

# **SOUTHERN AFRICA**

## **A TIME FOR CHANGE**





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AFRICA**

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FOR  
CHANGE**

## FOREWORD

**A**SIDE FROM SEVERAL organizations specializing in African affairs, a few groups of university students, and schools of African studies at about 50 universities and colleges, few people have demonstrated any concern for the black masses of southern Africa who are still brutally dominated by a stubborn white minority.

This public unawareness of conditions there may well be a major reason why the United States has been able to avoid establishing a practical southern Africa policy, let alone a reasonable policy for Africa as a whole. It may also be a reason why public indignation over southern Africa has not yet arisen here.

That public response is needed is unquestionable. But response in behalf of black Africa will not come about until the news media regard Africa as a major news source on a par with Europe, Asia and Latin America, and people acquaint themselves with the issues.

*Southern Africa: A Time For Change* is an effort on the part of the church to emphasize the deepening plight of southern Africa, the background of the current crisis and its future. It attempts to help bridge the communications gap between two vital areas of the world.

Africa was once almost totally owned by others. As late as 1953 only five countries (Liberia, Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa) were considered free. Britain had 14 colonies and protectorates, and French Africa covered almost a third of the continent. Portugal, Belgium and Italy had the rest.

Now, with most of Africa free, it is the southern tip where white rule has proved reluctant to change, to read the signs of the time. It is there that a cataclysmic clash between whites and blacks, the haves and have-nots, is menacingly near. It is there that a great mass of people live an existence of misery and degradation.

The church is deeply concerned about the problems of Africa. Historically, its involvement came from a preoccupation with preaching the Gospel: its primary goal was to convert and to civilize. However, its teachings often fell upon deaf ears because for Africans, it was the flesh that suffered from inhuman treatment, the stomach that ached from hunger and the mind that thirsted for knowledge.

Gradually the church realized that it could not minister to the soul of the African without consideration for his health, education and social welfare. So it built and staffed hospitals, schools, social centers and



hostels, often before it was able to build its own houses of worship.

During these early years of the church in Africa it also served as the voice of the African, who, ruled by outsiders, had little or no voice of his own. But as the years wore on, the church grew strangely silent as pressures from the ruling white governments threatened to close the institutions it had worked so hard to establish and that had cost it so much to build. As Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia, once pointed out, the church lost its voice out of fear of losing its institutions.

Today, the church reacknowledges its responsibility to speak in behalf of the oppressed. Most denominations have forthrightly condemned apartheid in the Republic of South Africa and her illegal takeover of South West Africa. In Rhodesia the church has championed social, political and economic reforms that would allow the African a significant voice in his own affairs. A similar stance was taken in regards to Portugal's subjugation of Angola and Mozambique.

Southern Africa has reached a stage in history where change is imperative. It is to this end that *Southern Africa: A Time For Change* examines a blatant racism perhaps unparalleled anywhere else in the world.

Critics will charge that this is an unbalanced, exceedingly biased approach to the question of racism in southern Africa. We cannot agree more. South Africa has its own lobbyists. So do white Rhodesians and the Portuguese. Their positions have always been championed and they need no help from us. What we present here is an urgent message to people who have a compassionate, humanitarian concern for those who are forced to live under conditions most of us would not tolerate for long.

This publication attempts to arouse a response which will help to cause a change in southern Africa. It outlines actions all of us can take if we are really sensitive to the plight of our fellow human beings, regardless of their color or where they may happen to live.

In southern Africa there is time for change while the prospects for peace and co-existence between blacks and whites are still a possibility and before the issues have assumed more disastrous proportions.

That time is now.

GEORGE M. DANIELS



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# ROOTS of

**A** GRAVE CRISIS FACES the world in the five states of southern Africa, where some 36 million people are denied the right to participate in making the laws by which they are governed and are segregated and classified on a purely racial basis. Trouble is brewing in this area, for, as the white minority governments have become more repressive, numerous well-organized liberation groups have turned to violence to secure the rights of the majority.

It behooves every American to acquaint himself with the trends and conditions in this vital region. All five of the political divisions in the area are ruled in one form or another by white minority governments. The history of each is a story in itself.

South Africa has followed a policy of segregation for generations, with the restrictions on the black majority becoming more severe in direct proportion to the achievement of independence in other parts of the continent and to the anticipated possibility of political and economic demands from within.

South West Africa became a trusteeship territory of South Africa under a League of Nations mandate. It is now, for all practical purposes, a colony of South Africa, despite a series of United Nations resolutions terminating the area's mandate status and contemplating establishment of an independent government.

South Africa's contempt for democratic principles is matched by the harsh practices of the breakaway regime in Rhodesia, where British and United Nations sanctions have proven too mild and too easily circumvented to be effective.

In Angola and Mozambique, where half a million whites dominate a black population of more than 12 million, African liberation groups and some 100,000 Portuguese troops have been engaged in armed conflict for several years.

Taken as a whole, there are 36 million nonwhites in these five areas who are ruled by a white minority of four and a half million. They have been suppressed for generations. They have been denied political and economic rights. They have been exploited, segre-

gated, terrorized and killed. Their best leaders, who dared to speak out against the governments, have paid for their ideals with their lives.

There are significant white populations in these five territories, to be sure. For many of these white people, Africa is the only home they have even known. They do not want to leave, yet they are afraid to stay if majority rule ever becomes a reality. In their fear they ignore the commendable experiences of Zambia and Kenya, and are instead seeking strength in military suppression. It will not work.

The leaders of the African liberation movements increasingly have come to believe that they will achieve their objectives only by violence. When one considers that they are denied the opportunity for peaceful demonstrations, rallies and petitions, that political organization is forbidden, that 99 percent of the population is not even allowed to vote in most of these areas, their desperation is understandable.

With positions hardening on both sides, the conflict seems destined to grow and to involve not only the peoples of southern Africa but also neighboring African states and an increasing number of nations throughout the world.

The other independent nations of Africa have cast their lot with the freedom fighters. At the September (1967) meeting of the Organization for African Unity in Kinshasa, the 38 members of the Organization of African Unity voted to give \$2 million of their \$3.1 million budget to the various liberation groups.

In these circumstances, with a long and bitter struggle looming ahead, the choices for United States policy are as difficult as they are urgent. To be sure, we have often expressed our ideological position and our hostility to both colonialism and the antidemocratic systems in southern Africa.

The United States has long made clear its opposition to the apartheid policies of South Africa. Our government has joined in economic sanctions against Rhodesia. It supported the creation of an ad hoc United Nations committee to study the problem of South West Africa. It deplored the trial in Pretoria of the South West African freedom fighters. And the United States has tried to exact guarantees from its NATO ally, Portugal, that military equipment pro-

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Edward W. Brooke (R., Mass.) is the first Negro senator elected by popular vote since Reconstruction. This article is condensed from the speech he delivered on the floor of the Senate after his fact-finding trip to Africa in 1968.



# REVOLT

by EDWARD W. BROOKE

vided by the U.S. will not be used outside the NATO area.

But, in African eyes, the record of what we have not done speaks much more clearly. We have taken no purposeful action to discourage American private investment in South Africa, which is now in excess of \$600 million and serves as a vital pillar of support for that unpopular regime. In addition, we have placed no restrictions on United States trade with South Africa other than a prohibition against the sale of military equipment.

The United States regards Rhodesia as a "British colony in rebellion," yet because of the limited nature of our investments and trade, our economic sanctions have had no impact at all; and we have done too little to persuade the British to increase pressure on the rebel governments.

America's allies sell arms and sophisticated military equipment outright to the South African government, and the United States government has made little effort to persuade them to do otherwise. Portugal receives considerable military assistance from the U.S., and the African freedom fighters insist that American weapons are killing their people in Angola and Mozambique.

I believe that the time has come to wrench ourselves from this pattern of implied complicity with the southern African regimes. I do not fancy that maximum American pressure will bring early and easy political change to the area. I realize that firmer action on our part may increase tensions with our European allies. But I believe we must remove from the United States any hint of sympathy for the minority governments of southern Africa.

Conditions in southern Africa confront the United States and other members of the international community with the most difficult issues of international law and morality. No one who respects as I do the rule of law among men and among nations, will lightly transcend the principle that the domestic affairs of sovereign states are not an appropriate subject for international consideration. The U.S. and other western nations have been understandably reluctant to take stringent action against southern Africa precisely because of their respect for this standard.

But the facts are that the abridgement of human liberty in this area is so overwhelming that it is necessarily the concern of all nations. The danger to international peace is so great that it must be dealt with by the larger community of nations. With the exception of South Africa itself, none of the territories involved is itself a sovereign state which can properly invoke the privileged claim that its domestic affairs are immune from international review. What we face in southern Africa is a last, terrible harvest of practices which have won the general condemnation of mankind.

I believe we must make clear to South Africa that, lacking evidence of that government's willingness to move toward social justice and equality for the African population it controls, the United States will begin to disengage from its burgeoning economic ties to that country.

I believe we must make clear to Portugal that, lacking a credible commitment to self-determination in Angola and Mozambique, the United States must and will begin to reduce its military relations with the Lisbon government, even at the sacrifice of the military facilities which we have permitted to develop on Portuguese territory.

I believe we must do all in our power to end the intolerable situation in Rhodesia, and that includes an absolute ban on United States trade with the territory.

These steps will not suffice for the purposes we seek, but they will represent a beginning. At stake is our moral and political credit with all of Africa. I believe that credit is more precious than any short-term advantages we might protect by maintaining cordial relations with the minority regimes in southern Africa.

If we are to enjoy beneficial relations with Africa as a whole, it is imperative that we be willing to sacrifice the ephemeral advantages of good relations with South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal so long as they persist in oppressing millions of Africans. Only by standing with the just demands of the African majority, only by fidelity to our own principles, will we be able to lay a sturdy foundation for our future relations with the continent at large.



## PART I — SOUTH AFRICA

WILLIAM R. FRYE

**S**OUTH AFRICA is a land of bewildering contradictions. Its whites, both Afrikaans- and English-speaking, are among the most enterprising and talented people in the world. They have a frontier spirit, a zeal for economic conquest and a sense of boundless opportunity for the imaginative and talented (provided they are white). There is a kind of early-American flavor to the zest and sweep of South Africa. Rags-to-riches stories among the whites are not uncommon. One of the world's great tragedies is that such admirable qualities should be overhung by a cloud of fear, prejudice and extremism.

Few of these people are intentionally cruel; most are devout, hospitable and even tenderhearted. Yet they do cruel things, and a majority of them vote for a government that enshrines their prejudices and

practices into law. (If an Afrikaner wants to break a chap's heart, he makes a law.) Then they turn around and deplore what has happened, finding a rationalization for it: "We must maintain civilized standards," or: "We would be overwhelmed." And they desperately want the world to understand why they have acted as they have.

All the pressures that have produced a world-wide movement from farm to city are present in South Africa: population pressure, poverty on the farms, opportunity at the centers of industrial growth. Such farm to city migration became significant in South Africa in the 1920's and reached extremes during World War II, accompanied by a rash of ugly slums, crime, misery, hazards to health and other familiar blights of slum life. When mass migration continued





## A NATION TORN ASUNDER

after the war, the Smuts government sought to regulate the flow of migrants with a system which barred people who would be a burden on the white economy but permitted a convenient influx of cheap labor to industrial areas.

Despite this control, between 33 and 40 percent of the nonwhite population lived in cities in 1967, and best estimates are that it will be 70 percent by 1990. Thus influx control has not stopped African migration from country to city, and the government holds out little hope of its doing so before 1978, if then. Moreover, there is no prospect of relaxation in the incredibly complex and virtually unmanageable system of regulation which influx control has required.

For nonwhites, the heart of the control system was and is what they call the *dom pas* (stupid pass-

book), now officially known as a "reference book." (All South Africans over 16 years of age are required to carry at least an identification card, but only nonwhites must have the elaborate reference book.) A document of 90-odd pages, resembling in some respects a passport, it contains a miniature life history of the owner. He must have it on his person at all times. Without it, he or she cannot travel, take up residence, obtain employment, or even legally exist.

No fewer than 1,313 persons a day, on the average,

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were prosecuted for passbook irregularities and related offenses in the year ending June 30, 1966. The bloody demonstrations at Sharpeville and elsewhere in 1960 arose out of protests against the pass laws.

These laws produce all kinds of hardships. Even getting caught momentarily without the book can bring punishment. "I was arrested near my house while on my way to buy a paper," Cameron B. of Johannesburg related. "My family brought my pass to the police station, and it was in order; but I was not released, and the next day I was fined eight *rand* (\$11.20)." This is six days' pay for the average urban black person.

Other pass violation cases are handled more quickly—much more quickly. *New York Times* correspondent Joseph Lelyveld, whom the government later expelled, tells of visiting the Bantu court in September 1965.

He saw 71 cases handled before lunch, 57 of them in 80 minutes.

"Why were you in Johannesburg?" the magistrate asks an accused.

"I was looking for my child."

"Where is your child?"

"Lost."

Ten days," says the magistrate, and bangs his gavel.

**M**ANY SOUTH AFRICANS would agree that a revolutionary could be born in a cowshed. Mrs. Helen Suzman, for example, has repeatedly warned the government that influx control pass laws and other inequities are making revolutionaries out of Africans. Mrs. Suzman is the only member of Parliament elected from the Progressive Party, which favors voting rights for all men and women who meet certain qualifications, regardless of race. Leaders of the much larger United Party have said somewhat the same thing, though they would ease, not repeal, pass laws. The government dismisses such warnings of possible revolution as lying propaganda and many South Africans consider them politics.

Virtually every aspect of influx control produces its own special inequities and cruelties. Without government permission, children may not live with their parents after they reach the age of 18. They are thus forced into the labor market to become useful. The Johannesburg authorities in 1966 ruled that an African mother residing on her white employer's property may not keep an infant child with her even until she has

## Because of its treatment of the

finished nursing it. Presumably it would reduce her usefulness to the employer.

And the regulations are steadily getting tougher. On January 1, 1965, it became impossible for Africans to win unchallengeable residence rights anywhere in white South Africa. Even though a man had lived and worked in an area for 15 years, or worked for the same employer for ten, or had been born there, he was no longer entitled to remain as a matter of right if the authorities wished to evict him.

This law, embodied in the so-called Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964, has been widely denounced, both in and out of South Africa. It made every urban African a migrant laborer, a disembodied pair of hands, completely at the mercy of the authorities. Temporary sojourner in a white area, the government called him.

The Bantu Laws Amendment Act made influx con-



trol, in legal theory, absolute. It enabled the government to isolate potential revolutionaries, idlers, delinquents and criminals. But it also served to create furious grievances. For every revolutionary the government might segregate under this law, four, or perhaps 40, would be created in his place.

The Group Areas Act of 1950 (called by its critics the "Ghetto Act") is a massive zoning ordinance which seeks to rearrange South African society into a predetermined pattern with all the whites housed in certain areas, all the coloreds in others, all the Asians in still others, and finally all the blacks in what is left.

Gathering all members of a group into its designated area has meant uprooting and resettling hundreds of thousands of people in what surely must have been, and still is, one of the largest involuntary movements of peoples in modern times. For many blacks, the change from slums to government townships or locations, even with their concentration-camp appearance, has been a dramatic physical improvement. The government dwellings are simple, but they have small yards, and are equipped well enough that Africans consider it a tragedy when they are endorsed out.

On the other hand, the change from slum to township or location involves certain hardships: loss of familiar surroundings; an increase in rent, which is sometimes severe; the inconvenience and expense of living in an isolated district, many locations being some miles out of town; severe restraints on one's movements (Africans may not be outside the fence after 11 P.M.); and perhaps most galling of all, acquiescence to apartheid.

## **SOUTH AFRICA**

*Government:* Independent republic; all-white national parliament.

*Population:* 18.7 million. Africans, 66 percent (12.7 million); whites, 19 percent (3.9 million); coloreds, 10 percent (1.8 million); Asians (Indians and Pakistanis), 3 percent (600,000).

*Languages:* English, Afrikaans (dialect of descendants of Dutch settlers), African languages.

*Capitals:* administrative, Pretoria; legislative, Capetown; judicial, Bloemfontein.

*Major exports:* gold, diamonds, wool.

freedom, without which life is an empty routine.

A group of some 1,000 African squatters in a shantytown called Holpan, 40 miles north of Kimberley, the diamond center, was ordered to transfer to a nearby location in late 1965. Many had lived in Holpan all their lives and did not want to shift. The rent to be charged for the government houses (\$5.60 a month) was, for them, very high; it would be one third of all they could earn at nearby farms and diamond diggings, even in the best months. They refused to go.

One day, about a week before Christmas, govern-

## **nonwhite majority, says a noted journalist, South Africa**

From the moment an African settles in a government township or location, the ceiling on his advancement becomes clear and visible. Even if he is moderately successful—some are, despite the enormous obstacles—he cannot move up to better housing unless it is available inside the fence. He is kept at the level the government considers appropriate for people of his color.

Moreover, he is dependent on the sometimes capricious government, not just for his residence, but for everything else of importance he possesses. He may not even marry freely under all circumstances and expect to live a normal life. If a black African is married to a mulatto or an Asian, he and his wife may never be able to make a home together. One or both may be restricted to a location or township for people of that racial group. Nonwhites lack the essential ingredient,

**has become a curse in a**

**large part of the world:**

**"A profanity used with some  
of the worst expletives**

**in the language."**



ment trucks pulled up abruptly. The Africans were taken, with their possessions, not to the designated location but to the Mamuthla Reserve, 25 miles away. There was nothing there but barren *veld*—no shelter, no food, no opportunities to earn a living, no schools for the children, nothing. The trucks dumped them and left them to fend for themselves.

For Asians, the move often represents a physical downgrading. It can also be accompanied by severe financial injury, despite government effort to mitigate it. Property often cannot be disposed of advantageously when its occupants have been ordered to vacate and when the neighborhood has been closed. Some Asians are small entrepreneurs, and for them, enforcement of the Group Areas Act may mean damage to their livelihood as well, since their place of business may also be uprooted. One elderly Indian in Pretoria, a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, has served three prison terms rather than move from a home he has occupied for 37 years.

The rationale for this policy is that different races, or "nations," as they are now being called, must be compartmentalized "for their own good." While much of the world is striving to become color-blind, South Africa persists in seeing men not only in terms of their color, but of their shades of colors.

No contact which remotely implies equality between races is permitted. They travel, with rare exceptions, in separate trains and buses, eat in separate restaurants, sit on separate park benches, walk through separate doorways and are buried in separate graveyards. There are separate hospitals, separate ambulances, separate telephone booths and separate taxi stands. The main Afrikaner churches are strictly segregated. (Some smaller denominations are integrated, but the authorities can forbid it.)

There are separate clubs, schools and movies. Factories even make workers punch separate time clocks, and comic books deal almost exclusively with characters of a single color. There are separate hours for nonwhites at zoos, art galleries, museums and public gardens. Stiff penalties are meted out for sexual intercourse between white and nonwhite.

"Petty apartheid," as segregation practices of a minor character are called, sometimes gives rise to curiously strained logic. The 150 or so Japanese businessmen in Johannesburg are treated as "honorary whites," a concept that would certainly have startled the authors of the "yellow peril" legend in the 1920's. This special concession can perhaps be explained by the fact that so few people are involved. A more likely explanation, however, is that Japan now is one of South Africa's most important trading partners, along with Britain, the United States and West Germany.

Some 6,500 Chinese, on the other hand, are not



considered white, though they are accorded special treatment. They could perhaps be described as "white by government permit." Chinese born in South Africa are usually issued permits to live and work in white areas; foreign-born Chinese, still whiter, have additional privileges.

Even among white South Africans, classification is not always an easy task. A white man may have a dark complexion, and a mulatto a light one. According to the Institute of Race Relations, there has been at least one case where a white man was classified nonwhite





## Sharpeville Massacre

**M**ARCH 21, 1960, was the day set aside by the African people to protest the pass laws that stringently control the movement of black people within South Africa. The pass is a document of 96 pages containing personal statistics and history which must be carried at all times by each "native male or female above the age of 16." It must be produced on demand for inspection by the police at any hour and in any place.

The pass laws have been used as a means of harassment by South African authorities. Incessant pass raids have become a permanent feature of the state. Brutality is a normal occurrence in raids in which police invade homes, separate families and terrorize whole communities.

The increase of pass raids and other indignities brought on the call, initiated by African political

because he had worked in the sun for a long time and gotten a deep tan. On appeal, he was restored to white status.

**O**NE ASPECT OF APARTHEID unquestionably intensifies hostility between races. It is "job reservation," the law or custom that certain types of jobs must be filled only by members of the race considered "suited" for it. Regardless of a man's qualifications, he may not legally cross the barrier which artificially defines his occupation. A nonwhite may sacrifice and struggle to gain

expertise badly needed by the economy (it is formidably difficult for him to get education and training beyond the elementary level, but a few manage it). Then, after getting his degree, he is expressly forbidden by law to seek a job on the open market commensurate with his skill. Except in his own milieu such jobs are, with rare exceptions, for whites only. There are ways to get around some of the requirements and others are not strictly enforced. But for many nonwhites, and especially for the unemployed, the impact of the law is heavy.



leaders, for a mass peaceful protest on March 21. Over 20,000 protesters gathered at Sharpeville and Langa, Capetown. Despite strong feelings of indignation, they were assembled in a spirit of complete nonviolence. Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, one of the protest leaders, said, "We are willing to die for our

freedom; we are not yet ready to kill for it."

The demonstrators at Sharpeville told police they had left their passes at home and that they would no longer carry them. The plan was to overflow all the jails and engulf the whole country. The police, however, reacted to such numbers

with panic. Without warning, squads appeared from inside the police station, armed with rifles and automatic weapons, and opened fire on the crowd.

The front ranks of demonstrators were cut down in a slaughter that killed 69 people immediately and injured 257, most of them seriously.



Job stratification is intended primarily for the benefit of whites, but it also applies among blacks, coloreds and Indians. Black Africans resent the fact that Indians and coloreds take from them some of the few opportunities they might otherwise have. In turn, Indians and coloreds look down on black Africans and discriminate against them socially, fearing their potential competition and hence sharing with whites an economic motive for repressing them.

Psychologically too, prejudice is a contagious disease. Feeling repressed by the whites, the Asians and the col-

oreds seek, perhaps unconsciously, to enhance their own status by shoving the blacks further down the scale.

Fear of job competition from nonwhites ("cheap black labor") is strongest among ill-educated, unskilled, or semi-skilled whites; "poor whites," some of them would be called in the American South, although the parallel is not precise, their position on the American socio-economic ladder being a rung or two higher. Unable or unwilling to compete with nonwhites on even terms, they are given specially protected status.



The *Rand Daily Mail*, South Africa's leading English-language newspaper, reported: "... volley after volley of .303 bullets and sten-gun bursts tore into the crowd ... as scores of people fell before the hail of bullets. Bodies lay in grotesque positions on the pavement. Then came ambulances, 11 of them.

Two truckloads of bodies were taken to the mortuary."

The South African government unleashed a wave of terror following the massacre. In a single sweep, 21,000 activists and opponents of apartheid were arrested on contrived charges and detained without trial. Hundreds fled ahead of

the net across every border northward. A generation of exiles came into being which now numbers well over a thousand and grows daily.

The people of South Africa and South West Africa wait silently for a deliverance that an indifferent world does not bring. Every day of silence brings violence closer. •



For them, job reservation is a kind of social subsidy—a convenient cushion, but one that removes what could otherwise be a useful stimulus to self-improvement.

Job reservation produces some of the most extraordinary irregularities of all. South Africa's boom has brought a major shortage of housing-construction workers. Yet in many places black plasterers may not legally be hired, no matter how desperate a contractor may be for labor. So unemployment and a labor shortage exist side by side in the same field.

Underlying all this inhumanity to man is *baasskap*

(boss-ship). *Baasskap* is the doctrine—the utter conviction—of white superiority, with a determination to keep things that way. "We want to make South Africa white," Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd told Parliament in 1963, when euphemisms and circumlocutions were less in style than they are today. "Keeping it white can only mean one thing, namely, white domination—not leadership, not guidance—but control, supremacy."

Apartheid, however, cannot safely be presented to the world in the form of bald white supremacy. The

outside world's hostility is an economic disadvantage to South Africa as well as an inconvenience and an embarrassment, and the government wishes to minimize it. To do so, and to help silence domestic opposition as well, the government has devised an elaborate structure of theory and logic with which to rationalize its policy. It has even ceased to use the word "apartheid," preferring to call the policy "separate development" of whites and nonwhites in their "respective areas."

The centerpiece of this structure of rationalization is the plan to establish the eight "Bantustans," or black-ruled states, three of which have already been set up as of 1968. Here black Africans will theoretically possess the rights of which they have been deprived in white areas: the right to elect their own rulers, to run their own economy, to own property, to choose where they will live and work.

The Bantustans are to comprise roughly the 264 present tribal areas or reserves, plus a little additional land, a total of about 13 percent of the country. Each Bantustan will embrace the "homeland" of a tribe or group of tribes (a "nation"). Africans of that tribal origin who are not presently living in the Bantustan but instead are "temporarily sojourning" in white areas will be allowed to exercise civil and political rights *in absentia*. Government literature promises that ultimately the Bantustans will take their place within a "Commonwealth of South Africa" in which "the white state and the black states can cooperate together, without being joined in a federation, and therefore without being under a central government, but cooperating as separate and independent states."

On paper this ingenious plan accounts for much. Black Africans living in "white" areas can be said to be away from their home "state." Like aliens in a strange country, they cannot expect to take part in the government of the state of residence. They can reasonably be required to carry passports; they can be deported at will by the local authorities; the terms of their employment can be arbitrarily determined. They can even be forbidden to own land, though few countries treat aliens this severely. Being legally migrant, they are not to be regarded as a regular and permanent part of the community, even if they and their forebears have in fact lived there for generations. Having thus conjured away the majority of the population, the minority becomes a majority, the area becomes "white" and white men can exercise "control, supremacy."

The South African government has invested a great deal of time and money, domestically and abroad, in promoting "understanding" of the Bantustan scheme. It is clearly intended to be the capstone of the apartheid edifice, the ultimate realization of "separate de-

velopment." Known as "grand apartheid," by contrast with the "petty apartheid" of separate taxi stands or job reservation, it clothes government policy in wise and beneficent garb, giving the government a useful vehicle for both domestic politics and foreign propaganda.

In fact, the Bantustan scheme as outlined on paper and as tested in the Transkei, a coastal area below Durban, falls so far short of the theoretical optimum as to raise serious doubts about the government's real motives. There are gaping holes both in the theory and in the practice.

Rural Africans in the reserves, numbering perhaps four million, will be separate, but they will certainly not be equal. They will face these handicaps:

1. The allocation of land between "black" and "white" areas is not equitable. Africans constitute 68 percent of the population of the country; those now in the reserves, roughly 27 percent of it. This many people clearly cannot be accommodated properly on 13 percent of the land (even if that area represents a greater percentage of South Africa's arable land). The "black" area includes none of the country's rich gold or diamond mines, none of its principal ports, none of the manufacturing centers—in short, little except underdeveloped agriculture and forestry on which to build an economy. And much of the agricultural area is suited primarily for grazing.

2. No adequate effort is being made or proposed to render the African areas viable. Africans, most of whom are at or below subsistence level, have virtually no savings to invest in development projects. White capital, without which there can be no real development on a significant scale, has been authorized only under strictly controlled conditions (on the curious theory that otherwise it would preempt black opportunities).

