



25 August 1992

## U.N. Presence in S. Africa

*The Security Council of the United Nations on 17 August, voting unanimously, authorized Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to send UN observers to South Africa 'to help end violence in that country.' This follows upon a 10-day late July visit to South Africa by former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance acting as the S-G's special representative, during which he had an impressive number of meetings with wide-ranging parties. Despite earlier snorting by South African foreign minister Pik Botha ('I cannot see how you can end the violence that way'), Pretoria, after several days of stalling, announced it had agreed to the UN observers being stationed around the country to monitor political violence and the 'reform process'.*

*The Secretary-General made his observations to the Security Council based on his discussions with Secretary Vance and his entourage. Here are some excerpts:*

It is neither necessary nor possible here to recount the far-reaching work being undertaken by Justice Richard Goldstone, Chairman of the Commission of Enquiry into Public Violence and Intimidation....I believe that the efforts of the Goldstone Commission should be supported by the international community and the recommendations of the Commission should be fully and speedily implemented by the Government and, when so required, by the parties in South Africa. I believe that those (recommendations) relating to a total ban on the public display of dangerous weapons and the security of hostels need to be acted upon with utmost urgency, as recent events have sadly proven necessary. Further, I believe that the Commission's code of conduct for mass demonstrations can do much to control violence. It is also necessary, in my view, that the leaders of the major political parties should....take firm steps to stop their supporters from participating in acts of violence.

*(continued, over)*



The long-standing capacity for violence by the various political groups in South Africa is so central to the lack of trust in the political life of the country that I feel it must be remedied. Accordingly, I recommend that the Goldstone Commission under take a series of investigations into the functioning and operations of certain agencies, inter alia, the army and police, the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the KwaZulu police and, more generally, certain private 'security firms'.....While such investigations would widen the scope of work of the Goldstone Commission, they could be undertaken within its present terms of reference. Should the Commission need further financing for its expanded work, I would urge the Government to be forthcoming.....

The reports of the Goldstone Commission when written are, at present, submitted first to the State President and only after being reviewed by the Government are they made public more widely. I believe political and public opinion in South Africa would welcome the reports being made available to all signatories of the National Peace Accord within 24 hours of submission to the State President.....

The National Peace Accord of 14 September 1991 establishes a comprehensive framework, agreed upon by all the major parties, organizations and groups of South Africa, to end violence and to facilitate socio-economic development and reconstruction. The mechanisms foreseen under the Accord, however, lack teeth and need to be greatly strengthened. This was the unanimous view of all those who discussed this matter with the United Nations delegation, including those who are associated with the existing structures of the National Peace Secretariat.

Both the National Peace Committee and the National Peace Secretariat need to be more consistently and substantially supported from the highest political levels, as do the 11 regional dispute resolution committees covering all parts of the country. Most importantly, they require financing and full-time staff of the requisite calibre. Further, there is desperate need for efficient, functioning offices or operations centres at the major 'flash-points'; these should be staffed on a 24-hour basis and fully funded and equipped. For each of such offices there should be a standing group composed of representatives of the Government, ANC, Inkatha and other concerned parties. Such offices should be capable at all times of acting immediately to defuse incipient problems; they should have prompt and direct access to law enforcement agencies.....

Given the mechanisms already established by the National Peace Accord, to which all parties have agreed, I have concluded that, at this stage, the wisest course of action would be to strengthen and reinforce those mechanisms. Such action would, in my view, contribute tangibly to enhancing the capacity of indigenous structures that can play a major role in the building of peace, both in the present and in the future. I recommend, accordingly, that the United Nations make available some 30 observers to serve in South Africa, in close association with the National Peace Secretariat, in order to further the purposes of the Accord. The observers would be stationed in agreed upon locations, in various parts of South Africa. As necessary, their number could be supplemented by other appropriate international organizations, such as the Commonwealth, the EC and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).....

I would also urge that the Government act expeditiously to ensure the early appointment of the Justices of Peace and the establishment of the special criminal courts envisaged in the National Peace Accord.....

For all of its shortcomings, the CODESA process must be pursued and improved. I believe it needs to encourage others, who have not yet joined, to do so, in the interests of the country and of peace....There is a manifest need to establish a deadlock-resolving machinery at the highest political level.....There may well be need for CODESA to consider the appointment of an eminent and impartial person, who need not be a foreigner, to draw the strings together and to provide the impetus and cohesion that CODESA needs to accomplish its tasks.

....The role of the international community and of the United Nations in particular can, at this moment, be profound and beneficial. It can facilitate a great and peaceful transition of historic proportion in a part of the world that has suffered too long.



# Trapped in the web of military power

**President de Klerk is powerless to act against the hard men of South Africa's army, a former intelligence officer tells John Carlin in Johannesburg**

A DISAFFECTED former senior South African intelligence officer says that contingency plans exist for a military takeover if the old white-dominated order is ever genuinely threatened. Colonel Gert Hugo, who resigned his commission in July 1991 after a 12-year career in military intelligence, says that he and his commanding officer received a top-secret message from Pretoria in early 1990, shortly after Nelson Mandela's release. The message amounted, he said, to a plan for "a silent coup" in the event of the African National Congress reaching the threshold of power.

Whether President FW de Klerk is aware of the schemings or not, he is powerless to act against the hard men in the military, Col Hugo says. The South African Military Intelligence have so much dirt on the cabinet — so much evidence of complicity in past crimes — that the generals have become untouchable.

"In early 1990, shortly after Mandela's release, all SADF [South African Defence Force] groups in South Africa received a top-secret signal from Pretoria. I was the senior intelligence officer in Group Eight, East London, at the time. The signal, which was addressed

JOHANNESBURG (Reuters) — Judge Richard Goldstone, who is probing violence in South Africa, has ordered a company investigating the erasure of taped police radio messages on the night of the Boipatong massacre to stop its inquiry, the Johannesburg *Sunday Times* said yesterday. He ordered the consultants Grinaker Electronic Agencies to halt investigations after discovering the firm had business links with the South African Defence Force.

