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SWAPO President Sam Nujoma: "The occupation forces are still expanding"

U.S. OPTIMISM ON NAMIBIA LOSING CREDIBILITY

The State Department continues to speak optimistically about prospects for a Namibia settlement despite the passage of a mid-August target date for concluding an agreement in the 4 year old talks and ending the 16 year old military struggle against South Africa's illegal occupation of the territory.

A rapid completion of the negotiations conducted by the US led Western Contact Group between the South West Africa People's Organization, the African Frontline states and South Africa would start the 7 month process leading to elections in Namibia as outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 perhaps in April of next year.

The UN plan, accepted in 1978 by all parties, provides the formula for a transition from colonial occupation to independence in Namibia. It calls for internationally supervised elections for a Constituent Assembly empowered to

write the new nation's constitution. What has held up Namibia's transition to statehood is South Africa's refusal to begin the implementation of UNSCR 435.

The US has recently argued that South Africa is now willing to proceed with the plan for reasons of self-interest such as the cost of the war and the decline in South Africa's economy. They also state that South African objections regarding implementation have been all but resolved leaving only details to be worked out.

The American optimistic assessment is not, however, shared by SWAPO or the Frontline states. In an interview with TransAfrica, in Tripoli during the attempted Organization of African Unity summit, SWAPO President Sam Nujoma said, "The South African racist regime has no intention of relinquishing its colonial domination over Namibia." He added that, "The occupation forces are still expanding their

military build-up inside Namibia . . . new airports and military bases are being constructed and aggression against the people of Angola continues daily."

While the military activities of South Africa tend to contradict the US statements on Pretoria's intentions, the stated achievements in the talks themselves have recently come under question. Phase I of the negotiations, which addresses the issues of Constitutional Principles to guarantee white minority rights and the electoral system, is still unfinished.

Though the Contact Group had the Security Council circulate a document said to represent the agreed upon Constitutional Principles, it does not accurately reflect the final agreements reached earlier this year. The document omits 3 important provisions relating to the relationship between the three branches of government (which was to be defined by the Constituent Assembly); the restructuring of the Public, Police and Defense services; and, the establishment of local councils or regional administration only by an act of parliament.

The electoral issue was said to be near resolution when South Africa dropped its insistence on a mixed system of proportional representation and single member districts combined. But they have thus far refused to choose between the two.

On Phase II issues there seems to be more agreement. The size and make up of the military component of the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) is nearly finalized with four of the seven nations to participate already named, an upper limit of 7500 troops has been confirmed and the UN Secretariat is working out the other details. SWAPO appears to have accepted UNTAG monitoring of bases in Angola and Zambia and the South African posed question of UN impartiality in its supervisory role has been satisfied through report language to the Security

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NAMIBIA: US DIPLOMACY OR DUPLICITY?

By Walter Fauntroy

The State Department's 3 month old optimism that a Namibia settlement is near at hand will soon be put to the final test as the US led Western Contact Group attempts to resolve the few remaining problems in the talks between SWAPO, the African Frontline states and South Africa, and gain a UN Security Council implementing resolution to set the transition plan in motion. For lack of a clear indication of South Africa's willingness to end its illegal occupation of Namibia, the State Department's optimism is shared by few other parties to the negotiations. In fact, for the Africans involved there is a strong sense of *Deja vu*. Unlike the Reagan administration, they have been to the point of imminent settlement before only to see the South Africans back down and increase their military presence in Namibia and their destabilization efforts against their neighbors instead.

Yet we are hopeful, if not optimistic, that a speedy conclusion to the talks can be achieved allowing the people of Namibia to gain their right to self-determination that they have struggled for against colonial oppression for nearly 100 years and which for the past 16 years they have waged a costly armed struggle. Namibia's independence would also provide US diplomacy with some credibility in Africa, which it is sorely lacking at present. It would equally allow us, and the international community generally, to focus our attention and resources on working for majority rule in *apartheid* South Africa itself.

The principal doubt about South Africa's commitment to begin implementation of the 4 year old UN settlement plan derives from Pretoria's insistence on a withdrawal of the Cuban troops in Angola as a part of any agreement. Here they have seized upon a position taken by the Reagan administration, albeit incorrect and self-defeating, that the principal threat to stability and development in southern Africa is the presence of Cuban troops and the bogeyman of "communist expansion."