White men are being permitted and, indeed, encouraged and assisted to build industries outside the borders of the reserves, the workers commuting across the frontier to their jobs. However, fewer than 250 factories, employing only 44,000 black men in all, were built or expanded between 1960, when the program began, and mid-1966. Moreover, these totals are arrived at, in government reports, by an extraordinarily broad definition of the word "border."

Some factories are included which are located scores of miles from the African reserve which they presumably adjoin. And the program is running out of steam. Except where the government has made special concessions such as tax rebates and authorization to pay unusually low wages, these industries rarely have been striking financial successes, and the government is having a hard time persuading investors to establish more of them.





There is serious doubt that the government will ever genuinely want the Bantu homelands self-supporting. It is convenient to have to export labor—that is, send out workers on limited-term contracts—to white mines and farms, as they have done for decades. Thousands of youths sign up each year for stints ranging from three to ten months, the white recruiters portraying the tour as a “badge of manhood.” While away, part of their pay is withheld and sent home to their relatives in the form of “remittances.”


Some \$1.4 to \$2.8 million is believed to be transmitted in this manner each year to the Transkei alone, providing a sizeable share of the net income of the territory, one without which it could not survive. The young men then return home bringing a few lengths of cloth, some jewelry, a Coleman lamp or stove, and/or some cash.

3. The prospect of self-government for the reserves is largely on paper and may well be a fraud. At best, the process of “emancipation” is likely to move at a very slow pace indeed. In the Transkei, the first Bantustan established, African self-rule is largely illusory.

When I was in Transkei’s capital, Umtata, in 1964, the hotels were strictly segregated, admitting whites only. The white authorities had just turned down a proposal to build a hotel for blacks. This made Umtata just about the only “national” capital in the world where the prime minister could not hire a hotel room. Since then, about one third of Umtata has been designated a black area and a small motel connected with a filling station has been purchased for African use.

The Transkei has a unicameral legislature in which the 45 elected representatives are outnumbered by 64 traditional chiefs, whose position is hereditary but who can be dethroned by the South African government. The election of November 1963 was the first and as of this writing the only territory-wide election to be held. The party of the paramount chief of Western Pondoland, Victor Poto, a soft-spoken, barrel-shaped man who opposes apartheid, won 33 of the 45 elected seats, but Poto failed to become prime minister. Instead, his rival, Chief Kaiser D. Matanzima, a man more responsive to Pretoria, put together a parliamentary majority, obviously composed primarily of hereditary chiefs. It was taken for granted that Pre-





► toria had twisted arms and greased palms among the chiefs to make sure the right man was elevated.

The policy of Chief Kaiser D. Matanzima is to apply apartheid, or separate development, to the Transkei in reverse; that is, to make the Transkei all black except for Umtata and Port St. Johns, the only harbor. Whites have been, or are being, barred from owning property, voting, taking jobs reserved for blacks, and so on. The principal practical effect of this policy is to number the days of the "white traders," once numbering 600 to 800, who run "trading stations" (general stores) in the countryside. Each of these traders acts as a combination doctor, lawyer, adviser and great white father for his captive clientele of several thousand blacks. Many of the traders are an important stabilizing influence, but they are being

sacrificed to the doctrine of race separation. As of August 1966, 246 stations had been offered for sale.

Chief Victor Poto, one of Matanzima's political rivals, would prefer a multiracial society. He told me Chief Matanzima keeps his parliamentary majority in line by threatening chiefs with withdrawal of their benefits. Poto said he favors establishment of more Bantustans, but only if they are made multiracial, that is, opened to whites. In such multiracial societies he would not want unqualified majority rule, one-man-one-vote. He would set up qualifications for the franchise, including especially literacy. But African voters would inevitably be in the majority.

I also talked with some of the white "advisers" designated by Pretoria to sit at the right hands of the cabinet ministers. Matanzima's alter ego was J.T.H.



# What God Hath Joined Together

**M**ATSOKOLO MAPHEELE was married at the age of 19 in an Anglican church in Herschel, South Africa. Herschel is a tiny village of the Transkei, where green mountains and rolling valleys are, as Alan Paton would say, lovely beyond any singing of it. Jackson, her husband, who had left Herschel in his youth for Paarl in the Western Cape, had returned some 600 miles to win her.

"What, therefore, God hath joined together, let no man put asunder."

Matsokolo was to recall the words of the priest many times during the five-year ordeal that began in 1959.

Jackson Mapheele could not stay in Herschel more than a few days without losing his right to return to Paarl as a resident. No black African in South Africa may freely choose where he is to live or work. His movements are strictly controlled under the laws of apartheid, the South African government's unique contribution to the social mores of the twentieth century.

For a nonwhite, Jackson Mapheele had a reasonably good job in a textile plant in Paarl. He had won the respect of his employers, had been able to save a little money, and most important of all, had been in one place long enough to earn residence rights to which a great many black Africans were not entitled.

But his bride could not legally go with him to Paarl until he had found a place for them to live. This is often difficult for a black man in South Africa. Even if he can afford it, he is forbidden to go into the real estate market to buy or rent a home. He must live in specified locations or townships. These are housing developments, which, though the houses or barracks are

often of relatively good quality, have much of the appearance and atmosphere of concentration camps.

When available, dwellings in the townships are rented by the government to Africans considered qualified. An African ceases to be qualified when, for example, he loses his job and does not promptly get another. He can then be "endorsed out"—forcibly removed—to the *kraal*, or mud hut, in the countryside where he or his ancestors lived.

No family dwellings were available in Mbekweni township in Paarl, where Jackson Mapheele lived. So he had a bed in a single men's barracks. Since the law did not permit Matsokolo to come to Paarl and live separately from her husband, and since she could not join him in bachelor quarters, she could not legally come to the city at all. Suddenly the word "apartheid," which means "apart-ness," took on special significance for them.

**T**HE FIRST TWO YEARS of the Mapheeles' married life consisted of separation forced by the law of

Mills, a tough and supremely self-confident man with an extensive, detailed knowledge of the Transkei.

He seemed very much in charge. He controlled the prime minister's appointments, apparently without the balderdash of consulting the prime minister. He said with a straight face that there was no way to judge Chief Matanzima's independence: since the chief has not clashed with Pretoria, there had never been a difference of policy. (When Verwoerd was assassinated, Matanzima called him South Africa's "greatest statesman of all time.")


**P**RETORIA OFFERS a variety of rejoinders. It claims that outsiders do not understand the unique character of South Africa's problems. It says the government knows what is good for the primitive "natives" better

than they do. It claims that white men pioneered the country, as Americans conquered and displaced the Indians, if anything, less inhumanely; that they developed the land by their own sweat and ingenuity, as did Americans, and are therefore entitled to regard it as their country.

South Africans maintain that outside interference is illegal, immoral and counterproductive. Finally, they say the outside world will one day awaken to the fact that racial integration leads to conflict, not harmony, as shown in Watts, Detroit and Chicago. A variant of this argument, not used so frequently of late, is that South Africa is really not so very different from the American South.

There is some truth to the contention that outsiders do not fully understand South Africa's prob-





the land. Finally defying this cruel and unnatural law, Matsokolo surreptitiously moved in with an uncle in Langabuya location, a squalid shantytown near Mbekweni. As if coming to some sordid assignation, Jackson visited her at night and slipped out the following morning, praying the authorities would not find out.

The Mapheeles lived this way for another two years until their first child, Alfred, was born. Then the authorities either found out what was happening or decided they could no longer look the other way. Matsokolo was endorsed out.

She got help and took her case to court. Lower ranking magistrates in South Africa are appointed and may be dismissed by the Minister of Justice, and hence are vulnerable to political pressure. But many of the higher courts are fiercely independent, the judges being appointed, in effect, to life terms.

Mrs. Mapheele found both lawyers and judges sympathetic. The Judge President of the Cape Supreme Court, commenting bitterly on "the absurdities of this country," said openly that he would "try to find" in her favor.

lems, but not much substance to the rest of this case. The paternalism of the argument that "Papa knows best" what is good for the "natives" is often a cloak for the determination to remain "Papa."

White South Africans did indeed contribute ingenuity, hard work and enterprise to the development of their splendid country. Nonwhites contributed much of the physical labor. There is no apparent reason why both should not reap the harvest, sharing its benefits in proportion to ability and contribution, as in any freely competitive, shared society. It is the determination of the white man to retain a disproportionate share of benefits by the exercise of naked power that offends the outside world. It is the belief of the whites that they must have all or will be left with nothing that is at the root of the trouble.

Outside "interference" to help awaken the whites in South Africa to this mistake is certainly neither illegal nor immoral, and if carefully honed, need not be counterproductive. Nor is it true that too much integration has produced racial discord in the United States. During the Newark riots in July 1967, *Die Vaderland*, a pro-government newspaper, recommended that the United States try apartheid as a remedy for its social ills. "America's obsession with integration only causes chaos, strife and destruction," it commented. The truth, as most thoughtful Americans know, is that chaos, strife and destruction have sprung from too little, not too much integration. Despite progress in recent years, Negro ghettos still afford too little opportunity for adequate education, too few job openings, too much slum misery. It would scarcely be a



"It would be most unfortunate," the court said in reluctantly finding for the government, "if, as a consequence of this judgement, husband and wife were forced to live apart. It appears that Parliament intended to ensure that, as far as possible, natives who are in lawful employment in a proclaimed (i.e. white) area should be permitted to have their wives in the area; indeed, it would be unthinkable that Parliament intended otherwise."

This comment touched off an explosion of public sympathy for the Mapheeles, first in Paarl and then in the rest of the country. The sympathy was not limited to nonwhites. Many white South Africans saw the case in a religious context and were disturbed. Here was a couple, married according to Christian rites in an Anglican church, being ordered to live apart in direct defiance of what the church taught as God's law. Moreover, there was a newborn baby to be cared for.

"This arbitrary law, inflexibly applied, has imperilled just about every Christian, Western value that South Africa exists to uphold," one editorial writer stated.

Another wrote: "We have no doubt what would have happened

if an administrative regulation had separated a white man from his wife. But in this case the married couple is black, and when Mrs. Mapheele comes to say good-bye to her husband, only they will shed a tear. After all, a technicality of apartheid has been upheld; and does South Africa really worry about the moral cost involved?"

Mrs. Mapheele was given two extensions, but the order remained in force. In the court's eyes it might be "unthinkable" for the law to be applied in such a way as to separate an African woman from her husband. But it was by no means unthinkable to the cabinet of the late Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd. Nor was it objectionable to many of his supporters.

During the court action, Mrs. Mapheele had again become pregnant. Now, in all the upheaval, she had a miscarriage and was confined to bed. This won her another temporary stay.

Her husband faced an anguished decision. If he went back to Herschel with her, he would lose his job in Paarl and all the rights that derived from it, as well as the associates he had known for years.

He would also have to undertake an entirely new life in the country. He might not be able to support his family on jobs available in Herschel, where the total population was approximately 100. If he stayed in Paarl, with a population of 38,000, he could at least send money for Matsokolo and Alfred to live on. A forced return to primitive rural surroundings is no light matter for the urbanized African, already one step up the economic ladder. But the alternative for Mapheele was to bid his wife and son good-bye, perhaps for good. This he could not do.

The time between the Mapheeles' initial expulsion order and the day it took effect was 18 months. That final day was anticlimactic for everyone but them. Newsmen converged on Paarl. They watched Mapheele's bachelor quarters, his wife's residence, and the railway station. No one appeared. The Mapheeles had dropped completely out of sight. Apparently they had left or been taken from Paarl ahead of the deadline.

Where they had gone, no one seemed to know. Perhaps an embarrassed government did not want the world to know. ●

satisfactory answer to round up troublemakers, unemployed and drifters and ship them to a partially Negro-governed state in, say, West Virginia.

Nor is South Africa the American South with an Afrikaans accent. There are important differences of kind, as well as degree, between discrimination in the two areas. Even before Congress passed the Civil Rights Bill of 1964 and the Voting Rights Bill of 1965, the comparison was invalid. It is not just that the government of the United States is fighting against, not for, white supremacy; even the policies of the most conservative southern states are not comparable to apartheid.

George Wallace could never forcibly separate a Negro from his wife and children by government decree, deport him from the city to the countryside,

or pass a law requiring his employer to fire him and hire a white replacement. Hard as it is for Negroes to get good jobs in the South—and the North—they are not forbidden by law to take them, if employer (and union) are prepared to give them an opportunity. Negroes have had trouble getting registered to vote in the deep South; people have been murdered for attempting it. But they are legally entitled to the franchise, and more are getting on the rolls each year.

It is because white South Africa has embodied racial discrimination in law and enshrined it as eternal verity, even claiming scriptural authority for it, that it has set itself apart, not merely from the American South, but from the overwhelming majority of mankind. ●



# A CASE FOR

by ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

**I**N LIGHT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S unyielding and intensified policy of apartheid, the United States government immediately should disentangle itself from remaining economic, military and scientific ties with that country.

We have long recognized that South African race policies offend human dignity today and might threaten peace tomorrow. We have long sought through diplomatic channels to induce changes in South African racial policies. Unfortunately our efforts have had little impact of consequence.

The South African government has ignored United States representations while continuing to build its repugnant system of total racial segregation—apartheid. It has increased its suppression of democratic liberties for its people, blacks and whites alike.

Now, even at some cost to ourselves, our government should take steps which would visibly disengage us from South Africa.

By so doing we will protect our moral and political position in the world. We will also lend practical support to those who are working toward the reconciliation and

equality of the races in South Africa. And we will strengthen the defense of American interests in the rest of Africa and the nonwhite world, including the high level there of United States investments and trade.

Among these fast-growing large-magnitude economic American interests are oil in Libya and Nigeria, copper in Zambia, rubber and iron ore in Liberia and bauxite in Ghana. We often overlook the fact that the value of these interests in Africa north of Rhodesia now substantially exceeds our economic interests in southern Africa. And we tend also to overlook the political value of fostering the good will of more than 30 black African governments representing 150 million people. This should not be.

I propose the following governmental steps:

**Arms embargo.** Stricter enforcement of the South Africa arms embargo, including a ban on sales of American "dual-purpose" items such as trucks and executive-type planes that can be used by their military. We should also use our influence to halt such sales by Japan, France and other countries.

**Missile and space program.** We should close our missile and space tracking stations and shift to facilities elsewhere as soon as physically possible.

**Nuclear agreement.** We should carefully examine whether continuance of the United States-South

Africa nuclear cooperation agreement is in our over-all interest.

**Fueling by official ships.** No official United States ships should use South Africa ports.

**Economic ties.** The United States government should actively discourage private loans and investment by American businessmen and bankers in South Africa.

The United States sugar quota for South Africa should be abolished.

I also urge visible disengagement from Portugal in the Portuguese-ruled African territories of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea.

As a result of United Nations Security Council action, we have embarked upon a similar policy of disengagement and disassociation with regard to Rhodesia. We should under no circumstances relax our support for this UN embargo.

**A**LL THAT I PROPOSE with respect to southern Africa is peaceful action. I do not advocate the use of force; on the contrary, I oppose it.

But at the same time that we reject force, we must offer more than words to prove our moral abhorrence of the racist cancer in southern Africa.

We must take all peaceful and practical steps, within the capacity of our government, to help stop the spread of this cancer, and with all reasonable speed, eradicate it. •

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Arthur J. Goldberg is a former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, former Secretary of Labor and United States Ambassador to the United Nations. This article is reprinted with permission from the *Chicago Daily News*.



**plead for a boycott of the apartheid regime.**

# DISENGAGEMENT

**by GEORGE M. HOUSER**



**N**OT TOO LONG AGO a group of South African refugees said to me: "Do you realize that Americans are our enemies because they support the apartheid government in South Africa?" What they meant was not so much overt American support of the apartheid policies but a more subtle yet not less substantial backing of the South African regime. The refugees implied that the United States, as a favored trading partner of South Africa, strengthens South Africa's economy and the unjust hold of apartheid on its nonwhite people.

This is not an unusual opinion. In fact, the current debate on the strategy of countries and people who oppose apartheid revolves around the words "engagement" or "disengagement." Proponents of the engagement theory assert that greater economic involvement in South Africa by expanding employment opportunities will eventually integrate the black South African into the economic and political life of the country. Those who urge disengagement state that, even if a disengagement strategy will not bring down the regime by itself, it will at least end our material and psychological commitment to maintain the status quo, so that new options for actions will then become possible.

More than 260 American firms, through affiliates or branch offices, are doing business in South Africa. The total private direct investment is \$601 million, according to a 1968 State Department estimate. With indirect investment added, the total is over \$800 million. This amount accounts for 13 percent of foreign private investment in South Africa, which is second only to Britain's investments. American firms earn more than \$100 million a year from these investments.

As far as trade is concerned, more than 16 percent

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of South Africa's imports comes from the United States and 8 percent of its exports goes to the U.S. (not counting gold). The main exports from the U.S. are chemicals and fertilizers, machinery, petroleum and transport equipment (American companies produce approximately 60 percent of South Africa's cars and trucks). Principal imports from South Africa are fish products, chemical elements and compounds, metals, uranium, chromium, asbestos and diamonds.

Supporters of the engagement theory argue that, as the economy of South Africa becomes more and more industrial and urbanized, Africans will be encouraged to come to the urban areas at more favorable wages and under better working conditions. The pass system will tend to break down because of the need for black labor in the cities, and from these changes in economic patterns political gains will emerge for black Africans.

Furthermore, it is argued that the regime can be influenced only if there is greater communication from the outside, not less. Supposedly the increase in investment also increases the amount of influential communication.

Thus, this theory implies, it is possible to be an opponent of apartheid and yet to carry on business as usual on the ground that the strengthening of the economy is also bringing about the downfall of the architects of this system of racial oppression.

**T**HE FACTS unfortunately indicate a much less optimistic future than the engagement theory provides. As American investment in South Africa has grown, and as the South African economy has expanded, apartheid policies have worsened.

In 1950, just two years after the Nationalist Party, with its doctrine of apartheid, came into power, American investment in South Africa amounted to \$140 million. It has grown five times that amount since then. During this same period the Nationalist Party has increased its political hold on the country so that it now has about 75 percent of the seats in Parliament and its legislation cannot be blocked.

The period of Nationalist Party control has resulted in the most oppressive apartheid measures. Numerous restrictive laws have been passed, the major political organizations of nonwhites have been banned and most of the black leadership is either in prison or exile.

The economic situation has become more, not less inequitable during this time. Between 1947 and 1961 white wages increased by 35 percent, while black wages increased by only 11 percent. In 1967 the average black miner received \$21.60 per month; white miners received \$364.10. In construction black workers were paid \$56.70 and whites \$331.45. The government

**American investment has helped to make South Africa so self-sufficient that it cannot be challenged effectively.**

spends \$15 a year for the education of every black child in primary grades, but \$182 for each white child.

Apartheid laws make advancement within industry for the African worker almost impossible. Under the Industrial Conciliation Act, for example, African trade unions are not permitted to engage in collective bargaining or to strike. Under the same act the minister of labor has the right to determine which job categories will be reserved for particular racial groups.

The purpose of this legislation is to prevent black competition on the skilled or even the semi-skilled level. The minister of labor can make exceptions in job reservation categories, but he always has the power to invoke the law as he sees fit or as he may be pressed to by white workers.

Even in the so-called "Bantu homelands" the African is not free to develop his potential. The 1954 Tomlinson Commission, which brought "separate development" into being, called for the creation of 20,000 new industrial jobs each year in the homelands. In the first six years only 1,760 jobs had been created.

Thus, the economic advancement in South Africa seems to have no direct effect on the practices of the apartheid system. One basic reason for this is that apartheid is built on the pass structure by which no African has the legal right to live outside of the 13 percent land surface designated either as a Bantustan or as a reserve. Half a million Africans are arrested every year under the pass laws.

In addition, American economic investment in South



**Trade and investment  
in South Africa  
could be decreased  
with a minimum  
of inconvenience  
to the United States.**



Africa aids South Africa in its drive towards self-sufficiency. American oil companies have been particularly active in aiding South Africa in prospecting for oil. An item in *The New York Times* of October 22, 1966, reported, "Eight American oil organizations, one French, and a South African company have been granted concessions to prospect for oil and gas on the country's continental shelf. The concessions are a part of the government's intensified search for oil to strengthen its hand in the event that international sanctions are applied because of the government's apartheid policies." Standard Oil and Mobil Oil, through subsidiaries, handle 48 percent of South Africa's oil refining capacity.

In spite of the ban on sending military equipment to South Africa, some American enterprises nevertheless strengthen the military potential of South Africa. Kaiser Jeep's subsidiary distributes products (Jeep and Gladiator) readily convertible into vehicles for maintenance of internal security. American know-how has perhaps been a vital factor in building South Africa's chemical and nuclear industries.

Thus trade with South Africa has, to a considerable extent, been replaced by production within South Africa. And American major investment has helped to make South Africa so self-sufficient that it cannot be challenged effectively.

American businessmen who are involved in South Africa make no criticism of apartheid's repressive policies. This suggests that American business interests in South Africa are hostages of the system and perhaps

not even interested in seeing change. In 1966 Henry Ford II said, "When abroad, we must operate by the standards of the host country or forfeit our welcome."

The South African press is happy to quote statements of visiting American businessmen. In January 1965, for example, Milton P. Higgins, chairman of the Norton Company in Wooster, Mass., was quoted as saying: "I think South Africa is going to remain a strong country, led by white people. I think foreign countries should leave South Africa alone. If they leave it alone it will get on and do a great job."

In a survey taken among American business representatives operating in South Africa, 39 percent responded that if they were South African citizens they would vote as members of the Nationalist Party. Thirty-five percent said they would vote as members of the United Party. Only 13 percent would vote as Progressive Party members.

Both the Nationalist and United Parties proclaim the necessity of apartheid or of white domination. Thus there is no evidence at all that creative communication between investor and host actually occurs. Indeed, it is more likely that the American investor is often a willing pupil of the "advantages" of apartheid and the cheap labor it provides.

The advocates of economic engagement can factually point out that profits from investments in South Africa have increased in recent years, but they cannot point out that this has lessened the strictures of apartheid on the black people of South Africa. They can rightly declare that the economy of South Africa is booming, but they cannot say that this has increased political or economic freedom for the nonwhites.

If the purpose of engagement with South Africa is to reap greater profits in the short run, then the present policy is a successful one. If, on the other hand, the rationale for engagement is to help end apartheid, to lead to freedom of action for the non-white majority of the country, then engagement is a tragic failure. The burden of proof is upon those who advocate and are practicing engagement.

**W**HAT WOULD a disengagement policy be? Essentially it would reverse the trend towards economic ties with South Africa. The United States government, for example, would discourage increased investments in South Africa. Under the Export Control Act the president could find that it was not to the best interests of the U.S. to trade with South Africa. The president would urge Congress to end the sugar quota which was set for South Africa when trade was stopped with Cuba. The United States could find alternative locations for the space tracking stations presently located in South Africa. The ban on sending

military supplies to South Africa could be expanded to include any heavy equipment such as trucks or truck parts which could conceivably be converted to military use.

Trade and investment in South Africa could be decreased with a minimum of inconvenience to the United States. American investments there are only one percent of our total foreign investments. Trade with South Africa amounts to only 1.1 percent of our total foreign trade.

A lessening of American trade and investment in South Africa would have a much more serious effect on South Africa itself. The United States, as has been shown above, provides almost one-fifth of South Africa's import and takes a little less than a tenth of its exports. It is not claimed that unilateral disengagement by the United States would bring down the South African regime. However, it would cause some dislocations within the South African economy and hopefully demonstrate to the South Africans the unreality of the course they have set for themselves.

The effect of a possible disengagement policy by the United States cannot be minimized. Condemnation of South Africa's apartheid policies in the United Nations has been almost unanimous. Only Portugal has openly backed South Africa. If the U.S. were to adopt an uncompromising policy towards South Africa, it would cause it to find alternative markets. It would be possible to devise a world strategy to aid those countries which are most dependent on trade with or investment in South Africa, such as Great Britain, so that they, too, could adopt a policy of disengagement. The whole world climate might well be reversed if a powerful country such as the U.S. took the lead in disengagement.

American policy towards South Africa is looked upon by the rest of the world as the measure of the United States' sincerity in espousing freedom and equality for all men. The policy will be found wanting as long as American capital supports and profits from apartheid. Disengaging from South Africa would aid the U.S. in helping to mitigate the increasing racial polarization in the world.

**T**HE MORAL IMPERATIVE for disengagement from South Africa is very compelling. Apartheid is racism. It denies the basic ethic of the Judaeo-Christian religion that all men are children of God and made in his image. A recent statement of the South Africa Council of Churches has put it this way: "The policy of separate development is based on the domination of one group over all others. It depends on the maintenance of white supremacy; thus it is rooted in and dependent on a policy of sin."

### *Final questions*

1. Can business be expected to adopt a disengagement policy if the government has not?

Since business acts primarily to make a profit, it is unlikely that it will voluntarily change its practices. However, business interacts with government. And government, having a wider perspective than any one segment of society (such as business), encourages all institutions to come into line with its policies. Thus pressure for economic disengagement must be brought to bear on both the United States government and business.

2. If a disengagement policy were successful, would it hurt the nonwhites more than the whites? Many African leaders are urging economic disengagement. If the South African economy were hurt by withdrawal of capital, naturally this would affect the South African people. However, it would have less effect on the nonwhites than on the whites because they already occupy the lowest rung on the South African economic ladder. Their per capita income is less than one-tenth that of the whites. A large part of the African population subsists on agriculture.

3. What about other countries whose policies we do not particularly like? Why do we pick on South Africa?

First, as the British foreign minister has pointed out, dictatorships based on race are infinitely more dangerous to world peace than any other. In today's world, with its imperative for racial equality, support for the unique brand of legalized racism which apartheid represents only fans the flames of world conflagration.

Furthermore, apartheid is a policy about which it should be possible to take effective international action. South Africa increasingly stands alone. It has, at best, only Portugal and the illegal regime of Rhodesia as its overt allies.

A policy of disengagement towards the government of South Africa should make it possible to become more actively engaged in aiding those opponents of apartheid who are currently its economic or political victims. More significant support, for example, could be given to the Republic of Zambia as it attempts to break its trade ties with South Africa. A more vigorous American scholarship program, whether in Africa or the United States, should become a reality, particularly for nonwhites who are in exile from South Africa. A positive policy of political asylum for opponents of the regime should go into effect in the U.S. without delay. More could also be done to aid Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, currently held in economic hostage to South Africa.

With a new policy, the United States would be in a position to give real leadership to those forces which can challenge the repressiveness and the inequalities of apartheid. •



**First came the Germans who exploited South West Africa cruelly and profitably.**

**Now South Africans are the masters and, once again, black Africans are**

**captives in their own land**







# CAPTIVES IN THEIR OWN LAND

by ELIZABETH S. LANDIS

**T**HE DOCUMENTED HISTORY of South West Africa is meager. Bushmen were probably its first inhabitants, but they were gradually driven into the less habitable regions by other Africans whose descendants live in the territory today. In the nineteenth century white incursions began. The Nama and Herero fought over the south-central grazing lands, while the Ovambo and related peoples controlled the northern area where they live today.

The Germans took advantage of these intertribal enmities to gain protectorate agreements covering much of the territory except for the Walvis Bay area (which is still a part of South Africa) and the northern region, which remained unsubmissive. They exploited the territory cruelly, greedily and profitably.

Both the Nama and the Herero finally rebelled against their "protectors" and were brutally suppressed. When the South Africans occupied the territory during World War I in support of the allies, many Africans hailed them as rescuers.

The South African government expected to claim South West Africa at the end of the war as its reward from the allies. Instead, all dependencies of the defeated states became wards of the international community, represented by the League of Nations. The League itself could not administer these territories nor were they considered able to govern themselves. So the League assigned them to the victorious allies—in each case to the occupying power—to be administered as a "sacred (international) trust." South West Africa thus became a South African mandate.

