

American Committee on Africa  
164 Madison Avenue  
New York, NY 10016

November 26, 1974

Report for: ACOA Executive Board (and a limited group of friends)

From: George M. Houser

Re: Trip to Africa - October 17, 1974 - November 5, 1974

Special note: This report is only semi-confidential, but it is certainly not for publication in its present form. I have dictated this and have not had an opportunity to edit it.

About the trip in general

The occasion for this trip was an invitation from President Kenneth Kaunda to attend the celebration of Zambia's Tenth Anniversary of Independence. I had not expected the trip, but it was too good an offer, with expenses covered by the Zambian Government, not to go. I spent eight days in Zambia. Almost a week of this time was taken up with various special celebration events. It was colorful and exciting in many ways, particularly on the actual anniversary date of independence, October 24. Although there were many representatives from African states and virtually all of the liberation movements in Lusaka for the events, this kind of occasion is not an ideal kind for sitting down for long discussions. There was some opportunity for discussion, of course. However, for the most part it was possible to have

briefers talks with people as we ran into each other or sat beside each other at some of the special events. In this report I will not try to describe the events of the week nor to discuss the Zambian situation itself.

I won't try to list everyone with whom I talked. I will have occasion to mention some of the names of those with whom I talked most at length in the body of this report, although some I will not mention by name because I don't think they ought to be quoted directly or even paraphrased. Nevertheless, among the more notable people with whom I had good discussions were President Kenneth Kaunda, President Samora Machel of FRELIMO, Herbert Chitepo and Henry Hamidzaripi (Chairman and treasurer, respectively, of ZANU), Jason Moyo, Edward Ndlovu and Jane Ngwenya, all of ZAPU; briefly Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO; John Malacela, Foreign Minister of Tanzania; Hashim Mbita, Head of the OAU Liberation Committee; Agostinho Neto, Daniel Chipenda, both of different wings of the MPLA; a number of South Africans connected with both the ANC and PAC, although briefly with Oliver Tambo, the President of the ANC.

Comment on the mood in southern Africa

I was in Africa at a most interesting time. It was just about six months after the coup in Portugal. The independence of Guinea-Bissau had already been recognized by the Portuguese. Agreements had been reached with FRELIMO for the formation of a transitional government in Mozambique and a date for independence next June 25 had been set. During the week, I was in Lusaka the date that the debate in the United Nations Security Council for the expulsion of South Africa was taking place. The vote on the resolution, vetoed by the three western powers took place while I was in Dar es Salaam and I actually was informed of it as I was talking with representatives in the African National Congress office in Dar. Also, while I was in Lusaka, Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa and South Africa's Foreign Minister both made somewhat unusual speeches which attracted wide attention. Furthermore, Kenneth Kaunda responded with his apparently reconciling speech at one of the events during the week of celebration in Zambia.

There is an unmistakeable new mood in southern African affairs as a result of the changes in Portugal and the subsequent changes in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau. Kaunda spoke of this in his speech when he said, "Events of the last few months have changed the course of 500 years of history ...." In speaking of the Rhodesian situation he said, "Black victory is inevitable." To paraphrase him he said further, "The only question is will this victory be brought about by peaceful or violent methods?"

Speeches made by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of South Africa announced that they were having non-interference policy as far as Mozambique was concerned. They said further that South Africa opposed both colonialism and neo-colonialism. They said that South Africa wants to be a part of Africa and that their policy must move in this direction. They wanted to normalize their relations with Black African states and they offered economic assistance of one sort or another if the Black African states wanted to accept it.

In general, I can say about the mood prevailing in southern Africa that it reflects "great expectations". It looks for important change to take place within the very next few years. This spirit is infectious and it is expected that what has happened in the Portuguese territories is now going to spread rather rapidly to Zimbabwe, Namibia, and even in the heartland of white supremacy in South Africa itself. This mood is something which one feels, and it is reflected in any discussion which one has. I can only compare it, to some extent, with the mood which prevailed in 1960, when 17 African countries became independent. However, it is different than then. The present mood is born out of struggle and victory. It is not based on the false premise that independence and freedom will be handed to the people from some force outside of themselves.

