ACAS NEW YORK GENERAL MEETING -- APRIL 23

The completion of the ACAS officer roster will be the main business of the ACAS meeting at the end of the African Heritage Studies Association Conference in New York on Saturday afternoon, April 22, Statler Hilton Hotel. A summary of the aims of the organization and the need for action also will be presented.

A meeting of the ACAS Executive Committee, consisting of the co-officers, is called for that evening -- place and time to be announced.

Sunday, April 23, is slated for the first ACAS general meeting for developing programs of action by the members. The meeting will begin promptly at 9 a.m. at the United Methodist Center for the U.N., at the Church Center for the U.N. building, First Avenue at 44th St. All ACAS members are urged to attend.

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CALL FOR MEMBERSHIP -- JOIN ACAS NOW!

Please add my name to the ACAS membership list and send me copies of the ACAS Newsletter. I enclose $5.00 initial organizing dues.

NAME: ........................................................................

ADDRESS: .........................................................................

.................................................(zip)...........

AFFILIATION: .................................................................

OFFICE PHONE: .................................. HOME PHONE: ..................................

Send to Tom Shick, ACAS Finance Committee, c/o Dept. of Afro-American Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706.

ACAS MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE: George W. Shepherd, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver (Co-chairperson)
Edward Hawley, Africa Today
Robert Billingham, Black Studies, University of Northern Colorado
James Scarritt, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado
Akbahrali Thobani, African Studies, Metro College, Denver, Colorado

The meeting was chaired by Prof. Edris Makward, University of Wisconsin, Madison, who introduced the two main speakers: Prof. Immanuel Wallerstein and Mr. Edgar Lockwood, who spoke concerning "American Scholars and the Political Economy of Southern Africa" and "The Carter Administration and Southern Africa an Overview," respectively. (See summaries elsewhere in newsletter.) A motion was made, seconded, and passed unanimously to establish the Association of Concerned African Scholars (ACAS) as an organization to achieve the following goals:

1. To facilitate the articulation of scholarly analysis and opinion with the process of national and international policy formulation with special focus on the policy of the United States government.
2. To formulate and communicate alternatives to U.S. Africa policies to the peoples of the United States and Africa.
3. To develop a communication network among concerned Africanist scholars in order to (a) mobilize support on important current issues, (b) provide local sponsors for public education programs, (c) stimulate research on policy-oriented issues and to disseminate findings, and (d) to inform and update members on important international policy developments.
4. To coordinate activities with other national and local organizations in order to facilitate each other’s work and not to compete.

A motion was made to elect officers of ACAS for a period of one year, beginning with the completion of the officer slate at the New York Spring Meeting, 1978. Co-chairpersons were to be elected, one at this meeting and one at the Spring Meeting in New York. The offices and persons elected as the first co-officer in each case were:

Co-Chairperson: Prof. Immanuel Wallerstein, SUNY-Binghamton
Co-Chr., Committee for Research: Prof. Ann Seidman, U. Massachusetts
Co-Chr., Committee for Political Education and Action: Prof. Willard Johnson, MIT
Co-Chr., Committee for Membership:
Prof. George Shepherd, Univ. of Denver
Co-Treasurer: Prof. Tom Shick, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison
Co-Newsletter Editor: Prof. Michael Bratton, Michigan State Univ., on behalf of a group of persons at MSU who are cooperating.

An interim organizing membership fee of $5 was established, pending establishing regular activities and annual dues. Approximately 80 persons paid this fee and joined at the end of the meeting.

DRAFT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

This statement of principles is presented in draft form for the consideration of ACAS members.

We are a grouping of scholars interested in Africa and concerned with moving U.S. policy toward Africa in directions more sympathetic to African interests. For political and practical reasons, our emphasis for the foreseeable future will be on southern Africa.

We are encouraged by the overall direction of events in southern Africa, but we remain skeptical of U.S. government intentions in the area. We remember the crusading rhetoric with which the U.S. began its intervention in Indochina and the liberal image of the Kennedy administration during the time that intervention was expanded. We both recall and continue to be conscious of U.S. covert intervention in Angola, of U.S. assistance to support Morocco's aid to Zaire, and of the legacy of U.S. and NATO support for Portugal in its former colonies. We note the de facto support provided for the system of white supremacy in South Africa by United States economic, military and nuclear ties.

The people of southern Africa have in recent years taken enormous strides in their struggles to liberate themselves. There is real danger, however, that the U.S. corporate and government involvement will hamper their full attainment of their goals. We as scholars have both the possibility of, and the responsibility for, preventing this danger from materializing. We particularly feel the need for emphasizing the long-term interests of the African and American peoples, and for clearly distinguishing these interests from those of the transnational corporations and the U.S. government.