The Cubans arrived in Angola in 1975 at the invitation of the late President Augustino Neto to help defeat a

massive South African invasion of the former Portuguese colony of the verge of its independence. Though a reduction of their presence has been initiated on several occasions, continual South African attacks have caused the Angolans to ask the Cubans to remain. They do so only at the wish of the Angolan government and it is therefore solely a bilateral matter between two sovereign nations.

The issue of the Cuban presence in Angola has never been a part of the negotiations for Namibia's independence, it is nowhere mentioned in the UN settlement plan (Security Council Resolution 435) adopted by all parties, including South Africa, in 1978 and none of the other 4 members of the Western Contact Group had ever raised the issue to be considered as a part of the Namibia talks.

It is unforgivable that the US would provide South Africa a stalling tactic by trying to introduce this issue, which is essentially an internal matter for Angola, into the negotiations, thereby subordinating the US commitment to the Namibian people's independence to some backward strategic objective. It is even worse that the South African's have said that their newfound flexibility in the talks is based on a US assurance that the Cuban question will be resolved if Namibia is to be independent. That the administration would offer such an assurance is very disturbing particularly in the absence of any US/Angolan agreement on this issue and while ongoing talks between the two countries have thus far produced no progress on the issue.

This style of diplomacy has led a number of observers to argue that the US is being duplicitous and that the optimism and near completion of the negotiations will eventually be explained away by blaming Angola for any failure to reach a settlement. Such a characterization should be rejected by the informed American public as it will most certainly be rejected by the international community. For if the current talks do fail it will be because of the same South African intransigence that has undermined all settlement attempts in the past.

A failure to reach an agreement will

also mean, among other things, the end of the Western Contact Group as France, Canada and West Germany have all indicated they will not continue with the negotiations if implementation is not begun this year. Should this occur it will become necessary for the international community to seek another strategy to achieve Namibian independence and comprehensive sanctions under chapter seven of the UN Charter appears to be the only alternative. The US has traditionally vetoed all such resolutions but another veto following a failure to gain South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia would be particularly invidious and unjustifiable.

While the armed struggle to liberate Namibia is bound to escalate if South Africa's occupation continues, the US can either support the call for sanctions or be responsible for a protracted war costing thousands their lives and for continuing to deny one million black people their right to self-determination.

The basis for the Reagan administration's "constructive engagement" policy toward South Africa is its perception of "shared strategic concerns" in the region and the secondary argument that it is easier to influence nations that we have good relations with. South Africa has used this policy to

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FAUNTROY: "For the Africans there's a sense of *Deja vu*."

GUYANA: GIVING SOCIALISM A BAD NAME

"In Guyana, there is today a fundamental crisis . . . At its heart is a collapse of the production system which has resulted in a rapid deterioration of the standards of living, wages and real earnings of the mass of Guyanese workers and peasants . . . With formal independence, the strata which inherited the State has repressed [workers] rights under the guise of various slogans such as "cooperative socialism" and "paramountcy of the party". In the process, it has argued that the loss of democratic rights is a prerequisite of building the country. To us, the loss of these rights is necessary only to the ruling party's maintaining of itself in power."

—Clive Thomas

WPA Central Committee Member
Chairman, University of Guyana Staff Association
January, 1981

The Guyana government declared itself bankrupt this spring and faces a growing movement in the country to put an end to the 18 year old regime accused of sustaining itself by systematically rigging elections, repressing opposition and instituting party paramountcy in Guyana. The Reagan administration, while not extremely close to the Georgetown regime, is concerned with the prospects of a radical replacement to Forbes Burnham and has already made false charges of Cuban military training of opposition parties.

A country the size of Great Britain, Guyana is located in northern South America. Its population of about 800,000 is concentrated along a narrow coastal strip and is quite cosmopolitan with 51% East Indians, 43% African and mixed, 4% Amerindians and the remaining 2% of Portuguese, English and Chinese descent.

In 1950 the modern political history of Guyana began with the formation of the People's Progressive Party (PPP). The PPP, led by Cheddi Jagan, an East Indian, and Forbes Burnham, a black, brought together Guyana's two major ethnic groups. In elections finally held in 1953 under a constitution advanced by the British, the PPP won 18 of 24 seats. Within six months the British government, under pressure from the US, suspended the constitution arguing that the avowed Marxist-Leninist Jagan and the socialist oriented Burnham posed the threat of a communist dictatorship.

During the next few years Burnham and Jagan split politically and in so doing diminished the chances of racial co-operation. Race replaced class in Guyana's political life. By 1957 Burnham formed his own party, the People's National Congress (PNC), but when constitutional government was restored that same year Jagan's PPP won the elections. The 1961 elections produced another PPP victory.