I should like now to make some summary comments on impressions I have about the situation in the separate countries that make up southern Africa.

### South Africa

President Kaunda made his "reconciling" speech aimed at South Africa on Saturday, October 26, on the occasion of his receiving a Doctor of Laws degree at the University of Zambia. It caused immediate comment on the spot. I had an opportunity for half or three quarters of an hour discussion with him personally at the State House three days later on October 29. Whatever conclusions one might draw from having heard or having read the speech, it would be impossible to conclude after talking with him, as I did, that he was overly optimistic about changes which were taking place in South Africa itself. In his speech and also in personal discussion he said that there is going to be bitter struggle. This change in South Africa will have to be brought about by the South Africans themselves. Outsiders can help, he said, just as they in northern Rhodesia were helped in their struggle for a free Zambia, or as FRELIMO was aided in a struggle for a free Mozambique and as the Zimbabwean movements as they try to create an independent country. He further said that the African states are not planning to make a military attack on South Africa. But in the speech, Kaunda was not primarily addressing himself to an analysis of apartheid and of the police state inside South Africa itself. His appeal to

South Africa was not based on the assumption that South Africa was becoming liberal. Rather it was based upon a new kind of realism which South Africa could no longer ignore. As he put it to me, South Africa is no longer isolated, no longer surrounded by buffer states, or will not be for very much longer. White South Africans are not anxious for a long period of guerrilla warfare to set in in their country. I was told by one South African leader in exile about a poll which had been taken only a few weeks ago among a sampling of South African whites. The question was asked whether they would leave South Africa if widespread guerrilla warfare broke out. Forty per cent of those questioned indicated that they would leave. Most of the 60 % who said that they would not leave were Afrikaners as over English-speaking. Kaunda's speech was made on the premise that because of the new state of things in southern Africa since the Portuguese coup that South Africa would be seeking ways of protecting herself. Therefore, South Africa might be willing to look both at the future of Rhodesia and of Namibia in a different way. That is why in his speech he made a direct appeal for South Africa to pull her troops out of Rhodesia and to get out of Namibia. This was the real point of Kaunda's speech.

No one with whom I talked felt optimistic about changes in South Africa itself. The contradictions between South Africa's attempt to sound reconciling towards Black Africa and yet following the usual policy of repression inside the country was glaringly apparent as Foreign Minister Muller announced the policy of non-interference towards Mozambique at the same that the South African internal security forces were banning demonstrations by the South African Student Organization and the Black Peoples Convention in support of FRELIMO.

I can summarize some of my impressions from discussions with a good many people about South Africa in the following points:

a. A speeded up action against apartheid and the police state is expected in South Africa. As the representative of the ANC in Dar es Salaam said to me, "This is the most hopeful time ever for South Africa". Change that takes place in one country is bound to be infectious. This is the effect of the change in Mozambique.

b. The old liberation movements, the ANC and the PAC, both are keeping closely in touch with the newer organizations that are arising in South Africa such as the South African Students Organization and the Black People's Convention. I think that most of the leaders of the old groups recognize that new leaders and new groups are being thrust up in South Africa. A concomitant of this is that the old rivalries which existed between these movements exist more on the outside than they do on the inside.

c. The liberation movements on the outside are not making urgent demands on FRELIMO to aid them in their own struggles. They recognize the problems that Mozambique has. It should not be expected that there will be guerrilla attacks launched from Mozambique's border with South Africa by the South African liberation movements in the near future.

d. Again and again the point was made to me that it is a bad mistake for foreign economic interests to think that their investments will be safe in South Africa. The Foreign Minister of Tanzania said to me, "It will become apparent soon enough that these investments will not be safe." Some South African exiled political leaders said to me that the argument for increasing the foreign investments on the theory that this would bring change about was now clearly irrelevant.