The newspaper also reported that Wilhelm Verwoerd, 30, the grandson of the former South African prime minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, the main architect of rigid apartheid, has joined the African National Congress.

only to the top intelligence officer and the commanding officer, warned of a threat of uprising, anarchy and revolutionary overthrow spearheaded by the ANC.

"The hidden message, but it was absolutely clear, was that we had to make contingency plans for a total military take-over when this happened. My officer commanding, for example, envisaged imposing martial law — judge, jury and executioner."

And Col Hugo, who retains close links with the military, said the plan still exists today. "Under lock and key at every group headquarters is an operational contingency plan with a copy at army headquarters. It's a contingency plan for a coup." Those in the know, he said, are sworn to keep the plan hidden, even from their fellow officers.

Senior officers of "MI" secretly empowered in the 1980s by then President P W Botha to control their country's political destiny, show no inclination to bow to the apparent drift to democracy in the 1990s. The openness which goes hand in hand with unfettered democracy is the biggest threat to the generals' power, said Col Hugo.

After a number of conversations over a six-week period, Col Hugo agreed to give an on-the-record interview. Engaged in dirty tricks operations as recently as last year, he has worked closely with the most contentious, and least known, figure on the South African political scene today, General Christoffel van der Westhuizen, the head of MI.

Gen van der Westhuizen is the man whose name appeared in an earlier signal document authorising "the permanent removal from society" of four black political activists assassinated in 1985. He is the man who must ultimately take the blame for the MI plot revealed in the *Independent* last month to kill the London-based police defector, Dirk Coetzee. Such has been Mr de Klerk's powerlessness that, three months after the initial exposure, the general has not even been suspended from his duties, leaving him free to deploy MI's vast resources to the task of covering up his tracks.

Col Hugo takes it as read that MI have been turning the wheel of political violence which has claimed 7,000 lives in the past two years. "Some of the attacks, some of the train massacres for example, bear the unmistakable hallmarks of the Special Forces reconnaissance regiments. Others are pure Koevoet [the fearsome 'Crowbar' police unit used in the Namibian war]."

The phenomenon generally of "black-on-black" killings — the township wars between Inkatha and ANC supporters — "has been a dream come true". But now, after countless allegations of orchestrated mass murder, Mr de Klerk is under growing domestic and international pressure to axe some heads. Why doesn't he?

"The most powerful reason why he can't act is that he and his ministers don't know even the half of what is still going on today, but they're still implicated because many of them were part of the system under Botha. If he were to go after 'Joffel' — the in-house nickname for Gen van der Westhuizen — he would send a message to other senior officers with dirty hands and the spin-off would be that all would open up, all the beans would spill. The top brass, simply, have got too much dirt on the cabinet."

Another reason for Mr de Klerk's paralysis is that, in the worst of cases, he fears "a take-over, a palace coup or whatever".

The perceived threat represented by "the enemy", the ANC, was magnified "2,000 per cent" by a military intelligence apparatus eager to secure high budgets from the politicians and by individual officers eager to enhance their own importance and that of their operational regions.

An example of this hyperbole is provided in a secret military document obtained by the *Independent* and dated as recently as 17 January 1991, which shows that the ANC is still classified as "the enemy" and is perceived to have intensified its "revolutionary momentum". "Aim of Enemy", the document says, is "to take over the government of the RSA through negotiations, whilst retaining the ability to violently overthrow the government".

The secret military document reveals detailed contingencies involving political manipulation — including the media — and counter-insurgency urban operations in which "attention must be given to the protection of white residential areas".

As chief of Ciskei intelligence, Col Hugo watched the unfolding of what he called a classic "total strategy" scheme to develop, through the creation of a political party known as the African

Democratic Movement, a perfect replica of the Inkatha project. The difference being that whereas the branch of the Zulu nation represented by Inkatha was recruited to the "total strategy" cause in the mid-Eighties, the ADM and the leader of the Ciskei, Oupa Gqozo were enlisted in 1990, well into Mr de Klerk's rule and after negotiations with the ANC had begun.

"A front company was set up in the Ciskei called International Research and headed by an undercover SADF intelligence officer, Kommandant Anton Nieuwoudt. The task was to win Gqozo's confidence at a time when he was leaning towards the ANC and poison his mind with stories of ANC plots

to kill him. Having reduced him to a paranoid wreck, they set about — just as they did with Buthelezi and Inkatha — buying off tribal headmen and getting them to join the ADM. Politically the ADM is as close to the government as Inkatha — unquestioned allies against the ANC."

In the short term, the violence and the manipulation has an effect. But in the long term, as a rebellion right now against Oupa Gqozo in the Ciskei indicates, it all seems so counter-productive. Why do they keep going?

"The problem is that still today, 60 per cent of SADF officers cling to the total onslaught theory, and respond to it as they always have. The official view is

that the enemy has not changed. The Communists are in the country now and even if they're down now they'll rise up again unless checked. That gives you an idea of how deep the indoctrination goes."

But it is not only ideology that motivates the SADF's hidden persuaders. "There's the perception that negotiations will be helped along in De Klerk's favour — that is, in favour of the whites — if the machine keeps turning over. There are simpler motives. Like the fear that, 'God! I'm going to lose my job!' There's the motivation of being guilty as hell. And very, very important to understand these people, there's the buzz of the game, the addiction to power."



# A shady life of dirty tricks and 'funnies'



Gert Hugo: 'The message was that we had to plan for a military takeover'

DIRTY tricks used to be Colonel Gert Hugo's bread and butter. He joined the South African Defence Force (SADF) in 1974 and Military Intelligence (MI) in 1979, when he was moved to Namibia to join the war against the Swapo freedom fighters.

Functioning in a special unit which infiltrated Swapo, he was involved in cross-border operations into Angola. He ran agents and established covert networks on both sides of the border.

Between 1983 and 1985 he went underground, posing as a water affairs official in Oshakati in northern Namibia where, pony-tailed and heavily bearded, he lived in a large house with a black woman as cover for cross-border infiltration.

In 1986 he moved to Port Elizabeth,

under the command of General van der Westhuizen, whom he described as charming, handsome, brilliant and adored by women.