During this period the Kennedy administration, still reeling from the Bay of Pigs fiasco, was determined to prevent Jagan, seen as a Soviet tool, from leading Guyana to independence. The idea was to find a way of combining Burnham's 41% of the vote with the 16% of the anti-socialist United Force Party of Portuguese businessman Peter d'Aguiar. Violence was provoked throughout 1962 and 1963 with strong implications of CIA and AFL-CIO in-



volvement and which had a strong racial undertone, further polarizing the society. In 1964 the British imposed the solution of new elections, just prior to independence, based on proportional representation with the whole nation a single constituency. Burnham's 41% and d'Aguiar's 12% gave this alliance of convenience and foreign influence enough votes to oust the PPP.

In the elections of 1968 Burnham gained a clear majority of his own by rigging the elections through massive use of faked overseas and proxy votes. He repeated the blatant electoral fraud on a larger scale in 1973.

Guyana became a *Cooperative Republic* in 1970 and during the next 6 years nationalized most of the major industry in the country. The PNC has

now taken over 80% of the economy and the opposition argues that this is the basis by which Burnham hopes to constitute a party ruling class.

The takeover of the economy has been accompanied by its rapid deterioration. Sugar, bauxite, alumina and rice production for 1981 had not even attained the output levels of a decade ago. In addition to the collapse of the major producing sectors, domestic foodstuffs and services are also failing and the maintainance of public utilities has neared collapse as well. Unemployment is estimated above 40% and widespread inflation and food and spare part shortages complete the dismal internal economic picture.

The PNC, in order to control worker's demands for an improved standard of living, has had to repress non-PNC trade union activity and restrict the system of worker bargaining and industrial relations.

National elections were constitutionally required in 1978 but Burnham opted for a referendum to draft a new constitution. The various opposition groups organized a remarkably effective boycott of the referendum and popular opposition began to gain momentum. The 1980 general elections under the new constitution also were boycotted and the boycott gained international recognition exposing the fraudulent nature of elections in Guyana under Burnham and the PNC.

A most significant development leading to the rise of organized popular opposition was the increasingly effective mobilising capacity of the multiracial Working Peoples Alliance (WPA). Formed in 1973, the WPA joined politicians, intellectuals and workers from both major ethnic groups and pledged itself to racial harmony, free elections and democratic socialism.

Because of its growing effectiveness and popular appeal, the government has directed the full weight of its re-

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AFRICAN AND CARIBBEAN NEWS BRIEFS

SOUTH AFRICA TO REQUEST IMF LOAN

(WASHINGTON) A leaked confidential State Department cable reveals that South Africa may soon request major assistance from the International Monetary Fund in order to relieve a projected balance of payments deficit of R4 billion, caused by the sharp fall in diamond and gold prices, South Africa's main export commodities. Trans-Africa obtained the document in mid July and released it to the press with the aim of creating publicity and kindling a campaign to suspend or expel South Africa from the Fund at an upcoming IMF Board of Governors meeting in Toronto, Canada. Heavy borrowing from the Fund in 1977, allowed South Africa to finance a massive military build up. Last November, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution suggesting that the IMF, one of its specialized agencies, reassess its relations with the white minority government in South Africa.

HAITIANS BEING RELEASED

(MIAMI) On June 29, Judge Eugene Spellman ruled that the detention of 1,900 Haitians was "illegal" and ordered their immediate release provided each is sponsored by a relative or agency and that weekly reports are made to the sponsor until a hearing date with proper legal representation. The Justice Dept. appealed the decision but the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta upheld Spellman's ruling and the release of Haitians began in mid July. Ostensibly the Administration started detention as a means of insuring that Haitians would appear for their hearing appointments, citing a 60% failure rate. But most observers saw the move coupled with interdiction of Haitian vessels on the high seas as forceful measures aimed at deterring further inflows of Haitians. This and previous administrations have categorically prejudged Haitian entrants to be illegal economic migrants and not political refugees as they claim to be, despite an autocratic form of government in Haiti and a court case finding incidents of torture, beatings, and harassment experienced by repatriated Haitians refused U.S. asylum.

