

African Labor and Social Change Under South African Law:
Some Comments for Considering the Role of Foreign
Corporations in the Republic of South Africa

David Wiley
Department of Sociology
Michigan State University
June, 1978

To consider an appropriate response to the foreign corporations operating in South Africa, American academic institutions require the best factual information available concerning South African law, worker conditions, African opinion, and the role of the foreign corporations. Professor Leon Weaver of the Department of Criminal Justice, MSU, has alleged serious inaccuracy, errors, and misleading premises by those who have questioned the role of foreign corporations in South Africa at the March 30, 1978 meeting of the MSU Board of Trustees Investment Committee. In addition, Professor Paul Hurrell, Chairperson of the University Committee on Academic Environment has requested comment and information from members of the MSU academic community with knowledge about Southern Africa.

This brief paper represents an attempt to provide a comment on those issues to set the factual record in perspective.

I. Social Change under South African Law

The key issue in this discussion is the efficacy of foreign corporations to achieve large scale social change in South Africa.

- A. Almost 100 foreign corporations now have consented to the "Sullivan Principles," which seek improvement in the conditions for employees of those corporations.¹ This Sullivan formula is the principal response of the corporations to the rising protest of Africans in South Africa and to the opprobrium which their support of the South African government has brought in the wider world community. These principles should not be faulted for any improvements they accomplish for those workers in the particular companies, within the limitations of the corporate commitment. However, the principles are at fault in several ways:

1. There is no timetable for fulfillment of the commitments, no deadline for completion of the goals, and no sanctions for companies which fail to achieve the goals. Because of the company association agreements with "registered unions", to which Africans do not belong, much of the change mentioned will not be possible. A similar set of principles was developed in Britain as a "Code of Conduct" for British corporations in South Africa to increase African wages and recognize African trade unions. One recent analysis² indicates that only one British firm, at that time, had recognized an African trade union, and later had withdrawn that recognition. This lack of progress occurs under no sanction or threat of law. To the contrary, the law, as noted below, impedes the changes.
2. The principles affect a very small number of employees. Even if all United States corporations in South Africa carried out this program, it is estimated that less than two per cent of the total African labor force would be affected. In many of the U.S. corporations, with their more capital-intensive technologies, Africans constitute a minority among employees. For example, at Ford (South Africa) Africans are approximately one-fourth of the work force.
3. More importantly, the changes in the workplace are unlikely to have major ramifications on the apartheid laws or the structures of inequality in South African society. Regardless of workplace improvements, the small number of workers who do benefit from the improved conditions still will be without citizenship in South Africa, will be classified and assigned to particular tribal homelands (which many have never even visited from their urban homes), and will not enjoy the most basic human rights. The South African government recognizes the harmlessness of the Sullivan principles, especially after they requested and were allowed to alter the original state-

ments. At the request of the South African Ambassador to the United States the following clause was eradicated: "...where implementation requires a modification of existing South African laws and customs we will seek such modification through appropriate channels;" thus, even seeking change of the South African system through legal channels is eliminated from the principles. As the South African Financial Mail has noted, these principles in no way bring the corporations into a confrontation with apartheid, especially by avoiding the issue of African trade union rights.³

Apparently, Rev. Leon Sullivan, the original author of the principles and a member of the General Motors Board has recognized this weakness and "has conceded in the past that U.S. corporations probably ought to withdraw from South Africa." Now, Rev. Sullivan has indicated that he also advocates no further U.S. corporate expansion in South Africa. In a letter to the National Council of Churches, he stated,

"I share your concern about investments. I have already requested consideration for halting of any additional investments by American companies in the Republic of South Africa, until conditions are notably improved. This includes loans, and a cessation of any new investment or expansion to present investment in South Africa. I am in agreement, also, with your concern regarding strategic arms sales, and that there should be non-cooperation with respect to forcing United States companies to provide strategic equipment for intention of war."⁴

4. Even though individual workers will have improved conditions in the corporations, those corporations shall continue to enrich and empower the South African government, which clearly has decided to resist significant change in the system of inequality. The recent refusals to alter the pass system, the tightening of labor and security legislation, and the statements of Prime Minister Vorster that he "cannot foresee such a day" when blacks will exercise political power in South Africa - all belie the assertions of significant growing liberalism in South African society. As has been noted elsewhere, the signatories of the Sullivan Principles continue to supply petro-

leum products to the South African military and, via South Africa, to the Rhodesian rebellion. Other corporate signatories supply computer technology for the systems of monitoring and control of the African population, vehicles for police and military, components for the complex military technologies, and taxation with which the regime can enlarge its budgets for military, police, and bureaucracies of control.