WE WILL ACT:
1. To promote scholarly analysis and opinion vis-a-vis the process of national and international policy formulation.
2. To formulate and communicate alternatives to U.S. Africa policies to the peoples of the U.S. and Africa.
3. To develop a communication network among concerned African scholars in order to (a) mobilize support on important current issues; (b) provide local sponsors for public education programs; (c) stimulate research on policy-oriented issues and to disseminate findings; (d) to inform and update members on important international policy developments.
This new organization is not intended to be in competition with other groups and organizations working on southern Africa but rather complementary to them. There is an important and distinct role that scholars can play in terms of research and analysis.

The scholarly community is both a forum for substantial debate and a constituency for action. And scholars' very position in their community permits them to add credibility and legitimacy to particular analyses and policy positions.

WHY SCHOLARS OUGHT TO BE MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED

As students of Africa, we have a responsibility to Africa. That responsibility requires that we be particularly sensitive to, and provide support for, African aspirations. Whatever our disciplines and areas of research interest, we ought by now to be clear about the nature and causes of injustice, oppression, and exploitation in southern Africa. We also ought to be clear that peoples throughout Africa give high priority to the ending of white rule in southern Africa. Since the U.S. government and corporations are contributing to the perpetuation of white domination and underdevelopment of Africa, we must act consciously to challenge them.

This is a critical time. In the current verbiage about the reassessment of U.S. policy toward southern Africa, there may be some potential for new directions, or at least an opening to challenge a reaffirmation of the long-standing commitment to neocolonial relationships. We need to organize and act while we can have most effect.

This is also a critical time because black South Africans have once again reminded us of the vitality of their struggle. Their actions have once again exposed as myths the notions of African acquiescence and of the invulnerability of apartheid. Zimbabweans and Namibians are on the verge of genuine independence. We need to do what we can to remove the obstacles to their liberation.

Though our vision is broad, we do not expect to be able, quickly and by ourselves, to change the nature of world capitalism, or to initiate an entirely new U.S. foreign policy, or to overcome centuries of underdevelopment and racism. We do believe that on specific issues, at particular moments, we can employ our knowledge to exercise a positive influence. And we think that neither those issues nor our influence is inconsequential.

The image of a humane, peaceful, and just world, however distant, haunts and strengthens us; it clarifies what we have in common with the peoples of Africa. To have an effect at all, we must organize our strengths.

SOUTHERN AFRICA AND LIBERAL INTERVENTIONISM

(Excerpts from an address by Immanuel Wallerstein to the first meeting of the Association of Concerned African Scholars (ACAS) Houston, Texas, November 3, 1977)

The Carter administration has been asserting of late that it is seeking to bring about majority rule in southern Africa. It has put forward an image of liberal interventionism on the side of the Africans. Yet Joshua Nkomo and Sam Nujoma have insisted that all they want is for the US not to help the white regimes. Liberal interventionism stands forward as the most dangerous enemy of African liberation movements in southern Africa, and the Africans know it.

Geopolitically, southern Africa has become, and promises to remain for some time, a world node of acute political conflict. The ending of the war in Vietnam brought into being a relatively stable situation in that region. The Middle Eastern conflicts seem to be winding their way, however slowly, to an arrangement that may or may not turn out to be stable. But southern Africa promises most clearly to be a center of increasing, not decreasing, armed conflict.

The difficult years for African liberation (1965-74) were precisely the years of intensive US involvement in Vietnam. The United States clearly felt that it could not "afford" another major trouble zone and threw its weight behind the status quo. After the coup in Portugal in 1974 the downward thrust of African liberation was resumed. The response taken by Henry Kissinger was to drop the status quo option represented by NSSM 39 and to replace it with the liberal interventionism initiated hesitatingly under Eisenhower, then pursued with a flourish under Kennedy. At that time the US had encouraged the European powers to 'decolonize', provided the resulting African regimes were pro-Western or at least 'non-aligned', and provided -- even more important -- that economic links with the West were not cut. Basically Kissinger sought to revive the earlier US option of a 'deal' of decolonization and apply it to southern Africa in 1976.

Thus when Andrew Young or Walter Mondale or David Owen speaks of a 'last chance' for a 'peaceful transition' he means it is a last chance to install relatively tame African governments in Zimbabwe and Namibia, governments that would hold their own radicals in check and would continue to permit the same steady flow of products and profits as historically has been the case. Of course the 'deal' would provide a cut for local politicians and businessmen. But this is no skin off the back of the large corporations. The 'cut' for African cadres would simply substitute for the 'cut' now taken by the white settlers.
The Carter administration would be happy to make this 'deal' with the Patriotic Front or SWAPO, but the leaders of these movements are not buying at the moment. National liberation movements in southern Africa are increasingly dynamic and politically educated and are aiming at independence on better terms. But Carter is not only offering a deal, he is seeking to impose one. He is trying to persuade both Nyerere and Vorster to help him impose it, but the U.S. is ready to go it alone if need be. The aid programs are being drafted; the agents are being planted; the pressures are being felt in Congress and the foundations and the press to 'cooperate' -- all in the name of African majority rule -- for the good of the African movements, whether they like it or not.