Here he met and worked with the army's covert "Hammer" unit and engaged in what he called "funnies" — political operations, often with the police, involving, for example, breaking down doors, kidnapping and interrogating activists. In 1989 he was appointed chief intelligence officer in the SADF's East London unit. By this stage his disillusionment with the SADF was almost complete.

"When I was stationed in Namibia, the enemy had a uniform and a gun — a gun pointed at you. It was war. It was clean. Now I had become involved in party politics, in shady operations

against an enemy I could not clearly define." He felt abused, he said — a feeling shared by some, if not a majority, of SADF officers.

In August 1990 he moved to one of the SADF's more thinly disguised surrogate outfits, the Ciskei Defence Force. In July last year he himself fell victim to dirty tricks, he said, when he was convicted on charges of stealing 18,000 rand (£3,500) after exposing an MI plan to manipulate the Ciskei leader Oupa Gqozo into becoming an instrument of the secret nationwide war against the ANC. He resigned his commission and since then he has been unemployed.

A bitter man with powerful enemies whom he would like to see fall, he plans, if he can, to leave the country soon.

THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH AUGUST 23 1992

## INTERNATIONAL

# Generals put de Klerk under the Hammer

AN INCIDENT seven years ago at night on a lonely road near a wild elephant reserve in the Eastern Cape has triggered the biggest political predicament for F.W. de Klerk in his three turbulent years as South Africa's State President.

Matthew Goniwe, a school-teacher and popular leader in the Eastern Cape of the United Democratic Front, a cover organisation for the then outlawed African National Congress, was driving with three black companions to their home in the small inland town of Cradock after a meeting in Port Elizabeth.

Near the Addo Elephant Reserve they ran into a road-block. They were pulled from their car and stabbed several times. One man was shot dead and another strangled with telephone wire.

When the bodies of Goniwe, Ford Calata, Sparrow Mkonto and Sicelo Mhlauli were found at Blue Water Bay near Port Elizabeth, their faces had been burned away. The hands of one victim had been chopped off. The numberplates had been removed

from Goniwe's car and replaced with false ones. The inquest concluded only that they had been murdered by "unknown persons".

At the time the "Cradock Four" were murdered in mid-1985, the exiled ANC leadership in Zambia had launched a campaign "to make South Africa ungovernable".

Black anger was met by the white fist of the "total onslaught" strategy controlled by the State Security Council, a body which superseded the civilian Cabinet and consisted of the then President P.W. Botha, an inner core of ministers and all the military, police and security chiefs. The Council was served by a secretariat headed by a South African Defence Force general from Military Intelligence. Below it were 12 regional Joint Management Centres roughly coinciding with the military command areas and usually headed by an SADF brigadier. The Eastern Cape was one, with its HQ in Port Elizabeth.

Goniwe's murder may have faded into the mists of Afri-

by Fred Bridgland  
in Johannesburg

can history but for a chain of events this year, the latest of which was the murder last Monday of a white Addo farmer, Andre de Villiers. He was gunned down at his farmhouse not long after he announced that he had begun supplying information to the ANC linking the Goniwe assassinations to a clandestine SADF hit squad known as "Hammer" operating out of Port Elizabeth. De Villiers, 42, told friends he had gone to the ANC because he was exasperated by police and government refusal to consider his evidence.

De Klerk's problem is that recent revelations have shown that Hammer was established and trained by the SADF officer then in charge of the Eastern Cape, Brigadier Christoffel Joffel van der Westhuizen. Van der Westhuizen is now Chief of Staff of Military Intelligence and one of the most powerful men in the land. According to intelligence sources, de Klerk



President de Klerk: problems piling up

has regarded Van der Westhuizen as an ally in his struggle to contain a "third force" within the security establishment which seems bent upon undermining his political initiatives for a phased transition to multi-party, multi-racial democracy.

De Villiers's murder, and a mass of evidence collected by Eastern Cape Attorney-General Michael Hodgson, suggest that members of Hammer are still operating, giving the

ANC its strongest ammunition yet for its contention that a "third force" is behind much of the violence destabilising South Africa.

Hodgson's main witnesses have gone into hiding. A prime Hammer unit suspect is a Port Elizabeth police officer who once kept a human hand in a glass jar in pickling fluid on his office desk to terrorise black detainees under interrogation. The human hand has since been replaced with severed baboon hands.

Van der Westhuizen, whom de Klerk noticeably declined to defend at a press conference last Thursday, has been unavailable to the press since the publication in May of a message he sent in 1985 to the State Security Council. This sought authorisation for Goniwe and others to be "permanently removed from society as a matter of urgency". The request was sent on June 7 1985. Two weeks later, Goniwe and his friends were dead.

In 1987, Van der Westhuizen set up another Hammer unit in Johannesburg whose

activities are now under investigation by journalists and human rights activists.

Van der Westhuizen's — and de Klerk's — troubles were compounded in April when two SADF Military Intelligence members were caught by British Intelligence in London. Their mission was to assassinate former South African Police death-squad leader Captain Dirk Coetzee with the help of Ulster Loyalist paramilitaries. Coetzee, living in Britain under Scotland Yard protection, has long been recognised by MI6 as a target of "third force" killers, not only because he has exposed the activities of SAP death-squads but because he possesses evidence which can implicate others in "third force" operations.

Seventeen angry fax exchanges took place between John Major and de Klerk as UK-South Africa relations plunged to their lowest since de Klerk became president in 1989. Eventually, the assassins were quietly spirited back to Pretoria. One was Captain Pamela du Randt,

former personal assistant of General van der Westhuizen.

As de Villiers was being buried yesterday, and Hodgson continued unearthing new leads in the Goniwe-van der Westhuizen affair, de Klerk was coming under pressure to sack his top generals, including van der Westhuizen, Police Commissioner General Johan van der Merwe and SADF chief General Kat Liebenberg, who was in charge of Special Forces and covert units from 1982 to 1985.

De Klerk would prefer to avoid a purge of the generals because he needs a stable security force in case of an irretrievable breakdown in constitutional negotiations with the ANC.