### Zimbabwe

A dominant feeling I have after talking with many people on the situation in Zimbabwe is that liberation leaders are confident that the minority white regime will not last a great deal longer. As Henry Hamidzaripi, the treasurer of ZANU, said to me, "Now we are assured of victory". They do not assume this victory will be handed to them nor that it will be easy. The liberation struggle has been speeded up. The guerrilla forces of both ZANU and ZAPU have extended further inside the country with the ZAPU forces being mostly in the north and the west stretching down to the central part of the country, and the ZANU forces in the north and the east, but also apparently in the west. It is assumed by most that ZANU is in the strongest position. However, ZAPU has begun to heal the wounds which were caused with the split in their movement several years ago

when a faction led by James Chikerema and George Nyandoro split to form a new organization called FROLIZI. This last organization, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, is still carrying on, but it is not assumed by most that it is in a very strong position. I did have a chance to talk with Chikerema and Nyandoro and they are still active in planning. Although pressure has been put on the South African government to remove its troops, none of the Zimbabwean leaders with whom I talked said that there was any sign of this happening. In fact, they did not accept the generally held opinion that South Africa meant to pull her troops out any time soon.

One indication that the Smith regime feels a little shaky in Rhodesia in the light of the FRELIMO government in Mozambique is that they have closed up the detention headquarters where many of the ZAPU leaders have been detained for the last ten years. The most prominent of these detainees has been Joshua Nkomo, the President of ZAPU. Gonakudzingwa was a detention camp located at the south-eastern section of Rhodesia and it was practically on the Mozambique border. Obviously it was closed down because it was feared that an attack could be made upon the security of the detention headquarters from across the border in Mozambique. Nkomo is now in prison in Salisbury.

The Smith regime is taking many kinds of desperation measures. I talked with Jane Ngwenya, who is one of the top leaders of ZAPU and she told me of an experience which took place just a few weeks before I arrived, in Botswana, when she was there with another leader of their movement, Ethan Dube. She told me how Dube had been followed by 3 Rhodesian plain-clothes policemen, one an African and two Europeans. They kidnapped him by striking him unconscious and then putting him in their car and driving him across the border into Rhodesia. Jane said herself that she would also have been captured in the same way, but she had stayed at her home that evening because she was not feeling well. No word has been heard from the Rhodesian authorities about the fate of Dube in spite of protests from the Botswana and the Zambian governments.

There are other desperation measures. Just a couple of months ago the ZANU office in the Liberation Center of Lusaka, was bombed in the middle of the night. As a result of this there is the tightest security at the Liberation Center that

I have ever seen in the many years of visiting it. No visitor is allowed to go into the place beyond the reception room any longer. In fact, only the very few designated members of each of the movements is allowed to go in. They must do their real business elsewhere and must carry out all discussions outside of their office.

Perhaps one of the most telling recent incidents reflecting defiance of the Smith regime by Africans, was the almost total failure of a conference (or "indaba") called by Smith with supposed African leaders of his choosing. In spite of the fact that some 150, almost all of them in the pay of the government, were invited to come to this discussion supposedly to deal with some of the issues between the Africans and the white government in Rhodesia, there was a 95% boycott. This has never happened before and those who refused to go to the meeting were certainly jeopardizing their jobs.

Virtually all of the Zimbabweans feel that the Smith government will fall in the next few years. It will not be by an overwhelming military victory. An economic crisis, plus emigration of an increasing number of whites will certainly lead to the collapse. Jane Ngwenya told me that when she was in Francistown, in Botswana, through which the train from Rhodesia passes on its way to South Africa, the southward moving trains were loaded with whites from Rhodesia going to South Africa. The trains going north from South Africa to Rhodesia were almost empty of Europeans. The Zimbabwe liberation leaders do not believe that they will be finally involved in negotiations with the representatives of the white minority in Rhodesia. They think the British will come back in with the breakdown of "law and order". They therefore think that they finally will have to deal with the British. But neither the ZAPU nor the ZANU leaders will be willing to engage in constitutional discussions on how many Africans will be allowed to vote, or how many Africans as over against Europeans will be in the Parliament of Rhodesia. This stage is past. They will be willing to discuss only as FRELIMO discussed with the Portuguese, the transfer of power.