South West Africa was classified as a mandate which the governing country might administer as an "integral portion" of its own territory. This power was, however, limited by the special mandate agreement for South West Africa, which provided that the territory must be administered so as to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress" of its inhabitants.

South Africa's conduct as a mandatory power made a mockery of the concept of international trust and of the mandate agreement. It was, in fact, hardly distinguishable from the preceding German regime.

South West Africa was opened to white South African immigrants, and Africans who had reclaimed their tribal lands from the German settlers were again ejected. All Africans not employed by whites were relegated to reserves established for them by the new government. These reserves were far too small for the number of Africans in the territory. Most of them were within the Kalahari or Namib deserts, without the bore holes and other improvements which the government supplied or helped construct on white-owned farms. The land assigned to the Herero lacked not only water but also adequate nutrients in the soil so that animals grazing on it suffered deficiency diseases.

The all-white government also enacted statutes similar to those in effect in South Africa to control non-whites. *Pass laws* prohibited Africans from entering, leaving, or traveling through the "police zone," the southern two-thirds of the territory. For the violation of *vagrancy laws*, Africans could be sentenced to labor



## PART II

### SOUTH WEST AFRICA



on public works or private property—a fine source of cheap black labor for white farmers. Rigorous *master and servant laws* emphasized the duties of servants (black) and the rights of masters (white).

Whenever Africans protested, the mandatarly reacted with force. It subdued the turbulent Ovambo north of the "Red Line" (the northern boundary of the police zone) in a military action in which their chief and about 100 tribesmen were slain. It quelled a rebellion of the Bondelswarts Nama by bombing them—men, women and children—into submission. It forced discontented Rehoboth Basters, seeking independence, to back down by suddenly surrounding their area with South African soldiers. And it quieted the again rebellious Bondelswarts by physically removing their chief and imposing other severe administrative sanctions against the community.

South African administration was repeatedly criticized by members of the League of Nations, particularly the bombing of the Bondelswarts, which created a minor international scandal. But since the League required a unanimous vote to take any action, South Africa could veto any effective censure of its own conduct. An international organization unable to cope with nazism and fascism in Europe was unlikely to prevent the maltreatment of blacks in an obscure corner of Africa.

Until the collapse of the League at the beginning of World War II, the South African government met all the formal requirements of the mandate agreement. After the war the South African delegates to

the newly formed United Nations announced that their government wished to annex South West Africa and that the inhabitants of the territory desired to be incorporated into the then Union of South Africa. The General Assembly withheld its consent, which was required by the mandate agreement for any change of status. It urged, instead, that South Africa place its mandate under the United Nations' similar, but more advanced, trusteeship system. The Union refused.

**A**T THE FORMAL DISSOLUTION of the League of Nations in 1946, South Africa promised to administer South West Africa "in accordance with the obligations of the Mandate" until a change of status occurred. However, it continued to incorporate the territory into South Africa. It developed the argument that when the League was dissolved, the mandate also came to an end, giving South Africa absolute sovereignty over South West Africa by right of conquest. South Africa denied the right of the United Nations, as successor to the League, to supervise its administration of South West Africa.

Differences between the United Nations and South Africa over the administration of South West Africa increased after the National Party, which advocates

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rigid apartheid, came to power in 1948. Unable to resolve these differences, in 1950 the General Assembly sought an advisory (non-binding) opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legal status of South West Africa. It was the court's opinion that South West Africa remained subject to the mandate after dissolution of the League and that the UN had supervisory power, even though South Africa was not legally required to transfer the territory to the UN's trusteeship system. During the following decade neither censure, appeasement nor negotiation moved the South African government either to recognize the authority of the UN or to ameliorate its treatment of the territory's nonwhite population.

When it finally became clear that no agreement could be reached, Ethiopia and Liberia, on the urging of the United Nations General Assembly, proceeded against South Africa before the World Court. Under Article 7 of the mandate agreement, former League members could ask the court to decide a question concerning interpretation or application of the mandate agreement if the question could not be settled by negotiation.

The complainants asked the court to rule that South West Africa was still subject to the mandate, that the United Nations was entitled to supervise administration of the mandate, and that South African administration (specifically the introduction of apartheid) was contrary to the "well-being" and "social progress" of its nonwhite inhabitants. This was a novel legal maneuver. If it succeeded, it would result in a decision "binding" on South Africa; that is, the Security Council might order sanctions to compel obedience.

The court struggled with the South West Africa case for more than five years. It first ruled it had

authority to decide the complaints. But four years later, in 1966, the court, somewhat changed by death, illness and replacements, held that it should not, after all, rule on the merits of the complaints.

Despite the fact that the court did not rule on any of the questions raised by Ethiopia and Liberia, the South African government claimed that the court had vindicated its administration of the mandate. It immediately began to implement the "Odendaal Plan" to extend total apartheid to the territory.

The Odendaal Plan follows the general pattern of race relations established earlier in South Africa. Under this plan every South West African is to be classified ethnically as belonging to one of 12 population groups. Each group is assigned a "homeland" within the territory, where its members are recognized as "citizens" with "full rights." Outside his homeland every person is considered an alien, without rights.

The division of South West Africa into homelands, which was proposed by an all-white government, naturally assigns the lion's share of the police zone to the territory's 96,000 whites. It includes all the cities, harbors and coastline, and substantially all presently exploitable mineral deposits—indeed, all territory not specifically assigned to another population group. Most of the coloreds will presumably continue to live around urban areas.

The proposed homelands for the nonwhites correspond generally to present reserves, although the total area is somewhat larger. All the homelands except the Rehoboth Gebiet and Namaland are located in desert or semi-desert areas although considerable portions of Ovamboland and Okavangoland may, with government assistance, eventually be irrigated. The homelands can no more be expected to support their increasing future populations than the existing reserves can support their present populations. Great numbers of Africans will have to continue to work in the white "homeland" as a landless, rightless proletariat. At present there are some 50,000 Africans in the urban areas and about 65,000 on white farms. Most of them exist in desperate poverty, earning less than the minimum standard necessary to sustain healthful living.

The inducement to accept the homelands is the promise that they will eventually receive "self-government." Within each homeland there will be no "job reservation" or other artificially imposed limitation on self-advancement of ethnic "citizens." However, if the South African pattern established in the Transkei is followed, meaningful self-government will not be granted until a homeland becomes economically viable and has a technologically proficient population. And the homelands are too small and too poor ever to be economically viable.



**A**T THIS POINT only Ovamboland has been provided with a legislative assembly of tribal chiefs and granted the right to "legislate" on a fairly extensive list of local matters, subject, of course, to South African approval. Ovamboland is a more or less traditional tribal area extending across the border into southern Angola. It has approximately 271,000 "citizens," about 44 percent of the total population of the territory.

In accordance with South African practice, it is probable that all Africans will soon have the "opportunity" of progressing towards self-government. This opportunity lies in assuming most of the costs of education and social services in the homelands—to be financed through taxation—thus learning "financial responsibility." Currently the territorial government spends eight times as much for each white child who attends school as it does for each nonwhite child. All white children go to school, whereas only a small, if increasing, percentage of nonwhite children attend any school.

Implementation of the Odendaal Plan in the police zone will require the shifting of vast numbers of the nonwhite population. None of the reserves which will be absorbed into the homelands is inhabited exclusively, and many not even predominantly, by the ethnic group to which the homeland is allocated. The South African Institute of Race Relations estimates that approximately 135,000 Africans live outside the homelands proposed for them.

South West Africa's voteless nonwhites have no peaceful way to protest this implementation of apartheid. Strikes, boycotts and demonstrations are forbidden. Even individual criticism may be punished administratively, as by denying work permits. After the World Court destroyed the long-cherished hope of outside intervention, the largest popular organization, SWAPO (South West Africa Peoples' Organization), declared it would support guerrilla warfare to end white South African domination of the territory. Freedom fighters, trained in other countries, began to slip back into South West Africa. Most of them were quickly captured by the South African police. But on the basis of the threat supposedly posed by them, Parliament quickly passed the Terrorism Act.

This statute empowers the police to arrest and hold alleged terrorists and witnesses for indefinite periods. It defines the crime of "terrorism" so broadly that any activity from simple theft to breaking a window in a schoolhouse is technically within the definition and thus punishable as treason. The act was made

## **SOUTH WEST AFRICA**

*Government:* de facto South African control

*Population:* 610,000. Africans: 81 percent (498,600); whites: 16 percent (98,000); coloreds: 3 percent (15,400)

*Languages:* African languages, Afrikaans, German, English

*Capital:* Windhoek

*Major exports:* diamonds, wool

retroactive to 1962 so that freedom fighters arrested before it was passed were liable to death by hanging. It is believed that some 200 "terrorists" have been arrested under the act although there is no way for anyone outside the Special Branch (secret police) to be sure. Thirty-seven Ovambo were tried under the act in 1967 despite protests by the United Nations, the United States and virtually every civilized country.

As a consequence of the International Court's non-decision and of South African implementation of the Odendaal Plan, the United Nations' General Assembly declared South Africa's mandate terminated and decided to take over the administration of the territory itself until independence. It created a council of UN members to oversee UN administration of the territory, which it now designates Namibia. Unfortunately, the great powers effectively sabotaged this action by refusing to become members of the council. The council's small nation members have been unwilling or unable to confront the South Africans, embarrass their regime, assert UN authority or even publicize the situation.

By accepting membership on the council, the United States could dramatically reverse South Africa's unimpeded success by default at the United Nations. Some other great powers would then undoubtedly feel compelled to become members also, for reasons of political advantage. Effective action must be taken now to thwart South Africa's attempt to "divide and rule" South West Africa. •



# THE PRETORIA TRIAL



**I**N 1966, 37 SOUTH WEST AFRICANS (Namibians) were arrested in their homeland under South Africa's Anti-Terrorism Act. They were charged with conspiracy to overthrow their government by force and taken to South Africa for trial.

The Anti-Terrorism Act is designed to impose the severest sentences on those who oppose the governments of both South and South West Africa. With its passage, terrorism became a crime punishable by a maximum sentence of death and a minimum prison sentence of five years. The act was proclaimed in 1967 and made retroactive to 1962.

Countries around the world expressed outrage at the arrests. The United Nations had repeatedly stated that South Africa's rule in South West Africa is illegal and hence, its courts have no jurisdiction over Namibians.

The accused were members of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), a political group formed in the 1950's. At their trial in Pretoria one of them, Toivo Herman ja Toivo, a founder and regional secretary of SWAPO, delivered a statement to the court.

The son of a catechist teacher at a Finnish mission, Toivo was born in 1924. When he was ten, his father died of tuberculosis contracted while laboring in the American-owned Tsumeb lead mines. Toivo studied at a mission school and went to work in Cape Town, South Africa, after World War II. There he and fellow Namibians organized SWAPO.

Toivo first came to public attention in 1957, when his tape-recorded petition to the United Nations, smuggled out of South Africa, created an international sensation. As a result, he was deported back to South West Africa. There he continued to expose and oppose the policies of apartheid until his arrest in 1966.

Defying world protests, South Africa found the group of Namibians guilty in February, 1968. Toivo was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, two men were acquitted and the others received sentences of from five years to life.

A condensed version of Toivo's courageous statement follows.



**M**Y LORD,

We find ourselves here in a foreign country, convicted under laws made by people whom we have always considered as foreigners. We find ourselves tried by a Judge who is not our countryman and who has not shared our background.

When this case started, Counsel tried to show that this Court had no jurisdiction to try us. What they had to say was of a technical and legal nature. The reasons may mean little to some of us, but it is the deep feeling of all of us that we should not be tried here in Pretoria.

... We are Namibians and not South Africans. We do not now, and will not in the future recognize your right to govern us; to make laws for us in which we had no say; to treat our country as if it were your property and us as if you were our masters. We have always regarded South Africa as an intruder in our country. . . .

We are far away from our homes; not a single member of our families has come to visit us, never mind be present at our trial. The Pretoria Gaol, the Police Headquarters at Compol, where we were interrogated and where statements were extracted from us, and this Court is all we have seen of Pretoria. We have been cut off from our people and the world. We all wondered whether the headmen would have repeated some of their lies if our people had been present in Court to hear them.

The South African Government has again shown its strength by de-

taining us for as long as it pleased; keeping some of us in solitary confinement for 300 to 400 days and bringing us to its Capital to try us. It has shown its strength by passing an Act especially for us and having it made retrospective. It has even chosen an ugly name to call us by. One's own are called patriots, or at least rebels; your opponents are called Terrorists.

... We will not even try to present the other side of the picture, because we know that a Court that has not suffered in the same way as we have, can not understand us. This is perhaps why it is said that one should be tried by one's equals. We have felt from the very time of our arrest that we were not being tried by our equals but by our masters, and that those who have brought us to trial very often do not even do us the courtesy of calling us by our surnames. Had we been tried by our equals, it would not have been necessary to have any discussion about our grievances. They would have been known to those set to judge us.


It suits the Government of South Africa to say that it is ruling South West Africa with the consent of its people. This is not true. Our organisation, SWAPO, is the largest political organisation in South West Africa. We considered ourselves a political party. We know that whites do not think of blacks as politicians—only as agitators. Many of our people, through no fault of their own, have had no education at all. This does not mean that they do not know what they want. A man does not have to be formally educated to know that he wants to

live with this family where he wants to live, and not where an official chooses to tell him to live; to move about freely and not require a pass; to earn a decent wage; to be free to work for the person of his choice for as long as he wants; and finally, to be ruled by the people that he wants to be ruled by, and not those who rule him because they have more guns than he has.

Our grievances are called "so-called" grievances. We do not believe South Africa is in South West Africa in order to provide facilities and work for non-whites. It is there for its own selfish reasons. For the first forty years it did practically nothing to fulfill its "sacred trust." It only concerned itself with the welfare of the whites. . . . Only one who is not white and has suffered the way we have can say whether our grievances are real or "so-called."

**T**HOSE OF US who have some education, together with our uneducated brethren, have always struggled to get freedom. The idea of our freedom is not liked by South Africa. It has tried in this Court to prove through the mouths of a couple of its paid Chiefs and a paid official that SWAPO does not represent the people of South Africa. If the Government of South Africa were sure that SWAPO did not represent the innermost feelings of the people in South West Africa, it would not have taken the trouble to make it impossible for SWAPO to advocate its peaceful policy. . . .

Your Government, my Lord, undertook a very special responsibility



**‘We believe that South Africa has a choice — either to live at peace with us or to subdue us by force. If you choose to crush us and impose your will on us then you not only betray your trust, but you will live in security for only as long as your power is greater than ours.’**

ity when it was awarded the mandate over us after the first World War. It assumed a sacred trust to guide us towards independence and to prepare us to take our place among the nations of the world. South Africa has abused that trust because of its belief in racial supremacy (that white people have been chosen by God to rule the world) and apartheid. We believe that for fifty years South Africa has failed to promote the development of our people. Where are our trained men? The wealth of our country has been used to train your people for leadership and the sacred duty of preparing the indigenous people to take their place among the nations of the world has been ignored. . . .

I do not claim that it is easy for men of different races to live at peace with one another. I myself had no experience of this in my youth, and at first it surprised me that men of different races could live together in peace. But now I know it to be true and to be something for which we must strive. The South African Government creates hostility by separating people and emphasizing their differences. We believe that by living together, people will learn to lose their fear of each other. We also believe that this fear which some of the whites have of Africans is based on their desire to be superior and privileged and that when whites see themselves as part of South Africa, sharing with us all its hopes and troubles, then that fear will disappear. Separation is said

to be a natural process. But why, then, is it imposed by force and why then is it that whites have the superiority? . . .

I have come to know that our people cannot expect progress as a gift from anyone, be it the United Nations or South Africa. Progress is something we shall have to struggle and work for. And I believe that the only way in which we shall be able and fit to secure that progress is to learn from our own experience and mistakes.

Your Lordship emphasized in your judgment the fact that our arms came from communist countries, and also that words commonly used by communists were to be found in our documents. But my Lord, in the documents produced by the State there is another type of language. It appears even more often than the former. Many documents finish up with an appeal to the Almighty to guide us in our struggle for freedom. It is the wish of the South African Government that we should be discredited in the Western world. That is why it calls our struggle a communist plot; but this will not be believed by the world. The world knows that we are not interested in ideologies. We feel that the world as a whole has a special responsibility towards us. This is because the land of our fathers was handed over to South Africa by a world body. It is a divided world, but it is a matter of hope for us that it at least agrees about one thing—that we are entitled to freedom and justice. . . .

That is why we claim indepen-



dence for South West Africa. We do not expect that independence will end our troubles, but we do believe that our people are entitled—as are all peoples—to rule themselves. It is not really a question of whether South Africa treats us well or badly, but that South West Africa is our country and we wish to be our own masters.

There are some who will say that they are sympathetic with our aims, but that they condemn violence. I would answer that I am not by nature a man of violence and I believe that violence is a sin against God and my fellow men. SWAPO itself was a non-violent organisation, but the South African Government is not truly interested in whether opposition is violent or non-violent. It does not wish to hear any opposition to apartheid. Since 1963, SWAPO meetings have been banned. . . . We have found ourselves voteless in our own country and deprived of the right to meet and state our own political opinions.

Is it surprising that in such times my countrymen have taken up arms? Violence is truly fearsome, but who would not defend his property and himself against a robber? And we believe that South Africa has robbed us of our country.

**I** HAVE SPENT MY LIFE working in SWAPO, which is an ordinary political party like any other. Suddenly we in SWAPO found that a war situation had arisen and that

our colleagues and South Africa were facing each other on the field of battle. Although I had not been responsible for organising my people militarily and although I believed we were unwise to fight the might of South Africa while we were so weak, I could not refuse to help them when the time came. . . .

In 1964 the ANC and PAC<sup>1</sup> in South Africa were suppressed. This convinced me that we were too weak to face South Africa's force by waging battle. . . . I tried to do what I could to prevent my people from going into the bush. In my attempts I became unpopular with some of my people, but this, too, I was prepared to endure. Decisions of this kind are not easy to make. My loyalty is to my country. My organisation could not work properly—it could not even hold meetings. I had no answer to the question "Where has your non-violence got us?" Whilst the World Court judgment was pending, I at least had that to fall back on. When we failed, after years of waiting, I had no answer to give to my people.

Even though I did not agree that people should go into the bush, I could not refuse to help them when I knew that they were hungry. I even passed on the request for dynamite. It was not an easy decision. Another man might have been able to say "I will have nothing to do with that sort of thing." I was not, and I could not remain a spectator in the struggle of my people for their freedom.

<sup>1</sup>African Nationalist Congress and Pan African Congress.

I am a loyal Namibian and I could not betray my people to their enemies. I admit that I decided to assist those who had taken up arms. I know that the struggle will be long and bitter. I also know that my people will wage that struggle, whatever the cost.

Only when we are granted our independence will the struggle stop. Only when our human dignity is restored to us, as equals of the whites, will there be peace between us.

We believe that South Africa has a choice—either to live at peace with us or to subdue us by force. If you choose to crush us and impose your will on us then you not only betray your trust, but you will live in security for only as long as your power is greater than ours. No South African will live at peace in South West Africa, for each will know that his security is based on force and that without force he will face rejection by the people of South West Africa.

My co-accused and I have suffered. We are not looking forward to our imprisonment. We do not, however, feel that our efforts and sacrifice have been wasted. We believe that human suffering has its effect even on those who impose it. We hope that what has happened will persuade the whites of South Africa that we and the world may be right and they may be wrong. Only when white South Africans realise this and act on it, will it be possible for us to stop our struggle for freedom and justice in the land of our birth.





## PART III

### ANGOLA MOZAMBIQUE

by EDUARDO MONDLANE

WILLIAM MINTER

**F**EW AMERICANS have heard of Mozambique, for it has not made the headlines yet. If known at all, it is as a vague name somewhere on the map of Africa, or perhaps a tourist poster with game parks and sidewalk cafes. Certainly very few realize that it is the scene of a violent confrontation between Portuguese troops and African guerrillas, fighting for the independence of their country.

The Portuguese try to portray Mozambique as a tropical paradise of racial harmony. They have integrated different races and cultures, they say, into a blend of peoples all proud to say "Somos portugueses" ("We are Portuguese"). Perhaps economic progress is slow, they may admit, but no other colonial power has so successfully implanted "Christian civilization" in Africa.

To the casual visitor, or to the American full of images of "chaotic" Africa, such a picture may be attractive and convincing. Unfortunately, it bears no relationship to the facts of history or to the realities of today.

Mozambique, which stretches along the southeastern coast of Africa for over 1,000 miles, was first used by the Portuguese as a stopover on their way to India in the fifteenth century. From several small trading posts on the coast they carried on sporadic commerce and occasionally sent expeditions up the Zambezi River in search of the gold and silver of the African kingdoms further inland. Few Portuguese women ventured as far as Mozambique and thus miscegenation was commonly accepted and practiced.

But miscegenation, whether open, as with the Portuguese, or hidden, as with the northern Europeans who went to the United States or South Africa, does not preclude prejudice. Even before the eighteenth century height of the slave trade in Mozambique, the Portuguese firmly held that the black man could legitimately be enslaved and was indisputably inferior to the white man. Any black Mozambican who is free to speak will tell you that the same attitude of racial superiority persists today. Marvin Harris, a specialist in the study of race relations, noted on return from a 1958 trip to Mozambique that "the clear majority of whites in Mozambique regard the Negro as inferior and accept his inferior social position as irrefutable proof of the fact."

In the scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century, the Portuguese seized effective control of Mozambique and the colonial system that has resulted is unique in the restrictions placed on the people of the country. Mozambicans may even talk enviously of the comparative freedom and prosperity in neighboring South Africa, probably the most consistently racist state in the world.

For most of the twentieth century the Africans have been governed under the legal and administrative system known as the *indigenato* (for the *indigenas*, natives). By this, Africans were treated effectively as children under the full control of the administrator of each district. This administrator exercised practically all police and judicial as well as executive functions. His permission was necessary for any commercial transaction, the allocation of crop land, the choice of an occupation and even entry into or exit from one's home district. The movements of the *indigenas* were controlled by passbooks, which everyone had to carry with him at all times.

The loophole was supposedly that any *indigena* who became "civilized," that is, adopted completely European customs and language and had the economic resources to live like a white man, could become a Portuguese citizen. Up until the change of this system in 1961, only one-tenth of one percent of the African population had achieved this status.

Officially the *indigenato* system was abolished after the Angolan revolt began in 1961, and everyone is now a Portuguese citizen. But there have been many laws passed in Lisbon before and ignored in the colonies. The practice continues. The administrator still exercises the same arbitrary authority over his charges. Blacks still carry different identification books from whites and are subject to the same restrictions as in the past. This paper citizenship means



much less in Mozambique than the rights granted on paper to American Negroes by the various civil rights bills.

**T**HE CONTROL STRIKES most directly at the labor of the black man. Like most other colonial powers, the Portuguese followed the abolition of slavery, so long the basis of trade, with attempts to force the Africans to produce cash crops. Labor by conscription was common not only in the Portuguese territories but also in the Congo and many of the French territories. Taxes to be paid in money were also commonly imposed, thus forcing the African to step out of his subsistence economy to work for the white man. In most of the other territories however, the economic development induced and the wages paid soon insured a sufficient supply of black labor without conscription. However, in Mozambique to this day, conscription forms the basis of the economy.

Legally the African is forbidden to be "idle." He must be forced to be useful, the Portuguese say. Unfortunately for the African, growing his own crops on his own farm for his family is not considered work. Only the production of sufficient cash crops, or paid employment for the state or private employers, is considered real work. Any black person not engaged in this can be, and is, rounded up by the administrator, forced to work for the state, or handed over to a private farmer or industrialist with whom he then signs a "voluntary" contract.

To escape being forced to work, he may sign up before being caught and be allowed to stay in his home district with his family. Or he may sign up with the labor recruiters for the mines of South Africa or the estates of Rhodesia. Then he will be somewhat better paid, can send money home to his family, and, on the basis of the number of workers "recruited," the Portuguese government will itself receive payments and trade concessions from the South African government. Marvin Harris estimates that approximately two-thirds of the mature, able-bodied men of southern Mozambique are employed in foreign territories. The effect on family life can be imagined.

In northern Mozambique, more distant from the cheap labor-employing enterprises of South Africa and Rhodesia, another system is used to get the maximum out of the Africans. There Africans are assigned to produce certain crops and then sell them to monopolies which buy at a deflated price. Cotton, the chief crop produced under this system, supplies the Portuguese textile industry, which is one of the basic industries of the Portuguese economy.

Officially forced cultivation of cotton was also abolished in 1961, but prices continue to be low because the forced labor system allows the administrator to indict Africans as malingerers without having to prove it in a court of law. The very law promulgating the reform says that "the government recommends the inexorable repression of vagrancy." Thus, in the parts of northern Mozambique still under Portuguese control, the acreage for cash crops cuts into that which needs to be used for food, and famine sometimes occurs.

**U**NTIL 1964 legally, but still in practice, almost all education for Africans was carried out in a separate system under the control of the Roman Catholic churches. Protestant missions were allowed to operate only a few schools, and government schools were only for whites and those few assimilated blacks who could afford the high fees.

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Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) was assassinated February 3, 1969, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. A Presbyterian layman, he received a doctorate from Northwestern University. In 1963 he founded Frelimo.

William Minter, a former teacher and writer of textbooks at Frelimo Secondary School (a facility of the Mozambique Institute), is a graduate of New York's Union Seminary. He is currently doing research on United States-Portuguese relations as they apply to Portuguese African colonies.

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Education for Africans begins, and often ends, in *ensino de adaptação* (rudimentary education). It consists of three years of mission school, which teaches Portuguese language, catechism and a little arithmetic as preparation for entry into ordinary primary schools taught in Portuguese. But since heavy agricultural tasks required by the missions often cut into the time needed to learn the language, only one African in five passes the final exam and becomes eligible to enter the ordinary primary school, which goes to the fourth grade.

A somewhat better idea of the *ensino de adaptação* may be gained from the statistics of the Archdiocese of Lourenço Marques, in the southern, more advanced section of the country. In 1961-62, there were 99,200 students enrolled; of these only 75,100 actually attended classes and 10,800 passed the yearly exam. Some 6,100 completed the three-year course, and were thus eligible to enter third grade in the ordinary primary school. The total population of this section of Mozambique is approximately 1,500,000.

The situation in secondary instruction is similar; it is primarily for the whites and mulattos. In 1963 there were less than 200 black students of the 3,600 in secondary school. In 1967 there were 6,200 students in secondary school; the percentage of Africans is not known but is unlikely to have jumped substantially. As for the university established in 1963, in its first year it had a total of five black students out of 300.

The curriculum is both backward in educational techniques and oriented completely to Portugal. Portuguese history and geography, Latin, Greek and French are heavily emphasized. Mozambique is in Africa, but there is hardly a word of history or geography of Africa, no recognition that Africans, too, have a culture. All must be Portuguese: language, culture, concepts and religion (Roman Catholicism).

Since the revolution began in 1964, the Portuguese have been forced to try to do more for education, to attempt to win over some educated black Africans to their side. But still the education of white settlers comes first; more and more are being encouraged to emigrate from Portugal to Mozambique, and Portugal can't even support its school system at home. It is unlikely to create a fair one for Africans.

In most of the rest of Africa, it has been possible to organize protests, to demand independence or at least reform. And occasionally the colonial governments have given in. But Portugal is different. Under a fascist dictatorship since 1930, freedom of speech was unknown at home, much less in the colonies. In 1951, the colonies were officially designated "overseas provinces," and it was said that they were integral parts of Portugal itself. Any talk of independence was considered treason.