At the same time, friendly foreign governments are warning him he cannot allow Rambo to embarrass him further.

As a Johannesburg Star newspaper columnist commented last week: "There is a risk in de Klerk confronting the monster his National Party has created, but the risk of not confronting it is even greater."



# Changes in South Africa Are Less Than They Seem

## *Bureaucracy, White Attitudes Impede Reform*

By David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Foreign Service

JOHANNESBURG—Even in the New South Africa, change seems exceedingly slow in coming.

Real change, in fact, has often been a chimera. The legal pillars of apartheid have tumbled one by one. But many of apartheid's structures and practices are still alive, deeply rooted in this racially taut society.

"The Great Imagining" of Johnny Clegg, the white South African pop singer, has not taken place. Whites and blacks have not joined hands to build the multiracial new South Africa he evoked.

Instead, whites are retreating into old enclaves of privilege and building new ones.

The government has latched onto the idea, new to this country, of federalism, casting it in some ways as a remake of the old apartheid concept of "own affairs" and "own communi-

ty." As it is understood here, federalism would let whites maintain control over their own separate communities, way of life and facilities at the local level when blacks take over in Pretoria.

"Assimilation is not what's on the minds of whites," said one Western diplomat. "They are going back into their old enclaves."

President Frederik W. de Klerk, probably South Africa's most astute white leader ever, started out in February 1990 to shift radically the course of the old apartheid state. But while the list of his reforms is long, white society and the government bureaucracy have worked to vitiate them.

Only half-hearted attempts have been made to root the reforms in a white community of 4.5 million people, most of whom were initially unreceptive and later outright reactionary. The result is a kaleidoscope of half-reforms and partial changes that often seem to have no pattern.

See APARTHEID, A28, Col. 1

The early months were heady times. De Klerk stuck to his word to the international community, particularly the U.S. Congress, and met all the markers set down for re-admission into the community of nations.

At a breathtaking pace, de Klerk lifted the ban on anti-apartheid groups and a state of emergency, freed ANC leader Nelson Mandela and thousands of other political prisoners—and plunged into negotiations with black leaders whose names the local press had been forbidden to publish for 30 years.

De Klerk scrapped the Land Acts that had turned 87 percent of the country's land into a white preserve. He canceled the Group Areas Act that had sealed whites, blacks, Indians and mixed-race coloreds into separate worlds. And he ended the system of classifying all South Africans according to race.

Anti-apartheid groups were allowed to hold marches and rallies, call for the white government's overthrow and insult authorities freely. Blacks were permitted to engage in protest politics, if not yet to vote, without fear of being thrown into jail as Communist subversives.

For this keeping of promises, de Klerk was applauded by the international community, which began peeling away the layers of sanctions—economic, political and sports—that had isolated the white minority government for three decades.

Finally, last March, de Klerk won overwhelmingly an all-white referendum endorsing his reforms and constitutional talks with black leaders. This allowed him to stand on the steps of his presidential residence in Cape Town and proclaim "we have closed the book on apartheid."

Not quite, if one pays attention to the details. The old apartheid system, even the constitution, is largely intact.

The 10 so-called "self-governing" or "independent" black homelands—keystones of the failed apartheid plan to spin off blacks into their own separate "nations"—have remained. The apartheid system of separate government departments for each race group has continued. Changes in most basic structures of the apartheid system, the white government told blacks, would have to await the outcome of constitutional talks.

The government also has not been eager to undertake affirmative action programs or make grand gestures to show blacks that the "old" South Africa is really dead. Reforms emptied of their content are legion.

De Klerk made a token effort in 1990 to deal with what the government calls "backlogs" in housing and social services for blacks. He created the Independent Development Trust and funded it with \$900 million, half from sale of strategic oil reserves, for barebone relief projects.

But there were no massive public works projects to employ the 43 percent of the black labor force that is out of work. Nor has there been any mass housing scheme to help the 3.6 million squatters and backyard shack dwellers in urban areas.

For the country's 33 million blacks, apartheid in education has been largely untouched. The government steadfastly has resisted all appeals by the black community to integrate the 14 separate education departments into one structure dispensing equal education to all.

Only for whites did the education system change. The government handed schools over to white communities and empowered them to decide whether the doors would be open to blacks. The new policy was not called "own affairs," the language of the old apartheid system. But in practice, it gave whites the power to keep their schools segregated just like before.

The result has been that barely a few thousand blacks are attending formerly all-white schools. The one attempt to open to all races three formerly white schools in the white Johannesburg suburbs ended in the three turning all black. White parents refused to take the chance.

The government made a noisy announcement, for instance, that segregation in hospitals was ending. But it quietly allowed local communities to continue segregating the races in separate wards.

Nor has anything changed in the election system. There are still three separate houses of Parliament. Blacks do not vote. Whites, mixed-race Coloreds and Indians have continued to hold separate elections.

The first chance blacks were given to vote was in a referendum in the Johannesburg suburb of Yeoville, where, with much fanfare, they were allowed to join whites several months ago in deciding the direction of traffic along the main street.

The Separate Amenities Act of 1953, which kept blacks out of white parks, pools, libraries and restaurants, has been scrapped. But in the small rural *dorps*, or villages, local white authorities have increased fees for public facilities or rendered them inaccessible to blacks wanting to use them.

Shortly after working hours end at 5 p.m., blacks who are not maids or house boys in white homes are out of the white suburbs and back in their old segregated townships. Just like old times.

There are still few laws to enforce integration, so it is extremely difficult for blacks to take discrimination cases to court. The old apartheid laws made it an offense to enter whites-only public facilities. But there are no new laws making it an offense to refuse entry to blacks.

Results of the attempted land reforms have been meager. The Magopa people, whom apartheid had forced from their traditional lands near the city of Ventersdorp, west of Johannesburg, last year re-occupied them. They had part of it legally restored to them in June, but their most fertile land remains leased out to a white farmer.

The Majeng people in mid-June went back to their old land, near Kimberley in the northern Cape Province. They wanted to stake a claim to their ancestors' land. But they discovered local authorities had early this year illegally sold 2,400 acres of it to six white farmers.