- B. Key to the position that U.S. corporations should remain in South Africa is the belief that there are important areas of African rights and privileges which can be negotiated by the companies with the South African government. For instance, Professor Weaver has noted that the government "...is not opposed to the training and advancement of Africans provided that white workers do not object."⁵ It is true there is some leeway for companies to advance African workers. Indeed, this advancement fits with the goal of the South African government, and perhaps many companies, to create a small but influential "black middle class" of technicians and operatives who will have vested interests in the company and in the government to restrict the rise of the urban black lower classes and peasants. Until now, Africans have been excluded from skilled and, frequently, even semi-skilled jobs by four basic methods as Davis has explicated:⁶ a) legislation - The Mines and Works Act of 1911 (as amended later) excluded Africans from a range of employments, which were reserved for whites and other non-African non-whites. In 1951 the Bantu Building Workers Act prohibited a range of African employments in the building industry, except in African townships and Bantustans. Further, under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 the government empowered the Minister of Labour to take administrative action in order to extend the color bar to any industry or set of occupations. The minister's official determination gives legal effect to this administrative action. Recently the government removed these reservations, hailing the "end" of the job

reservation system even though this Act has been used for job reservation in only 2.3% of the total work force. In general, the Act has been used to allow African skilled workers to fill needed positions when whites were unavailable, reversing that stance when an adequate supply of whites were available. b) More commonly, informal work agreements between white unions and companies have removed the onus of job reservation from the government. These agreements are made under the Industrial Council Agreements, the main mechanism of the color bar in industry. Registered unions and employers' associations negotiate collective bargaining agreements, which are given legal force by action of the Minister of Labour thereby becoming binding on all workers. Africans are not allowed to become members of the registered unions and cannot, therefore, enter into the Industrial Council negotiations, even though the agreement is binding on them. Under an "employment of trade union labour" clause, Africans normally are excluded from skilled work. Members of the "registered unions", including White, Coloured, and Asians, may hold the negotiated positions - not Africans. More specific but similar agreements were enacted to exclude Africans from skilled positions in the Supplementary Agreement for the Iron, Steel, Engineering, and Metallurgical Industries (employing 450,000 persons, 75% African) and the Industrial Council Agreement for Transvaal Furniture Manufacturing.

Much of American investment is in the vehicle industry. The agreement for the Motor Industry indicates that "no member of either of the employer's associations shall engage or continue to employ an employee who is unable to produce a membership card issued by one of the trade unions who are parties to this agreement." Further specification effectively excludes Africans in the Motor Industry from all categories except the three categories of "cleaners, labourers, and watchmen."⁷ c) A third mechanism of discrimination is found in the apprentice program under the Apprenticeship Act of

1944. The law does not exclude Africans from apprenticeship but maintains tight government control over apprentice registration; however, the Minister of Labour in Parliament in 1972 noted it was not government policy to allow Africans to become apprentices in white areas, where most South African industry and skilled occupations are located. d) Most common of all is exclusion of Blacks from skilled work by custom. A company, seeking not to antagonize its white skilled workers, its registered non-African unions, and its purchasing public, simply finds it easier to not find an adequate African applicant for a position, in spite of the presumed good intentions of the managers at corporate headquarters in the U.S.A. or even in the South African head office.

It should be clear from this exposition of the employment situation that South Africa does not need a Job Reservation Act to effectively bring about workplace discrimination when it empowers the white union's grip on skilled positions, when it gives force of law to union-employer agreements, and when it uses "ministerial policy" to enforce apprenticeship discrimination with the force of law, even though the letter of the law is nominally non-discriminatory.