What can be done by Americans who think that African liberation in southern Africa is part of human liberation? They can support the African movements. They can demand that their own government cease supporting the white regimes. But above all they can avoid being lured into the trap of supporting liberal interventionism. The siren song is sweet, but the shoals are very sharp. And the game is for keeps.

POLITICAL ACTION AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE

Willard Johnson, Co-chairperson

The aim of this committee is to educate and mobilize opinion throughout the U.S. in order to influence policy and decision makers who determine official U.S. relations with Africa. We wish to have our foreign relations promote respect for the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to advance the liberation of oppressed peoples, and to achieve a more nearly equal distribution of power, productivity and wealth among the peoples of the world.

Our First Tasks

The most important thing to be done as we are completing the organization of the Association is to establish a preliminary committee of people (about ten) across the country who will take an active role in building up an effective network of concerned people and organizations. This committee will need to have specific names and addresses of activists. We need your help in contacting these people. Each person reading this newsletter can help by doing the following:

1. Identifying yourselves and others who may be willing to carry out the following types of tasks: (please note that identifying yourself to this committee does not mean that you are engaged in lobbying activity or other activity that may jeopardize the tax-exempt status of your other affiliations)
   - write letters to decision makers
   - write background papers for decision makers and for the media
   - give expert testimony to legislative and executive hearings
   - write articles and editorials and letters to newspapers, etc.
   - speak to rallies and meetings
   - appear on the media
   - circulate petitions

2. Seek out other activists who share our goals and are willing to help. We especially need to know of existing groups already active in support of such goals.

3. Monitor the activities and capabilities of enemies of our goals. Who takes action to retard progress toward liberation, freedom and equitable power and economic relations and conditions in Africa and the world? We need to receive copies of local editorials, letters to the editor, and other circulars that you think make the achievement of our goals harder. Be as specific as you can in identifying the oppositional individuals and groups.

4. Tell us what your own sense of priorities is, and what specific activities and issues you wish to have us focus on. Effective political action must be focused, and it must involve people active at the local level.
The organization as a whole, through its interim executive committee, and after electing a co-chairperson at the April New York meeting, must determine what will be our overall top priorities for collective action. Meanwhile, we need to have your ideas. One possible priority campaign might be to oppose any further action by the U.S. and the Western members of the Security Council ("the Gang of Five") from undermining the provisions of Security Council Resolution 385 calling for complete South African withdrawal from Namibia in order to have fair elections there to prepare for the transition to complete independence.

Another priority might be to mobilize a campaign of university and other disinvestment in corporations doing business with the South African government or investing in South Africa. We might want to target banks that are making loans to South African organizations and agencies. Universities, churches, labor unions, pension funds, etc., could be pressed to withdraw accounts from any such banks.

Another important and potentially effective campaign might be to mobilize public support for U.S. government backing of an oil embargo against South Africa with the immediate goal of retarding South African support to Rhodesia, and increasing the pressure on South Africa to cease its illegal interference with the establishment of United Nations administration leading to Namibian independence. Ultimately, an effective oil embargo by American firms could assist the transition to democracy in South Africa itself.

We must constantly keep aware of our general goals and do all we can to build understanding and acceptance of them by the general public as well as specific governmental officials. The specific issues and short run priorities will have to change in accordance with circumstances, which is another reason we must now concentrate on building a network of people who are already committed and ready to assist.

Please send your names, other people to be contacted, and your ideas on priorities and activities to: Willard R. Johnson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Dept. of Political Science Cambridge, MA 02139

ACAS RESEARCH COMMITTEE
Draft Proposals
- Ann Seldman, Co-chairperson

I. PRIMARY FOCUS OF RESEARCH:

The ACAS Research Committee should, at the present time, focus on gathering information in three main areas to assist in strengthening support for the complete liberation of southern Africa:

A. The nature of continuing oppression and exploitation in Southern Africa:

- The South African racist state capitalist regime's current maneuvers to perpetuate and deepen the exploitation of the black population;
- The development of various forms of South African domination and exploitation of the populations and resources of neighboring countries;
- The introduction of techniques for destabilizing the political economies of those neighboring states which have embarked on a transitional path to socialism, and/or which aid the liberation struggle.

B. The involvement of U.S. interests in the maintenance and reinforcement of the exploitative political economy of southern Africa:

- The role of U.S.-based transnational corporations in providing advanced technology, including military weapons, capital and markets for the South African political economy; and extracting raw materials and exploiting the populations of South Africa and neighboring countries;
- The role of U.S. transnational banks in assisting the South African government, parastatals and private firms to obtain funds to finance continued economic and military growth;
- The extent to which U.S. government policies strengthen the political economy of South Africa and its domination of the southern African region through: a) facilitating the continued involvement of U.S. transnational corporations and banks; and b) permitting the South African government and the illegal regimes of Namibia and Zimbabwe to obtain U.S.-designed military weapons including nuclear capability;
- The role of domestic interests and groups within the U.S. government and in private circles opposing efforts to change U.S. policies toward the support for fundamental and progressive change in southern Africa.