As far as the relations of ZANU and ZAPU to one another are concerned, I had the feeling that they were somewhat improved although still very distant. None of the agreements arranged in



the past for a joint military council, for example are being implemented. However, the organizations are not fighting one another and individuals within them have friendly enough personal relations towards one another. They do not essentially attack one another even in public debate. The attitude is that probably the differences they have cannot be satisfactorily dealt with in exile. It is hoped that they can be dealt with, they will be dealt with creatively as they can again take open and legitimate political action inside the country. If they cannot come to some kind of an agreement inside the country, then there will be serious repercussions. President Kaunda told me that as soon as Nkomo and Sithole are released from prison, he hopes to invite them to come and talk with him in Lusaka to see if they cannot come to some kind of working arrangement. There are no very apparent ideological differences between the movements. They do have certain practical differences. One of these is their attitude towards the African National Council of Bishop Muzorewa. ZAPU takes a much more tolerant attitude towards it than ZANU. Some of the ZANU leaders with whom I spoke thought that it ought to go out of existence because it had outlived its usefulness. The ZAPU leaders tended to think that it still had a role to perform as a legal organization of African opinion inside the country. Neither one sees the organization as a valid competitor to their own political standing.

### Angola

I can only make a few comments on the Angolan situation from my discussion with Agostinho Neto, Daniel Chipenda, and a visit to the FNLA headquarters in Kinshasa. Of course, a discussion of the Angolan situation came up in talks with many other people as well. The main issue now is: Who can the Portuguese negotiate with in order to establish a government that will lead to full independence? As is well known now the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA all exist. To further complicate the problem the MPLA has now split into three factions. Although there were attempts made under the sponsorship of the OAU to heal the breach between these factions, these efforts have not been successful. Agostinho Neto, who has been the President of the MPLA ever since 1962, is recognized as the head of the MPLA by the OAU and is supported in this by Kaunda and Nyerere. The faction led by Daniel Chipenda now has headquarters in Kinshasa. He receives some support from President Mobutu of Zaire and also has a co-operating arrangement with Holden Roberto of the FNLA. The other MPLA faction is led by

Pinto deAndrade and has a headquarters in Brazzaville.

The hope of Kaunda and Nyerere is that all of the movements will form a coalition at least for negotiating purposes with the Portuguese. Efforts are being made in this direction now. It remains to be seen how successful this effort will be. At the time I was in Africa my impression was that FNLA, MPLA-Chipenda, MPLA-Andrade, and UNITA probably could form a negotiating front. But also at that time Neto was not close to agreement. In my talks with Neto in Dar es Salaam he indicated that he would make a proposal of his own to Holden Roberto. If this was not accepted, then he would try to negotiate separately with the Portuguese.

The FNLA, UNITA, and MPLA-Neto have all established headquarters in Luanda. At the time I was in Kinshasa I visited FNLA headquarters. Holden Roberto had just gone to the airport to see off the second contingent of his representatives going to Luanda. By the 5th of November, the FNLA had more than one hundred of their representatives who had flown into Luanda from Kinshasa. The FNLA is certainly in a strong position in that they probably have the largest military establishment, have received training from Chinese instructors, has the financial and logistic backing of President Mobutu of Zaire, has a half million Angolan refugees in Zaire to call upon, and because of his backing from Zaire has a long border with Angola. However, the real question is what kind of support any of these movements have inside Angola. Without doubt, Dr. Neto has a great deal of support in the Luanda area. Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, has a great deal of support in southern and in eastern Angola. Chipenda, through his faction of the MPLA, has the support of many of the military leaders who have been leading the struggle in eastern Angola since 1966.

The real danger is even if a coalition is formed for discussing arrangements for independence with the Portuguese, any agreements will not last. Can an uneasy coalition hold together long enough to form a stable government?

### Mozambique

My intention when I left New York for this trip was to include my first visit to Mozambique. I had even been successful in receiving a visa to enter Mozambique through the Portuguese Consulate in New York. However I planned to clear my intention

with FRELIMO leaders in Lusaka. This I did as early as possible after I arrived in Lusaka. I talked especially with Jorge Rebelo, the secretary for information of FRELIMO (still based in Dar es Salaam), and Mariano Matcinha, formerly the FRELIMO representative in Zambia and now the Minister of Labor in the FRELIMO transitional government of Mozambique. After several discussions with them about my proposed five day visit to Lourenco Marques, it was finally clear to me that they were not encouraging their friends to visit Mozambique at this time. They did not say to me "Don't go". They said we are "not encouraging our friends to go at this time". Their reason essentially was that they were not prepared under present circumstances to give proper attention to such visits. I felt that I had no alternative but to accept this advice. I think they appreciated it. This meant that I had additional time to stay in Dar es Salaam and also to fit in a visit to Kinshasa. One reason I was glad for this new plan, in spite of my disappointment in not being able to visit Mozambique now, was that I felt that I would have more time to talk with Janet Mondlane, and to Samora Machel and other FRELIMO leaders. This alternative plan worked well.