Professor Weaver also indicates that South Africa stops short of outlawing unions. Apparently he wishes to indicate that this is a positive factor, even though he also admits that a) the government "uses an unstated policy of delay and impediment of black unions," (p. 2); b) "that the effectiveness of such unions will depend on company responses," and quoting others, c) "Africans lack the normal trade union rights and there are very few African trade unions...." and e) "Government...tolerates the existence of scores of black unions that are of little effectiveness to date." From this, Professor Weaver also fails to note that under South African law African workers a) are not allowed to belong to the only powerful unions ("registered unions."), b) were prohibited, under the Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953, from all strikes, stoppages,

go-slows, refusals to work, and similar action, c) may lose their homes for any such labor protest, d) under the 1977 amendment to the Bantu Labour Regulations Act, are prohibited from striking against any local authority; against any service providing light, power, water, sanitation, passenger transport, etc.; and, as of March 1977, against any other activity declared by the Minister of Labour to be an "essential service." e) are harrassed by police for illegal assemblies under the Riotous Assemblies Act, may be denied bail after arrest "for security reasons," and arrested as strikers for minor infractions, especially with the pass laws.

II. South African Wages

Opponents of U.S. disengagement from South Africa seek to refute the claim that there is increasing disparity of white and African incomes and to demonstrate the improvement of wages and benefits to workers.

A. Increasing Disparity of African and White Incomes

Of course there are various sources of data and many ways to make comparisons. Some statistics from South Africa are amenable to this interpretation, for instance by demonstrating a reduction in the ratio of white to African wages in certain industrial sectors; however, the statistics allow this because they do not reflect the rampant unemployment of Africans, the underemployment of many, and the real unemployment which is camouflaged by deportation of African workers from the white urban areas to the impoverished rural "homelands." In general, I have found no disagreement among the sources that: 1. Over the past decade the absolute gap between white and African incomes has grown, 2. Over the five years 1970-75, the white increase in hard cash has been R221 while the average African increase is only R37 - one-sixth the white figure,⁹ 3. "The average white household had R362 more to spend each month in 1970 than the average African household. By 1975, that gap had widened to R546. In

1975, the average white household had an income 8.5 times as large as the average African one; 2.9 times as large as the average Coloured and 1.9 times that of the average Asian Household."¹⁰ 4. In 1975, the African workers with 71% of the population received 23% of the income.¹¹ 5. In 1975, the poverty line (minimum living level) set at \$127.65, one study reveals that 63.5% of African households had monthly incomes of less than \$92,¹² 6. In all major industrial sectors, the absolute gap in earnings per annum between African and white more than doubled during the period 1965-77. The specific increases in the absolute per annum gap are:¹³

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Absolute Gap in Annual Earnings</u>	
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1977</u>
Mining and Quarrying	R2733	R7834
Manufacturing	2187	5450
Construction	2441	5656
Central Government	1525	3599

6. The long-range intent of the government is made clear in a study "Racial Income Distribution in South Africa," by M. McGrath of the University of Natal. McGrath demonstrates that the gap between African and white wages increased by 42% during the period of National Party Rule (1946-present). The ratio of income per head of whites to that of Africans increased from 10.6:1 in 1946-47, to 11.9:1 in 1960, and to 15.0:1 in 1970. These estimates are based on non-primary subsistence production only.¹⁴ In all of these statistics, the ratio and gap would worsen if marginalized, Bantustan-confined workers and agricultural workers were included.

It is possible to use the data to show various kinds of improvement for particular sectoral employments for Africans; but the absolute gap between white and black wages is the more relevant figure. For instance, one can state that for non-agricultural average real earnings (excluding earnings in private services, e.g., lawyers), white earnings declined

by R62 1975-76 (due to the stagflation of South Africa) while African earnings increased by R35. Even when the reader is cognizant that these comparisons exclude all African agricultural earnings (a sector in which widespread malnutrition and social malaise is reported), the more relevant comparisons are that a) net white earnings remain more than four times African earnings (R3368 white, R720 African) and b) mean African real earning of R720 for 1976 is less than half the minimum Poverty Datum Line needed for adequate family sustenance in Soweto.¹⁵ And these mean real earning data do not include the net decline which would be incurred if the African unemployed were included.

Professor Weaver's point that "some blacks have improved their lot" is not contested. But more relevant are the comparisons of the net deterioration of African wages relative to whites over the past forty years.