SOUTH AFRICA PLANS TO CEDE LAND

(PRETORIA) The South African government plans to transfer part of the KwaZulu homeland, a 3,000 sq. mi. portion, to neighboring Swaziland without the consent of the inhabitants. Observers see the move as a way for South Africa to gain greater influence with the Swazi leadership, who will now have access to the sea, and to conveniently disenfranchise one million black South Africans. The proposal, however, has united black leaders of different stripes. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, tribal leader of the Zulus—the people who will be affected by the transfer, has long been despised for his complicity with government aims of balkanizing blacks along ethnic lines. Now both the African National Congress, the banned liberation movement, and Bishop Desmond Tutu, the premier moderate critic of apartheid have joined him to protest the land deal.

COUP ATTEMPT FAILS IN KENYA

(NAIROBI) An attempted coup in Kenya's capital of Nairobi was crushed by forces loyal to President Daniel Arap Moi. The attempted coup was led by Junior Air Force Officers in the early hours of August 1st. The rebels took over the Nation's only radio station and accused the Moi government of corruption and mismanagement. Moi had recently cracked down on the opposition within the country detaining critics, censoring the press and legislating a one-party state and the rebels criticized the government for each of these acts. In the aftermath over 3,000 Kenyans were arrested including the entire air force.

SOUTH AFRICA INVADES ANGOLA

(LUANDA) While western negotiators pursued a final settlement of the Namibia conflict, South Africa launched a massive invasion into southern Angola in late July from its bases in illegally occupied Namibia. The invasion force, said to consist of 34 battalions, 40 combat cars, 200 pieces of artillery, 60 combat planes, 30 helicopters and 300 armored vehicles, penetrated some 175 KM into Angola killing an estimated 400 Namibian refugees. The invasion underlines the Angolan's need for the 15-20,000 Cuban troops stationed there to prevent Pretoria from overrunning the Luanda government. South Africa also attacked Zimbabwe in August and lost 3 of its soldiers in fighting there. The South Africans are also suspected to have staged the bombing of Zimbabwe's Air Force planes earlier in the summer causing extensive damages.

U.S. MILITARY AIRLIFT TO SOMALIA RAISES CONCERN

(WASHINGTON) Ranking members of the House Africa subcommittee sent a letter to Secretary of State, George Shultz, cautioning him that shipment of military supplies to aid Somalia currently engaged in a conflict with a dissident group, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, could harm U.S. interests in the region. The two Congressmen, **Howard Wolpe** and **William Goodling**, while condemning what they considered an Ethiopian incursion, fear that a U.S. military response would fuel the conflict and heighten Cold War tensions. They urged the Administration to frame a broader diplomatic plan and specifically pursue a "high level . . . initiative" intended to secure a "rapid, mutual withdrawal of forces and a ceasefire."

TEN KILLED IN SOUTH AFRICAN MINE STRIKES

(JOHANNESBURG) Grievances over unequal pay and unsafe working conditions triggered extensive strikes in South Africa among black goldminers during the first week in July. Eight mines were affected and some 12,000 miners involved, making the work stoppage one of the largest to date. The government authorities responded with brutal attacks, using tear gas, truncheons, dogs, and gunfire. In the process, ten were killed, hundreds injured, and thousands shipped off to neighboring countries from which they migrated or to semi-arid "bantustans" or black reservations where employment opportunities are non-existent.

LEGISLATION AND POLICY UPDATE

***IMMIGRATION REFORM BILL**—The comprehensive **Simpson-Mazzoli** immigration reform bill passed the Senate on August 17 and now awaits consideration by the House Judiciary Committee and the full body sometime after the Labor Day Recess. The Senate version will establish a review panel; grant amnesty to millions of illegal aliens; impose sanctions on employers who knowingly hire illegals; direct the President to develop a fraud proof identity system; and grant the Attorney General sweeping powers in adjudicating refugee asylum cases among other things. TransAfrica, concerned mainly with the hypocritical and inconsistent treatment of refugees of color, supported amendments by **Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA)** that would have strengthened the independence of an asylum review board and rights of judicial review. His amendments failed miserably both in committee and on the floor. As reported by the Senate, the relevant asylum section will have the Attorney General sitting on the review panel, appointing other members, and writing standards and procedures. These provisions, in TransAfrica's view, will not serve to depolitize the refugee screening process and grant some due process guarantees to asylum seekers. On the House side with a greater number of liberals, TransAfrica hopes to improve the relevant sections by adding provisions for class action judicial review and maintaining the independence of the appeal board. TransAfrica submitted statements for the record to both Senate and House subcommittees responsible for the legislation.