In Dar es Salaam I had a good opportunity to talk with Janet about the future plans of the Mozambique Institute and the intentions of FRELIMO regarding certain Institute projects which we had been helping support through the Africa Fund based in Tanzania. I also had about four hours on two different days with Samora. I can summarize some of these discussions in the following points:

1. There are tremendous transitional problems in Mozambique. This is illustrated in the educational field by the fact that many of the teachers in the existing schools in Mozambique have left. Some of them were married to military people. Others are Europeans who are leaving the country. This means that FRELIMO will be short handed for trained school teachers. Also there will be a shortage of materials, particularly the kind that FRELIMO would want for their own school curriculum. Therefore, for the time-being FRELIMO will have to work through an educational structure which they have inherited while they prepare new material and seek new teaching personnel.

2. The three principal projects of the Mozambique Institute in Tanzania will be continued for the indefinite future. These projects are the secondary school at Bagamoyo; the hospital and medical training work at Mtwara; and the children's and women's work at Tunduru. There are now 274 students in the secondary school at Bagamoyo. They are currently up to the 8th grade. They plan to continue this at least through the 9th year and possibly through the 10th. This will be a principal training ground for teachers and others in technical aspects of governmental work in an independent Mozambique. Perhaps much more attention will be given in this school for technical training. At Mtwara it will be important to continue the nurses training program as well as the medical program for the many Mozambicans who are still in southern Tanzania. The Tunduru Center will continue to be used as a training center for women and also a preparatory training center for younger children. They are already in the process of building new classrooms at Tunduru and they hope to have at least another thousand children there in addition to the thousand or 1500 already there. They need an improvement in their water and electrification system. They also have a animal husbandry project well advanced and this will continue. They already raised many pigs, cows and goats there.

3. FRELIMO earnestly seeks our continued support for their projects, both in Tanzania and in Mozambique itself. Particularly mentioned were their needs for 9 to 12 ton trucks for transportation purposes inside Mozambique and also inside Tanzania. The trucks are needed for internal distribution of food and for the transportation of agricultural products etc. At the three projects in Tanzania they need all kinds of regular supplies just to keep the institutions running. The project which we have done just a little bit about to supply plows for farmers to use inside Mozambique is still very current. They need seeds for planting. They need school materials. They need medical supplies. If I can paraphrase both Samora and Janet, they said to me, you know what the general situation is. Just use your own judgement on how best you can present the case for raising funds or getting supplies. We are just too busy these days to be able to put out carefully prepared reports outlining all of our needs.

In the course of our discussion Samora invited me to come back to Mozambique soon. He suggested that I come by the end of December which I told him would be impossible. However, I expressed the hope that it could be arranged for some time in early 1975, perhaps with a delegation of others. He indicated that they would help to organize this in any way that would be helpful to us. He in effect said, "Come to Mozambique. See what the needs are for yourself and discover how you can best help." Of course, the needs of Mozambique are far beyond the ability of a small, private organization to adequately meet. They need governmental assistance. Samora told me that he had had an hour's discussion with Donald Easum, the present assistant secretary for Africa at the U.S. State Dept.. Just what approaches the Mozambique government will take to the United States government in view of U.S. support for Portuguese colonialism over so many years, remains to be seen. Nevertheless I know that some discussion took place regarding grants, loans or credits. Apparently Easum indicated that the U.S. would recognize the Mozambique independent government right after independence next June 25.