...continued next page...
ACAS Research Committee, continued.

C. On request, providing information and technical assistance to southern African liberation movements to help in the formulation of development plans for the future restructuring of their political economies when conditions permit.

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMITTEE:

A. The Research Committee will seek to identify and cooperate with other individuals and organizations already conducting research in the areas indicated;

B. The members of the Committee will be selected from areas throughout the country to:
   1. coordinate research already being done by ACAS members along lines indicated;
   2. identify additional competent researchers;
   3. develop new research to fill in the gaps or meet requests for additional information as the need arises.

FINANCIAL NEEDS OF AFRICANIST ACTIVISTS

SOUTHERN AFRICA MAGAZINE: has provided consistent in-depth coverage of Southern Africa for over a decade. This important national resource has been supported with church and individual donations since its inception. Now it is in difficult financial straits. Help is requested through a) individual donations, b) individual subscriptions, and c) recommendations to campus libraries to subscribe. For sample copies, donations, or further information write: Southern Africa Magazine, 244 West 27 St., 5th Floor, New York, NY 10001.

WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA: This office, which led the lobby for repeal of the "Byrd Amendment", has mounted a new campaign to end U.S. Export-Import Bank financing of trade with South Africa. Financial assistance is needed to pay for the campaign and to add staff for more research on Southern Africa policy and actions of the U.S. government. 110 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

MOZAMBIQUE EDUCATION FUND, INC.: Seeks contributions for purchases and shipment of books and literacy materials to Mozambique, through the Mozambique Ministry of Education. For information, write Mozambique Education Fund, P.O. Box 83, Minneapolis, MN 55440.

If you are interested in participating in the work of the ACAS Research Committee, please fill out the form below and send to: The ACAS Research Committee c/o Int'l. Development and Social Change Program Clark University Worcester, MA 01610

1. If you have been conducting research on a topic related to the ACAS research agenda, please state the title, summarize the main issues covered, and indicate the status of your research: ...

2. If you would be willing to conduct research on any topic related to the ACAS research agenda, indicate which topic, the aspect on which you would like to concentrate, and whether you plan to work alone or with a group of others: ...

3. If you, or the group with whom you are working, would be interested in preparing popularized pamphlets or leaflets relating to any of the topics indicated, please state which topic(s) and whether you already have the necessary information or whether the committee should send you additional information: ...

4. Do you have any other suggestions for the work of the committee? ...

BE SURE TO INCLUDE:

Your name: _______________________________________
Affiliation: _______________________________________
Mailing address: ___________________________________
Office telephone: _________________________________
Home telephone: ________________________________
WHY WE SAID "NO" TO A.I.D.

Sean Gervasi  Immanuel Wallerstein
Ann Setdman  David Wiley

In 1977, Congress authorized the expenditure of one million dollars for "the preparation of a comprehensive analysis of development needs of southern Africa to enable the Congress to determine what contribution United States foreign assistance can make." AID was instructed to present specific proposals on how to spend this one million dollars. AID seems to have approached several groups of scholars heretofore critical of U.S. policy in southern Africa on the possibility of serving as "consultants" to draft this analysis. AID in late November approached the four of us as scholars in contact with persons knowledgeable about the region (and not ostensibly because of our links to the Association of Concerned African Scholars)* to meet with them to discuss what kind of work ought to be done, could be done, and might be done by us. We agreed to meet with them in December in Washington.

The project was presented to us as one on "Constraints to development of greater self-reliance within and among the economies of the independent states in the southern Africa region." AID said it wished to identify and analyze these constraints in such a way as "to permit derivation of action policies and projects." AID said it wished a genuinely new approach which utilized African and Africanist scholars to articulate African aspirations. In this connection, they said they were discussing a proposal to develop a consortium of universities and scholars in the majority-ruled states of southern Africa as the major locus of such research.

We discovered in talking with some of them that there were, however, some constraints imposed on how one could discuss constraints. One could not "politicize the analysis" (although one could "recognize the political context"). One could not discuss policymaking or policy goals of the U.S. or other governments towards the evolution of southern Africa. One was supposed to assume a majority rule government in Zimbabwe and Namibia, however that were achieved, and of whatever political groups that might be composed. One was not supposed to talk about the role of trans-national corporations, but only about the flow of factors of production.

* There was a fifth person approached who was unable to attend the meetings.

In the course of the presentation by AID, we learned that it is likely that during an anticipated interim government, but prior to elections, a large World Bank mission will be sent to Rhodesia to prepare a plan to be implemented by the "transition government" and presumably afterwards by the government of a majority-ruled Zimbabwe. We were told that our task would be to present an analysis of "development needs" for the entire region that was so persuasive that whoever was in power (in southern Africa or in the U.S.) would wish to adopt an action program based on this analysis, and that this would be a major contribution to an ongoing dialogue and debate within the U.S. government.