***GRENADA HEARING**—On June 15, both government and private witnesses testified before the House Inter-American Affairs subcommittee on U.S.-Grenada relations. Since March 1979 when **Maurice Bishop** came to power, U.S.-Grenada relations have been rocky. The U.S. has sought to isolate and undermine the tiny island state by denying emergency hurricane assistance, voting against IMF loans, excluding it from the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and attempting to dissuade European powers from funding the construction of an international airport. State Dept. spokesperson, **Stephen Bosworth**, explained that U.S. antipathy toward the Bishop regime was based on a fear of growing Soviet-Cuban influence, human right violations, and strident anti-American rhetoric. All the other witnesses, **Rep. Merv Dymally (D-CA)**, **Rep. George Crockett (D-MI)**, **Sally Shelton** (Carter's ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean), and **Randall Robinson** (TransAfrica), criticized the Administration's stance for being too petulant and shortsighted. They praised the tremendous economic and social strides made by Bishop and reserved final judgement on the evolving political system. They vigorously suggested the initiation of constructive dialogue between the two countries.

***US-SOUTH AFRICA NUCLEAR TIES**—Two bills have been introduced that could have an effect on future US nuclear relations with South Africa. **HR 6318**, introduced by **Sen. Gary Hart (D-CO)** and **Rep. Richard Ottinger (D-NY)**, **HR 3513**, introduced by **Rep. Morris Udall (D-AZ)** and **Rep. Jonathan Bingham (D-NY)**, are not specifically directed at SA but would affect the apartheid regime's nuclear plans by closing loopholes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. SA is not a signator of the NNPT. **Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY)** is expected to introduce legislation

soon that would specifically prohibit the export of Nuclear materials or technology to SA, and prohibit US training of SA nuclear scientists.

***CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE**—The much embattled Caribbean aid plan intended to thwart economic instability and communist expansion in the region is nearing House floor consideration. The \$350 million emergency assistance portion has been appropriated by both chambers but authorization is still needed. In an effort to speed progress on the legislation, the emergency money section has been separated from the larger package but strong opposition is expected from liberal House Democrats who are concerned with the skewed distribution of aid, favoring El Salvador and other pro-American regimes in Central America. No action has been taken on the tax incentive measures in both chambers and the free trade zone section, the most potentially beneficent part of the aid package, has been gutted in response to pressures from import-sensitive domestic industries and labor unions in the House Ways and Means subcommittee on Trade. During congressional hearings on the CBI TransAfrica testified twice and submitted five statements for the record on the House side fairly critical of the administration's proposals.

***CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS AGAINST CUBA**—In a remake of the Monroe Doctrine Theory, a House-Senate conference on a supplemental appropriations bill approved an amendment introduced by **Sen. Steve Symms (R-ID)** that favors the US using "whatever means necessary, including the use of arms" to contain Cuban "aggressive or subversive activities" in the western hemisphere. It also asserts that the US will "work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination." Congress is also likely to adopt legislation, already approved in the House, to establish a government propaganda radio station to broadcast programs to Cuba. The bill, **HR 5427**, passed the House by a vote of 250 to 134 and now goes to the Senate. Construction on 'Radio Marti', as the station will be called after famed Cuban patriot Jose Marti, is nearly completed despite the fact that no legislation has been finalized approving the construction. Marti, who authored "Inside the Monster: Writings on the US and American Imperialism", would not be pleased to see his name being used in this manner.

***SOUTH AFRICA INVESTMENT BILLS**—On June 10 the Subcommittees on Africa and International Economic Policy and Trade approved two bills restricting US corporate investment in South Africa. **HR 3597**, introduced by **Rep. Bill Gray (D-PA)** would prohibit all new corporate investment in South Africa with penalties of up to \$1 million and 10 years in jail for violations. The section prohibiting reinvestments by companies already in South Africa was dropped. **HR 3008**, introduced by **Rep. Steve Solarz (D-NY)** would make mandatory a set of "fair workplace principles" for US companies operating there. It would also ban all bank loans to the SA government and government entities; make public all US bank loans to Businesses in SA; and ban the importation of the SA Kruggerand (gold coin) to the US. The bills will now go to the full Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by **Rep. Clement Zablocki (D-WI)** to be considered.

PAN-AFRICAN UNITY SUMMIT POSTPONED

The Organization of African Unity's 19th summit meeting, scheduled for early August in Tripoli, Libya, was postponed due, to the lack of a quorum. The thirty-one member-states that did gather in the Libyan capitol decided to form a seven nation committee assigned to persuade the 19 nations that boycotted the conference to attend an extraordinary summit later in the year in either Tripoli or Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the seat of the OAU secretariat. Thirty-four states are required to form a quorum in order to legally carry out OAU business.