"Nothing has changed," said Ken Margo, a spokesman for the Transvaal Rural Action Committee. "The government has not conceded these were forced removals and therefore people should get their land back."

In the Central Witwatersrand, the region around Johannesburg, whose population growth is the country's highest, white authorities have come up with a development plan that would settle the hundreds of thousands of recent black arrivals in new communities that will be as far as possible from the white suburbs of Pretoria and Johannesburg.

"This is the apartheid city, ladies and gentlemen, for Pretoria's development," commented Ann Bernstein, an urban planning specialist at the Urban Foundation here, as she reviewed the urbanization plan. "The plan just assumes documents of the past should be carried forward unchanged. It's new rhetoric but old inclinations."

Not only the bureaucracy so fiercely resists the New South Africa. White society, after an initial flirtation with liberalism in early 1990, also has pulled back into its segregated shell.

The main white preoccupation in Johannesburg's plush northern suburbs has been to protect family and property from spiraling crime. Whites are building higher walls and installing ever more elaborate security systems every day. In Brakpan, a suburb of upwardly mobile whites, residents literally walled off the neighboring black township.

In the outer northwestern suburbs, whites are waging an enormous fight, putting up barricades and winning a court order to prevent 1,300 squatter families at Zevenfontein from moving any closer to white homes.

These northern suburbs are not, by South African measure, centers of reaction. They are a stronghold of the Democratic Party, perceived as the "liberal" white party.

In the dorps and smaller cities, the pattern after de Klerk's dramatic announcements of February 1990 has been almost identical everywhere.

At first, liberal whites, often from de Klerk's own National Party, tried to befriend the local black community and discuss its demands. Chief among these has been amalgamation of non-white townships with the core white municipality to establish a single governing body providing common garbage, water, electricity and other services.

But as soon as white communities have realized the high cost of such mergers to white power, privilege and purse, they have pulled back. If there is a successful merger anywhere in South Africa, it has escaped the notice of the press.

The most "liberal" experiment in "one municipality, one tax base," as blacks call their merger demand, took place this spring in Kimberly, the town of diamond fame, where whites are a small minority. The white council proposed, and pushed through, a single authority to run the greater metropolitan area. But the whites allocated themselves six seats on the council and gave all the other racial groups together the same number.

Perhaps the most painful reminder that real change will be a long time in coming to South Africa has been the police force. Despite numerous reforms loudly proclaimed by the government, the police today acts pretty much as it did in the Old South Africa.

It seemed all summed up in the anguished cry of one of the country's leading pathologist, Dr. Jonathan Gluckman, who on July 26 went public in an attempt to stop the killing of blacks in police custody. "I can't stand it any longer," he told the Sunday Times, showing the newspaper a file of 200 post mortems on blacks, 90 percent of whom he estimated had been murdered by the police.

The murders were continuing, he said, despite his pleas to de Klerk and the police command to put a stop to them. The latest government figures show 68 people have died from unnatural causes in police custody in the first six months of this year.

*Ottaway has just ended a 2½-year assignment as the Post correspondent in South Africa.*

London

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## Pssst, wanna fly to a fortune?

● Arms dealers in South Africa are making a fortune by bribing high-ranking military officers in Mozambique to sell off the country's air force, including MiG-21 jet fighters and Mi-8 helicopters. Pilots willing to fly a helicopter out to sea, where a ship is waiting, are being enticed by a £100,000 reward and the promise of relocation to a foreign country. Such is the scale of the illicit trade that when a senior police officer in Maputo, the Mozambique capital, began investigating, he was promptly assassinated.

**T**WO prison officials have claimed that white warders who belong to an Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging cell at Leeuwkop Prison, near Johannesburg, are forcing black convicts to make spears and pangas for use in township violence.

The officials have not been named for their own safety. Their evidence is corroborated by eight prisoners who have told *The Weekly Mail* of convicts being used to manufacture "traditional weapons".

"These weapons are hidden inside a disused cell near the engineering works at Leeuwkop Medium A prison. Some of the weapons are stockpiled in the veld near the cells where members of the AWB hold meetings at night," said one of the prison officials.

The Department of Correctional Services has rejected the allegations as being "malicious and devoid of all truth".

Prisons authorities rejected allegations that members at Leeuwkop shout slogans and flaunt the insignia of the AWB and asked for names of the members involved so that these can be fully investigated.

*The Weekly Mail* sources say white sergeant employed at the prison workshop was arrested earlier this year with a load of "traditional weapons", hand

## AWB uses prison as arms factory, claim warders

guns and balaclavas in the boot of his car.

This sergeant, named as Vermaak, is said to be heavily involved in AWB activities at the prison. This claim was also rejected by the Department of Correctional Services.

Tipped off by the eight convicts of the far-rightwing activity, *The Weekly Mail* made contact with the two officials who separately corroborated the details.

One said he personally witnessed warders displaying AWB insignia on prison premises in violation of departmental regulations. The other was interviewed while he was doing guard duty at a remote section of Leeuwkop's prison farm. He provided a detailed account of where the engineering shop, and cell alleged to store arms, was located.

An investigative team from *The Weekly Mail* visited the jail and tracked down the former prisons officer after receiving a number of letters smuggled out of the cells at Leeuw-

*Prisoners at a Transvaal jail are allegedly forced to make traditional weapons by white warders who belong to the AWB. By EDDIE KOCH and GRAHAM HARVEY*

kop. The letters include claims that:

●Warders shout AWB slogans while doing physical training at the prison.

●Members of this right-wing group subject convicts to severe racial assaults and abuse. *The Weekly Mail* has a pile of letters smuggled out of the prison which allege abuse ranging from racial assaults to homosexual rape of convicts.

●"Leeuwkop is a training base of the AWB."

●Weapons "used for violence in the trains" are made at the "passerswerkswinkel" (workshop for fitters and turners) at Leeuwkop's Medium A

section.

●A base located on a farm near the prison is used as a meeting place for members of the AWB and "there is a weapons cache" here.

"We know their hideout and where the weapons are stored," says a letter signed by four inmates who supplied their full names and prison numbers.