We rejected the proposal categorically on the following grounds:

1. We could see no way of discussing "development needs" in the absence of discussing the political arrangements that are probable and preferable.

2. As far as we could tell, present U.S. government policy in the National Security Council and the State Department was moving in a direction contrary to the aspirations of the liberation movements, and we could not work within such policy assumptions.

3. We felt we were far more likely to affect U.S. policy along lines we favored by laying bare its premises and mobilizing opinion than by "working from within", a fortiori since we doubted that any AID analysis would affect policy decisions at the level of the National Security Council; and that "working from within" would hamper our credibility as fundamental critics of present U.S. policy.

4. We rejected any effort to conceal the nature of the debate by pretending to "depoliticize" it.

5. We rejected the assumption that development aid was necessarily per se a good thing, and that more aid is always better than less aid.

6. We rejected the assumption that the United States should be planning strategies of development for southern Africa, even if the parties concerned were not making such plans, since it might be for good reason (but of course we believed the leaders of the Patriotic Front and SWAPO were indeed making plans in the light of their own political perspectives).
Let us elaborate briefly on each of these points:

1. We asserted our view that the political economy is an integrated whole and that it was absurd to discuss development strategies, especially for the entire region, in the absence of political premises and choices. We cited an elementary example. The present Rhodesian government has an open border with South Africa and a closed one with Mozambique. How can anyone analyze what a Zimbabwe government could or could not do unless we had some idea if the borders were to remain as is, or if both borders are to be open, or if the situation will be inverted (open with Mozambique and closed with South Africa)? In short, it is not plausible to make an analysis (not to speak of its not being desirable) without knowing if we are talking of a Patriotic Front government, or a government arrived at by "internal settlement" (and presumably still coping with the offensives of the liberation movements).

We further said that we could not possibly leave out the role of the trans-national corporations (TNC's) from an analysis of the "causes" of underdevelopment (as was suggested) when we believed that the TNC's were one of the prime causes. We said that inviting the World Bank to make proposals was itself a political decision of the greatest importance, since the World Bank represented a particular (and highly contested) view of political economy. And how could one discuss solutions to southern African economic dilemmas, including Mozambique and Angola, in the face of present Congressional strictures on U.S. aid to these two countries? In short, we felt it was not true that there were technological analyses that were ideologically "neutral". We were not neutral, nor could AID be, nor did we think it had ever been.

2. We emphatically did not believe the U.S. government was presently being neutral. We were in fact appalled by the recent developments in U.S. policy towards southern Africa. We saw the U.S. government as breaking away from its prior commitments to the front line states to support the Patriotic Front. We saw the U.S. government as acquiescing in, if not taking a lead in, the creation of the so-called "internal settlement." We saw the U.S. as preoccupied by the creation of "moderate" regimes, the criterion of moderation being primarily how little such a regime proposed to tamper with the status quo. We saw the U.S. as having failed to take any serious measures against U.S. corporations (like Mobil and Union Carbide) that have systematically violated the Rhodesian embargo. We noted that the U.S. was taking no serious measures against the enrollment of U.S. citizens as mercenaries for Ian Smith. We were deeply concerned with the recently-confirmed transfer of Cessnas to Rhodesia from France, as well as their continued sale to South Africa. This was the type of U.S.-origin, dual-use, strategic material President Carter precisely promised would no longer be delivered, directly or via third parties. In short, the political context which we saw for this study was one of a U.S. effort not to promote the well-being of southern Africa as represented in the aspirations of the liberation movements of southern Africa. We remembered all too well the creeping involvement of the U.S. in Vietnam and we chose not to be party to repeating a similar kind of involvement in southern Africa.

3. We were told, in response, that we could best affect policy by doing such a report. It was implied we were letting down those who agreed with us within the Executive Branch or in Congress. We felt, however, that we could not in any way lend support to present policy objectives, and it seemed quite clear that consulting with AID in such a context would in fact do this. We could see no way in which our report would affect real policy; instead it might simply provide window dressing for continuation of current directions. We were not impressed by the receptivity of the Administration to critical views. Earlier in 1977, a petition concerning U.S. southern African policy signed by 600 African scholars had been presented to officials of the State Department and the National Security Council. Thus far, there has not even been the courtesy of a substantive response. Nor has there been a significant change in policy; if anything, U.S. policy has deteriorated since.

4. The proposed emphasis of the consultative study was to be on the regional plans for development of southern Africa, and on economic and social constraints within each nation, without reference to either the nature or the constitution of these governments or the goals they set or will set for development. We were warned that if we insisted on " politicizing" the discussion on southern African aid, there were others equally eager to " politicize" it, but in ways we would not like. It was implied that groups like those opposed to ratifying the Panama Canal Treaty were sympathetic to Rhodesian white settlers as people who had "built up" their country. We said that we were very aware of such views and that the very best thing for all of us was to move the discussion out into the open, with the options clearly drawn. At the present, the discussion is often clouded in Aesopian language. A "depoliticized" discussion of development is inevitably Aesopian. Hence if we wrote a report in this form, it would only assist those within government who wished to push
U.S. policy in the direction of maximally maintaining the status quo to get away with it.