In 1962, African peasants in Mueda, northern Mozambique, demanded independence. They should have known better. They were invited to a meeting with the administration, then surrounded by the army. Several hundred people were killed. Other attempts at organization were met with similar reprisals and imprisonments.

It was only after the independence of adjacent African states that nationalists had a place to organize openly. Small organizations of exiles, especially in Tanzania and Rhodesia, began to send appeals to the United Nations, already awakened to the situation in the Portuguese colonies by the 1961 Angola revolt. But any effective UN action was blocked by Portugal's NATO allies, principally the

## MOZAMBIQUE

*Government:* an "overseas province" governed as an integral part of Portugal

*Population:* 7.2 million. Africans: 97 percent (7.1 million); whites: 2.3 per-

cent (165,000); mulattos: 0.5 percent (36,000)

*Languages:* African languages, Portuguese

*Capital:* Lourenço Marques

*Major exports:* cotton, copra



United States, Great Britain and France. Nationalists in Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique soon reached the same conclusion as their brothers in Angola: only by a war of independence would they change the status of their people.

In 1962 several movements came together in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and formed Frelimo (the Mozambique Liberation Front), a joint movement for the independence of Mozambique. Frelimo planned further appeals to the United Nations and to Portugal to negotiate, but it also planned for the war it knew to be unavoidable.

Peaceful protest made no more impact than before. United States policy was even more supportive of Portugal after the death of President Kennedy than before. On September 25, 1964, 200 Frelimo guerrillas in four provinces of Mozambique began attacks on Portuguese military installations. The Portuguese tried, and still try, to present it as only a few people crossing over from Tanzania. But it is more than that.

In 1965, Lord Kilbracken, a conservative British journalist, visited the war zone in Niassa province and testified to Frelimo activity. Now, in 1968, large areas of two provinces are under Frelimo control. The number of armed guerrillas has grown to 10,000, most of whom are trained inside Mozambique. Their attacks have escalated from mines and ambushes to attacks on Portuguese military posts and airports.

Frelimo's policies are those of a long guerrilla war. Attack where the enemy is weak, concentrate on military targets, treat civilians and prisoners well and above all organize among the people. For it is only the support of the people that will enable Frelimo to win against the vastly better equipped army of Portugal, with its NATO aid and, more recently, reinforcements from South Africa.

In July of 1968 Frelimo held its second full-scale Congress, for the first time inside Mozambique. Nearly 200 people from all parts of Mozambique, observers from other liberation movements and even an English journalist and writer on African affairs attended. The key leaders were re-elected and the organization restructured to deal adequately with the many responsibilities of the movement.

Never has Frelimo's action been limited to the military alone. In 1963 the Mozambique Institute was founded in Dar es Salaam to give education to refugee Mozambicans. Shortly afterwards primary schools were begun in the refugee camps, and, as soon as possible, inside Mozambique. Now over 15,000 students attend Frelimo bush schools. The teachers are inadequately trained and lucky to have textbooks for themselves, much less for the students. But Frelimo has now established a teacher-training course in one of the camps, and the teachers at the Mozambique Institute are writing primary school texts, mimeographing some and hoping to get others printed. The demand for new schools is enormous; anyone who has even a little education is pressed into service to teach others.

As Frelimo occupied more of the interior, other nonmilitary programs also became important. The people abandoned the forced cultivation of cotton and increased their food production. Since the Portuguese had forcibly evacuated all Indian and European traders, Frelimo had to set up a system of distribution of basic farm tools (hoes and axes) as well as other household items. To supply some of the funds for this, they encouraged the export of easily transportable crops such as cashew nuts, peanuts and sesame seed. As all transport in the liberated areas is by head portage, export of cotton and sisal has not yet proved profitable.

Health services are also important. As yet there is not one black Mozambican doctor. About 400 workers with various degrees of training carry out a program of first aid, treatment of such basic diseases as malaria and inoculations against smallpox. Patients with more serious cases are evacuated, if possible, to hospitals in Tanzania. Shortage of medicines is always a problem.





The Portuguese withdrew their administration completely from much of northern Mozambique, leaving only the army in its fortified bases. So Frelimo has set up structures of local and regional administration. Traditional structures have been used whenever possible, but a course has also been established to teach basic administration to a select Frelimo cadre.

**I**T IS A HUMAN TENDENCY to hope for easy solutions to difficult problems. Many Westerners hope in vain for voluntary changes in Portuguese policy or in the South African racist system. And many Mozambicans thought at first that it would be only a matter of a few months until the Portuguese were driven out. But Frelimo knows that the struggle may last for years and all programs must be planned on that basis.

If the Portuguese were unaided, they might be forced out quickly. Already they are sending so many troops to Africa that if the United States sent as large a percentage of the American population to Vietnam, there would be two and a half million there. But the diplomatic, military and economic support Portugal gains from NATO membership is invaluable. In addition there are South African troops in Mozambique guarding the huge Cabora-Bassa dam site in which South African capital is involved. It will be a long struggle.

The demise of Portuguese Premier Salazar is unlikely to make any difference either. On September 27, 1968, Marcelo Caetano, his successor, pledged to continue the same policies and to preserve the "integrity of the Portuguese nation," including the overseas provinces. But it will certainly be used by American apologists for Portugal, saying "give the new man a chance."

And the American people have little to say about it. It is a simple fact that when a foreign policy issue is not in the headlines every day, public opinion is practically non-existent and its influence nil. The special interests of the American navy with its base in the Portuguese Azores, and the businessmen with their investments, and the Cold Warriors whose first preoccupation is anti-communism—these interests determine United States policy towards Portugal and the independence of its colonies.

The Portuguese present themselves to the world as the defenders of Christian civilization against barbarism and communism. They are certainly not alone in using piety to hide injustice. The church bears a heavy responsibility for such confusion. The Roman Catholic Church in Mozambique has declared the idea of African independence a "philosophical monstrosity," and the Pope himself, on a recent visit to Portugal, awarded a religious medal to the head of the Portuguese secret police. The many Roman Catholics in Frelimo have indeed a hard time distinguishing genuine Christian faith in Roman Catholicism from such distortions of it.

The Protestant missions have a somewhat better record, being quite active in education. But in Mozambique they have always been inclined to put the security of the institutional church above real identification with the aspirations of the people. The weight of the institutional church in Mozambique is clearly on the side of continued oppression, either by open support or simply by inaction.

The church in Mozambique is still largely a mission church, and Portugal itself is supported by the whole Western world. Inaction on the part of American Christians means tacit support of racism and colonial oppression; the failure to arouse the conscience of Americans means that the weight of American power falls on the wrong side. Frelimo will fight on regardless, as will the other movements in southern Africa. The question is whether, in their struggle for a just society, they will have to see in the church an enemy or an ally. •







## A REVOLUTION

**T**HE CASE FOR Angolan independence first came up at the historic All African People's Conference in Accra, Ghana, in 1958. In 1969, more than a decade later, Angolan nationalists are still trekking to pan-African gatherings to seek support for their cause, often from leaders who had earlier shared status as impecunious nationalist petitioners.

During the intervening decade, Britain, France and Belgium have, however reluctantly, given in to local nationalist pressures. They have transferred political power and sovereignty to African governments. But not Portugal. Under an ultra-conservative government that is concerned with prestige, the mystique of a civilizing "mission," and both immediate and long-range economic benefits, Portugal has held firm to the legal fiction that its "overseas provinces" in Africa constitute inalienable parts of the Portuguese nation. These parts have no right to a separate identity, for

they have been officially assimilated. But as of 1960, only one percent, or 40,000, of over four million Africans in Angola had been recognized as *assimilados*, or persons who have completely assimilated Portuguese ways.

When pent-up, unheeded African grievances against conscript labor, political repression and social discrimination exploded into the Angolan revolt of 1961, soon after Congolese independence, a deluge of violence and counterviolence made Angola headline news around the world. Now entering its ninth year, the Angolan conflict—almost forgotten by the world outside—continues its painful course with no resolution in sight.

During its dramatic initial phase, it became a concern of President John F. Kennedy and merited articles by journalists such as Walter Lippmann and Arthur Krock. In 1961, Angola occupied six and a half columns in the *New York Times Index*. By 1967, however, it was receiving little government or private attention in the United States, and its space in the *New York Times Index* had declined to one-fourth of one column. Relatively well-informed Americans commonly asked: "What ever became of the Angolan revolution?"

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## ALMOST FORGOTTEN by JOHN MARCUM

Then, in August 1968, Portugal's seemingly indestructible premier and strongman, Dr. Antonio Salazar, was felled by a cerebral stroke. The press and foreign officers of the world suddenly took a new interest in Portugal and its colonial wars.

Because they had not kept abreast of developments in Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique, however, some normally perceptive observers wrote rather foolish things. Take for example the case of *The New Republic* (October 5, 1968). "It is principally in Africa," said that serious liberal weekly, "that Salazar's departure is expected to have a marked effect." What one should look for, it went on to say, was a move toward secession by leaders of an estimated 300,000 white Angolan settlers. Shades of another Rhodesia.

Yet readers of Salisbury and Johannesburg papers knew that current white rule in Angola faces a stronger military threat than in Rhodesia. Violent encounters with Angolan guerrillas over wide areas of eastern and northern Angola have been sorely testing the Portuguese army. Far from being ready to go it alone, Angola, according to Rhodesian and South African correspondents, has need of all the 50,000 metropolitan soldiers stationed within its borders—as

well as assistance from South Africa to supplement Lisbon's resources.

**A**ERICAN OPINION ABOUT events in Angola is generally formed on the basis of an appalling lack of information and a considerable bit of misinformation. According to *The New Republic*: "A Che-type Marxist guerrilla movement exists in Angola's south, led by Mário de Andrade, a former cat's paw of Nkrumah." The fact is that Andrade has not been the leader of an Angolan nationalist movement since 1963. And Andrade's successor as head of the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), Dr. Agostinho Neto, has not yet been reported to be leading the revolution from inside the country.

Indeed, a major criticism leveled against Angolan nationalist leaders, including Holden Roberto, head of the rival *Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio* (GRAE), has concerned precisely their tendency to lead from exile and to avoid the risks and hardships of a Che Guevara. In Portuguese Africa, only Amílcar Cabral of diminutive Portuguese Guinea has acquired the popular image of an on-the-spot-with-the-guerrillas revolutionary.





Reports from the Zambian press in late 1968 did suggest that Jonas Savimbi, the leader of a third Angolan movement, the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA), was, in fact, back inside Angola, where he had spent several months in 1966-67 with the *maquis* (underground). Nonetheless, despite the commercial profit with which the American press romanticized the Che Guevara saga, American newspapers and periodicals made no mention whatsoever of this apparent African effort to create a new "Che-type" revolution within a revolution.

Why are Americans so ill-informed? Is it preoccupation with Vietnam? Disenchantment with Africa since the Congo entanglement? Belief that the nationalists are so bitterly divided among themselves that they are likely to prove ineffective in the long run? Or is it weariness with a long, nibbling insurgency that produces unconvincing communiqués heralding nationalist victories and Portuguese casualties such as, if real, would have long ago toppled the Lisbon government? Perhaps it is a bit of all of these.

Put summarily, the situation in Angola at the outset of 1969 was one of conflicting trends. On the one hand, coffee production and sales to the United States were excellent. Capital and settlers continued to flow in. An international consortium headed by the West Germans was beginning to tap the rich iron ore of Cassinga in the south. Evacuated by means of an extended rail line and an expanded port at Moçâmedes, the ore promised to become a major new source of revenue. From a joint Luso-South African hydro-electric project on the Cunene River in the far south to Gulf Oil's \$150 million investment and break-

through into a rich new oil field in the Cabinda enclave of the far north, prospects for economic development appeared very good.

All this gave the Portuguese government some grounds for public expressions of confidence in its capacity to maintain its rule over Angola. Perhaps it is not irrelevant to recall, however, that in 1958-59 oil and iron plus French capital were seen as the bases for developing and keeping Algeria French.

**I**N ANGOLA, as in Algeria, it may not be possible to defeat African nationalism by means of tardy economic and social development. Indeed, the other side of the picture in Angola is one of chronic, small scale insurgency spread over much of the outlying, lightly populated regions of the north, east and south. The fighting is under the direction of three rival organizations, each of which denies not only the legitimacy but even the existence of its competitors. In part, they are involved in a race to see who can first establish a firm foothold in the bush and forest and then move into the real population centers along the railroads, on the cultivated plateaus and in the coastal towns. The decisive test may be their relative and absolute capacities to build an effective political underground in these centers of concentrated population.

Certainly, if the new Marcello Caetano government should ultimately decide to devolve real authority to a local, multi-racial government in Angola, such an underground organization could prove a crucial base from which to seek political power. If a war-weary Lisbon turned power over to an essentially white gov-



## ANGOLA

*Government:* An "overseas province" governed as an integral part of Portugal

*Population:* 5.2 million, Africans: 92 percent (4.7 million); whites: 7.5 percent (420,000); mulattos: 0.5 percent (50,000)

*Languages:* African languages, Portuguese

*Capital:* Luanda

*Major exports:* petroleum, coffee.

ernment, however, black Angolans would be faced with a considerably more repressive regime. An insecure white minority government with an uncertain support among a few thousand mulattos and black *assimilados* would almost certainly rely on the vigilante approach to law and order that Angolan whites used during the crisis of 1961.

Lisbon is, of course, counting on a multiracial solution of its own making. In addition to economic development and military supremacy, it is banking upon assimilation through education. Indeed, it may very well be correct in expecting that the Angola of a decade from now will be shaped by young people now enrolled in the territory's much expanded, if still inadequate, school system. This system is designed to produce African graduates who will view themselves as black Portuguese. Everything depends upon not producing graduates who will think, question and act in terms of the rational self-interests of persons who view themselves as Portuguese-speaking Africans.

Because so much depends upon the success of this gamble in education, and because most Portuguese are convinced that Anglo-Saxon Protestants have proven to be inherently incapable of educating Africans to be black Portuguese, Protestant participation in Angola's expanding educational program has been kept to a minimum. American missionary personnel have, in fact, been harrassed and squeezed down from over 300 to less than 100 since 1961. As a justification for this the Portuguese can cite the fact that a disproportionate number of African rebel leaders are products of Protestant mission schools.

And is it not a matter of historical record that

Protestant missionaries have been engaged in protracted competition with Portuguese Catholics and have long challenged the moral authority of the Portuguese government to conscript labor or torture prisoners? Inevitably, the free thinking, unorthodox style of the missionaries helped to legitimize the idea of opposition to the colonial system. Protestants were and are a threat to the preservation of an imposed colonial order.

A logical projection from this state of affairs could very well be a further reduction in Protestant activity in Angola during the next few years. The bleak prospects for Protestantism derive from two factors: (1) the relationship of Protestantism to African protest coupled with Portuguese reprisals against both, and (2) the foreign policies of the United States and Great Britain, which have supported the Portuguese and alienated Africans. Both of these points have been dealt with in detail and with conviction in the growing Protestant literature on contemporary Angola.

In *Cry Angola!*<sup>1</sup> a British Baptist, Len Addicott, described the injustices which led to the uprising of 1961. His moral outrage over the massive slaughter of Africans in retaliatory action by the Portuguese and the graphic picture of Portuguese counterterror drawn by such Baptist observers as the Revs. Clifford Parsons and David Grenfell explains why the Baptist Missionary Society was expelled from the Bakongo area of northern Angola. Similarly outspoken criticism of Portuguese atrocities against Methodist pastors and teachers in the Mbundu region (Luanda-Malange) in articles by Bishop Ralph E. Dodge and the Revs. Malcolm McVeigh and E. Edwin LeMaster reinforced



Portuguese assumptions that Methodists, also, are objectively dangerous.

A recent autobiography by a Brethren teacher, *Angola Beloved*,<sup>2</sup> ascribes Portuguese beatings and torture of African Protestants in the interior region of Songo to the mere suspicion of "nationalistic leanings." It also points out how Christian communities among the Lwena and Chokwe of the east are now caught between the Portuguese army and African guerrillas, both of whom demand support or else. And meanwhile, the protective or supportive presence of missionaries dwindles as Lisbon refuses to grant visas for replacements or for those wishing to return from furlough.

The Rev. Dr. Carl R. Dille of the United Church of Christ, principal of the Emanuel Theological Seminary at Dondi, also charged in the Washington *Afro-American*, October 10, 1967, that Portuguese authorities were torturing and murdering African Protestants because of suspected sympathy or complicity with nationalist guerrilla activity. Perhaps most damning in Portuguese eyes was his assessment that, though legally proscribed, racial discrimination was still widespread and the official goal of a multiracial society increasingly distant. Africans, he said, are being pushed to the point where they have "only one recourse, violence."

Because few missionaries who leave on furlough are allowed back, Dr. Dille may have felt no inhibitions about speaking out critically. But should missionaries have spoken out about injustice even when this would have meant being forced out of the country? Dr. Sid Gilchrist of the United Church of Canada has raised searching questions about this issue in his impressively and disturbingly honest *Angola Awake*.<sup>3</sup> Dr. Gilchrist says that it is amazing to him that "an overwhelming majority of missionaries have managed to 'keep their noses clean,' to see naked brutality habitually used against Africans all around them and yet to muzzle themselves and never say 'a mumblin' word' against the oppressor."

In an indictment of Protestant practice that could also be read as a refutation of Portuguese criticisms, the Canadian physician, who served the Ovimbundu community of central Angola for most of his professional life, has concluded that: We have "taught what the Portuguese said to teach." We have produced graduates "far more fluent in the Portuguese language than the products of mission schools in ex-British colonies are in English." We have "tried des-

perately to convince the youth of Angola that they are 'Portuguese' even when only a very few could ever hope to attain the pseudo-Portuguese citizenship open to a small elite. On matters of politics, human rights, economics, higher education and social justice our silence has been complete, cold and granite!"

Now "retired" and working among Angolan refugees in the Congo, Dr. Gilchrist has also pointed out that at another level the problem is less that of the Protestant teacher or doctor who feels it important to continue his creative work under duress and in silence than that of the governments of Western states that have lined the Western world in support of Portuguese colonial policy.

The symbol of this Western complicity with colonialism is NATO. Writing of Portugal's suppression of the 1961 uprising, Dr. Gilchrist has said: "... I doubt that there is one educated African in Angola who is not convinced that the Portuguese fought with NATO arms." There is also a widespread awareness of American financial (coffee sales, bank loans), military (Azores bases) and diplomatic (voting at the United Nations) support for Portugal's overall capacity to maintain its rule over Angola.

In June 1962, Len Addicott predicted that: "Only if the United States, the leading nation of NATO, and England, the traditional defender of Portugal, can force Dr. Salazar to change his policy, will they not be seen by the Africans as the accomplices of Portugal." As "accomplices," Western governments are in truth viewed with a combination of hostility and fear by Angolan liberation movements. Many Africans believe that American support for an arms embargo against Portugal in 1962 would have meant an independent Angola in 1968. Fated, instead, to the prolonged agony of a guerrilla war, they enjoy sympathy and support from both African and Communist powers—a little of the first and none of the second from the West.

Politically conscious Angolans are thus growing increasingly negative about everything—Protestantism included. Some even fear that the United States might someday intervene actively on the side of Portugal to prevent what Washington would perceive as a "Communist take-over" of a key area of industrial- and mineral-rich southern Africa. Such an adventure—with incalculable results for a racially divided U.S.—might be the result of a drifting American policy unless a Vietnam-chastened U.S. is prepared to accommodate to the presence of overtly hostile governments in southern Africa. Or unless—and how Washington carresses this unless!—Marcello Caetano should prove wise and strong enough to smash the chain of violence and redirect the course of history.

<sup>1</sup> *Cry Angola*, Len Addicott. London: SCM Press, 1962.

<sup>2</sup> *Angola Beloved*, Ernest Wilson, Neptune, N.J.: Loizeaux Bros. 1967.

<sup>3</sup> *Angola Awake*, Sid Gilchrist. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1968.



**Refugees are multiplying by the thousands.  
When life becomes too unbearable where they are,  
they set off on hazardous journeys to cross the nearest border.**





# FLIGHT TO FREEDOM

BY MALCOLM McVEIGH



**T**HERE ARE well over a million refugees in tropical Africa today. Because of political upheavals, South Africa and its de facto colony South West Africa, the British Commonwealth renegade Rhodesia, and Portuguese Angola and Mozambique have among them created an estimated 550,000 refugees.

Portugal is by far the worst offender. In the Republic of Congo alone there are 500,000 Angolan refugees listed in the 1968 World Refugee Report of the U.S. Committee for Refugees. There are now twice as many refugees outside Angola as there are European residents inside of it.

African unrest under Portuguese control, not only due to lack of political participation but also because of social and economic abuses, smoldered in the colonies for many years. In 1961 Angola erupted in bitter fighting with an attempt by Angolans to take over the government. Many Europeans were killed, and the Portuguese responded to these attacks by bombing and destroying African villages throughout the northern part of the country.

In the wake of the devastation and fearful for their lives, Angolans in the border area fled immediately into Congo. Others moved into the forests of northern Angola and built new villages in hiding places wherever they could find them.

Thousands of Angolans still live in these hidden villages. However, it is a precarious existence at the least. Portuguese planes and patrols keep them on the move, and when life becomes too unbearable they set off for Congo.

They travel at dusk and during the night, through the forest, over crocodile-infested rivers and under constant danger from the Portuguese soldiers. Refugees from deep inside Angola have reported marches of up to 45 days on the trip out and almost invariably they tell of death (from illness or encounters with military forces) to

members of the group on the way. In the meantime the war goes on.

The causes of refugee movements in eastern Angola and western and northern Mozambique are similar. The attacks of African nationalists on Portuguese outposts and plantations are followed by severe Portuguese reprisals against the local population and these in turn result in the flight of refugees across the border into neighboring countries.

What happens to the refugees after they have crossed the border? Again the Angolans may serve as a useful illustration. Of the half million Angolans who came into Congo since 1961, about 400,000 crossed into the relatively small area of lower Congo stretching from Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville) to the Atlantic Ocean. The other 100,000 are spread along the border eastwards, with a rather large number moving into Katanga since December 1966.

Although some relief efforts have been carried on by the Congo Protestant Relief Agency at Dilolo in Katanga and Tshikapa in Kasai Province, the major relief and resettlement programs have been concentrated in lower Congo.

When refugees first began flooding into Congo in 1961, the Red Cross provided emergency aid. However, when it became apparent that the problem was of a long-range nature, relief operations were turned over to the church-related voluntary relief agencies Caritas Congo, Catholic Relief Services, and Congo Protestant Relief Agency. Since 1961 the CPRA has helped to resettle 200,000 Angolans in lower Congo.

When Angolans arrive in Congo,

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Malcolm J. McVeigh, a United Methodist missionary, recently served as director of material aid for Protestant relief work among Angolan, Mozambican and Sudanese refugees in Congo. Previously he had served as a United Methodist missionary in Angola and was there during the late 1950, early 1960 hostilities.



they are registered and given clothing, blankets, cooking utensils, hoes, machetes, seed and weekly food rations for one year—that is, until their houses are built, gardens planted and first crops harvested. If there is malnutrition, the sick are hospitalized and fed special diets until health is restored.

New primary schools and dispensaries have been built throughout the refugee area, and a secondary school has been established at Sona Bata, 50 miles south of Kinshasa, to provide refugees with opportunities for academic careers.

**T**HE ANGOLANS are not placed in refugee camps but are encouraged to settle among the Congolese of the area. Most are of the same Bakongo tribe, so frictions are not as severe as they might otherwise be. Generally the Angolans become share-croppers, paying for the use of the land with a percentage of the crops raised. This is not ideal when we consider that the resettled refugees are living at a subsistence level; but on the other hand, we must be grateful that personal relations are as good as they are and that the Congolese have made room for them.

The Angolans have more than doubled the population of the area since 1961. If voluntary agencies have been able to help with the resettlement, this does not in any way diminish the credit which must go both to the Congolese people for their part in the process and to the refugees themselves for the enormous effort they have made in their own behalf.

Many international groups have contributed to the resettlement program. Considerable credit also must go to the Congo government for its cooperation in relief efforts and for taking responsibility in shipping relief goods to the refugee areas. The Congo government not only has welcomed the refugees but also has permitted them a degree of freedom allowed by few other countries; and all of this has been done while facing its own enormous problems of adjustment

and internal strife since independence in 1960.

In another independent country bordering on southern Africa, Tanzania, relief operations began in 1965 with refugees from Mozambique. Ten thousand of them had crossed the Ruvuma river because of pressure from Portuguese military forces. A fertile site at Rutamba, 80 miles north of the border and 30 miles from the coast, was selected and a three-year resettlement plan established jointly by the Tanzanian government, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Lutheran World Federation. As in Angola, clothing, seeds and tools were distributed, with supplementary food rations made available from the World Food Program. The plan has also included the construction of buildings to meet health and educational needs. In 1966, 3,000 more refugees crossed the border in western Tanzania, and these have been resettled in similar fashion at Lundo and Ndecho near Lake Nyassa.

The total refugee population from Mozambique in Tanzania swelled to 19,000 in 1967. An important self-help project of Frelimo, the Mozambique Liberation Movement, has been the establishment of the Mozambique Institute to prepare students with inadequate educational background for further academic studies in Africa and abroad.

Similar accounts could be made of relief operations and refugee settlement in Zambia and Malawi.

Rhodesia and South Africa present their own special difficulties. To date there have been no mass movements of refugees from either of them. However, unrest runs high in each. If liberation movements should be successful in installing African governments in Angola and Mozambique, the pressure on Rhodesia and South Africa would be much greater.

Refugees from Rhodesia and South Africa are composed principally of students who escape to Francistown, Botswana. It is difficult to know how many refugee students have followed the Bots-

wana route to central and northern Africa. But the U.S. Committee for Refugees, in its 1968 report, estimates about 6,000 are now residing in various African countries.

**T**HOSE WORKING closely with refugees in Africa are cognizant of the enormous problems which they face today and the lack of coordination and resources placed at their disposal. The new African governments are increasingly aware that they must assume more responsibility for the refugee question.

However, we must recognize that this is not an African problem but a world problem, and consequently we all have a part to play in its solution. A realistic appraisal of the situation should make us aware that assistance, both financial and technical, from government, philanthropic and church-related sources will be required for some time to come.

What does all this mean for us, living in the comforts of the Western world? What should our reaction be? How can we become involved? At least three things can be said in reply:

First, we can attempt to deepen our understanding of the refugee situation in Africa. Second, we can be sympathetic with the refugees in their hardships and suffering and contribute to programs aimed at alleviating that suffering.

Finally, we can sympathize with refugees in their desire for a solution to the political problems of their countries which will permit them to return to their homes.

This is not possible, however, so long as the countries of southern Africa are ruled by minority white governments which persecute black populations and deny them participation in the national processes. World opinion has not yet concentrated with any real force on the injustices of southern Africa. When this happens, there is no doubt that international pressure for the recognition of human rights can be a decisive factor in solving this refugee problem. •





## PART IV — RHODESIA



**Suspicion, distrust, resentment and hatred are the harvest from the seeds of**



**injustice being sown in Rhodesia, where the name of the game is**



**R**HODESIA IS A LAND-LOCKED country in southeast Africa, a little smaller than California and with less than a third of that state's population. Its climate and natural resources have over the past 70 years attracted many white settlers, whose children know no other homeland. During the formative period of 1920-30, the largest number of immigrants came from South Africa, with the British culture dominating their pattern of life. They are attached, both emotionally and economically, to the rolling hills, fertile valleys, vast expanses of grassland, and mines of iron, chrome, gold, copper and asbestos.