All the informants asked that their identities be withheld on the grounds that their lives would be endangered if these were published.

The allegations follow a top-level probe by the Department of Correctional Services into reports by a Natal newspaper that right-wing warders were promoting political faction fighting among black inmates of the Pietermaritzburg New Prison.

Brian Zulu, a former convict of this jail, alleged that warders belonging to the AWB smuggled knives to Inkatha prisoners and encouraged them to attack African National Congress members in the cells.

Zulu's allegations were published in

*The Natal Witness* in March this year.

He claimed that an ANC supporter who shared his cell, named as Vusi Mkhize, was stabbed to death in the prison dining hall. The attacker was allegedly an Inkatha supporter who had been supplied with the weapon by a white warder.

Zulu says he personally witnessed three white warders at the Pietermaritzburg prison beat a prisoner to death. "He fell down and the warders pulled him inside the cell. They put a blanket on him and locked the door. The prisoner did not cry or ask for help. The next morning he was dead."

Lawyers for Human Rights in Pietermaritzburg have affidavits from black warders of this prison which report that white warders attend AWB rallies and training sessions on the prison premises at night.

"Alleged AWB activities of members at the Pietermaritzburg Prison was thoroughly investigated and no substantiation for the allegations could be found," said the Department of Correctional Services. "It appears that the so-called testimonies are based on facts and they must be seen as propaganda stunts."

*The Weekly Mail* has agreed to provide the department with names of alleged members of the AWB at Leeuwkop so that these can be properly investigated.



## Out of South Africa

John Carlin



THIS is a story so run-of-the-mill in South Africa it barely qualifies as news. Ordinarily, it would pass unnoticed by the public — save in the context of a criminal statistic. Yet another sequence of break-in, assault and rape.

But I'll tell it anyway because it concerns a friend of mine by the name of Bheki Mkhize. He is a nephew of the Inkatha Freedom Party leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, is an active supporter of the ANC and has survived numerous attempts on his life in the past two years.

His would-be assassins have become so frustrated they have started targeting his family. Bheki lives in Johannesburg but his wife and most of his nine children have remained at the tribal family home in Ulundi, the capital of Chief Buthelezi's KwaZulu homeland. He had thought that they would be safe there.

Last Wednesday, at midnight, three men broke open the door of the house where his wife lives. Each carried a gun, a knife and a spear. Two had balaclavas over their heads. They stormed into her bedroom, where she lay with her three daughters and two babies, and said they were policemen searching for marijuana. But they made little attempt to stick to their cover story.

After bashing Bheki's wife across the back of the head with an iron bar they searched the house for money and succeeded in pocketing 92 rand (£17). Then one put a knife to her chest and asked: "Where's your oldest boy?" She did not reply, so they hit her again until she confessed that he was in the room next door. That was Njabulo, who is 14, and lives in Soweto with Bheki's youngest son, Kingdom, who is eight. The two of them had gone down to Ulundi for the school holidays.

Two of the assailants marched into the boys' room and found Kingdom on the bed, feigning sleep. Kingdom has learnt cunning beyond his years since an episode on 9 June when a man put a gun to his head on a Soweto street and told him that if his father did not die, he would.

In this instance he put himself at risk to protect his brother. Njabulo himself was hiding under the bed.

They did not find him, so they went back to beating his mother. Meanwhile, Njabulo escaped through the window. The three men then ran to the house next door, where Bheki's grandmother lives with one of his sisters and her five children. But they failed to find Njabulo. They did, however, find Thandazile, who is Bheki's niece, 18 and four-months pregnant.

One of the men grabbed her,

another went back next door to grab Bheki's 12-year-old daughter, Nozipho. They took the two girls off to the bush where they raped them. When they returned, the one who had stayed behind said he, too, wanted Nozipho. So the other two stayed behind while he took her off for a second session in the bush.

"That means," a disconsolate Bheki told me on Monday night, "that two men raped my 12-year-old."

At about lam, the three men left, but not before telling Bheki's wife that this was nothing compared to what lay ahead.

At daybreak the family trooped off to the doctor and then to the police station. Now, if there is one organisation Bheki might trust even less than the South African police it is their malevolent offspring, the KwaZulu police. Funded entirely by Pretoria and run by a white general who cut his teeth in the counter-insurgency war against the ANC, the "ZPs", as they are known, are in effect Inkatha's private army. They have been widely accused of killing ANC supporters and protecting Inkatha "warlords" from prosecution.

Nevertheless, Bheki's family reported the case to a Detective Sergeant Mbatha, whom they furnished with the name of one of the assailants. Bheki, for his part, told the story to his lawyers in Johannesburg from versions he obtained from his wife on the phone and Njabulo and Kingdom, who are now back home. But Bheki has as little faith as his lawyers that the ZP will track the men down. So what is he to do?

"I'm very much confused," he told me. "But I've decided myself that I'll give them a month." And then? Bheki thought for a long while. He is a union leader, a leader in his community in Soweto, a natural leader. People listen to him and one message he always tries to put across is not to fight fire with fire, not to avenge a death with a death. That is to play into the hands of the state. Inkatha's bosses in the security forces, Bheki knows, are never happier than when the blacks are killing each other.

"I don't know, my friend," he finally answered. "I'm afraid they've damaged my child. She might be pregnant. And you know, if they hit my children it's worse than killing me." Bheki took a deep breath. "I'll give them a month. That's what I'll do. Then if nothing happens I'll talk to my homeboys from Ulundi. I'll see what the family can do. You see, I'm afraid I'm losing control. I'm losing my faith in my principles. But if there's no law, well, I'm a human being myself."

## Mary Benson on South Africa's failure to prosecute Matthew Goniwe's killers

THE names keep recurring in reports of the sinister activities of senior members of South Africa's security forces: General Christoffel van der Westhuizen, head of military intelligence, and Matthew Goniwe.

It is three months since a copy of a top secret signal dated June 7, 1985 was published in which Van der Westhuizen confirmed a telephoned proposal to the state Security Council that Goniwe and three associates be urgently "removed from society".