III. Black Opinion

Supporters of South Africa and a continued corporate presence take exception to the assertions that corporate withdrawal would be supported by "the majority of South African blacks if their voices could be heard" and is supported by the genuine African leaders. To support his disagreement, Professor Weaver notes a) that the executive body of the South African Council of Churches (75% black) has developed guidelines for acceptable corporate behavior, b) quotes with approval John Burns' New York Times observation that "many influential blacks have opposed further withdrawals," and c) notes Chief Buthelezi, Bantustan leader, stopped short of advocating withdrawal.

We should not be surprised that these leaders inside South Africa have not called for economic sanctions or withdrawal since such opinions

are an offense under the Terrorism Act, punishable with a minimum sentence of five years imprisonment and a maximum sentence of death. For instance, note the charge against one such violator:

"In the Supreme Court of South Africa . . . the Attorney General of the Province of Transvaal, who as such prosecutes on behalf of the State, present and informs the Court that . . . WHEREAS one Sipho Buthelezi . . . did, upon the 31st of January 1973 . . . wrongfully, unlawfully and with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic or any portion thereof, write or cause to be written letters to . . . the companies . . . mentioned in schedule 'B' attached hereto, and thereby did . . . discourage, hamper, deter and/or prevent foreign investment in the economy of the Republic . . . NOW therefore accused number (1) is guilty of the offense of participation in terroristic activities."¹⁶

Professor Weaver's exceptions are best answered by the South Africans themselves: A. Mr. Donald Woods, former Editor, Daily Dispatch, East London, South Africa;

"For many years, and for a variety of reasons, the Western powers have resisted implementing effective punitive measures against the government of South Africa. But the time has now come for the West to reassess its past attitudes.

This implies the urgent reconsideration of the institution of economic sanctions, and those who oppose this on the grounds of attendant economic hardship to blacks should note the fact that the most authentic black spokesmen in South Africa have consistently stated that they would prefer such hardship to a continuation of a policy they regard as a negation of their humanity in every facet of their lives

I have to tell you that the level of black anger in my country today is so high, and the determination of most white voters to resist fair compromise is so strong, that both sides are on a collision course towards a racial civil war. Unless there is a concerted action by the world community, such a tragedy is a real probability.

The first priority of the Western nations should, I submit, be an immediate policy of disengagement from diplomatic, cultural, sporting, trade, military, investment and general economic ties now existing."¹⁷

B. The Christian Institute of South Africa, Statement, 1976.

"Governmental insistence on enforcing apartheid and its rejection of normal negotiation with freely chosen black leaders, have produced a situation in which there are few ways of preventing the escalation of violence and bloodshed into a major confrontation. One of the few remaining methods of working peacefully is through economic

pressure, which could help to motivate the changes needed to bring justice and peace in South Africa. The Christian Institute therefore supports the call for no further investment in South Africa because:

1. Strong economic pressure is of vital importance in bringing about as peaceful a solution as possible.
2. Investment in South Africa is investment in apartheid, and this is immoral, unjust and exploitative.
3. Attempts to change the situation through pressure by investors have proved inadequate.
4. The argument that economic growth can produce fundamental change has proven false: Many black organizations have opposed foreign investment in South Africa, and this would be the opinion of the majority of South African blacks if their voices could be heard."

C. The Late Chief Albert J. Luthuli, Nobel Prize Winner.

"The economic boycott of South Africa will entail undoubted hardship for Africans. We do not doubt that. But if it is a method which shortens the day of blood, the suffering to us will be a price we are willing to pay. In any case, we suffer already, our children are often undernourished, and, on a small scale (so far) we die at the whim of a policeman."

D. Mr. Tsietsi Mashinini, exiled President, Soweto Students Representative Council

"AFRICA NEWS: What are the most important things you want to tell Americans about the situation in your country?"

TSIETSI MASHININI: If the United States could get its corporations out of South Africa . . . can stop supporting the racist regime that killed so many of our people, the black people in South Africa would appreciate that . . . American organizations and movements can play a very important role in getting America out of South Africa and getting Americans to identify with the liberation movements and the true owners of the land, not with the repressive, racist regime."¹⁸

E. South African Student Organization, Policy Statement, 1972.

"SASO sees foreign investments as giving stability to South Africa's exploitative regime and committing South Africa's trading partners to supporting this regime. For this reason SASO rejects foreign investments.