There were at least three major factors contributing to the failure of the OAU to obtain a quorum. The first was the controversy over the war in the Western Sahara. For at least two weeks prior to the summit, OAU officials and various Heads of State lobbied intensely to settle the split over the question of seating the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as the organization's 51st member. The SADR has been established by the POLISARIO Front movement which has been fighting for independence against Morocco for the past seven years.

The SADR was admitted to the OAU at the 38th Council of Ministers meeting in February in Addis Ababa by the outgoing OAU Secretary General, Edem Kodjo. The decision was said to have been an administrative one made on the grounds that a majority of the member-states (26) had recognized the SADR. Morocco promptly led a 19 delegation walk out and argued that only a two-third majority of the OAU could make such a decision at a summit meeting.

Some countries offered their commitment to the legitimacy of the POLISARIO struggle while withhold-

ing their support for recognition of the SADR as a country because of the threat to the OAU posed by this question. Nigerian President Shehu Shagari explained Nigeria's "neutral" position on this matter by saying; "After all, SWAPO is not a member of the OAU, but we support it." Nonetheless, 17 of the 19 boycotting nations are identified as being pro-Moroccan in the Western Sahara conflict.

The second factor contributing to the quorum breakdown was the venue. By holding the summit in Tripoli, Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi would have become the Chairman of the OAU and the representative for all of Africa for the next year. A number of African countries harbor hostilities against Qaddafi for what they consider



QADDAFI: OAU's next chairman?

Libyan interference in their internal affairs and some have even accused Tripoli of planning to overthrow their governments. Their absence, seen as protesting the transfer of the OAU chair from Kenya to Libya, would not have been enough to prevent a quorum and in any case most of these nations fall into the pro-Moroccan camp on the Western Sahara question as well. The decision to have the summit hosted by Libya was made by consensus at last year's summit conference in Nairobi.

The final factor undermining the summit was the behind the scenes role of the United States government. According to several African officials in Tripoli, the State Department had sent cables to most of the American embassies in Africa months prior to the summit, encouraging the missions to, "Look into ways of persuading certain governments not to attend the conference in Libya." Critics claim that the

Reagan administration was prepared to "do anything" to prevent Col. Qaddafi from speaking for Africa in international fora in the coming year. The US is also an ardent supporter of Morocco and has recently increased military assistance to King Hassan II.

Perhaps only the first factor would have been enough, by itself, to prevent the summit from taking place, but with the addition of the other two it was all but assured that the summit would, at best, be postponed.

Despite the problems causing a postponement, the mood in Tripoli was one of optimism regarding a summit conference to be convened at a later date. In a report in AFRICA NEWS (August 9, 1982), an OAU spokesperson described Tripoli as a "temporary setback" and explained, "We have so many other important interests that unite us that one issue will not create the situation which some of our detractors are hoping for, the disbandment of the organization."

The OAU has weathered numerous conflicts within the organization during the past 19 years that observers and diplomats alike feel have strengthened the organization. It has been able to assist in the building of regional groupings for cooperation in trade, transportation and communications. Most significantly it has provided a unified voice in support of the end of colonialism on the continent and offers material support to the liberation movements of southern Africa through its Liberation Committee.

The following countries were represented at Tripoli, attended the informal meetings and the final session with the SADR:

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (27).

- Nigeria and Kenya played a "neutral" role. They were represented at Tripoli, but did not attend the final session (2).

- Chad was a special case because it was not clear who was representing (1).

- Togo, in theory a neutral, had its position compromised by the Chad question (1).

The following countries boycotted the final session:

Cameroon, Comores, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Upper Volta, Liberia, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and Zaire (19).

—WEST AFRICA August 23, 1982



KODJO: OAU's outgoing Secretary General

U.S. OPPOSED TO LAW OF SEA TREATY

On July 9, President Reagan announced that the United States will not sign the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, a treaty the vast majority of the world's nations will adopt at a December meeting in Caracas, Venezuela. The document, a culmination of nine painstaking years of negotiations, represents a major attempt to control and rationalize the exploitation of the oceans, a vast and rich economic resource and quite literally one of the planet's last frontiers.

President Reagan in an explanation of his decision, said he was opposed to "regulation on the high seas". U.S. opposition centers on the section governing the mining of minerals from the deep seas, an area outside the legal jurisdiction of any one state and designated as the "common heritage of mankind" by a 1970 United Nations resolution, incidentally supported by the U.S.