The more than four million Africans also prize their traditional homeland, with its interesting topography and invigorating climate, varying from 40-degree nights in July to 90-degree days in October. During the past 40 years the Africans have more than quadrupled their numbers, mainly from natural birth. The whites have depended considerably on immigration for their increase.

Presently, the minority white group, under the leadership of Prime Minister Ian Smith, is exercising a reign of repressive domination and rigid control. But the black population is determined that the time has come for majority rule. It seeks to achieve it as soon as possible—at one time through negotiation, but more

recently through force, which it now considers the only viable alternative.

Portugal and South Africa have come to the aid of the white minority group in its attempt to maintain the status quo at all costs, whereas the rest of the world at least pays lip service to majority rule. While Great Britain and the United Nations fail to effect drastic changes in Rhodesian policy, the people of Rhodesia continue to prepare for the inevitable showdown between blacks and whites.

Thus, Rhodesia, a land of great expectation and promise, is passing through an intense period of crisis: political, economic and moral. To understand the issues in the current tense situation, a brief look into Rhodesia's unique history may be helpful.

Unlike most African territories, Rhodesia has never been a colony. Its modern history starts out with a treaty between Lobengula, king of the Matabele, and Cecil John Rhodes, head of the British South Africa Company. The treaty gave the company exclusive

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# TO DIVIDE AND RULE



by RALPH E. DODGE



mineral rights over the entire territory. In 1889 a charter was granted to the company with rights conferred directly from the British crown. Not only was Rhodes to promote civilization and establish good government, but he also was given extensive rights to make treaties, promulgate laws and organize a police force. However, the British government reserved the right to review the relations between the British South Africa Company and the Africans and to intervene in the interest of the majority population at any time.

Rhodes lost no time in implementing his rights. He set up an administrative post and proceeded to usurp tribal authority. Later an order-in-council from Great Britain provided for an administrator to issue regulations and a judge to preside over a court. The company soon established a land commission and appointed native commissioners. A legislative council was established with a majority of its nine members representatives of the company.

Gradually, however, the white settlers became restive under company administration. In 1923 they went to the polls to decide the future of the country. The two alternatives to company rule were either to join the Union of South Africa or to set up local "responsible government." By a slight majority they decided on local government.

Thus, in 1923, Rhodesia was annexed to the British crown as a largely self-governing territory. Great Britain, however, continued to reserve the right to intervene in the interests of the Africans and to be responsible for external relationships.

**I**N 1931 the Land Apportionment Act was passed. This act has the same effect as South Africa's Group Areas Act: it severely limits contact between black and white. It reserves 37 percent of the land for 237,000 whites and 46 percent for four and a half million blacks. Rural Africans are compelled to live in so-called tribal trust lands, under the authority of a government-appointed chief or on small farms patched throughout the country. Although these lands total 40 million acres, only 17 percent of them is suitable for annual crops. Thus the majority of Rhodesia's Africans is forced to live a life of poverty and subsistence.

The whites, on the contrary, are allotted rich farming land by the act: 52 percent of it is suitable for annual crop cultivation. Most of it is situated near the railroads, so that products can easily be marketed. On the whole, 98 percent of the most fertile land is in the white areas, and only two percent in black areas. This





act is one of the main bones of contention in the African struggle for justice.

From 1953 to 1963 Rhodesia was included in the Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. With the dissolution of the federation, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became independent, but Southern Rhodesia retained its white minority rule and became more repressive in its policies. The so-called Rhodesian Front came into power, and in 1964 the conservative right-winger, Ian Smith, took the party leadership.

Under Smith the Front began talking about complete independence under "responsible white leadership"—negotiated if possible; declared, if not. A new constitution was drafted. Press censorship was initiated. African nationalists were sent into restriction without trial for an indefinite period or imprisoned.

The University College in Salisbury and the more progressive churches were especially crippled through deportations. Former Premier Garfield Todd was placed under house arrest. Heavy fines were imposed for the mention in print of the names of African nationalist leaders.

Educational advancement was slowed down, separate development programs were initiated, and from the African and the world viewpoint, the wheels of progress halted or turned in reverse. Then came the

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965.

Now, four years after the Front's declaration of independence from the tenuous ties which held Rhodesia to the United Kingdom, one can evaluate its effects. Politically the country has survived as a declared free state, but her independence has not been officially recognized by a single country. She has isolated herself from all the world except the few white people in South Africa and Portuguese territories.

Great Britain's lead in requesting sanctions, and the United Nations' prompt response, indicates with what concern the nations of the world view the Rhodesian Front's attempt to stop the progress of African people.

Although the black population of Rhodesia is not free to form its own political parties, and although its chosen leaders are still in detention or prison, its opposition to the Rhodesian Front is almost unanimous. Besides, the recent formation of a predominantly white Centre Party advocating African advancement and multiracialism for Rhodesia shows that the Smith regime does not have the support of many liberal and courageous whites. Increasingly, even the whites in Rhodesia are voicing their opposition to the isolation and separate development policies of the Rhodesian Front.

The two main black political parties, the Zimbabwe





African Nationalist Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), banned in Rhodesia but operating in exile, continue to disrupt the surface harmony of the police state by guerrilla incursions from outside. The seriousness of this threat to the regime is evidenced by the request of Rhodesia for armed police assistance from South Africa. With the increasing opposition of whites from within and the pressure of sanctions and armed incursions from without, Smith now appears to be on the defensive even among his own white electorate.

**N**EVERTHELESS, one should not assume that the minority white electorate in Rhodesia will move of its own accord toward a truly representative government. The pressures from outside must be stronger than those of self-interest from within; that is, the white people of Rhodesia must be convinced that a democratic, inclusive society is in their own long-range best interest.

In spite of the fact that sanctions have not been enthusiastically followed by all the nations of the world, sufficient economic pressure has been brought to bear upon the Rhodesian economy to hurt it. Recently, respected business and financial leaders in Rhodesia have publicly warned the Prime Minister of

the danger of continued or increased sanctions. Carol Heurtley, president of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, has warned of the near-collapse of the industry. He asserted that there is very low morale among those still trying to earn a livelihood from tobacco farming.

At about the same time as the Heurtley warning, Evan Campbell, chairman of the Rhodesian Board of the Standard Bank, has asserted that there is a marked economic deterioration due to wide-scale unemployment, especially in the black sector of the population.

Both Maurice Smith, a mining engineer, and Robert Meuwson, chairman of the Rhodesian Iron and

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## RHODESIA

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*Government:* Illegal independence from Britain declared by whites in 1965

*Population:* 4.6 million. Africans: 95 percent (4.4 million); whites: 5 percent (237,000)

*Languages:* English, African languages

*Capital:* Salisbury

*Major exports:* tobacco, asbestos

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Steel Company, have publicly declared that Rhodesian mining operations are stagnating under sanctions. Thus, those who are closest to the industrial, economic, and commercial life of the country are deeply concerned with current conditions and future prospects.

The Smith regime has pledged itself to a policy of separate development which is very similar to that of apartheid in South Africa. The vast African community is to remain in an inferior position, subject to the wishes of the minority white group.

Even the Asians and those of mixed blood are feeling the bite of discriminatory legislation such as that contained in the Property Owners' Bill, which removes nonwhites from white residential areas if their presence there is considered undesirable by the white residents. Rather than build up an inclusive national community with common interests and common goals, the Rhodesian Front policy is that of "divide and rule," irrespective of the long-range damage which this may do to the nation. Suspicion, distrust, resentment and hatred will be the harvest from the seeds of misunderstanding and injustice currently being sown.

In the process of implementing the regime's policy of separate development, the responsibility for education is increasingly being placed on the local communities. This means that, with their limited resources, the African communities are not going to be able to maintain even the present standard or amount of education. The national government is spending about one-tenth as much per pupil on blacks as on whites.

Since UDI, the situation has even further deteriorated because of the great difficulty which both school drop-outs and graduates of secondary schools have in finding jobs. Whereas in most independent countries to the north graduates are offered positions in industry or government service, their counterparts in Rhodesia often are excluded. Before UDI it was profitable to sacrifice in order to give one's children an education; this is no longer true, and a retrogression in education is setting in, contrasting greatly with the expanding opportunities in adjacent independent countries.

The greatest tragedy of an authoritarian and exclusive regime is the effect it has on the people it governs. To remain in control, such a regime often disregards the human potential of its subjects. When that regime is also racially biased and repressive in discriminatory legislation and social practices, there is little opportunity for the development of creative personalities. Thus, as national and world figures emerge in independent African countries, those of equal potential in Rhodesia and other dominated areas of southern Africa burn up their energy in frustrations

or in open opposition to the repressive regimes.

This leads to a second tragedy of Rhodesia as representative of dominated countries: the danger its political situation poses for world peace. Within and without Rhodesia the Zimbabweans ("Zimbabwe" is the name chosen by Africans for Rhodesia when they can govern it) are not going to sit idly by and wait for the minority white group to offer them the spoils of cooperative subjection. The African no longer accepts an inferior position.

When he is humiliated, as all Africans in Rhodesia presently are, he inwardly rises up in resentment and waits for a time of retaliation. He is like human beings everywhere, abundantly capable of forgiveness and equally capable of vengeance.

The independent nations of Africa have shown ability to forget the hurt of colonial domination as they now burst forth in new cooperative activity. But even as these nations rejoice in their new-found liberty, they do not forget their brothers in southern Africa who are still smarting under repressive laws and psychological intimidation. The stage is set for what might easily become a major world conflict, with the initial spark of conflagrations springing from the racial clash in Rhodesia.

**T**HE UNITED STATES is far from Rhodesia geographically. The "A" in America begins the alphabet and the "Z" in Zimbabwe ends it. But they are both part of that alphabet. Realizing this oneness, Americans can help bring about an equitable and peaceful solution to the Rhodesian situation.

They should continue to support the United Nations in its attempts to end the present illegal regime in Rhodesia. There can be no peace in southern Africa until black and white sit down at a conference table and jointly hammer out legislation that will be mutually acceptable. Sanctions, if widely applied and strictly enforced, may well bring Ian Smith, or his successor, to the conference table with black leaders in Rhodesia.

Americans can let their senators and representatives in Washington know that they support peaceful settlements to world problems. This does not mean a continuation of the status quo. It means a sincere and diligent search for fair solutions to all problems, whether national or world-wide in scope.

If something is not done to change the direction of events in Rhodesia to make possible African advancement and social justice, the world will pay in blood for its indifference. If courageous, long-range planning were undertaken, Rhodesia could once again be a country of promise rather than of tragedy and potential conflagration. •



JUSTIN V. J. NYOKA:

# RIGHT OF ADMISSION RESERVED

**D**ISCRIMINATION in Rhodesia is intensifying, although the government denies it.

While working for *The Rhodesia Herald*, the country's largest white-owned newspaper, I decided to test the color bar in public places. I visited ten restaurants and five leading hotels. None of the restaurants would allow me to have a meal or even a cup of tea. Of the hotels, only one was truly non-racial.

Recently I tried the same exercise, this time with a British Broadcasting Company television crew ready to film and record what happened. This action cost me my job on the newspaper, although I had acted purely in my private capacity.

At one hotel where we asked for drinks and lunch, we were told by an African waiter that there was an "objection" from the management, namely my presence as a black man. My friends from the BBC argued that there was no sign saying only whites were admitted. In an incoherent retort the manager said

the sign "Right of Admission Reserved" meant that only whites were admitted.

Indeed, I had expected this type of answer. I knew the double-talk that characterizes white Rhodesian thinking. Rhodesia has never spelled out her racial policy. There is only one place in Salisbury, a public convenience, with the sign "Europeans Only."

In many places a black person, especially if he is in the company of white friends from overseas, is left to guess whether or not he can be served. If members of the Friends of Rhodesia Societies from Britain and the United States happen to visit the country, a hotel proprietor can be persuaded to accommodate blacks so that visitors on guided tours can see the so-called equal social treatment accorded to blacks.

After our incident I told the BBC crew that the increasing bitterness and frustration which the few educated and well-to-do Africans in Rhodesia show toward this kind of treatment is probably the beginning of a more concerted opposition to the white administration. I also said that the majority of whites in the country looked on the African as an animal or as sub-human. This remark especially angered my newspaper employers, the government-owned Broadcasting and Television Corporation, and the white

public, which associated my personal comments with the paper on which I worked.

At times Rhodesia's national newspapers join in the defensive battle against the probing of outside journalists. After the BBC crew and I had established that Africans were being turned away from the Salisbury swimming pool, the city's only Sunday paper was quick to correct any "wrong impression" created by the BBC.

I had been turned away from the pool one day at 1:50 P.M., while the BBC was taking a film of the incident. I was told that "it was too late to admit any more new customers" but advised to come back at 3 P.M. When a friend of mine tried to be admitted at that time, he was turned back without any reason being given. The Sunday paper, however, persuaded some nonwhite children to pose for a photograph which showed them lying side by side with white children at the pool.

The fact is that the Municipal Amendment Act bars the use of the same facilities by people of different races.

I have discovered that whites in this country do not resent the lowly messenger boy so much as the articulate, well-educated African who confronts them at their own level and in their own language.

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Justin V. J. Nyoka, a Rhodesian journalist who was born in a tribal trust land southwest of Salisbury, was fired from the *Rhodesia Herald* on November 29, 1968 because of his controversial writing and political views. He has also been a correspondent for the *Times of Zambia* and Johannesburg's *Rand Daily Mail*.



**With no outlets to the sea, Zambia is Rhodesia's entrapped neighbor, dependent upon ports in enemy countries. Spiritually supporting black Africa, she is economically tied to the white-dominated South.**



**T**HE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA crouches across the map of southern Africa like a giant butterfly with unequal wings—in area, slightly larger than Texas. At the junction of the wings, serving as a body, is a strip of land scarcely 100 miles long: the Copperbelt. It gives the country its strategic and economic importance for its seven great mines make Zambia the world's third largest copper producer.

Throughout the wing-spread, in the rural areas, live over two-thirds of the country's four million Africans, who are mostly subsistence farmers. The other third shares the Copperbelt and line of rail south to Livingstone with 13,000 Asians and 80,000 whites. Most of the whites are British expatriates who are imported on short-term contracts to keep the industrial and commercial machine running, not settlers with deep roots in the soil.

Zambia is also a pinned butterfly with no outlet to the sea. She is trapped, abjectly dependent upon ports in enemy countries—Lobito in Angola, Beira in Mozambique, Durban and Cape Town in South Africa. A 2,000-mile stretch of railway runs through Rhodesia, Botswana and South Africa to Cape Town. Until very recently, this railway was Zambia's only lifeline and the only tangible legacy of Cecil Rhodes' dream of linking Cape Town to Cairo in the days when both cities flew the Union Jack.

Politically, Zambia faces north to black Africa; economically, she has been tied for half a century to the white-dominated South. When Britain took over from the British South Africa Company control of what was then called Northern Rhodesia, she pursued a policy of systematic neglect.

In contrast to lush Rhodesia the northern territory



# A NATION AMONG ENEMIES

by COLIN MORRIS

was hot, barren and unhealthy, penetrated only by hunters, traders and missionaries. Then copper was found there at the turn of the century. Successive British governments began to fuse together the two Rhodesias, using the north as a primary metal producer and ready-made market for an economy in the south diversified from tobacco to general manufacturing.

This scheme for creating a sophisticated industrial complex in southern Africa was fleshed out in constitutional form when the Central African Federation was created from the two Rhodesias plus Nyasaland. To the links nature had forged between the two Rhodesias, Britain added more. One, the Kariba Dam project, provides power for all three territories by harnessing the flow of the Zambesi River. The generating station was strategically placed on the Rhodesian side

of the great man-made lake. A network of communications systems, railways, airways, postal and telegraphic services was consolidated to make the graft permanent.

To join the two Rhodesias was about as wise as handcuffing together George Wallace and Stokely Carmichael for purposes of mutual cooperation. Southern Rhodesia's entrenched white settlers never had the slightest intention of allowing political power to fall into the hands of the black majority. Northern Rhodesia had never been a colony. She was a protectorate, which roughly meant that her people had not been conquered by the British but had freely handed over their country into the keeping of the queen until they were ready to rule themselves. Black government was a foregone conclusion from the outset.

Few people were surprised when the Central African Federation collapsed. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, renamed Zambia and Malawi, swept ahead to independence under two charismatic leaders, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda and Dr. Hastings K. Banda. Rhodesia, with some grumbling, reverted to her former status of internal self-rule, but was in law still a possession of Her Majesty.

Although the Rhodesian Siamese twins had been legally separated, they still shared a common digestive and circulatory system. This fact of life was not too hard for Zambia to bear so long as her political and economic loyalties did not pull too strongly in opposite directions. Like the rest of the world, Zambia assumed that Britain would eventually overcome white settler resistance in Rhodesia and advance her Africans by easy stages to self-rule. So Zambia continued to trade with Rhodesia and share supply outlets, though she made no secret of her intention of eventually tying in with east African countries politically more congenial to her.

Nevertheless, this redrawing of the map of southern Africa made the power situation very clear. Zambia was the friction point at which free black Africa encountered colonial white Africa. Almost every one of Zambia's border posts looked out upon hostile territory—Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia and the South African-controlled Caprivi Strip. The Organization for African Unity, of which Zambia is a member, had made no secret from its formation that an ultimate aim was the overthrow of the white minority regimes of southern Africa. Zambia was the jumping-off point for such an operation. This added menace to her economic dependence upon the South. In any such freedom struggle, the throw of a switch

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on Kariba power, the disruption of the railway line and an embargo upon Rhodesian coal from Wankie (used to smelt Zambia's copper) would disrupt her economy within weeks.

**I**N OCTOBER 1964, to the sound of fireworks and cheering crowds, the Republic of Zambia was born. In spite of her exposed position as black Africa's front line, the new nation seemed heaven-blessed. Her freedom struggle had been almost bloodless, so there were no bitter wounds to heal. Her nationalist movement had in Kenneth Kaunda a dynamic and honest leader. It also commanded support from nearly all Zambia's tribes. There were none of the serious tribal cleavages which have destroyed the unity of other young African states. The British had left behind a sound administrative structure and an honest judiciary backed by one of the best-trained police forces in Africa. Then there was the \$700 million-a-year copper revenue to ensure that Zambia need not start her life in grinding poverty.

The Zambia government was able to take over from Christian missions the responsibility for secondary education and health. Hospitals and schools burgeoned in the remotest areas and new roads opened up hitherto impassable tracts of country. The University of Zambia, at first a handful of staff in borrowed buildings, began to train the initial intake of Zambian undergraduates. In government, industry, police and army, Zambians started to replace white expatriates. National morale was high and race relations were good. The Zambian people were willing to let bygones be bygones. Few nations in Africa seemed to have a brighter future.

About one thing the pacifist president of Zambia was adamant. He was not prepared to squander Zambia's precious substance on the costly ironmongery of modern war. There were to be no supersonic jet fighters, ground-to-air missiles, extensive armor—all impressive on National Day parades but useless for bush-fire ground wars in dense Zambian bush. The butterfly made no attempt to grow a lethal sting. A handful of light planes and the workman-like little army the British had left behind them were Zambia's only defense.

Zambia's halcyon days lasted just a little over a year. On November 11, 1965, the Rhodesian prime minister, Ian Smith, unilaterally declared his country independent from Britain (UDI). And Kaunda, the man of peace, found himself in the ironic position of urging upon the British prime minister, Harold Wilson, the use of force to put down the rebellion. His grounds were that quick and decisive action might prevent the slow but certain extension of internal

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## ZAMBIA

*Government:* Independent republic

*Population:* 4.1 million. Africans: 97.7 percent (4 million); whites: 2 percent (80,000); Asians: 0.3 percent (13,000).

*Languages:* English, African languages

*Capital:* Lusaka

*Major exports:* copper

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violence within Rhodesia to the proportions of a civil, racial war. Wilson decided instead on a policy of economic sanctions coupled with a process of tortuous diplomacy which consisted of dispatching to Salisbury elaborately worded schemes for Smith to reject.

Kaunda and other African leaders wanted to know why Wilson had used force in the Arabian state of Aden to contain a nationalist rebellion but contented himself with bombarding the Rhodesian traitors with honeyed words. The answer, they concluded, lay in skin pigmentation. The Aden rebels were black Arabs; the Rhodesian rebels were white gentlemen. The imputation that Britain, as hub of a multi-racial commonwealth, was pursuing frankly racist diplomatic policies created a bitter split between Kaunda and Wilson that has been slow in healing. In the battle-line drawn across southern Africa, it looked as though Britain, for all her war-like growls against Rhodesia, had taken up a position on the white side of the barricade.

Zambia's perilous economic situation became apparent. So tightly had the two Rhodesias been tied together that the British sanctions which caused Rhodesia some discomfort were in danger of throttling Zambia to death. When Britain set up a sea blockade to prevent petroleum from being shipped into Rhodesia, Ian Smith retaliated by preventing fuel destined for Zambia from being transported by road and rail through Rhodesia.

Rhodesia suffered little since South Africa was willing and able to send in as much fuel as she required. Zambia, on the other hand, had to mount an extremely costly operation to bring in petroleum by tanker from



Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, down a beaten-earth road and by air, using American C130 "Herky-Birds."

The United Nations resolution, calling upon all member-nations to support a policy of sanctions against Rhodesia, found Zambia helpless. Much as she desired to do her share to bring the Rhodesian rebels to heel, the harsh truth was that Ian Smith was able at one blow to paralyze her. To add to Kaunda's discomfort, the other white regimes in southern Africa, Portugal and South Africa, closed ranks behind Rhodesia. Zambia was hemmed in by active enemies.

As the crisis deepened, Kaunda did two things which revealed his quality. The first was to keep cool. Only history will be able to record how much the world owes to this tight-rope walking feat of Kenneth Kaunda in not giving an inch on his principles, yet steering clear of bellicose behavior that would have invited overwhelming retaliation.

Kaunda's second response to the crisis was to accelerate the process of making Zambia economically independent of the South. In an epic engineering feat, over 1000 miles of pipeline were laid from Tanzania to the Copperbelt across some of the worst terrain in the world to provide Zambia with a permanent fuel route independent of Rhodesia. The import of all but vitally essential goods from South Africa and Rhodesia was stopped and Zambians had to tighten their belts until local manufacturing industries could be set up. UDI had the paradoxical benefit of forcing Zambia to do in a short while what she had intended in due time to do anyway: cut herself off from the south and forge economic links with her sister nations to the north.

But the cost of these emergency measures was crippling. Money had to be diverted from her development schemes. As is often the case when there is a public brawl, it is the spectators who suffer most. Britain's quarrel with Rhodesia rebounded upon Zambia. It ate into her treasury, taxed her patience and magnanimity, and held her back in the struggle to defeat Africa's elemental enemies, poverty, disease and ignorance.

Kaunda's most baleful prediction at the time of UDI has come to pass and added to Zambia's peril. Proud black Rhodesians, denied political rights on their own country and despairing of any negotiated solution to the Rhodesian issue, have begun to take up arms and infiltrate through the inaccessible Zambesi Valley. They harry the Rhodesian Army, which has been reinforced by South African paramilitary police units. What is Kaunda to do? These are, after all, loyal black subjects of Her Majesty, fighting to free their country from an illegal government. And it is clear that if they do not fight for their rights, no one else will. On the other hand, it is only a matter

of time before Rhodesia retaliates for what she terms Zambian-inspired provocation. Already, Rhodesian Air Force jets violate Zambian air-space daily in their search for guerrilla columns moving into Rhodesia.

Portuguese troops cross into Zambia regularly in pursuit of Angolan and Mozambican freedom fighters who have taken refuge in Zambian villages. In two recent incidents, Portuguese aircraft bombed and destroyed Zambian villages using, ironically, NATO rockets and bombs supplied to Portugal by Britain and the United States. The key question is: how long can Kaunda hold off inviting some major power to provide a strike force to neutralize the Rhodesian and Portuguese air forces? And which power?

Even if he wishes to, Kaunda is in no position to prevent freedom fighters from moving south through his country from their training areas in Tanzania. He has thousands of miles of frontier to guard and only a handful of officials to do the job. From time immemorial, Africans have moved back and forth across frontiers without benefit of immigration formalities. In many areas, the frontier is little more than a red line on an inaccurate map. Zambia is virtually an open thoroughfare. Furthermore, as a loyal pan-Africanist, the Zambian president feels an obligation to provide a refuge for fugitives from oppressive governments and to allow banned organizations in exile to state their case to the world from Zambia. They have no chance of doing so in their own countries. But the risks are formidable. As the freedom struggle gains momentum in southern Africa, it seems Kaunda was right when he asserted that a short, sharp dose of force on Britain's part at the time of UDI was the only way to forestall a widening racial war.

The terrible price Zambia has had to pay for UDI has also made inroads upon her national unity. In one of the most honest elections held in free Africa, Kaunda's party was returned to the National Assembly in December 1968 with 79 seats out of the 105 contested. But he lost ground in the two most traditionalist areas of the country, the Southern Province and Barotse, both ominously lying closest to Rhodesia. The reasons are complex, but among them must be the disappointment of the people because money earmarked for development had to be used for emergency planning. Another reason was the inevitable preoccupation of Kaunda himself and his ministers with the UDI crisis to the neglect of the party machine and domestic policies.

There is a limit to the amount of pressure Zambia can stand. The verdict of history upon Harold Wilson will be harsh if it turns out that his vacillation over Rhodesia results in the destruction of one of the most hopeful experiments in race relations and political humanism on the African continent. •





WE HAVE  
A RIGHT TO  
PROTEST

YOU MAKE A  
MOCKERY  
OF JUSTICE



**Education for black Africans is limited. There is no place for them in the system. Student protests are promptly squelched and student groups watched as possible cradles of opposition. The goal:**

# KEEPING THE STUDENT DOWN

by **MARY McANALLY**

**I**NSTANT COMMUNICATION and international contact have given broader dimensions to the power struggles of the 1960's. Someone in Berkeley yells "FLOWER POWER," and the next day an echo comes from Tokyo: "flower power." Where formerly there were isolated and regional student organizations, there now appears to be a unified, world-wide student movement.

This world-wide student movement is chameleon-like, manifesting itself in one city as a silent vigil and in another as a violent demonstration. But whatever its expression, it is characterized by a militant concern for classic human values: freedom of choice, sharing of wealth, international justice and social parity.

Why, then, is there so little student activity in southern Africa? Students there have a clear target for defiance in the gross racial in-

justices that exist. In education itself the disparities between possibilities for whites and nonwhites are glaring:

- In all of southern Africa, white school children have free and compulsory education. Education for African children is neither compulsory nor free.
- Government spending in South Africa in 1962 for white and non-white education was in a ratio of 8 to 1.
- In 1958 only 11 percent of the African school-age population was in school in Rhodesia.
- In Angola in 1956 only 1 percent of the African school-age population was in school.

It is no secret that the white minority governments in southern Africa have purposely created educational systems designed to keep the African in his place: servanthood or slavery. The late South African

Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, when Minister of Bantu Education, said in Parliament in 1953: "There is no place for him (the Bantu) in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour." In Angola, the Portuguese government says of its policy: "... to carry on the work of civilization that is Portugal's special mission it is necessary to guard the Africans against education and advancement ..."

It is little wonder, then, that a genuine "student movement" has not really developed yet in south-

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ern Africa. Not only is contact with the rest of the world severely limited, but contact between universities and among students of different races and political outlooks within a country is highly controlled as well. In South Africa there is strict separation of Africans on a tribal basis and of whites on a language/culture basis, as well as a separation of whites and non-whites on a racial basis.