5. We were told that it was the friends of Africa who had sought, and with some difficulty, to increase the size of aid to southern Africa, and that if ways to spend this money were not forthcoming, it might be reduced. Here we took the position that spending money on aid is not a virtue in itself, and that badly-spent money is far worse than unspent money.

6. Finally, we said, if there is to be planning for the future of southern Africa, obviously southern Africans should do it. It was one thing for the U.S. to respond to the requests of independent majority-rule governments like Mozambique and Angola (and we noted the U.S. is precisely failing to do this), and quite another for the U.S. to make plans for not-yet-created majority-rule governments in Zimbabwe and Namibia. It was our view that the liberation movements would probably reject the whole idea of pre-planning by outsiders, not only on the grounds that it was a diversion, but even more strongly on the grounds that it was a negative political act. (At this point, we were astonished to be told that this was more or less what one of the AID planners had recently heard from Tanzanian officials about this very same project.) We also discovered that the plan to involve southern African scholars through a consortium of African universities was no longer being actively pursued. We said that nonetheless, if appropriate groups of African scholars associated with the liberation movements and the front line states were to engage in such a study, and thought our help might be in any way useful, we would be ready to do what we could. But to presume that this analysis should be done for them, for their own good, was part of the dangerous atmosphere that had infected U.S. policy since the second World War. We did not think it was morally or intellectually tenable.

We concluded by saying that we were very concerned with the well-being of southern Africa and with the lack of fit between U.S. foreign policy and the aspirations of the liberation movements. We would continue to do research on southern Africa, and continue to speak publicly in criticism of present U.S. policy, and in support of the liberation movements. That, it seemed to us, was the most relevant immediate contribution we could make.

12/17/77

U.S.-LED NEGOTIATIONS POSE THREATS TO FREEDOM IN NAMIBIA

Dr. Willard R. Johnson
Professor of Political Science, M.I.T.

In an effort to head off a Turnhalle based in a "permanent solution," to the conflict between the Namibian people and the Republic of South Africa, the United States has come dangerously close to jeopardizing the Namibians' hard won right in international law and diplomacy to determine their own future in completely free elections that are not subject to interference by South Africa. In the spring of 1977, the so-called "Western Contact Group", which is composed of the Western industrial members of the Security Council, took the initiative, outside the framework of the United Nations, and against the opposition of the Namibian liberation organization, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), to begin negotiating directly with the South Africans who have defied international law and all the institutions of the world community by continuing to administer the Territory and to apply its laws and station its troops there.

While winning some important compromises from South Africa over the course of these discussions, the Contact Group has, nonetheless, undermined the one well established principle regarding the Territory—that South Africa has absolutely no legal right to be there. South Africa's firm physical control has been undeniable. But, the inability of the Namibian people, or the U.N. to dislodge South Africa has resulted from the unwillingness of the Western powers to confront it, with force if necessary. South Africa may be moving toward accepting conditions which could allow elections that SWAPO could win, but we are still far from any assurance of such benign procedures. The U.N. may yet confront a recalcitrant South Africa and have to move in forcibly to protect the interests of the Namibian people. Any erosion now of the clear U.N. rights to supervise the transition of the Territory to sovereignty would therefore constitute a serious set-back.

United States spokesmen have given a confusing picture of the negotiations. They have repeatedly claimed that their negotiations were being conducted within the framework and terms of Security Council Resolution #385, the most recent of numerous U.N. resolutions that have sought to end the illegal South African occupation and abuse of the Territory. But, Resolution 385 specifically invokes the 1971 opinion of the International Court of Justice that South Africa is under legal obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory, and once again explicitly "condemns the continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa," and the latter's
military build up there. It calls on South Africa to withdraw its illegal administration and calls for direct United Nations control of the whole Territory as a single political entity, prior to free elections that would permit the Namibian people to determine their own constitutional arrangements and choose their own political leadership. South Africa has no legitimate or legal role in any such process.

For the Contact Group to negotiate with South Africa for anything less than the latter's own effective withdrawal is to cloak its presence with a false legitimacy. The terms of the "Preliminary Agreement" that resulted from the discussions last Fall would have permitted South Africa to withdraw only in stages, starting after a "political process", that is, after elections for a constituent assembly to draft a constitution and possibly even after the completion of its drafting work. Certainly, such arrangements would deny the freedom of the elections themselves since the latter would be conducted with South African administrative and military machinery still in a position to intimidate the population and to counter any outcome which South Africa may not like. It would grant, for the first time in modern international diplomacy and jurisprudence, a South African right to participate in the transitional process. This could undermine the promise of four decisions of the International Court of Justice, and over fifteen resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council since the General Assembly terminated the mandate in 1966.