This area of the ocean floor holds the most significant untapped source of hard minerals known. Roughly spherical nodules, resembling burnt potatoes and containing manganese, nickel, cobalt, and copper, cover enormous expanses of the seabed at depths ranging from a few hundred feet to tens of thousands. Whereas the technologically advanced nations with the capability to recover the nodules, the U.S. being the foremost among them, would prefer an "open frontier claim system", one with exclusive proprietary rights over a finite area, the less developed countries and major land-based suppliers of these minerals fear price disruptions and permanent disadvantage. Thus given the competing economic interests, the Law of the Sea Conference attempted to reconcile the differences by establishing an International Seabed Authority that would regulate the exploitation by both private companies and an agency-owned enterprise to be operated for the sole benefit of the less developed nations. Furthermore the private, western-based companies would be obligated to sell mining technology to the international agency at a fair price.

Other provisions that troubled the U.S. were ones limiting veto powers to the question of the inclusion or exclusion of liberation movements in the seabed mining regime and a review

process that would adopt amendments by a 2/3's majority. The Reagan administration, fearing that private investments would be discouraged and U.S. technological superiority eroded by the mandatory transfer clause, sought to change these provisions. Mining industry officials estimate that before commercial production can begin from one deep sea site, \$2 billion has to be invested, therefore they are very reluctant to see the U.S. enter into international arrangement that would entail the redistribution of wealth and technology to the Third World.

The impetus for a treaty is clear. In the last thirty years the uses of the sea have multiplied, creating a need for a modicum of order and coordination among users. As the world's nations become more economically interdependent, shipping tonnage has increased dramatically and the need for uniform seaworthiness codes and clear navigation rights has been recognized. With steady population increases, the sea has also become a major source of food. By the late 1960's several fishing grounds had been severely depleted and a number of species threatened with extinction. Nations are also looking to the seas for recoverable gas and oil deposits sometimes within archipelagic waters or narrow straits where jurisdiction is unclear. Lastly, pollution and environmental deterioration are threatening to spoil scenic beaches and diminish marine life making scientific research and pollution abatement programs imperative.

As countries' uses of the oceans have grown, so have their legal claims. For more than three centuries the accepted seaward boundary of a country extended three nautical miles, approximately the area an 18th century land-based cannon could defend. Beyond this narrow sovereign belt, known as a coastal state's territorial sea, stretched the *high seas* which were legally free to all to use or travel across. However, with greater economic exploitation of the seas in recent years the effective boundaries have been extended amid various controversies and conflicts. The initiator of the "great seaward rush" was no other than President Harry Truman who in 1945 claimed the continental shelf on the north side of the Gulf of Mexico up to a depth of 600 feet

because of the large and "strategic" oil reserves discovered there. In the 1950's great fishing nations followed suit and asserted jurisdiction over fisheries 200 miles offshore. As a result, foreign vessels were seized, foreign fishermen detained, and in skirmishes some lives were lost.

In order to prevent a mad, competitive scramble for sovereign rights over the seabed, the United Nations after many years of desultory debate convened the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1973 to:

- establish a new international agency charged with regulating seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction;
- define the areas of ocean within national jurisdiction, including continental shelf limits;
- formulate rules for fishing, conservation and protection of marine life, pollution control and scientific research;
- write rules governing navigation and overflight rights especially through straits and archipelagic waters; and to
- design mechanisms for conflict resolution.

The draft reported out of the Conference on April 30, 1982 by a vote of 130-4 with 17 abstentions (mostly industrialized countries), represents a remarkable achievement in consensus building and pragmatism, except for the provisions on seabed mining and conflict mediation. Most observers and participants note with great satisfaction the strides made on clarifying the 200 mile exclusive economic zone for coastal states, navigational rights, and guidelines for coordinated scientific research and marine life conservation.

From a global perspective the implication of U.S. non-ratification is a grave blow to international cooperation and multilateralism. A gallant attempt at global problem-solving and institution-building may be dashed by the lack of support from leading industrialized countries in both the Western and Eastern bloc. Powerful mining interests particularly in the U.S. seem to be eclipsing legitimate national and international interests. Seabed mining is still not a reality and over the next twenty years is not expected to be a large scale activity because of the prohibitive costs. The portions of the treaty widely accepted serve more important and immediate basic needs.

Namibia (cont'd from page 2)

Council from the Secretary General and the Contact Group reaffirming a neutral UN role.