Television is illegal; radios are limited; newspapers, journals, books, and speeches are censored and often banned; there are government restrictions on travel, contact, association, speech and printing. Students can do little to protest the many injustices.

**T**HIS HAS NOT always been the case. In the late 1950's and early 1960's countries in tropical and northern Africa were gaining their independence, and repercussions were felt on the southern tip of the continent. The African liberation movements of southern Africa were beginning to stir, and demonstrations took place in South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique.

In most cases however, any overt action on the part of liberation or-

ganizations was promptly and successfully eliminated through intimidation and other strong-arm tactics by the minority governments. And today all the liberation movements of southern Africa have been banned and must operate in exile.

Many young people who were involved in the youth branches of these movements escaped from political persecution and often fled to Europe and America to continue their studies. Westerners, feeling it would be only a matter of time before the Africans in southern Africa gained independence, scrambled to help them. The United States allowed students to enter without passports or on one-way documents issued by Congo, Zambia or Tanzania.

Most of them, however, came on J-1 student exchange visas which required them to leave the United States when they completed their studies. Since independence has not come for southern Africa, these students are now virtually people without a country, living as refugees without official refugee status, unable to return to southern Africa or to stay where they are with any security.

Any student organization within

southern Africa is extremely limited in its activities. Student groups are carefully watched as possible cradles of opposition and political activity is quickly suppressed. Student disturbances at the University College of Rhodesia in the early 1960's were promptly squelched by government interference. Students were expelled or jailed.

The two major African nationalist liberation movements of Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), have both sought followers among the African students. Each has a youth wing which exists in secret but has no means of expression nor channels for action.

There is a student council-type organization at the university in Salisbury, on which there is non-white student representation — albeit with no vote. Recently, the illegal Ian Smith government cancelled all government bursaries for African students at the university because of so-called "political involvement." The Rhodesia Council of Churches and related ecumenical groups around the world have attempted to raise scholarship funds for them, but permission to continue studying rests with the



racist government.

Thus, for the most part, the only student organizations allowed to exist in Rhodesia—and most of southern Africa—are religious, literary, academic, social or professional.

The Portuguese have blatantly admitted their program for white supremacy in Angola and Mozambique. Their lack of concern for education of the Africans is evidenced by the fact that all education is left to Christian missions, which depend totally upon resources of their own. The Portuguese government has also discouraged the creation of a university in Angola or Mozambique, saying only African laborers and artisans are in demand.

A decade ago there was considerable political organization among African young people in the Portuguese colonies. In 1960 four political groups combined to form the *Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência das Colónias Portuguesas* (FRAIN). Two other active groups have been the *União das Populações de Angola* and *Frente Libertação de Mozambique* (Frelimo). The major impetus for these movements now comes from the outside, as before, since political activity from within is almost impossible. Too, the Portuguese news censorship keeps young people who identify with the liberation struggle uninformed, isolated and "contained."

Like young persons in the Portuguese territories, South West African students must go elsewhere for their higher education. In 1953 a few South West African students who were studying in South Africa decided to form a student body in the territory. Leading figures were such men as Jariretundu Kozonguizi, Mburumba Kerina, Toivo ja Toivo and Zedekia Ngavirue.

Among the bodies they formed was the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), which has presented many petitions to the United Nations on behalf of South West Africa's independence. But with South Africa's efficient control of South West Af-

rica now extending into every area of life, all political activity has been systematically eliminated, and some political leaders have been tried and sentenced for life in South Africa.

South Africa stands out in the southern Africa complex for its advanced technology, and large Westernized cities have made possible a student community larger than anywhere else in Africa. Although more than 35,000 South Africans are enrolled in universities, most of them are white. One of every 66 whites is a university student; only one of every 2,334 nonwhites is.

In addition, apartheid is strictly practiced in higher education, and there is a special expurgated curriculum for the Africans throughout their educational careers. There are 11 white universities in South Africa and three "tribal colleges" for Africans. Among a number of student organizations at these universities, four deserve note.

The *Students Representative Councils* (SRC) of the English-language universities of Cape Town, Natal, Rhodes, and the Witwatersrand, and of the Johannesburg College of Education, are affiliated to the *National Union of South African Students* (NUSAS). NUSAS also has some individual student members at the Afrikaans-language universities. The SRCs at nonwhite colleges are forbidden to affiliate with NUSAS.

NUSAS stands for multi-racial membership and multi-racial student functions. It has been publicly critical of much of the apartheid legislation of recent years. Some of its leaders have been served with banning orders or deported from the country. NUSAS and the University Christian Movement of Southern Africa (UCM/SA) are the only two multi-racial student bodies in South Africa. NUSAS must be seen as more of a "stand" than as a "movement."

The *University Christian Movement of Southern Africa* (UCM/SA) was officially created in July 1967, and arose out of a need by many Christian students for an ecumenical, inter-racial organization of stu-

dents nationally and throughout southern Africa. It has recently been involved in experimental worship, demonstrations and a general student power movement in South Africa which has caused it to be threatened and harassed by the government.

The *Afrikaanse Studentebond* (ASB) supports the present government's policies and is almost entirely representative of the Afrikaans-language universities. Students at the University of Stellenbosch recently decided to bar the ASB in its present form from their campus.

Historically, students in South Africa have played an important role in the creation and consolidation of any real movement for social justice. This is especially true of the University Christian Movement of Southern Africa. In many ways the UCM is the modern relevant church in a country where the socially concerned church is a rarity.

The church militant, willing to stick its neck out and suffer, has been almost nonexistent in South Africa. However, with the Christian Institute, the UCM and the September 22 statement by the South African Council of Churches, it is evident that a "confessing church" is surfacing that is willing to sacrifice. Many see UCM as a ray of hope on the generally dismal South African scene.

UCM is involving hundreds of black and white university students in multiracial dialogues and is thereby contributing to a real humanizing process. In addition, it is equipping students, via its "formation schools," to think strategically about controversial social problems.

Possibilities for UCM's continued effectiveness and witness are dim, for it faces a formidable and ruthless enemy which is determined to eliminate it before it becomes a real threat to the racist regime. But while the movement faces fantastic odds in its attempts to remold history, it deserves our strongest support for this task, which is one of suffering and defeat, but also embodies a glimmer of hope. •



# COLONIALISM AND THE U.N.



**I**N 1960 the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries. A year later its executive committee, the Committee of 24, was established.

When we recall that the declaration stipulates that "immediate steps shall be taken to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom," we can not avoid a feeling of failure. Nine years after the adoption of the declaration no one can yet foresee when the phenomenon of colonialism will come to an end.

Nevertheless, we must realize that in the United Nations tremendous progress has been made in dealing with colonial problems. With the exception of Portugal and South Africa very few countries today would deny that colonialism is the most flagrant violation of human rights. This understanding is a valuable moral victory.

Yet understanding has no great practical meaning as long as the UN membership as a whole is not determined to translate the words of the declaration into fact. This is precisely the task of the Special Committee of 24, which reflects the composition of the General Assembly and counts among its members the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

The presence of Western powers was (and still is) considered one of the main assets of the committee. Unfortunately, this has not proven to be true. Instead of seeking collective ways and means to put pressure

on the remaining colonial powers, the Committee has split into two groups divided by recriminations and acrimony.

In one group are the countries of Africa and Asia, often supported by the Soviet Union and the Latin American delegations; and in the other, the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western powers.

It is not my intention to analyze those recriminations here, but it is an indisputable fact that colonialism exists and that to bring it to an end, there must be cooperation among all UN members, particularly among the great powers. Until there is such cooperation, the outrageous colonial exploitation of the peoples and riches of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea will continue, as will the violence inflicted upon the African peoples of Rhodesia and Namibia (South West Africa).

There is no doubt in my mind that the crux of decolonization lies in Africa. Once the problem is settled there, it may well be that the remaining areas under foreign rule raise more technical than political problems.

But the situation in the southern part of the African continent is in no way encouraging. No sign of easing the tensions is in sight. South Africa is more stubborn than ever in its refusal to deal with the international community about the complex but clear case of Namibia. In Rhodesia the only ray of hope comes from the nationalist movements of liberation, which are



# SM

by MAHMOUD MESTIRI



showing more and more determination and efficiency in their struggle against the white racist minority regime of Ian Smith.

In the territories dominated by Portugal the nationalist struggle has reached an even higher level of efficiency. As a matter of fact, the three-front-lines war which Portugal is waging against the peoples of Portuguese Guinea, Angola and Mozambique is already lost.

It is hoped that Prime Minister Salazar's departure from the political scene will lead Portugal to accept this reality, so that the sufferings of the African people will be shortened and those of the Portuguese people as well, for the state of their relatively underdeveloped society can only worsen with the continuation of the costly colonial wars.

**I**T IS CERTAINLY a matter of sorrow that in an era of audacious progress in technology and science, we have to rely on guerrillas and violence to impose on the white man's intelligence the necessity of the African's dignity and freedom. For let us never forget that this colonial, and unfortunately racial, war was never desired by Africans. Africa and the Organization of African Unity could not but assist the African freedom fighters in every way possible.

One of the most important factors in this respect is that the United Nations has recognized in many of its resolutions the legitimacy and legality of that armed

struggle, and has called on all member states to assist and help the African people who are fighting for their independence. The Committee of 24 played a decisive role in this new development of an international approach to colonial problems.

Comforting as this may be, one should not lose sight of the fact that a real success of our committee would have been to avoid the armed confrontation which is taking place on an ever larger scale in Africa. Many Africans, Asians and Latin Americans believe that an energetic Western, and particularly American, diplomatic action, accompanied by appropriate measures, would have helped avoid the conflicts which currently plague the African continent and threaten world peace.

This belief is part of what is called in some Western quarters in the UN the "Afro-Asian acrimony," i.e., the bitterness of the Third World towards the West which is so patent in all UN organs dealing with colonial questions. But contrary to a widespread belief in this country, this bitterness is inspired by highly moral and peace-loving motives rather than by an anti-white or anti-Western hatred. It is because so many of our Third World countries believe that the Western powers should practice the values they preach, that their disappointment is so great when they find reason to question the sincerity of these values or at least of those who preach them.

But let us conclude on an optimistic note. During the last session of the Committee of 24 a new trend emerged. In spite of the complete legitimacy of their feelings and of their struggle, the Afro-Asian countries appeared capable of moderating their approach to the colonial problem in the hope that their realism would be properly appreciated by the colonial powers and their friends.

I have personally stressed before the assembly that this conciliatory current must not be mistaken for weakness or defeatism. The truth is that, aware of the need for frank and sincere cooperation, we have tried to open the way in the hope that the other side will take the opportunity and, together with us, reach an honorable, just and lasting settlement of this distressing problem. •

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Mahmoud Mestiri, ambassador for Tunisia to the United Nations, is chairman of the "Committee of 24" (the UN special committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples).





# AMERICAN INVESTMENTS

**T**HERE ARE two false notions about American business interests in South Africa: (1) United States investments there are free of political implications. (2) Their financial interests are so small that they don't matter. Apart from the immorality of earning huge profits from the exploitation and misery of millions of people, these investments do matter for important political as well as economic reasons.

In recent years, the rate of United States investment

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in South Africa has shown a steady increase. This has happened despite an increase in world awareness about the nature of the racial crisis in the apartheid republic. Investments have increased almost fourfold: \$140 million in 1948, when the apartheid regime was first elected, to \$528 million in 1965. During the last four years investments have continued to grow.

Normally sensitive to taking risks, American investors either are willing to accept these risks in South Africa or don't believe that the situation is risky. This can only mean that they believe the white supremacist regime will survive or is capable of achieving peaceful internal changes. These two assumptions need to be challenged.

The expanding investment is mainly in automobile





# **BOLSTER RACISM** by COLIN LEGUM

plants, mining, banking, and oil installations and explorations. All the major American automobile companies have greatly expanded their plants in recent years; so have the oil companies. American banking, never strong in the area, has played an increasingly important role only since 1961. In the aftermath of the Sharpeville shootings, world confidence in South Africa's stability evaporated, and with it, foreign investment. As a result, for the first time in its recent history, South Africa was faced with serious foreign exchange problems.

A group of American financiers saved the Republic from these difficulties by getting a \$150 million loan from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Chase Manhattan Bank, First National City

Bank, and a group of American leaders (not publicly identified). Chase Manhattan is now the single biggest shareholder in the giant Standard Bank, which, although it operates throughout Africa, does most of its business in South Africa.

South African officials speak with appreciation of the organization by Dillon, Read and Company and Charles Engelhard of the American South African Investment Company, which invests in the Republic's securities. Additionally, there is still in operation a scheme whereby 12 leading American banks provide a revolving pool of \$40 million for South Africa's Central Bank to pay for goods and services imported into the U.S. from the Republic.

The most important recent type of American in-





vestment is in the field of oil exploration. The Gulf Oil Company is now engaged in exploration in Zululand, while the Essex Corporation of America has invested over \$150 million to finance oil exploration. Its main source of finance is the Liberty National Bank in the United States. Essex had never operated south of the equator before November 1967; but then, according to its South African manager, Peter Wood, "it was decided that South Africa offered excellent opportunities."

This willingness to participate in a search for oil in the Republic contributes directly to what has become a top priority in the country's security interests. In 1960, the apartheid regime made the decision to embark on a huge program of oil storage and exploration to diminish its vulnerability to international oil sanctions, which were beginning to be talked about at that time. Its ability to resist international pressures will be strengthened to the extent that this policy succeeds in making it less dependent on foreign oil supplies. Here is one clear example of a direct relationship between the role of foreign capital and the political interests of the defenders of apartheid.

American and other foreign investors often find themselves under government pressure to comply with the Republic's national priorities. For example, American oil and automobile companies found they had no alternative but to expand their installations and

plants under direct government planning directives or see their rivals given preferential treatment. Pressures of a direct and indirect nature are frequently applied to foreign investors. For example, the Ford Motor Company at one time found itself under pressure because of the policies of the Ford Foundation. On other occasions American automobile companies found themselves in difficulties over the United States policy of maintaining an arms embargo in compliance with a Security Council decision.

Although American interests in South Africa are small by United States standards, they are substantial by South African standards—the yardstick which should be applied in determining their value to the local economy. But it is not only the size of American investments or their role in the strategic sectors of the economy that matters most; what is of crucial importance is the degree to which American participation in the Republic's economy reassures white supporters of apartheid that they can continue to look for support from the West. "So long as U.S. banks and businesses back us, we can go ahead," a South African once remarked.

**W**HITE SOUTH AFRICANS fear nothing as much as possible isolation from the West. Foreign business links can do more to reassure them about these anxieties than diplomatic relations, which, by their very



nature, are much more tenuous. Although South Africa's leadership is always upset by Western governmental criticisms of apartheid, those worry them less than the input or output of Western financial and technical resources. Thus the Western businessman, even more than the politician or the diplomat, is a critical factor in the Republic's political thinking. It follows that arguments about whether business and politics should be kept apart ignore a fairly obvious fact: that in the circumstances of South Africa they cannot be kept apart, as indeed every American businessman in the Republic well knows, whatever his disclaimers to the contrary.

Not all American businessmen are content to plead financial self-interest and to leave it at that; many of the larger investors actively promote South Africa's political interests. For example, James Dines, principal of a Wall Street firm of investment consultants, wrote in a series of reports circulated to his clients: "South Africa reminded me of a frontier country with no end of extraordinary growth. It possesses the classic ingredients of a superpower, a reasonable climate, rich mineral resources, and a vigorous and industrious people dedicated to capitalism."

Others make their contribution more obliquely through the South Africa Foundation, an organization devoted to improving the Republic's image abroad. Operating as a lobby, it plays an active part in promoting visits of specially chosen American leaders of opinion, especially in business and political circles. With few exceptions every prominent American who has taken up the cudgels on behalf of the Republic over the last five years has done so after first having visited the country as a guest of the South Africa Foundation.

It is not mere coincidence that Charles Engelhard of New Jersey played a key role in creating the foundation. He is perhaps the largest single American investor in the Republic. Not only does he directly control 23 major enterprises, but, through his chairmanship of the Rand Mines Ltd., he controls another 11 gold and uranium companies, three coal companies, two chrome companies, four cement companies, one lime company, and one steel and concrete pipe concern.

At this point it is possible to make an interim assessment about the way in which American investments directly help to strengthen South Africa's apartheid regime.

First, their capital and technical resources are of considerable value in a few key sectors of the economy.

Second, they contribute to promoting the regime's political objectives by accepting directives about the strategic industrial requirements of the country.

Third, they help to maintain ties between the Re-

public and the Western world, thereby encouraging a continued flow of new investments and thus reassuring the defenders of apartheid that however unacceptable their racist policies might be to international opinion, they can rely on the support of influential Western interests.

Fourth, through their financial involvements, prominent American businessmen participate actively in supporting a political lobby on South Africa's behalf.

Fifth, they cause the opponents of apartheid (especially nonwhites) to look upon the United States and other Western countries as supporters of apartheid and therefore as their enemies. They contribute towards strengthening anti-Western attitudes at a crucially formative time in the history of Africa.

**I**F WE TURN NOW to the sophisticated defense put forward by American businessmen to justify their involvement in South Africa, we are struck at once by a contradiction. In one breath they assert they are plain ordinary businessmen with no interest in South Africa's political condition, which, they claim, is of purely "domestic concern"; in the next breath they argue that foreign investment offers the best kind of political leverage to get the Republic's apartheid system changed.

Their argument in support of change through rapid economic development runs along two lines—short-term and long-term. In the short-term, they argue, the application of modern methods of technological development can directly contribute towards improving the wages and training of Africans. This may indeed be their aspiration, but the facts argue otherwise.

Because Africans are not permitted to form free labor unions, enter freely into wage bargaining or even into places of employment, American firms (like all others) can, in fact, have very little say over the basic conditions of work and life of Africans in industry. Wages in American-controlled plants are seldom higher than those paid by locally-controlled plants. In the mining industry (especially in South West Africa) the wage structure of American companies is among the lowest.

Moreover, the place of Africans—within industry-training, apprenticeship, and categories of employment—is the subject of legislation, over which foreign industrialists have little influence. The present policy of converting the whole of the African labor force into a system of migratory labor runs directly against the wishes of all the established industrial organizations in the country. But the government, motivated by ideology, overrides their representations.

Thus one can see how little reality there is in the short-term benefits advanced in this type of argument. What of the long-term? Here the argument is that a



fast-expanding economy would, in time, inevitably make apartheid unworkable. This view rests on the prognosis that the government will be compelled to adapt its policies to the realities of an expanding industrial economy and in submission to the bargaining power of the increasingly large numbers of industrially-skilled Africans. This doctrine sounds attractive; how sound is it in fact?

South Africa's past experience shows that it was precisely when Africans began to become an important factor in cities through the rapid industrial expansion achieved in World War II that the ruling political forces first began to evolve their theories of apartheid to stem the "advance of black people." Twenty years later, far from showing any willingness to submit to the realities of the country's fast-moving economy and despite crucial shortages of skilled and semi-skilled trained labor, which are slowing up even faster growth, their regime has toughened, not weakened, its restrictions.

The aim of this policy is perfectly clear. The white areas will not be deprived altogether of their black labor, but the entire urban black labor force will be turned into a migratory, unskilled working population. All this is done in defiance of the needs of a modern economy but as the price to be paid for maintaining the separation of races.

Meanwhile, the policy of decentralizing industry through the "border industries" established close to the Bantustans (rural reserves) provides a reservoir of cheap labor. At the same time it destroys the chances of normal industrial opportunities within the Bantustans themselves. South Africa's policy is to attract highly-paid white immigrants to do the skilled jobs in preference to letting Africans move up the industrial ladder.

So the facts of the situation run directly counter to the notion that a more flexible system will be the outcome of economic expansion. This is not surprising. Because South Africa has an ideological regime, it ignores sound economic practices as well as humanitarian considerations where these get in the way of its racial doctrines.

To these arguments the believers in the inevitability of political progress through economic growth reply that 20 years is too short a time in which to judge results. They ignore the 50 or so years before the official advent of apartheid. They also ignore the many lessons of other countries.

Americans should be the last to need reminding that huge industrial expansion is insufficient by itself to alter basic political and social conditions. In the United States, with the Constitution on the side of equality, the great economic growth of the last century failed to change the fundamental political condition of the 22

million Negroes, whatever material and social benefits may have accrued to a minority. It has lately come to be recognized that laws and enforcement machinery are necessary to achieve accepted changes in the status of black Americans. What hope, then, is there of getting political change in the vastly more complex race problems of South Africa, where the basic laws, unlike those in the United States, seek to entrench racial separation and inequality?

**T**HE WORLD is full of examples of economies that have grown rapidly without changing the political relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Even where great improvement was achieved in living conditions, material changes did not produce radical political change. This is especially true of oligarchies. The expanding economy of Nazi Germany, the growth in the industrial development of Salazar's Portugal, the brief economic boom of the ill-fated Central African Federation, the industrial acceleration in communist countries—in none of these examples has industrial expansion altered in any fundamental way the relations between a privileged elite and the rest of the population. Authoritarian control is capable of producing considerable economic expansion without allowing for any accompanying liberalization.

In a country like South Africa, where the ruling class is united in its determination to defend the principle of white supremacy, economic expansion can be controlled and directed to ensure the preservation of the established "national ideal" of those in power. Since the whole purpose of apartheid is to defend the existing power structure, which ensures total political, military, and economic control in the hands of a minority, any meaningful changes in apartheid would mean the eventual abandonment of white supremacy.

There is not the slightest evidence to support the view that changes within the present political system would alter the status quo in this respect; all they might do is to soften the impact of a rigidly segregated society. The basic fallacy in the argument of those who hold out any hope of political change through economic expansionism is that they fail to understand a single fact of history: in authoritarian societies economic forces are controlled by political forces, not the other way about.

It is naive to suppose that South Africa's white society would give up its power, its privileges and its present system of security for the sake of more rapid economic expansion. The change-through-expansion argument should be seen for what it is—a rationalization to justify what is in the best economic interests of those who employ it. Hard-headed political analysis shows that it is almost certain to be a dangerous delusion. •



# THE

by KENNETH CARSTENS

# CHURCHES

# ON

# TRIAL

**T**HE CHURCHES in southern Africa are trapped in their racist societies. Their claim to be Christian is in question, and the possibility of their having a positive influence is very remote. The churches in the United States are not so tightly cornered. Indeed, they are freer than any other institution to begin effecting a change in southern Africa. If they do not use their freedom, if they do not act for the good, there seems to be no other institution free enough to initiate actions which could save southern Africa from a tragedy of frightful proportions.

The basic problem with the churches in southern Africa and the United States is that they are afraid of radical social change and nonconformity. This is true particularly of the traditional, mainline denominations

The basic problem with the churches in southern Africa and the U.S. is that they are afraid of radical social change and nonconformity. This is true particularly of the traditional, mainline denominations that identify themselves with the ruling establishment. Most churches that are established tend to be captives of the dominant elements in society. They share similar values and see their interests as dependent upon, if not identical with, those of the establishment.

One reason for this is historical: the churches came, grew, suffered and prospered with those who now wield power. Another reason is pragmatic: to get and to stay too close to the poor and the weak could alienate the rich and the strong. This could cut off the churches' income and threaten their privileges, such as tax exemption.

So they may murmur moral misgivings about apartheid in South Africa or shout softly for racial justice after the secular establishment (e.g. the Supreme Court) has led the way in the United States. But it is only when these established churches are in a weak,



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disestablished position—like the Protestants in Angola or the black churches in the U.S.—that they seem to be free “to obey God rather than men,” regardless of consequences, as the distinctly disestablished church of New Testament times did.

Perhaps more than most institutions, the churches have always had dissident minorities, and therein lies some hope. But the big churches’ use of their power to bring humanizing change remains problematical.

The Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) in South Africa provides a classic example of a church conforming to the prejudices of a social group. For two centuries, the DRC maintained an official norm of non-racialism in the church, but in 1857 it succumbed to the mounting pressure to set up separate white and nonwhite congregations. The 1857 synod frankly acknowledged this step to be unscriptural, undesirable and “due to the weakness of some.”

This was a fateful decision with the most far-reaching consequences. Firstly, it led to the creation of the “Mother Church” (for whites) and several “daughter” or “mission” churches (for each of the African language-groups and the coloreds). This divi-

## **“Were you there when they crucified . . .?”**

sion furnished a blueprint for the present policy of apartheid. Secondly, it led the DRC to elaborate a justification for its racial policy, which now provides the ideology upon which apartheid rests.

Until recently, the DRC was without question the most powerful institution in the Afrikaner community. It still has a close grip on its members, who total nearly 50 percent of South Africa’s whites. The DRC alone could have stemmed the tide of racism that has now engulfed the country. Instead, during World War II, the Federal Mission Council of the DRC was urging upon the Smuts government its “sacred conviction . . . that the only salvation of the peoples’ existence lies in . . . race-separation (*rasse-apartheid*).”

That dissident DRC voices are still heard within that church and in the Christian Institute of Southern Africa is an astonishing tribute to human courage and endurance. But the possibility of their bringing the DRC back to a Christian stance in the foreseeable future is extremely remote. The church is trapped in its own ideology and in the efficient way that ideology has been institutionalized. It has insulated itself from the biblical witness and isolated itself.





**M**OST OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING churches came to South Africa after the British took over the colony from the Dutch in 1806. They did not have the 150 years of black/white conflict that the DRC had. They were bound to a different and smaller white constituency and were far more open to the liberal philosophical currents of the time. They were also much freer to get close to, if not to identify themselves with, the nonwhites. A few of their missionaries identified themselves so fully with the nonwhites and championed their cause so vigorously that they are still portrayed as villains in most South African history books.

These churches—especially the Anglican Methodist and Roman Catholic—have a somewhat more Christian stance, officially, on the race question. Their policy tends haltingly towards administrative integration, and the South African Council of Churches, which represents most of them, issued a forthright condemnation of apartheid in 1968 stronger than any previous official church statement. Yet even the best of them are almost completely segregated on the local level and pay lower stipends to nonwhite clergy.

All of them have more nonwhite than white members, but only one of them has ever had a black as its spiritual leader and administrative head: in 1963 the Methodists elected an African president of conference, an office that is held for a year. So there is ample basis for the Dutch Reformed churchmen's charge of hypocrisy on the part of churches that practice the racism they condemn.

The English-speaking churches are, at best, irrelevant to the agony of the "Beloved Country." At worst, they are a part—albeit an unwilling part—of one of the most dehumanizing socio-political systems in the world. Where can the church hide its head when 94 percent of the white population professes Christianity and 95 percent of the votes in the last election (only whites, of course, voted) were cast for the two main racist parties—58 percent for the Nationalist (apartheid) Party and 37 percent for the United (white leadership) Party?

Even the black churches in South Africa, although they do not bear the terrible moral responsibility the white churches do, are not theologically free and authentic. Their origin and values have either been foisted upon them by the whites (as in the case of the Dutch Reformed "mission churches") or been fashioned in reaction to the racism in church and society (the African Independent Churches). Religiously and emotionally they provide their members with a form of temporary escape from the vicious apartheid society. Socio-politically, they are a passive element of the status quo. Their prophet's role has, as in the white churches, been left to isolated individuals.

If any of these three groups of churches were to gain theological integrity, they could become forces to be reckoned with. Although the prospects are bleak, American churches ought to use every possible opportunity to challenge, confront and debate South African churches on the issues at stake. One of the most basic of these issues is, after all, the South African churches' identity as Christian institutions.