Further SASO sees the ameliorative experiments like those of Polaroid as at worst, conscience salving and at best, resulting in the creation of a change-resistant middle class amongst the few blacks employed by foreign firms."

F. Mr. Oliver Tambo, Acting President-General, African National Congress of South Africa

"The ANC has long called for the ending of all foreign capital investment in South Africa. We see the economy as essentially structured by a colonial-type relationship between the white minority and foreign capital interests on the one hand, and the African people on the other.

South Africa is an attractive center for profitable foreign investment, precisely because migrant labor in abundance is organized and made easily available to business by the regime as a conscious act of policy . . . companies are not motivated by the desire to bring employment to the African people or to improve the economic condition of African workers (but) . . . largely by considerations of profit, their share of the market and the sources of the raw material supplies they require."

G. Mr. Donald Woods, (Former Editor, East London Daily Dispatch) Interview

Mr. Clark: "There are something over 300 American corporations maintaining plants or offices in South Africa. We do a substantial trade. I think we are the second biggest trading partner behind Britain with South Africa, selling them something over one billion dollars a year in American goods, and yet the prevailing view in Washington is . . . if we put pressure . . . on American corporations to reduce their business and commerce in South Africa, it would be counterproductive in that the blacks in South Africa would be the ones who would be hurt the first and probably the most

Do you accept that or do you think the time has come to disregard those factors and apply strong economic pressures?"

Mr. Woods: "It is not easy for a white South African to advocate sanctions because blacks would be the main sufferers. But I can tell you this; it is the blacks who asked for this, and the blacks in fact resent the sort of arguments that I have used and that you have used that this shouldn't be done because they are the sufferers. They resent it because they say, 'Again it is a question of the white man saying what is bad or good for us.'

They say, 'We know what suffering is and we are not going to suffer more than marginally through sanctions. We are suffering far more through the help the West is giving Pretoria to increase trade,' and there is no doubt in my mind that the blacks deeply desire sanctions."

Mr. Clark: "One of the most respected black leaders in America, Vernon Jordan, who is the head of our National Urban League, . . . reported that he had talked with a number of black leaders, and to a man they were against American corporations pulling out of South Africa for the reasons we have mentioned."

Mr. Woods: "Well, I don't know what black leaders he could have spoken to. Most of them are in Robben Island or in detention or banned, but I could tell you, I know of not one out of several hundred who has that

view, and I am speaking of the authentic black leaders."¹⁹

IV. Alternative University Actions Toward Corporations

Across the nation, a number of alternatives are being utilized by universities in their response to the U.S. corporate presence in South Africa. In general, the actions can be classified as

a) No action on stockholdings on the grounds either that the university is not culpable as a minority stockholder or that the corporations govern their own affairs and would be offended by university action;

b) Terminating holdings in banks making credit and loans available to South Africa;

c) Divestiture of stocks in corporations not signing one of the "corporate responsibility" manifestos, e.g. Sullivan Principles, EEC agreement, British Code of Conduct;

d) Divestiture of stock holdings in corporations involved in provision of strategic materiel for the prosecution of apartheid and military control;

e) Prudent divestiture of companies not withdrawing at a specified future date; and,

f) Immediate divestiture.

The key issues utilized by university decision-makers to achieve the decisions appear to vary according to:

a) the extent to which the universities believe that moral principle should influence university investment of public funds;

b) the extent to which the universities believe that the moral character of the economic activities in which they invest their public funds has an effect on the legitimacy of the institution, the scholarly enterprise, and the human relationships within the institutions;

c) the weight which is given to the unique character of legalized racial discrimination in South Africa as compared with illegal but

functional racism in other nations and compared with the severity of human rights problems in other nations where we have ended U.S. corporate activity;

d) the importance given to changes in South Africa--some finding great hope in the several cases of amelioration of petty apartheid and advancement for a few employees and others finding little change due the systematic increment in apartheid through relocation of the African population into the Bantustans or "homelands;"