Within three weeks of the signal's dispatch, Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkonto and Sicelo Mhlawuli disappeared when driving from Port Elizabeth to their home outside Cradock. Not far from the burnt-out car discovered and eventually, by chance, the young men's mutilated, charred bodies.

From all over South Africa, tens of thousands of mourners converged on Cradock's black township, Lingelihle, in the arid Karoo for the funeral of the four. In news reports, the BBC and ITN focused on the young widows beside the graves, their terrible grief revealed as the camera panned slowly from their faces to their feet and on down to the coffins. That day, a state of emergency cleared screens of such pictures and of any violence perpetrated by police or military.

Why Lingelihle? Why Goniwe? During 1983 Cradock was described as "the hottest spot in the backveld revolution" sweeping South Africa and the immensely popular leader was Lingelihle's acting headmaster Matthew Goniwe.

Son of a domestic servant and a seller of firewood, he had inspired the community to form a residents' association which demanded urgent reforms in the dusty, poverty stricken township. Studious, quiet, small and bespectacled, Goniwe had raised educational standards, given self respect to unemployed young blacks and stopped much of the drinking and pot smoking. Repeatedly detained and accused of agitating, he remarked, "Education is not required when you have apartheid — the greatest agitator of all."

Working with Goniwe was Fort Calata, grandson of James Calata, Canon of the Anglican Church and a renowned musician, who, during the thirties, despite poverty and illness, had revived the Cape ANC in its serious decline.

Although James Calata had virtually retired from such political activity by the mid-fifties, he was arrested in the great treason trial of 1956 to 1961 and Fort, born at the time, was so named because his grandfather was imprisoned in the Johannesburg Fort. In 1961 the old

man was again arrested and found guilty of "displaying" pictures of an "unlawful organisation" — photographs of ANC delegations to the government in 1939 and 1942. In that persecution of Fort's grandfather lies a clue to the deaths all these years later: the security police in the Eastern Cape has long conducted a uniquely vicious assault on the area's leaders, among them Steve Biko and his friend Mapella Mohapi.

Two weeks after the Goniwe funeral came the assassination of one of the speakers, the lawyer Victoria Mxenge whose husband Griffiths had been similarly murdered.

It was four years before an inquest into the deaths was held. Representing the families, the distinguished advocate Arthur Chaskalson went through evidence to support his case that the killings had been "carefully planned, well co-ordinated and skilful" — killings in which the bodies, scattered far from the car, "had been put on their backs, petrol had been poured over their faces and fire had been set to their faces".

The magistrate found the suspicions that security police had been involved in the killings were "completely unfounded". At the time of the deaths — of that secret signal — Van der Westhuizen was a brigadier heading the Defence Forces' Eastern Province Command in the area.

IN THE outraged reaction, Matthew's widow Nyameke Goniwe bore the brunt of media attention. Now, at work in Cape Town but retaining her links with Lingelihle, she speaks quietly of his years as a schoolmaster, of how he taught maths and science — subjects much needed in black education — and English; of the wonderful letters he wrote from prison, letters about life; of how after release, he continued his work among students and their parents: "They adored him! He became a true friend, something he acquired from his mother. This led to a sense of community, of love of neighbours. There were no longer assaults in the townships."

That night when Matthew and his friends did not return home she had to "play brave", retracing their movements, inquiring at police stations, alerting the press — until the bodies were discovered. Nyameke: the name means perseverance.

Some two miles outside Cradock lies Lingelihle's soulless collection of small houses. Overlooked by the Karoo's flat-topped hills, in a desolate graveyard of stones, clods of earth and thorn scrub, are the four graves. From far off can be heard the shouts and laughter of children at play.



# De Klerk drags feet on 'hit squad' investigations

The president may fear a showdown with the military chiefs implicated in elite force violence, writes **David Beresford** in Johannesburg

**S**OUTH AFRICA is awaiting the outcome of a crucial test of the balance of power between the De Klerk government and the military establishment, in which a seven-year-old murder and the fate of the head of army intelligence appear to be pivotal factors.

By late yesterday, President F. W. de Klerk had still failed to respond to last week's recommendations from the United Nations and the Goldstone commission of inquiry for a wide-ranging judicial investigation into the army and the police.

The delay encourages speculation that the president fears precipitating a showdown with his defence chiefs, notably the powerful head of military intelligence, General Christoffel "Joffel" van der Westhuizen.

The general is increasingly emerging as a central figure in the long-running controversy over the military's role in the country's political violence, from the assassinations of anti-apartheid activists in the 1980s to more recent allegations of a "Third Force" promoting car-

nage in the townships.

Since Gen Van der Westhuizen was publicly accused three months ago of having planned the gruesome murder of four anti-apartheid activists in the Eastern Cape in 1985, further details of his sinister activities have begun to emerge — notably his part in the formation of a mysterious unit known as the "Hammer Force".

The unit, whose members sported badges in the shape of a sledgehammer, was set up in 1984 in the Eastern Cape by Gen Van der Westhuizen, who was then army commander in the province. Its training instructors apparently included at least three former members of the notorious Selous Scouts — Ian Smith's elite killer unit which was covertly funded in the Rhodesian bush war by South African military intelligence.

The Hammer unit is now believed to have carried out the murders of Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkoato and Sicelo Mhlantli. Their charred bodies were found with their burnt-out car on June 29,

1985, near Port Elizabeth. From the evidence of a number of witnesses it appears the men had been murdered two days before, when they were stopped at a roadblock set up by the Hammer unit. At least one policeman was also believed to have been there. Names of individuals said to have taken part in the operation are now widely known.

Last May, General Bantu Holomisa, leader of the Transkei "homeland", released a copy of an army signal which had been sent to the state security council less than a month before the Goniwe murders. It showed that Gen Van der Westhuizen was planning the anti-apartheid leader's "removal from society".

It is now believed that the copy of the signal was given to Gen Holomisa by a disaffected member of military intelligence. A witch hunt has since been conducted within the service, with the co-operation of local law officers, to try to find out who was responsible for the leak.