It is possible that the black churches in South Africa, divided though they are, could assume the role that the Dutch Reformed Church played for the Afrikaners. That is, they could nurture a black nationalist ideology and become its political vehicle. This would be a political expedient as disastrous theologically and ethically as that to which the white DRC resorted. But the term "expedient" is questionable since the blacks are continuously pushed in this direction by the ideology, policy and practice of the whites and by the living conditions imposed by apartheid. There would thus be far more pragmatic justification for such a course than the DRC has. Moreover, it is an implicit admission of our moral inferiority to expect the blacks to be more moral and Christian than the whites have been.

Since the churches have become the creatures of society, it is inevitable that they should reflect the polarization of society. As ruthlessly as society has dealt with its political dissidents, so will the churches deal with their own prophets who dare to point to the way of Christ, although this may mean stepping aside and letting the state do the actual crucifixion.

Pursuing this analogy, the American churches stand aghast at the rhetorical question, "Were you there when they crucified...?" Traditionally and historically their links with South Africa have been negligible and their racial attitudes as deplorable as any. However, after World War II some changes have set in.

The United States became a dominant power in world affairs. American business began to exploit the high returns of a booming South African economy built on what amounts to virtual slave labor (investments are now approaching one billion dollars), and the evils of racism became more widely recognized and debated. In these circumstances, apartheid could no longer be ignored by the more liberal and prophetic American churches. Nonetheless, they did not recognize the gravity of the South African tragedy until after the Sharpeville massacre—which, after all, was only a dramatic indiscretion that confirmed what Alan Paton and others had for years been telling Americans about the nature of apartheid.

Finally, when American churches began to address themselves to the South African scene, they did so as unwilling and uninvolved onlookers, even when their missionaries began to be deported. And why



shouldn't they? Are they not witnesses to just another ugly crucifixion which has really nothing to do with their own predicament? Most emphatically no!

Scientific and technological advances (e.g. modern drugs, electricity, the printed word) are not only private but also public benefits. Air pollution and the threat of nuclear annihilation are certainly not private problems. Similarly, there is a collective responsibility and guilt borne by every German, every South African, and every American, even though he has never killed a Jew, kicked a black or dropped a bomb. As the benefits of the technological age multiply, so do our responsibilities.

So when Washington gives a preferential sugar quota or refuses to act with her allies against acknowledged South African violations of the rule of law, every American shares this responsibility. When American banks and businesses help and profit from apartheid, even Americans on welfare share in the material benefits and the moral guilt. And where every one of us is either white or nonwhite, the race war that has already started in southern Africa involves all of us.

Perhaps because dollars are more tangible than votes or collective identities, American dollars in South Africa become the clearest and most concrete symbols of United States responsibility there. Church statements show a clear recognition of this. In 1963 the United Church of Christ (UCC) warned that "tragic internal conflict" threatened South Africa, that it was "virtually a police state," and that all who trade with and invest in South Africa "contribute indirectly to the continuance of a system that has made a mockery of human rights." The UCC called for action from the U.S. government (including the imposition of sanctions) and from churches and individuals (including consumer boycotts and withdrawal of investments).

**I**n 1964 the Methodist Church urged "all nations," especially Britain and the United States, "to give serious consideration" to the United Nations' call for economic sanctions against South Africa in order to halt the further extension of apartheid.

In 1965 the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (UPCUSA) stated: "Apartheid is maintained . . . by a totalitarian force reminiscent of Nazi Germany. . . . Apartheid is gravely inimical to the present and the future life, work and witness of the Christian church because its ruthless deeds are blasphemously perpetrated in the name of Christ. The 177th General Assembly . . . therefore strongly deplores any material support . . . of the present government of South Africa by the U.S. government. . . . American economic involvement, both governmental and private, has been

## **"American churches ought to . . . challenge, confront and debate South African Churches on the issues at stake."**

a significant factor in the stability of the South African economy and therefore of the present apartheid regime."

In 1964 the National Council of Churches issued a similar statement and asked the United States government to consider sanctions. In 1966 the council asked the government "to explore and exercise such political and economic pressures as may lead to the effective dissociation of the U.S. and its citizens from implicit support of South Africa's denial of rights to nonwhites."

If all these church bodies had acted on their own words and done what they called on government, business and others to do, things could have been much better than they are. Their own credibility and influence would have been increased and a movement started that could have begun to bring leverage to bear on South Africa. Calling for sanctions against apartheid while indirectly making profits from it can hardly enhance the churches' integrity and authority.

The clearest issue the churches have been challenged to act on are their banking practices. One of the most direct forms of support given to the apartheid government has been a revolving credit arrangement made with a consortium of ten American banks. Two of the ten, Chase Manhattan and First National City, have made unilateral loans as well. They also have long served some wealthy church boards.

In 1966 several churches asked their banks to discontinue the revolving credit because of the material and symbolic support it gave to apartheid. The banks replied that they could not allow such factors to influence their business, that conditions were improving in South Africa, and that their involvement might help to bring further improvements. The revolving credit



was duly renewed for another year in January 1967.

The churches renewed the requests to their banks, and the Methodist Board of Missions told First National City Bank that if it renewed its share of the credit in January 1968, the board would reluctantly have to withdraw a ten million investment portfolio to protest "as a first step." The bankers repeated the same arguments, pleaded with the Methodists not to withdraw, and renewed South Africa's credit for another year. The Methodist board did indeed withdraw its portfolio from the bank, but the credit was apparently renewed again in 1969.

The consortium banks are clearly determined not to allow this moral and political issue to influence their business deals. Therefore, the churches are even more clearly under a moral obligation to dissociate themselves from these banks.

The Methodists are likely to follow their first step with a second, and in December 1968 the executive council of the Episcopal Church resolved to take even more drastic action. It decided to terminate the council's involvement with *all* consortium banks "unless the involvement of the said banks" helps to "promote the welfare or education of all the people in southern Africa." (Hopefully, the Episcopal Church recognizes the fallacy of the theory, favored by the American and South African establishment, that economic involvement will eventually break down apartheid.)

The executive council also established criteria which, if taken seriously, would prevent it from making any further investments in companies operating in white-ruled areas of southern Africa and indeed should lead the council to eventually divest itself of investments in firms that continue to profit from apartheid.

Hopefully the other churches, especially those that first raised the issue, will take similar steps. Some major American universities—not because of the churches' example, but because of the concern of some students and faculty—are moving toward a similar position.

**T**HESE ARE MODEST BEGINNINGS after years of unrelenting efforts by a few concerned individuals. But the resistance to them could hardly have been much greater if the churches had been asked to sponsor a military invasion. This suggests that an issue of considerable importance has been raised, not only for South Africa but also for the churches.

For South Africa the importance of American economic involvement is symbolic and potential. The symbolic value of American government and business dealings with South Africa has far exceeded its actual face value. Its influence ranges from adversely affecting other countries' votes in the United Nations to favorably influencing foreign investors to bolster the morale

of the South African establishment. "If America is for us, who can be against us?" the whites justifiably feel, though few of them say it.

The apartheid budget and program unmistakably show that it is vulnerable to two main threats. One is counter-violence, which has already begun and can only end in a frightful conflagration. The other is international sanctions, which is the only way to try to prevent that final conflagration. Effective sanctions are impossible without full American support, if not American initiative.

And how can the United States support sanctions against a nation she is actively trading with and investing in? One cannot go forward in high gear when one is still accelerating in reverse. Getting into neutral is a necessary and desirable first step if one wants to at least stop going backwards.

Neither the United States government nor business have shown the will, the desire or the ability to disengage from apartheid. Among the political factors affecting Washington are the indifference of the American voters to the southern African powder keg and the fact that the racist regimes are white, supposedly anti-Communist and rich.

Business is inhibited because of the rich returns South Africa offers. When it denies this legitimate profit-motive, we must conclude that it is in South Africa only to help the racists. The evidence is so clear as to who benefits from the American dollars that pious prattle about business improving the situation is based on either ignorance or hypocrisy.

The churches are free of these incumbrances to the extent of their integrity as Christian churches. Their actions on the economic issue alone could eventually lead to American economic disengagement from South Africa, which would give Washington the badly needed credibility and freedom it needs in the international arena to act toward South Africa. It would also commit the churches more clearly to the responsible use of economic power.

It is true that the churches' economic involvement in South Africa is indirect. But their continued ties to banks that openly support the apartheid regime have become a clear issue. If they will not dissociate themselves from those banks, then, rightly or wrongly, whatever other good things they may do for South Africa, as well as their own moral integrity, will be suspect. And with the churches' history of paternalistic race relations at home and abroad, their decision may have the most far-reaching consequences both in the United States and elsewhere.

The churches in southern Africa and in the United States have much to say about love and justice. It is not by their words, however, but by their deeds that they will be judged.



by A. C. FORREST

# THE ARITHMETIC OF

**T**HERE ARE MANY ROADS along which Christian men in the southern parts of Africa choose to travel in their search for dignity, freedom and justice for the African people.

Some, reared in the Christian tradition, have decided that Christ was

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an Uncle Tom and his institutions stand in their way. Others do not dismiss Christ, but they reject his institutions and conclude that most professing Christians are meek supporters of the status quo.

Then there are those who are active and militant inside the church. One of them, Edward Hawley, United Church of Christ missionary and refugee pastor for the Tanzania Christian Council, preaches: "The Kingdom of God comes by violence

and violent men take it by force." Another, Colin Morris, a British Methodist and president of the Church of Zambia, says: "The terrorists are our only hope. They must burn and bomb and raid until the whites are so fear-ridden they will seek a settlement."

Yet many more say: "I cannot accept the violent way." And some add, "But don't ask me to suggest another."

Many, especially in South Africa,





# VIOLENCE

might compromise with violence but are convinced it cannot work. "The South African whites are too strong. With their Special Branch and efficient armed forces they could quash an insurrection in 24 hours."

Others who prefer and believe in the nonviolent way, find no hope in it. "How long?" they ask when you tell them of hopeful signs among South African Christian leaders. "How long? One century or two?"

Traveling through South Africa, Rhodesia, Zambia and Kenya, with short visits to Malawi and Tanzania, I asked several Christian leaders what they thought of the following story:

In New York an able young African, studying for his master's degree on a church scholarship, told me he was returning to Africa to work with the guerrillas. "I was raised by a Rev. Potter in a mission school," he said. "He took me into his home,

gave me an education, eventually gave me a job as a teacher in the mission, secured a church scholarship and arranged for me to go abroad and study.

"What I want now from you Christians in North America is a gun, and training in how to use it, so I can go back and kill all the Rev. Potters who are in our way. You think I should be grateful for a home, food and education, which are the rights of every man? You



**"There are many who see justice long delayed and are filled with a burning love for the oppressed. They are willing, against their nature, to become violent men and to seek to bring about the Kingdom by force, trusting in a gracious God to rework their deeds into a larger pattern of justice."**

think I should be faithful to the Christian values the mission taught me? What did the mission teach me? It taught me that I should be a good boy, work hard, get an education, so I could have a good job, eventually have a nice home, a fine wife and family.

"And right now I could go back to Africa and have all these things. But while I enjoyed them, 13 million of my people would remain impoverished, without dignity and without hope—kept in their places by white men.

"Now really, I'm not going to kill the Rev. Potter. He is a nice old man and my friend. But some of us have to learn to kill the Rev. Potters, for they are standing in our way and blocking the revolution that has

to come."

"So what do you think?" I asked Father Michael Scott, an Anglican missionary who was expelled from South Africa and now is resident theologian at Mindolo Ecumenical Centre, Kitwe, Zambia. "I'm not going to condemn the Africans who resort to violence," he answered. "They have been driven to it. One has to understand the reasons for it."

"There is a strange arithmetic to violence," he said. "Intellectuals cannot understand it. Reason goes out the window. I have lived in a country where guerrilla warfare has raged for years. I sometimes wonder if people don't just want violence to end their frustration.

"But we Christians can't abandon

our belief in a divine creative purpose in this set-up," he added. "We have to pursue that. Yet a lot of bloodshed will possibly come—maybe soon."

Generally, you find the hope freely expressed among African revolutionaries and their white supporters in independent Africa that time is on the side of the guerrillas in and around Angola, Mozambique and even Rhodesia. South Africa is a different matter.

Realists believe that South Africa could suppress any insurrection and contain any attack from without by African nationalists. "I'm telling you, the South African army and air force are good," a radical left-wing anti-apartheid South African Jew told me. "The terrain here, despite what it appears to be, is not good for guerrilla warfare. There is no hope of penetrating the army or bringing off a coup."

"On the surface the South African may seem apathetic," Alan Paton told me. "He's not apathetic; it's just too dangerous to speak or act. Such apathy would disappear in a moment if there was a chance. There are strong feelings—and they are ugly feelings—just below the surface. That apparent apathy could explode suddenly into violence. But the South African government is determined there will not be another Sharpeville."

**P**ATON IS A HUMBLE and non-violent man and a devout Christian. He is 66 years old now. His Liberal Party disbanded after a law was passed which made it impossible to carry on unsegregated. I wondered if the young radicals of South Africa would class him as a has-been.

"They revere Paton," a radical young South African pastor who knows the university crowd assured me. "On the other hand, some university students would find your Rev. Potter story completely understandable. So would the younger clergy of this country—including a good many in the Dutch Reformed Church.

"There is a cleavage between the



clergy under 35 and the older ones. A trend to rebellion is gathering momentum among the young. What we need is a complete reformation in South Africa. What is coming is a revolution.

"I have no hope at all that apartheid is being eroded," he went on. "Look at your American millionaires with a stake now in our system. There is no hope in amendment or political change. No one has appeared on the scene with enough charisma for that. I see no hope except in violence. It will have to come from the outside and it will take a long time, for our suppressive system is incredibly efficient. I daren't even let you use my name. In the meantime, the best you can do is to invite South African churchmen abroad even for a few months—it turns the world upside down for us to get to Europe or North America—and get as many North Americans over here as you can."

Michael Scott sees the possibility of a successful insurrection, but "only after an intense and bloody civil war. It could produce three million white refugees, completely destroy an affluent economy, and possibly drag in outside powers and bring about a world war."

But repeatedly in South Africa, I found prominent churchmen, educators, business men, foreign observers and the English press echoing the sentiments of Alan Paton: "Apartheid isn't working. It is breaking down." One distinguished African churchman—and the South African churches have elevated some Africans to places of eminence—said, "The reformation won't come through the politicians but through Christian businessmen and economists." His expression of hope was echoed by many who see signs in business, in young people, in the theological ferment in the Dutch Reformed Churches, and above all in the basic fallacy and bad economy of apartheid.

Outside the country, of course, when you report these things, you are asked, "How long? Just how many centuries do you think?"

Father Scott is one of the few

Christian leaders I met in Africa who seemed to have more than just a hope that there was a better and more effective way than violence. He has a plan, which he is working out in a little cottage at the Mindolo Ecumenical Centre in Zambia. It is to bring about a confrontation between prominent leaders of newly independent Africa and white leaders who support apartheid, separate development, and whatever it is Portuguese leaders of Angola and Mozambique support.

"There has never been such a confrontation," he says. "I think that African intellectuals have to think out the problems of apartheid—the African intellectual must put himself inside the skin of a white man. That is difficult to do. Some of them say to me 'Why should we try to reason with them?'"

Scott believes there is some hope. There are now African leaders with great prestige. He has the sympathetic ear of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. "White South Africans have always walked out of the United Nations when the African point of view was being presented. But today spokesmen from newly independent Africa would not receive the same contemptuous refusal from white politicians here as they formerly did at the UN. My argument is for a frank confrontation of views before an otherwise seemingly inevitable race war is forced upon us by events which get beyond the control of reason." He believes that "Christians, divided and ineffectual though they may sometimes be, could exercise some initiative here."

Most churchmen in South Africa and Rhodesia with whom I spoke said, "We have no connections with the underground. We know they are there, but we have no connections." And I suppose if they had, they wouldn't have told me. Colin Morris could have been executed in Rhodesia for saying what he said to me. And the sermon Edward Hawley preached at the funeral of Eduardo Mondlane, the assassinated leader of Frelimo, would have been an incitement to violence in Rhodesia.

In that sermon, delivered in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Hawley put Mondlane in the company of Malcolm X, Che Guevara, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King. He praised the fallen leader for taking his 11-year-old son to a military training camp for the Christmas holidays. And he quoted Jesus' words: "... to preach good news to the poor, proclaim release to the captives ... and set at liberty them that are oppressed."

I stood outside the big church among thousands of silent Africans and whites. Inside, representatives of the diplomatic corps joined the president of Tanzania in formal mourning for a rebel leader who had been working from Tanzanian soil to free Mozambique from its Portuguese masters.

"The Kingdom of God comes by violence and violent men must take it by force," the Christian minister preached somewhat apologetically, admitting there were different interpretations of that passage.

"There are many," he added, "who, like Dr. Mondlane, see justice long delayed and are filled with a burning love for the oppressed. They are willing, against their nature, to become violent men and to seek to bring about the Kingdom by force, trusting in a gracious God to rework their deeds into a larger pattern of justice."

An older churchman, a Britisher, told me after that funeral service, "I'm with Hawley completely in all the things he is ready to fight for. But I reject his method. I don't believe in piling up the bodies of young boys in the Zambesi Valley, or sending them in with inadequate training and old rifles to be strafed by planes. Don't ask me to suggest a better way. Maybe it is because I'm an old British Army man, and I just feel the futility of wasting young lives."

"Just trust us Christians over here," another said to me. "Help as many of us as possible to get out of our country for a while to study. Don't be too censorious of us. Trust the African church leaders, and don't expect us to do things the way you do them in your country." •





# The Reluctant Congress

by FAITH BERRY

**I**NTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICA in the United States Congress is of relatively recent origin. Before 1960, the year of the Sharpeville massacre, only two members of Congress voiced any concern over events in South Africa: Rep. Adam Clayton Powell (D-N.Y.) and Sen. Paul Douglas (D-Ill.). Since then four or five other representatives and senators have joined them in the attempt to bring the question of South Africa and the whole southern Africa issue to the attention of Congress.

In 1966 Rep. Barratt O'Hara (D-Ill.), chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs until his defeat in the primaries in 1968, arranged subcommittee hearings on U.S.-South Africa relations. They were the first to be held entirely on South Africa in either the House or Senate.

At the opening of the hearings Rep. O'Hara said: "... the committee is interested in ascertaining whether the U.S. will now consider additional measures to be taken toward South Africa. . . . Our government asserts that apartheid does not constitute . . . the kind of threat that would properly bring the matter of sanctions before the Security Council of the UN. . . . Whether that position is valid I do not know. That is the reason these hearings were scheduled."

South Africa did not participate in the hearings "on the ground that any testimony would constitute a tacit

acknowledgement of the subcommittee's authority to examine South Africa's domestic policies."

Dr. Leslie Rubin, a South African witness, presented an unofficial viewpoint. Dr. Rubin, who was at one time on the faculty of Capetown University and is a former representative of Africans in South Africa's Senate, stated: "In my view apartheid is the neo-Nazi creed of our time. I say that because while I know of many countries where there is discrimination based on race or color, I know of no country since the Germany of Hitler where racial discrimination has been raised to the level of a national philosophy and has become the very foundation on which the whole social and political structure in the country rests."

Most witnesses were American professors, clergymen, lawyers, labor representatives, government officials and state department attaches. Speakers presented arguments both for and against South Africa's position. Although the hearings lasted 55 days, they produced no significant results.

South Africa had been mentioned at length only once before, in 1960, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing known as *Basic Aims of U.S. Policy and Their Application to Africa*. Three speakers in particular—George M. Houser, executive director of the American Committee on Africa, Melville J. Herskovits, the late director of the Program of



African Studies at Northwestern University, and Joseph E. Johnson, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—unanimously recommended that the United States make consistent and clear its disapproval of apartheid and act accordingly through policy.

No hearings in either the Senate or House African subcommittees were held prior to 1959. But one of the most important studies on Africa was done in 1959 at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Program of African Studies of Northwestern University. A basic premise of the report was its beginning sentence: "The U.S. has never had a dynamic policy for Africa." The policy that existed, the report concluded, depended too heavily on the continued control of European powers rather than on seeking and encouraging self-government among Africans.

In Congress, when Africa was considered at all during the 1950's, the issue was how to combat communism once countries were no longer under European control. Anti-communism, not anti-colonialism, was the all-pervasive subject before widespread African independence, and in regard to South Africa and apartheid, the anti-communism tide was in its favor. For South Africa was staunchly anti-communist in the postwar period (and still is). Its government supported the United States on cold war issues, assisted in the Berlin blockade and supplied troops in the Korean War. In the 1950's it signed an agreement with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to cooperate in selling and transferring large quantities of U-235 uranium.

**I**n 1956 the tide began to turn for Africa in Congress. In June of that year Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) took House and Senate colleagues to task for not including Africa on their itineraries (and added he hadn't visited the continent himself).

While it is impossible to know how many members took up Sen. Mansfield's challenge, in the following year Richard Nixon, then vice president, embarked on an official African tour of eight countries. He later published a short tract entitled *The Emergence of Africa*, and recommended the establishment of a separate Africa Bureau within the Department of State.

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Three years later, in 1960, official study missions to Africa were initiated in the Senate and the House. In 1967-68 Vice President Hubert Humphrey toured Africa for two weeks while on official duty. Though he has been a staunch supporter of independent Africa since the late 1950's, it was his first visit to the continent.

In 1956, soon after Senator Mansfield advocated it in a speech on the Senate floor, the African Branch of the Department of State was separated from the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and reorganized. The change brought about two offices—one for the affairs of northern Africa and the other for southern Africa.

In March 1957 Sen. Theodore Green (D-R.I.) introduced a bill (S1547) calling for authorization of the appointment of an assistant secretary of state for African affairs. In 1958 Congress voted authorization, and the first such assistant secretary solely for Africa was chosen—Joseph C. Satterthwaite. He subsequently became the United States ambassador to South Africa.

Satterthwaite's appointment may have been a typical choice, considering attitudes in both the executive branch of the government and State Department at that time. He represented the John Foster Dulles type of diplomat and his speeches often reflected it.

In an address on Africa before the Southern Assembly at Biloxi, Miss., in 1959, the gist of his remarks was as follows: "We support African political aspirations when they are moderate, nonviolent and con-

### Subcommittee Members

Membership on Senate and House subcommittees on Africa have been subject to changes from resignations, deaths, retirements and election defeats. At this writing there are only three members remaining on the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs and only nine members on the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa.

Senate: Gale W. McGee (D-Wyo.), Chairman; Thomas J. Dodd (D-Conn.); and Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.)

House: Rep. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D-Mich.), Chairman; William T. Murphy (D-Ill.); J. Irving Whalley (R-Pa.); Robert N. C. Nix (D-Pa.); F. Bradford Morse (R-Mass.); Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-N.Y.); William S. Broomfield (R-Mich.); John C. Culver (D-Iowa); and Edward J. Derwinski (R-Ill.)



structive, and take into account their obligations to and interdependence with the world community. We also support the principle of continued African ties with western Europe. We see no reason why there should be a conflict between these two concepts."

As assistant secretary of state he was later replaced by G. Mennen Williams, who was followed by Joseph Palmer. The latter was in that position at the time of this writing.

Interest in Africa continued to grow in the House and the Senate. In 1959 the House Committee on Foreign Affairs established the Subcommittee on Africa. During its ten-year span of activity the House subcommittee has accomplished twice as much as the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate.

The latter has undertaken no study mission to Africa since 1961 and held only one hearing since 1960. Its frequently shifting chairmen have included Sen. Mike Mansfield, Sen. Russell B. Long and Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy. At McCarthy's resignation from the full Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January 1969, Sen. Gale McGee (D-Wyo.) became chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs. (Although interested in Africa and having accepted the chair-

manship through choice rather than seniority, Sen. McCarthy, during 1967-68, was occupied with the issue of the Vietnam war and campaigning for the 1968 presidential nomination.) During the same years, until his electoral defeat in 1968, the House subcommittee has had the same chairman in Barratt O'Hara.

Surprisingly, House members with the greatest interest in Africa have not always occupied a place on the Africa subcommittee. Likewise, some subcommittee members can actually be said to have little interest in Africa. On the Senate side this appears to be especially true.

Three of six subcommittee members have had domestic civil rights voting records in recent years which indicate that they are not prone to liberal attitudes towards Afro-Americans, let alone Africans. They are Frank J. Lausche (D-Ohio), Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.), and Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa).

Their interest in Africa has gone no further than issues indirectly relating to communism, and they have participated in neither of the two Senate study missions. Two of these members, however, Lausche and Hickenlooper, made way for replacements in the 91st Congress.

Rep. Charles C. Diggs, Jr., new House Subcommittee on Africa chairman, is holding a series of hearings on southern Africa issues.



**B**Y THE EARLY SIXTIES, changes and some progress in Congress's relation to Africa had continued, thanks to the efforts of a few of its members. But very little of it pertained to southern Africa. In 1960 response from both Houses was very slight to the Sharpeville tragedy. Compared to the main issue of that year—the Congo and its problems of "cannibalism," "blood-letting" and "Soviet-trained Congolese leaders"—Sharpeville had no priority at all.

Some members preferred the situation in South Africa to the one many villified and condemned for happening in the Congo. Not a few members still felt about it as did Rep. John Bell William (D-Miss.). In a speech before the House in 1962 he called South Africa "the only effective pro-Western nation on the African continent."

Not until 1965 did any member try to stop the regime in South Africa from receiving sugar quotas, which it had been given to a far greater extent than other countries since 1948. In October 1965, Sen. Wayne Morse tried (and failed) to amend the Sugar Act of 1948, reducing South Africa's allotment. His amendment was rejected, countered by Senator Russell B. Long (D-La.), who defended South Africa as a friend and ally.

By 1966, with breakaway Rhodesia in the headlines and both the issues of apartheid in South Africa and the mandate of Southwest Africa appearing before the United Nations, enough interest had been aroused





Vice President Richard Nixon in Africa in 1957.

about conditions in southern Africa for a House subcommittee on Africa to hold hearings on U.S.-South Africa Relations.

In the same year, the late Sen. Robert F. Kennedy (D-N.Y.) visited South Africa on a private trip at the invitation of the anti-apartheid National Union of South African Students. Speaking at Capetown and Natal Universities, he was joined at the latter by some 20,000 students in singing the American civil rights hymn "We Shall Overcome."

Kennedy also toured segregated residential areas, meeting with the late Nobel Peace Prize winner Dr. Albert Luthuli, then confined to a reservation in Zululand. The Senator, however, called for no economic sanctions against South Africa either on his trip or on the floor of the Senate—his reasons being that such action would prove as harmful to the black and colored population as to the white Afrikaners.

Despite such reasoning in relation to South Africa, the following year 61 Congressmen introduced a resolution in support of sanctions against Rhodesia. Their

move was principally in support of a United Nations resolution imposing sanctions on Rhodesia as voted by the Security Council. The resolution was passed December 16, 1966, by a vote of 11-0. (Subsequent efforts by conservative Congressmen to repeal the sanctions failed.) Following passage of the UN resolution, in an effort to implement its adoption, President Johnson issued an executive order, whereupon the United States withdrew part of its consulate staff from Rhodesia, announced a ban on exports vital to the economy, cancelled sugar quotas, placed an embargo on the sale of arms, and temporarily suspended bank loans and credit guarantees.

Why the United States backed mandatory restrictions against Rhodesia but consistently has refused to do so in the case of South Africa (except for an arms ban which became effective January 1, 1964) is actually no puzzle. Part of its answer, at least, is in the response G. Mennen Williams gave during the 1966 South Africa hearings. Rhodesia, he reasoned, was "the British government dealing with a recalcitrant colony." U.S. sup-

Sen. Robert F. Kennedy with Nobel Peace Prize winner Albert Luthuli in South Africa in 1966.





port of Britain was therefore justified on a legal basis. But South Africa, he added, "is an independent country and would cover another act of legal implications."