Though incomplete, the level of agreement reached in the talks has led the Contact Group to prepare a draft letter calling on the Security Council "to set in motion the implementation of Resolution 435." The letter, which also states that, "agreement has been reached among all the parties concerned" to begin implementation, is not likely to be delivered any time soon due to an issue that has never been a part of the negotiations or Resolution 435: the 15-20,000 Cuban troops in Angola.

South Africa has insisted that a withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola must be a part of any settlement agreement and the Reagan administration has aligned itself with South Africa on this issue. Though no bilateral agreement concerning the Cubans has been reached between Washington and Luanda despite a sudden flurry of shuttle diplomacy, the State Department has nonetheless assured Pretoria that the Cuban issue will be resolved if a Namibia settlement is to occur. The South Africans are now likely to block any Security Council action to begin the transition to Namibia's independence by simply continuing to withhold their decision on the electoral system until an agreement is reached between the US and Angola on the Cuban troops.

But the talks with Angola aren't going well for the US. The Angolan government has time and again stated its position that the Cuban troops were invited to Angola in 1975 because of the massive South African invasion that year and have remained at the invitation of the government because of continued South African aggression.

At the Tripoli meeting in early August, the Angolan Foreign Minister, Paulo Jorge, told TransAfrica that a withdrawal of the Cubans could occur only as outlined in the common declaration issued by the Cuban and Angolan governments on February 4. This communique states that the Cubans will not be removed until: South African troops are withdrawn from Namibia; the end of outside aid to insurgents fighting the Angolan government; and, the end of all danger of aggression toward Angola. Jorge added that, "We think it is also a question of the credibility of our word and we are very clear on the credibility of our word . . . we intend always to respect [it]."

Though the South Africans seek to

make a Cuban withdrawal a condition for a settlement, their large August invasion deep into Angolan territory [see page 4] and continued occupation of parts of Southern Angola contradict claims by the Americans that Pretoria is prepared to settle.

With recent by-elections in South Africa revealing a substantial electoral threat to the ruling National Party from the far-right Conservative Party, observers feel the *apartheid* regime is unlikely to risk the domestic costs of a SWAPO victory in elections in Namibia.

How the US will handle the present deadlock is unclear but there are indications that 3 members of the Contact Group (France, West Germany and Canada) will pull out of the talks if implementation does not begin this year. The other members are the US and Britain. The African Frontline states involved in the talks are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and also Nigeria.

Editorial (cont'd from page 2)

gain numerous "carrots" from the US while offering nothing in return because there is not even the threat of the "stick". This "best of friends" approach to South Africa, apart from deeply offending all black Americans, was supposed to have brought about an early Namibia settlement so that the Reagan administration could consolidate its alliance with Pretoria and bring South Africa back into the "framework of Western security" as well as "end their polecat status in the world." This was not enough for the *apartheid* regime.

If however a settlement is concluded in the coming weeks we must, aside from celebrating, recognize that South Africa moved out of a perception of its own self-interest and not because of some ephemeral American policy of friendship. We must make sure that in the instance of a settlement the Reagan administration does not attempt to "rob Peter to pay Paul." The rights and interests of the 24 million black South Africans living under *apartheid* inside South Africa must not be sacrificed on the altar of "constructive engagement" because of some false claim that this is what gave Namibia its independence. Nor should any secret deals be negotiated with the South Africans offering them anything such as full nuclear cooperation or a mutual defense pact, etc. in return for a Namibia settlement.

The Reagan administration should

understand that a non-violent resolution of the Namibia and South Africa questions serves our nation's vital interests in retaining access to various strategic minerals we require from these two countries and our access to the Cape sea routes as well as the most important interest of promoting human rights and international peace and security. But they must also understand that those situations are already violent ones and have been for years because of the systematic violence of South African rule. Therefore in order to affect non-violent solutions in this day we must move swiftly and forcefully to utilize every conceivable type of leverage we have to bring the government of South Africa to its senses before it's too late.

Congressman Fauntroy has represented the Nation's Capitol in the House of Representatives since 1971. He is currently the Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus and also sits on TransAfrica's Board of Directors.

Guyana (cont'd from page 3)

pressive machinery against the WPA. Three active members of the party, including the internationally acclaimed historian and party leader Walter Rodney, have been killed since November 1979. Detention and harassment are common as well as assaults by official or paramilitary forces of the PNC.

With economic and political conditions in such a state Burnham is seeking a diversion from the pressing need for change by raising the specter of an old border dispute with neighboring Venezuela. But critics argue that the emergency is an internal one and despite the severity of the situation the various opposition groups have thus far continued to pursue a non-violent political solution.

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