Another army officer in-

volved in the formation of the Eastern Cape Hammer force is believed to have been a woman captain, Pamela du Randt. She was one of two South African agents recently deported from Britain by Scotland Yard after being caught apparently setting up a contract for the assassination of the fugitive former security branch officer, Captain Dirk Coetzee.

The incident happened shortly before the captain, hid-

ding out "unsuitable" candidates.

The existence of the Hammer forces was secret, but references to the units have emerged over the years from various commissions of inquiry, without their significance having been appreciated.

The Siweyiya commission investigating unrest on the University of the Transkei campus heard evidence of an academic being snatched by a mysterious

unit carried out the murder in 1989 of the anthropologist and anti-apartheid activist, David Webster.

There are also suspicions that a Hammer unit murdered Anton Lubowski, the barrister and leader of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), in 1989.

Gen Van der Westhuizen has long been seen as a high-riser in the military establishment, being tipped at one stage as a future minister of defence. As it is he is probably the second-most powerful member of the military — after the commander-in-chief, General Kat Liebenberg.

Gen Van der Westhuizen's prosecution for the Goniwe murders, and possible others, is on the face of it unthinkable. That may be why the government has recently been strongly pressing the African National Congress for a general amnesty for political crimes.

The ANC has indicated that it is prepared to accept an amnesty, but only if there is full, public disclosure — of the sort proposed by the UN and the Goldstone commission.

The result has been some agonising in the corridors of power in Pretoria's Union Buildings.

## Secret 'Hammer' force members sported badges shaped like sledgehammers

ing out in London, was due to give evidence in an inquest related to "hit squad" operations in the Eastern Cape.

In 1987, Gen Van der Westhuizen was promoted to commanding officer in the Witwatersrand area around Johannesburg, and promptly set up a local Hammer unit.

According to one source, prospective members had to undergo intense physical training and bizarre psychological testing — one test involving a maze, another starvation in the presence of the subject's favourite food — aimed at whit-

"Hammer group" from the Eastern Cape.

The Hiemstra commission, looking into a municipal intelligence operation run by the Johannesburg city council, heard evidence from the head of the spy-ring — a major with military intelligence, Frik Barnard — that he had gone on a "Hammer course" being run by the army.

Another member of the municipal spy team testified about a special unit which had received training at a secret army base on a Transvaal farm. He claimed a member of this

# Boipatong tape 'wiped in error'

From John Carlin in Vereeniging

**E**VOKING images of the Watergate hearings, a South African woman police sergeant sought yesterday to explain before a judicial commission of inquiry into the Boipatong massacre how she contrived to erase tape-recordings containing evidence crucial to establishing the role played by the police.

Nearly 20 years ago, Rosemary Woods, Richard Nixon's personal secretary, maintained she had "accidentally" erased a vital 17½ minutes of taped conversations between her boss and his aides in which they discussed the cover-up of the Watergate burglary.

Yesterday morning in Vereeniging, five miles east of Boipatong,

Sergeant Elsa O'Reilly told Justice Richard Goldstone that she had accidentally erased 13 hours' worth of tape-recordings of police radio transmissions before, during and after the massacre. The importance of the evidence contained in the tapes is that they would either confirm or refute evidence provided by a number of witnesses — the latest, yesterday afternoon, a black policeman — that police in armoured vehicles assisted the Inkatha attackers on the night of 17 June, when 41 died.

Sgt O'Reilly's testimony was confusingly technical at times, but

in essence this was her explanation: a recording machine was installed at the Vereeniging headquarters of the Internal Stability Unit — the new name for the riot police — where she works in the operations control room, on 24 March this year. The machine, connected to telephone and radio lines, uses ordinary cassette tapes.

She mastered all of the machine's complex functions save for one. She did not know that if she turned the tape around from Side A to Side B, Side A would be wiped out during recording. "I was never told I could record only

one side of the tape and it is not indicated anywhere in the manual," she said.

Sgt O'Reilly, who looked to be in her late twenties and, heavily made up, wore a fashionably cut green camouflage skirt, giggled frequently during her two hours of testimony.

Three months passed, she said, before she was made aware of her mistake. It was only a week after the massacre, she said, that she learnt from a police investigating officer to whom she had given the tapes that they had been erased. She had handed tapes previously to officers working on other investigations but no one had drawn her attention to the problem.



# MASS ACTION

## WHAT IS IT TO BE?



THIS



OR

The Star Wednesday June 17 1992

## SAP's Martin Luther King ad offends widow

By HUGH ROBERTON

CORETTA Scott King, widow of civil rights leader Dr Martin Luther King, has angrily attacked the South African Police for invoking the name of her late husband in its weekend advertisements on the ANC's mass action campaign.

The advertisements claimed that Dr King's belief in peaceful protest was a model and inspiration to the SAP, and the advertisements urged South Africans to follow Dr King's lead.

Mrs King described the use of her husband's name by the SAP as "perhaps the most offensive and outrageous abuse of my husband's name that I have ever seen."

Her statement said: "With its long history of oppression of the black citizens of South Africa, including massacres of innocent men, women and children in peaceful demonstrations, most recently in Sebokeng in 1990, the SAP are poorly qualified as advocates of non-violence."

"Martin Luther King was strongly opposed to apartheid, which the SAP has supported with the most vicious tactics imaginable, including murder, torture and a relentless campaign of terror against the non-



Coretta Scott King... support for mass action campaign.

violent movement for freedom and human rights in SA."

Mrs King urged President de Klerk to order the SAP to "immediately cease" using her husband's name in its propaganda, adding she supported wholeheartedly the "non-violent mass action campaign for nonracial democracy in South Africa."

MARTIN LUTHER KING... "I HAVE A DREAM..."

**THE SAP STANDS FOR LEGAL, PEACEFUL & NON-DISRUPTIVE ACTIONS**

**SHOULD YOU CHOOSE MASS ACTION, PLEASE:**

- MAKE SURE ITS LEGAL AND PEACEFUL
- EXERCISE YOUR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS RESPONSIBLY
- DO NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
- AVOID ALL ACTIONS WHICH COULD RESULT IN VIOLENCE

**A FRIENDLY MESSAGE FROM THE SA POLICE**