I had met Samora Machel personally only once before. This was four years ago, 1970. He is a forceful, engaging, unpretentious person who gives strong leadership to FRELIMO and no doubt will to the government of Mozambique. He dislikes bureaucracy and told me that he looks with some distaste to the inevitability of being caught up in it to a certain extent after he is the head of the government. He does not like to stay in an office and one can expect him to be a travelling president who will go to the scene of the trouble to give it personal attention. He has a lively sense of humor and an easy way with people. I detected nothing but the deepest regards coming from his comrades.

From talking with a number of people not connected with FRELIMO although the conclusions were bolstered by discussions with FRELIMO, the FRELIMO troops in Mozambique are exercising amazing discipline. In talking with some newspapermen who had been in Lourenco Marques during the brief outbreak of violence, the white Portuguese were fearful what would happen when FRELIMO troops came in. They had the picture that they were "terrorists". They feared for their lives. This impression was spelled to a

great degree by the press conference, nationally broadcast, which Joaquim Chissano, the FRELIMO Prime Minister, had on the occasion of his investiture. He spoke both in faultless English and Portuguese. He was also able to speak French. Many newspaper people were on hand from the South African press. With his direct answers and obvious intelligence, Chissano disarmed many who carried deep-seated fears. Also, the FRELIMO troops parolling the streets of Lourenco Marques had been very restrained. Without a superficial fraternization with the people on the streets of Lourenco Marques, they have been instructed to and have "free conversation" with those who stop them with questions. So far, all reports indicate that they have acquitted themselves admirably.

It can be expected that FRELIMO will not undertake an aggressive policy towards South Africa. The leaders maintain a discreet policy of saying that everyone knows what FRELIMO stands for in this regard but their policy is one of defending their own borders, and not attacking others.

### Namibia

I spent very limited time talking with SWAPO leaders about the Namibian situation. I can summarize some of my impressions under these points:

1. The SWAPO leaders reflect the same kind of expectation of a changing situation in southern Africa that others do. They feel that there is an atmosphere of excitement inside Namibia.

2. They don't see any sign that South Africa is preparing to leave Namibia. In fact, it seems to be generally believed that South Africa would still like to simplify their problem in Namibia by creating a Bantustan. If this were accomplished, it would separate the most heavily populated African section of the country from the rest of it and leave the European group the largest of the population groups in what would be left of "South-West Africa". It seems doubtful that South Africa could get away with implementing this plan under present circumstances. Nevertheless, she may try.

3. SWAPO is following with great interest the elections for the Ovamboland legislature in January. They are working for

a boycott of the election. If there is an effective boycott it would certainly go a long way toward stopping South Africa from attempting to create an Ovamboland-Bantustan.

### U.S. Policy

I had brief discussions with <sup>personnel</sup> ~~personnel~~ in the American embassy in Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, and Kinshasa. There was nothing new that I learned about U.S. policy from these discussions. An interesting fact was that all of the U.S. ambassadors from southern African countries were meeting for a week of policy discussions in Lusaka beginning on November 4. It will be interesting to try to find out what transpired in these discussions and if any new directions may have been agreed upon.

The further and perhaps more important factor however is that my discussions with U.S. personnel reinforced the information which we already have, namely that the Bureau of African Affairs has very little influence on the thinking and the policies of Kissinger. And furthermore Kissinger is not very interested in nor involved in Africa.

Donald Easum was on an extensive tour of Southern African countries. I ~~came~~ across his trail both in Lusaka and in Dar es Salaam. He was visiting Mozambique and Angola, South Africa Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. We will have to wait to see what impression this trip and the conversations held may have had on him.

### Suggestions for immediate follow-up

This is not the occasion to try to outline a total program for ACOA or Africa Fund. However, a few suggestions seem apparent to me;

1. ACOA or Africa Fund could again activate a program which we carried out quite extensively a number of years ago - arranging speaking tours across the U.S. for selected African leaders. I think some Namibian leaders would be particularly important in this connection.

2. I strongly recommend that we try to arrange for delegations to visit both Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. We need to see first hand what the situation is in each of these places and how we can continue to help out within our means. Furthermore, we may come out with certain recommendations regarding government policy.

3. We should give renewed emphasis to our campaign for American economic withdrawal from South Africa. It is clear to me that under the present circumstances increased American investment, far from being a factor in bringing change about in South Africa, even more bolsters up the minority white regime there.