In the second round of negotiations between the Contact Group and South Africa, in Oct. of 1977, the Republic's spokesman again refused to agree to a withdrawal of South Africa's troops. Rather, they promised only to begin to reduce the number to about four thousand, after two months had passed, with in the framework of a formal ceasefire by SWAPO, without any armed activity having taken place. The ceasefire would be monitored by the United Nations. The Secretary General would have a representative in the Territory, with U.N. administrative aides, but South Africa would supply the General Administrator (indeed, Judge Stein already fills this role) with his own administrative aides and South Africa would be represented on a council of jurists to settle any disputes that might arise. This is far from the complete United Nations (Council for Namibia) control that Resolution 385 calls for during the elections and preparations for independence. Under the terms of the "Notes" from the Fall discussions, shown to SWAPO probably in December of 1977, at no point would the U.N. have been assured of more than observer military teams in the Territory.

South Africa would continue to have the power as it has always had the the will and interest, to interfere with either the achievement of the full exercise of international rights over the Territory by the U.N., or with the rights of the Namibian people to achieve self determination and reorient their political and economic life away from South Africa.

In the latest round of discussions, culminating in discussions with SWAPO in New York in February, the Contact Group advanced its own proposals aggressively. These provide for reducing South African forces to the level of fifteen hundred men, confined to barracks in two locations (albeit located in the densely populated areas of Ovamboland) with whatever size of U.N. forces the Secretary General may wish to deploy to monitor and to counter them. The future and role of Walvis Bay remains cloudy, and this may have military implications. SWAPO would presumably also have troops monitored and confined within the Territory.

South Africa has indicated acceptance of elections based on universal adult suffrage (presumably with each vote having equal weight) the release of political prisoners (with SWAPO obliged to do the same). But South Africa has not indicated acceptance of the military arrangements. They seem to want to deploy their troops, even if reduced to near the number proposed by the Contact Group, much more widely throughout the Territory and without strict confinement. In a dramatic shift of position, SWAPO has accepted the Western proposals, no doubt under strong pressure not only from the Western states but also from the "Front Line States". The South Africans, on the other hand, packed up and went home. It is highly doubtful that anything more lenient than the latest proposals could assure all segments of the Namibian people an opportunity fully and freely to participate in elections without fear of reprisal and interference by South Africa. It is not yet clear that even these proposed terms could assure that, until the nature and size of the U.N. military force is determined.

Thus, the earlier SWAPO skepticism about the negotiations seems still to have merit: "We are now asked to agree to a ceasefire which, if accepted will mean that we should lay down our arms and order our liberation fighters to surrender themselves in a situation where more than four thousand /the South Africans may be willing to agree to less/ armed forces are deployed ...SWAPO can obviously not agree to a ceasefire which will leave South Africa's army of occupation ... with clear leverage to pre-determine what you call 'political process' in her own favor... We are prepared to
agree to a ceasefire on prior understanding that all South African troops be withdrawn from Namibia before what you call the political process starts...We are prepared to agree to the confinement of our own armed cadres to specified bases in Namibia and to subject them to full supervision and surveillance of United Nations peace keeping forces." SWAPO now indicates its willingness to have a small contingent of South African forces remain, if fully countered by the U.N.

The SWAPO position that demanded complete South African military withdrawal was reasonable. It was in keeping with the full plethora of U.N. resolutions. Should South Africa not accept the last set of proposals the Contact Group's activities must not further weaken the position of the U.N. or the Namibian people. The negotiations must be pressed fully back within the confines of the U.N. resolutions or stopped altogether, as the U.N. prepares to meet its full responsibilities for the Territory. The Western powers should now be ready to use their full resources to help the U.N. be able to do so.

The Contact Group may have been motivated by the belief that continuation or escalation of armed conflict in the area is the worse of the pending prospects. It is not! Continued South African domination is! Or, the Group may simply have felt that it needed quick action to head-off implementation of South Africa's own "internal solution" in the Turnhalle constitution. But the Contact Group has come dangerously close to giving South Africa what it failed to achieve in three decades of trying, international acceptance of a legitimate role in a transition process that may yet block real self determination for the people of Namibia. The process leading toward that result must be altered, and the rights of the international community given more forceful play in it.

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The address made by Ted Lockwood to the founding meeting of ACAS in Houston on November 3, 1977, can be found reprinted in full as "Carter in Southern Africa - The Shape of Things to Come", Southern Africa, Volume X, Number 10, December 1977.

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NEW AUDIO-VISUAL MATERIALS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Soweto Uprising Slide Show, consisting of 155 frames, is available from the International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02138. Fee $25, plus refundable deposit of $65.

Banking on South Africa, South Africa. A carousel slide-cassette tape kit examining the role of United States corporate investments in supporting the racist government of South Africa. Distributed by California Newsreel, 630 Natoma Street, San Francisco, CA 94103.


Massacre at Nyasonia, Zimbabwe. This silent film documents the results of an attack on a defenseless Zimbabwean refugee camp in Mozambique by soldiers of Ian Smith's white minority regime. Distributed by California Newsreel, address above.

