the general level of public consciousness when they are used as a basis for political education. Public hearings can be a decisive act of international solidarity when it forces the eyes of the world on the nature of imperialism and exposes the hypocrisies of the American system.

Organize you and your friends to send a letter* to:

- Representative Charles Diggs, chairperson of the House sub-committee on Africa, requesting a hearing on CIA/US corporate and US agency involvement in the OTRAG/Zaire project. Address to Congressman Charles Diggs, U.S. Congress, Wash., D.C. 20515.
- Senator Dick Clark, chairperson of the Senate sub-committee on Africa, requesting that he join with Congressman Diggs to hold a congressional hearing on U.S. involvement in the OTRAG/Zaire project. Senator Dick Clark, U.S. Senate, Wash., D. C. 20510.
- the Black Caucus urging that they endorse a public hearing investigating U.S. involvement in the OTRAG/Zaire project. Congressional Black caucus, House Annex Bldg., Wash., D. C. 20515.
- send confirmation copies to our address, so that we can monitor the requests for a public hearing as well as lobby for the hearing.
- * A mailgram of 100 words or less can be sent by phoning Western Union for a cost of \$2.95.