Omitted in his speech was the fact that South Africa holds a different set of political and economic implications for the United States. Rhodesia is landlocked, but South Africa offers a sea route around the Cape of Good Hope, which may be logistically important to the U.S. Navy with a fleet enroute to, among other places, Vietnam. Rhodesia is also without the space tracking facilities in South Africa for use in NASA lunar and space programs.

Although rich in mineral resources, it is not, like South Africa, first in world production of industrial and gem diamonds, platinum and antimony; second in chrome and vanadium; and third in uranium, manganese and valuable types of asbestos. Most importantly, it is without the private American investors who currently earn some 750 million dollars annually from investment in South Africa, nor with the financial interests of some 275 American business firms whose exports to South Africa in 1967 alone—the same year economic sanctions were first imposed upon Rhodesia—amounted to over 427 million dollars.

Though still not as satisfactory as some might have wished, the year 1967 in Congress can be counted as the most important to date in regard to attention for southern Africa. The integrated crew of the U.S. aircraft carrier *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, refueling in Capetown and canceling shore leave because of discrimination towards black American crew members, was as much an issue in Congress for some members as Rhodesia.

By 1968, the most important Africa issue reaching Congress was no longer southern Africa but Nigeria-Biafra. Still to be considered, once interest turned to the southern part of the continent again, were the areas surrounding South Africa, largely dependent upon her but rarely recognized as such by the rest of the world—Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, South West Africa, Malawi, Portuguese-controlled Mozambique and Angola.

Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, stating public views on southern Africa, in remarks characteristic of American policy, acknowledged that "in dealing with these areas, our position is based firmly on the belief that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."

For over 32 million Africans, there has been no just power nor consent of the governed. And unless those given power in the future will consent to more than silence, both they and we shall continue to witness on the southern tip of Africa one of the great human tragedies of our time. •





by ENOC P. WATERS, JR.

# OUR HORSE- AND-BUGGY POLICY IN AFRICA

**R**ICHARD NIXON is the first American president to take office with any firsthand knowledge of Africa. He visited there twice as Eisenhower's vice-president. Even his surface awareness of Africa's burgeoning urban culture and rapid political currents give him an advantage in dealing with this troubled continent.

What he will do about American policy in Africa is unpredictable. That our African policies need overhauling is unmistakable. And just as unmistakable is the fact that any realistic African policy today will have to take into account the imminence of African domination in southern Africa. Common sense, if not our own sense of justice, should put our government on the side of the future.

America's relations with Africa have, with slight exception, been characterized by ignorance, prejudice and myopia. President Johnson admitted to a group of African ambassadors in 1967 that "Africa has never been as dark as our ignorance of it." Over a century ago, when European nations, aware of Africa's vast resources and potential, were establishing themselves as the continent's guardians, brokers, authorities and spokesmen, the United States was focusing on domestic concerns. A period of national suspiciousness and isolationism, exemplified by the Monroe doctrine, discouraged any interest in Africa, "a dark continent populated with savage black heathens." And at that time millions of people of African descent were living in the U.S., mostly as slaves.

The United States had access to African produce through England, France and Belgium. Since the bills came from London, Brussels and Paris, many of us probably thought the produce originated there, a case of taking the dairy as the source of milk. The American establishment looked to Europe for its ties and for approval. Even Liberia, the idea for which originated in this country, was not recognized by the U.S. until 1862 after both England and France had done so. Afterward, when that struggling little state was under attack from colonial powers which sliced off

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Senator Edward W. Brooke questions United States policy in Africa after 1968 trip to that continent.



parts of its territory, we failed to go to Liberia's aid.

During the 1884-85 Berlin Conference, called by the European powers to settle their conflicting colonial claims, the United States' chief concern was assurance that its commercial ties with Africa would remain intact. Though aligned with the Allied Forces during World War I, we did not participate at Versailles in the division of the African territories lost by defeated Germany. In 1935, when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia and the League of Nations voted sanctions against the aggressor, we not only continued trade with Italy but also increased it.

To Africans, the same unconscious racism that allowed white slave owners to write the Declaration of Independence is still evident in our advocacy of the principle of self-determination while undergirding the economy of South Africa, the most blatantly racist government in the world. It is obvious that southern Africa, which is dominated by South Africa, is politically of great importance. Besides its gold, diamonds, off-shore oil and key ports on the Atlantic and Indian oceans, southern Africa controls the sea route to Asia as long as the Suez Canal is closed.

The ambivalence of our policies toward various governments in Africa is a mirror of our inconsistent domestic racial policies and practices. Unreasoning fear of black militancy at home, particularly its emphatic African flavor, often leads to overt sympathy with the militant and oppressive regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. Inadequate general education as to the history, geography and culture of Africa as well as stereotyped portrayals of the continent and its people in movie and television films all contribute to our dangerous misconceptions about Africa.

There *was*, despite official indifference, an African consciousness and concern among American Negroes in the nineteenth century and even before. Noted sociologist St. Claire Drake observes that Negro religious institutions which developed during the last decade of the eighteenth century invariably included "African" somewhere in their titles. As early as 1787 Negro churches were sending missionaries to Africa. After 1865, these churches began to bring young Africans to this country on educational scholarships.

This African consciousness was suppressed by white American society. Many influential whites looked to the colonization societies, which advocated the resettlement of American Negroes in Africa, as a vehicle for ridding the nation of blacks who were swelling the ranks of the abolitionists. This stirred fear among the freed men to whom America had become home in spite of the mistreatment and humiliation they were forced to undergo.



Franklin Delano Roosevelt touring Robert Air Base in Monrovia, Liberia, in 1943. He is the only American president ever to have visited Africa.

**D**URING THE FIRST TWO DECADES of the twentieth century, when this fear had dissipated, Negro concern about Africa was revived by Booker T. Washington, who had become an officer of the Congo Reform Association; Carter G. Woodson, who, in 1915, founded the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History; W. E. B. DuBois, who called the first Pan African Congress in 1919; and Marcus Garvey, whose "Back to Africa" movement was peaking in the 1920's.

African diplomats at the United Nations naturally resent our history of indifference to their aspirations. To them the first sign that American diplomacy was catching up with reality came during the Eisenhower administration when the two Nixon visits to Africa occurred. Eisenhower followed this gesture by an address before the General Assembly of the UN in 1960, when 16 new African nations were admitted to UN membership. This speech outlined a program on international effort toward African development.

President Kennedy also showed his concern for Africa by quickly appointing G. Mennen Williams to head the newly created Bureau of African Affairs with the rank of Assistant Secretary of State even before he had named Dean Rusk as Secretary of State. This was noted as an unusual reversal of procedure.

Kennedy was not a Johnny-come-lately to African affairs. Back in 1957 he had supported the aims of Algerian rebels, and during his campaign for the presidency he had criticized our timid support of nationalistic aspirations in black Africa and our habit, which we never fully abandoned, of abstaining on African issues before the UN. He promised to develop a more assertive independent policy toward Africa instead of leaning upon Britain for guidance. In his





President Kennedy appoints G. Mennen Williams head of newly created Bureau of African Affairs.

inaugural address, while the world's attention was focused on Washington, he seized the opportunity to encourage Africans in their rush toward independence.

The Kennedy administration fulfilled its promises. Williams' friendly informality during his African tour was in sharp contrast to the icy formality of European diplomacy, and his endorsement of Africa for Africans, which stirred the wrath of the American press, was greeted with hosannahs by African nationalists.

The White House doors opened to a steady stream of African leaders. United States embassies were established at such a rate that the State Department had difficulty staffing them with personnel attuned to the African needs. African students poured into American universities, which quickly began to set up African study programs. African scholars, labor leaders, intellectuals and other dignitaries appeared in so many of our cities that there was a shortage of qualified hosts to entertain them. Peace Corps and Aid for International Development (AID) personnel roamed the African landscape, their occasional blunders and ineptness often overlooked or excused by Africans confident of their good intentions.

Our financial aid to black Africa reached its peak under Kennedy. In one year, 1962, AID loans and grants amounted to \$315 million. Our Food for Peace Program represented another \$107 million. The Export Import Bank granted loans totaling \$67 million for a total close to a half billion dollars. In the previous decade, black Africa had received less than \$100 million out of more than a half billion allotted for the continent. Most had gone to Egypt, Morocco, South Africa and Rhodesia.

The brief Kennedy period was also an era of Afri-

can discovery for major American foundations that had overlooked opportunities for aiding social advancement on the continent. Private investment in Africa, which had traditionally favored South Africa because exploitation of black labor swells profits, began to show signs of increase in the early 1960's as a result of our government's new African emphasis. Though unable to reflect the changed attitude as quickly as government, private investment, which barely exceeded \$1 billion in 1960, with three-fifths in South Africa, doubled in five years. While the major portion of the new money still went to South Africa, the gain by the black states was unmistakably the result of government initiative and encouragement.

American Negroes benefited from the African awareness of this era. They were called upon to act as hosts to foreign dignitaries, as government representatives abroad and as consultants in African programs. Perhaps at no other period have Negroes felt more involved with and part of their government. Their African heritage became an asset for the first time, and their identity thereby was strengthened.

Since 1950, when Edith Sampson was appointed, more than a dozen Negroes have served in American delegations to the United Nations. Their presence, however, has been unable to offset our poor voting record on African issues in that forum. Africans are particularly disappointed by our failure to ratify the International Covenant on Human Rights, work on which was started 22 years ago under an American, the late Eleanor Roosevelt.

**R**EAL AFRICAN DISENCHANTMENT with our policies began in 1964, when the United States permitted its transports to be used to land Belgian paratroopers in Stanleyville to rescue white hostages. It was particularly resented that it was Belgium whose chestnuts we were pulling out of the fire. After a notoriously brutal and suppressive colonial rule, the Belgian withdrawal from Congo was considered a cynical, calculated act, intended to precipitate the turmoil that followed.

Our intervention was regarded as a return to our preoccupation with white European kinship in disregard of our stated ideals. Events in the years since have increased the disenchantment. We have dropped so low in the esteem of many black Africans that our support of scholarship programs and welfare projects for black refugees are referred to in private as "the American conscience fund."

In fairness, it should be noted that solid contributions to discord and misunderstanding have been made by some Africans. Some, fanatically committed to other political ideologies or hoping to curry favor with governments not friendly to us, have depre-



cated our efforts, professed to find CIA agents under beds and ascribed imperialistic motives to our programs. Perhaps some have made the happy discovery that blaming us can help absolve their own mismanagement, profligacy or errors.

Experience should have taught us that charlatans, despots and fools come in all nationalities and colors, are even home grown and are best ignored. We have no control over what is said about us, either good or bad. But a government that has attained such a prominent stature in international affairs as ours, does have great responsibilities. We can't draw any comfort from the fact that some European and at least one Asian government (Japan) have records worse than ours for trafficking with white minority regimes in spite of UN sanctions. More is expected of us because we, unlike the others, have a history not merely free of colonial involvement but also characterized by opposition to it.

Congress, which often reflects more our ignorance and biases than our ideals, frequently obstructs or dilutes the best efforts of an administration by manipulating purse strings for personal, partisan or sectional advantages. But money isn't everything. An over-reliance upon material aid to build bridges of friendship often has the opposite effect of condescendingly suggesting that it is a saleable commodity, an implication that is heightened in relations between a very wealthy government, such as ours, and very poor nations.

As sorely as it is needed, and as much as it is welcomed, material aid is but one of several components needed to fashion a meaningful African policy that promotes their progress and satisfies our responsibilities. We cannot afford to be smug. The prototypes for all social and political ills of the struggling black nations are to be found in our own history.

Though African heads of state and their diplomats have little quarrel with the hospitality and respect accorded them in this country, many tend to measure our regard for them by the prestige of our visitors to their countries. In spite of our long association with Ethiopia and Liberia, only one American president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, visited either while in office.

Another irritating feature of our relations with the continent has been our tendency to expect, if not exact, African support of our position in the cold war. Our alarm over visits by African leaders to communist capitals, or the establishment of communist embassies in theirs, is unfathomable to many African leaders.

Senator Edward Brooke, in his address about our African policy last year in the Senate, quoted Uganda's president Milton Obote in this connection as saying: "One cannot say that, because somebody is your

friend, that friend's enemy is your enemy." At the United Nations, an African diplomat asked me: "If your people think Russia is bad for us, why does America permit it to have an embassy in Washington?"

Another factor to be considered is our domestic racial situation. The frequency with which references are made to our racial situation during debates at the United Nations — and to which our representatives indignantly object on the grounds that they constitute an intrusion into our domestic affairs — indicates there is a question in the minds of outsiders concerning the glaring differences between what we preach abroad and what we do at home.

We need also to close the credibility gap that arises from the inconsistency of our position regarding white-dominated southern Africa. Any UN resolution that condemns "in the strongest terms" the racial policies and the conduct of the white-dominated governments of South Africa and Portugal, or the rebel regime in Rhodesia, is assured an American vote. But when a resolution proposes that something be done to correct these injustices—not necessarily military—it can be anticipated that the United States will pose a bland alternative, or, if that is unsuccessful, abstain.


**W**E HAVE CONSISTENTLY cautioned against military intervention and condemned resorts to violence on the part of Africans to attain their objectives, but we have failed to propose practical alternatives. We did not favor economic sanctions against the rebel regime in Rhodesia until Britain asked for them. We supported an arms embargo against South Africa but wouldn't go a step further.

Africans cannot be persuaded that NATO arms aren't presently being used by Portugal in Angola and Mozambique. Nor can they equate our support of totalitarian regimes unfriendly to African democratic objectives—apparently based on military needs—with upholding the ideas that we profess.

Nor can they understand why the rule of law that bars their use of force does not also operate against governments that maintain minority rule by military might, that unilaterally overrule the World Court, and that exhibit contempt for UN decisions. To them, if not to us, the suppression of human rights and the merciless subjugation of a people is too high a price to pay for a tracking station or naval refueling facilities.

The ingredients of a policy needed for Africa are the same as those needed in our relations with other countries—respect, confidence, sincerity, and an awareness of a mutuality of interests that is unaffected by distance, race or culture. •





## **PART VI — RESPONSE**

**The Spirit of the Lord God  
is upon me,  
because the Lord  
has anointed me to bring  
good tidings  
to the afflicted;  
he has sent me  
to bind up the brokenhearted,  
to proclaim liberty  
to the captives,  
and the opening of the prison  
to those who are bound.**

**Isaiah 61:1 (RSV)**

# **A Mandate for Action**

**by JOHN C. BENNETT**

**T**HE GOD OF THE CHRISTIAN faith is a god who identifies himself with those who are victims of injustice. Our opinions about how to deal with unjust conditions may differ, but as Christians we must first recognize the evil for what it is by seeing it as an offense against God.

We are often told that the key to the Christian's ethical decisions is to find the signs of the activity of God in the world and then to move with them. It is not easy to be sure of what God is doing in many situ-

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Dr. John C. Bennett is President of Union Theological Seminary and a frequent contributor to church-related opinion magazines.



ations, but wherever people are struggling to throw off yokes of oppression, wherever those who are themselves politically free and economically favored identify themselves with the cause of the oppressed, there we may believe that God is at work to deliver his people.

Christian living involves this concentration on the dignity and welfare of people whom the world has neglected or exploited. This is clear in Jesus' story of the Last Judgment, with its emphasis on the nameless persons who are known only as those who are hungry, thirsty, naked or in prison.

The irony of Christian history is that the churches have flourished most among people who are rich and powerful, who until recently have lived complacently as lords of most of the earth. Today the domination of white people in the northern hemisphere is being challenged by the nonwhite majority of the human race, most of whom live in the southern hemisphere. This is the source of much of the tumult of this period, but it is also a major source of hope for a better world.

There are two areas in the world where domination by white men still keeps black men in subjection: the United States and southern Africa. I do not mean, however, to equate these two situations. Blacks in the U.S. have the advantage that the federal government has been their ally in overcoming segregation. Although the rank and file of black people in our cities feels trapped in the ghettos and kept down by the dominant habits and structures in our society, black political power can be an agent of change, and the blacks have many allies.

**T**HE BLACK MAJORITIES in southern Africa, however, are politically powerless, completely subject to white masters. Even when there are some advertised improvements in their economic condition, they are still at the mercy of the white man. They quickly become victims of police brutality and vindictive punishments whenever they refuse to conform or are suspected of conspiring against the system.

What is happening in southern Africa is our concern because of its dehumanizing effect on both op-

pressed and oppressors and because it may lead to a war in which our own country will be tempted to use force to maintain the status quo. The worst nightmare many Americans have is that, because of our economic stake in southern Africa, we might find ourselves fighting a new Vietnam-type war on the side of the white oppressors.

There is another dimension to the whole story of southern Africa: the role of the Christian religion. In South Africa there has been a close alliance between religion and white nationalism. Many Christians there assume that the system of apartheid is a last defense of Christian civilization in that part of the world.

But there are also white church leaders who oppose the apartheid system and who totally reject the use of Christian theology to defend it. South African churches differ in the degree to which they accept apartheid within the church. Their white members are in conflict over these issues, and those who struggle for racial justice and reconciliation need support from the world-wide church.

The issues raised by racial policies in southern Africa are religious and moral, but they are also political. Without the organization of black Africans to struggle politically for their rights, change will not occur. Those of us who are on the outside should give support both to the political struggles of the blacks and to the efforts of those whites who are committed to radical change in the presuppositions and structures of their society.

Our own country, with its enormous political and economic power, can make decisions that are favorable to change in southern Africa or it can prop up the system there through supportive policies or just plain default. This is a political problem within the United States.

There may be honest differences of opinion about the ways in which this country can best throw its influence on the side of the oppressed peoples in southern Africa. But all opinions should come from minds and consciences that have been made alert and informed. It is not enough to be morally indignant. It is necessary to translate this moral response into political action.



compiled by **TIM SMITH**

# **SUGGESTED ACTIONS**

## **EDUCATIONAL PROJECTS**

Public knowledge of southern Africa is very sparse. A massive education campaign is needed.

- Set up a local "Committee on Southern Africa" or ask your church, union, service club, political party or civil rights group to put southern Africa on its agenda.

- Send letters and articles to newspapers, radio and television stations alerting them to the importance of coverage of events in southern Africa.

- Hold seminars, discussion groups, public forums and teach-ins to introduce southern Africa to the local group with which you are associated.

## **POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY PROJECTS**

Public opinion must be mobilized if there is to be any change in American policy towards southern Africa.

- Get in touch with your congressmen, State Department officials, our ambassador to the United Nations, business concerns and the president. Individual letters, phone calls, petitions, telegrams, demonstrations and organized visits are all useful ways of expressing concern. An effective letter should provide a brief outline of the situation and specific questions on policy which will set the official on public record when he replies.



## SUPPORT

### ASYLUM

Presently the United States does not accept southern Africans who flee from their countries as "political refugees" as it does those who flee communist countries. Urge your congressman, the State Department and the executive branch to grant southern Africans a special refugee status.

### RADIO FREE AFRICA

An ambitious project for private citizens, in conjunction with African liberation organizations, would be to establish a Radio Free Africa in an independent African state. It would beam news broadcasts, warnings about informers, and indictments of particularly brutal South African officials to South and South West Africa. In addition, such a station could broadcast educational programs and encourage solidarity among nonwhite groups in southern Africa.

Tim Smith, a Canadian, has served on the Southern Africa Committee of the University Christian Movement in this country. Educated at the University of Toronto and New York's Union Theological Seminary, he has written a pamphlet and compiled an action program kit on southern Africa for the United Church of Christ. He has traveled widely in southern Africa.

### LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Moderate organizations such as the Ford Foundation, Union Theological Seminary in New York and the mission boards of various denominations have provided funds for Frelimo and other liberation movements. Books, medical supplies, clothing and agricultural implements are badly needed by all the liberation movements. Contributions may be sent to the Africa Fund of the American Committee on Africa.\*

### LEGAL AID TO VICTIMS OF APARTHEID

In 1965 the United Nations General Assembly established a trust fund for South Africa (the United States voted in favor) to give legal aid to those charged under apartheid legislation, to provide relief for dependents of persons persecuted by apartheid laws and to fund the education of prisoners and their children. (Over 50,000 dependents have lost their breadwinner through jail, banning or "endorsing out.")

It is estimated that \$750,000 is the minimum annual requirement needed for this fund. The Africa Fund associated with the American Committee on Africa receives donations for this purpose.\*

### STRONG ACTION ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA)

American churches should instruct their missionaries in South Africa and Namibia to assist the families of political prisoners and to transmit regular reports to their American mission boards. Visits should also be paid to political prisoners.

The United Nations should declare the South African government an illegal "occupying power" and so refer to it in all official documents and speeches.

The United Nations Council for Namibia should:

- Issue passports for Namibian

citizens and visas permitting entry of aliens into Namibia.

- Ask all UN member states not to acknowledge passports issued by the occupying power to South West Africans and to mark the passports of their own citizens "not valid for travel in South West Africa unless this passport bears a visa issued by the Council for Namibia."

- Direct all persons and corporations who are subject to any taxation in South West Africa to pay such taxes to the council.

### REEXAMINATION OF AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Until such time that American business can be persuaded to leave southern Africa, we must convince it to use its power and resources to at least ameliorate conditions for nonwhites. Several options are open to individuals and organizations, especially if they have stock in American companies in South Africa. Collective action toward such companies is obviously more effective than individual action.

### BASIC INFORMATION SHOULD BE ELICITED ABOUT:

- The number of factories and branch offices the company has in southern Africa; their location and whether they are border industries (in the case of South Africa).

- Employment (numbers, race, job description), wages (comparative levels by race), benefits (pensions, medical insurance), unionization policy for nonwhites, personnel relations, housing.

Public pressure should be placed upon these companies to raise wages, provide pensions, etc.

### BOYCOTT OF BANKS

Ten American banks, including Chase Manhattan, First National City Bank and Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., extend \$40 million revolving credit to the South African government on a yearly basis. Concerned individuals and organizations have withdrawn accounts to protest this direct aid to the South African regime. More of this action is needed.

\*American Committee on Africa, 164 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016



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## SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

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Sanctions against Rhodesia have been relatively ineffective largely because Portugal and South Africa have openly defied them and because of loopholes in sanctions. A serious American approach to sanctions might necessitate additional United States government personnel in Mozambique and South Africa who would be assigned to certify that materials exported from those countries did not originate in Rhodesia. (The U.S. already has officials in Hong Kong who certify that products do not originate in Red China).

## OPPOSE

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### SUGAR QUOTA FOR SOUTH AFRICA

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In 1962 the United States gave South Africa a sugar quota which granted the South African sugar industry a guaranteed percentage of the U.S. market.

South African sugar is produced by some 125,000 black workers who make 86 cents a day in the sugar fields. Ending the sugar quota would eliminate one of the institutionalized symbols of American support for South Africa.

The three million dollars or more in annual subsidies to the South African sugar industry could be given to the UN trust fund or shifted to an independent African country.

Write and ask for a repeal of the South African sugar quota to the president, the secretary of agriculture and members of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

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### AMERICAN TRACKING STATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

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In 1960 the United States and South Africa signed a fifteen-year contract establishing conditions for three American tracking stations in South Africa. The apartheid government has made it clear it does not want black Americans working there and, of course, allows black Africans only in menial jobs in the American station.

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### UNITED STATES NAVY VISITS TO SOUTH AFRICAN PORTS

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The U.S. Navy should not use South African ports, and a clear policy statement should be issued to this effect. Black Americans on shore leave must face the whole gamut of apartheid laws.

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### SEGREGATED AMERICAN EMBASSIES

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The United States must integrate its embassy in South Africa. Presently 84 American citizens are assigned to the embassy and its constituent posts in South Africa. No black Americans have been assigned to work in them because, according to a State Department official, an American Negro diplomat would be *persona non grata* there. The United States has let South Africa dictate United States racial policies.

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### TOURISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

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This is becoming a major South African industry. American travelers should recognize that their presence in South Africa provides a unique opportunity for the South African government to justify itself. Tourists seldom see the real lives and dilemmas of South Africa's non-whites and often leave the country with a very "white" picture of her racial situation. The least American tourists can do is to inform themselves of the apartheid situation before they visit South Africa.

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### PROPAGANDA FOR THE STATUS QUO IN SOUTH AFRICA

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Sympathizers with white regimes in southern Africa are conducting aggressive campaigns for recognition of their legitimacy. Among the most active of these lobbyists are the "Friends of Rhodesia." Counter

such propaganda by letters to congressmen, editors of local newspapers and radio and television officials.

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### SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS

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This agency of the South African government has recently inaugurated a weekly service from Johannesburg to New York. The airlines' promotional campaign is an open attempt to attract white Americans only.

- Request travel agents to boycott South African Airways.

- Refuse to fly by SAA and put South Africa on your list of countries "not to see."

- Write President Nixon asking him, in the public interest, to rescind SAA's permit.

- If you are black, apply for a visa from the South African consulate and ask the airlines to make unsegregated hotel arrangements for you. Both requests will be refused and such an instance will compound the evidence of South Africa's unjust policies.

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### AMERICAN MILITARY AID TO PORTUGAL

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While the United States has voted in the United Nations for self-determination for the Portuguese colonies, her links to NATO aid Portugal in suppressing the populations of Angola and Mozambique.

- Request that the United States disengage from bases such as the Azores.

- Request that the U.S. stop providing Portugal with military assistance and arms that free their own weapons for use against African nationalists.

**T**HESE SUGGESTED strategies are not likely to bring instant justice to the troubled area. But no one can predict the salutary psychological and political consequences if the American people and the American government adopt a firm and enlightened attitude towards southern Africa. •



# A BASIC RESOURCE LIST

## BOOKS/ARTICLES

### SOUTH AFRICA

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- Duffy, James, *Portugal in Africa*. Baltimore: Penguin, 1963.
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### RHODESIA

- Barber, James, *Rhodesia, The Road to Rebellion*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
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## UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

The documents and publications cited may be consulted at local depositories of United Nations publications in public libraries. A limited number of copies is available from the Unit on Apartheid, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017.

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## MAGAZINES NEWSLETTERS

*Africa Confidential*, 5/33 Rutland Gate, S.W. 7, London, England.

*Africa Today*, c/o Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, University Park Campus, Denver, Col. 80210. One year—\$5. Students—\$3.

*Africa Report*, Suite 500, DuPont Building, Washington, D.C. 20036. One year—\$8.

*Anti-Apartheid News*, 89 Charlotte St., London, W.1., England. One year—\$2.40 plus postage.

*Southern Africa*, Southern Africa Committee of the University Christian Movement, Room 758, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. 10027. 75¢ per monthly copy.

*South Africa Kits*, Council for Christian Social Action, United Church of Christ, 289 Park Ave. South, New York, N.Y. 10010. 50¢ per packet.

## FILMS

*Sabotage in South Africa*, CBS. 60 min. Black and white. Contributions: \$25. Available from American Committee on Africa, 164 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.

*South African Essay*, National Educational Television (NET). Two films, 60 min., each. Black and white. Contribution \$25. Available from American Committee on Africa.

*Angola: Journey to a War*, NBC. 60 min. Black and white. Contribution: \$25. Available from American Committee on Africa.

*Come Back Africa*, 83 min. Black and white. Rental fee: \$125. Available from American Documentary Films Inc., 336 W. 84th St., New York, N.Y. 10024.

*West Africa, Another Vietnam?* 40 min. Black and white. Rental fee: \$75. Available from American Documentary Films, Inc.

*South Africa*, ABC, 28 min. Color. Rental fee: \$50. Available from American Documentary Films, Inc.



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