Namibia Armed, Namibia. New film produced by SWAPO which examines the task of political education and mobilization. Contact SWAPO, Thea Ben-Gurirab, Room 1401, 801 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10011 for details on distribution.

South Africa: The Rising Tide, South Africa. Using historical footage, this film traces the roots of the student uprisings of 1976, stresses the links among liberation movements of South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, and emphasizes the influence of international organizations on these movements. Distributed by California Newsreel, address above; and Black Arts Celebration, 831 South Wabash, Suite 600, Chicago, IL 60605.

There is No Crisis, South Africa. A film using footage of the 1976 student uprisings and interviews with some of the young black leaders of the movement to document the new spirit of the South African nationalist movement. Distributed by California Newsreel, address above.

White Laager, South Africa. This film describes how the Nationalist government achieved power in South Africa in 1948 and went on to pass a series of laws to preserve and consolidate its power. Contact Peter Davis, Brophy Road, Hurleyville, NY 12747, for details on distribution.
Who Has the Right to Rhodesia? Zimbabwe.

A recent CBS documentary on the new developments in the negotiations for black majority rule in Zimbabwe. Distributed by the Audio-Visual Center, University of Michigan, 416 Fourth Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48103; and Carousel Films, Inc., 1501 Broadway, New York, NY 10036.

Further information on these and other Africa-related audio-visual materials may be obtained by contacting Diane Pflugrad, Coordinator, Africa Media Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824.

MATERIALS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA: NEW AND FORTHCOMING

Books:


Other:

Stop Export-Import Bank Financing of Apartheid, pamphlet, available from Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Ave. N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002. One to ten copies, 15¢ each; 11–50 copies, 10¢ each; over 50 copies, 5¢ each; with petition to Congress and Administration on Export-Import Bank and South Africa.


The Voice of Women, quarterly journal of the African National Congress of South Africa, Women's Section; $10 for American subscribers. Explores the role of women in liberation. VOW, P.O. Box 1791, Lusaka, Zambia.

Southern Africa, foremost Southern Africa news magazine in U.S., monthly, with news summaries, updates on events and nations, action suggestions, material resources. Individuals, $8; institutions, $18. Southern Africa Committee, 156 Fifth Avenue, Room 707, NY, NY 10010.

Africa News, weekly news direct from Africa via radio and telephone, news of current developments, interviews, topical updates (e.g. Uranium in Africa), fact-filled profiles of countries and issues. Special introductory offer at 40% discount: $15 for 48 issues. Africa News, Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702.

Amnesty International, "Treatment of Political Prisoners in South Africa," *Notes and Documents*, Center Against Apartheid, U.N. Dept. of Political and Security Council Affairs, No. 26/77. Other issues of *Notes and Documents* released recently include:

- "The Struggle for Liberation in South Africa: An Irresistible Tide," by Ambassador H.E. Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria), No. 31/77

Recent Congressional Hearings on Southern Africa, (on South Africa, Zimbabwe Development Fund, Rhodesian Sanctions, and Ambassador Young) a list of hearings and their sources, one page, from Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington D.C. 20002.


Samora Machel Speaks/Mozambique Speaks ($1.35) and Arms for Apartheid (10¢), American Committee on Africa, 305 E. 46 St., NY, NY 10017

Southern Africa Must Be Free, pamphlet, American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102, 75¢. A summary of the situation in Southern Africa, some basic data and statistics, suggestions for action and further reading and viewing on Southern Africa.

ACTION PRIORITIES

1. Stop U.S. Export-Import Bank Support of Trade with South Africa

Facts: EXIM supports South Africa by a) agreeing to pay off U.S. banks if South Africa defaults on repayments of loans for the purchase of U.S. equipment, b) insuring U.S. companies against South African payment default, and c) offering discount loans to banks to facilitate trade with South Africa. Since 1971, EXIM's coverage of South African risks has increased five times. For more information, draft petition and special pamphlet, write Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

Action needed: Write the President and the Congress to ask an end of U.S. EXIM support for purchases of American goods by the S.A. government, its agencies, and private interests.

2. Stop Any U.S. Support for an "Internal Settlement" in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia

Facts: The Administration has agreed with the British to a set of proposals which mandate participation by the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front (ZAPU and ZANU) in any Zimbabwean government. Recently, various government sources in Washington have indicated that this has been rethought and that only an "internal settlement" (i.e., with Chirau and the chiefs, Sithole and Muzorewa) is viable. Such an internal settlement will ensure civil war and a government which seeks to exclude the Zimbabwean liberation movements. Such a government is not likely to seek fundamental change in the economic and political structure of the nation, on the basis of which real development and governmental stability can develop.

Action needed: Lobby the Congress and the Administration to renew their commitments to seek and to recognize only a settlement which includes the Patriotic Front in the new government and to refuse to withdraw sanctions from an "internal settlement" government.