e) the extent to which, utilizing "effectiveness" as a criterion, the decision-makers are concerned with U.S. corporate provision of strategic materiel for the South African government and its institutions for the erection and maintenance of apartheid and repression or feel that the principles of free and competitive markets should prevail;

f) the extent to which there is trust in the U.S. corporations to voluntarily oppose the government; to act in the interests of African labor; to oppose the interests of the white and, occasionally, other non-white employees to assist African advancement; and to deny the government the knowledge, licenses, technicians, and facilities for the furtherance of apartheid and white privilege;

g) the extent to which the decision-makers believe that, moral issues aside, the withdrawal of U.S. corporate support may affect the legitimacy of the Nationalist government and its ability to resist concessions to the African majority;

h) the extent to which the African majority is believed to be violent and incapable of "civilized" behavior toward the white minority;

i) the extent to which one is concerned about the current violence of the government against the African population as opposed to "the increasing danger of a violent revolution" against the white government and its supporters;

j) the extent to which one is concerned about the long-term economic and raw material interests of the United States as opposed to the shorter-term operation and profits of the particular companies now in South Africa; and,

k) the weight and importance given to the development of white organized material infrastructure as opposed to majority rule, freedom of expression, and social and economic equality.

At this time, university decision-makers are generally opting for very minor change (Sullivan formula) in corporate activity, on the one hand, or, when that is regarded as inadequate, for divestiture of one kind or another. At this time, there are no formulations of an alternative code of conduct which would allow universities to remain invested in companies of South Africa because they were seeking genuine change in that system. Such an alternate code of conduct would require a corporation to a) make no new investments in South Africa; b) repatriate most profits made in South Africa to the U.S.A.; c) set a timetable under which the workplace would be truly integrated, all aspects of Sullivan principles realized, and African trade unions fully recognized; d) end all licensing of processes and patents which have military, police or repressive application; e) reduce to lowest possible level all tax remittances to the South African government; f) end all de facto and de jure recognition of South African government in illegally-occupied Namibia; g) end recognition of and operation within the Bantustans or homelands; h) support with profits those indigenous African social institutions which empower the oppressed majority; i) no expansion of South African operations; j) agree to non-compliance with South African government orders for military and police action in "emergencies;" k) end all internal supply to the South African government of information, materiel, and machinery which have repressive application; l) introduction of African management

and participation in the boards of governance of South African operations, et cetera.

The executive committee of the Association of Concerned African Scholars, an organization of academic Africanists in the United States, recently acted to make the support of university divestiture campaigns one of its three action priorities. This action was taken because of their conclusion that the corporations are not disposed to undertake the kinds of commitments, as outlined above, which would make palatable the retention of corporate "voice" in South Africa. This action followed on a petition of six hundred "Concerned Africanist Scholars" in 1977, which called on the U.S. government to "offer full support for the African people of South Africa in their efforts to attain majority rule . . ." which also presumed the inclusion of the African calls for corporate disengagement as noted on previous pages. As might be expected, a number of corporate officers, politicians, representatives of financial and South African government interests do not agree with this course of action.

FOOTNOTES

1. The "principles" include non-segregation of work facilities; equal and fair employment practices; equal pay for equal work; training programs for blacks and non-whites for supervisory, administrative, and clerical jobs; increase in blacks and other non-whites in management and supervision; and improvement of the quality of lives of workers in housing, transport, schooling, recreation, and health facilities.
2. United Nations, Centre Against Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, Notes and Documents, Conf. 9, November, 1977, p. 8.
3. Southern Africa Perspectives, No. 3, 1977, p. 3.
4. Letter to Rev. C. S. Powell, Director, African Committee, DOM, National Council of Churches, January 5, 1978, as quoted in The Corporate Examiner, Vol 7, No. 3, March 1978, p. 4.
5. Leon Weaver, "'Exit' Versus 'Voice': Correcting the Factual Record," unpublished paper, 1978, p. 2.
6. David Davis, African Workers and Apartheid, 1978, p. 14.
7. Davis, Ibid., p. 15.
8. Davis, Ibid., p. 25.
9. Market Research Africa, March/April, 1976.
10. Ibid.
11. Financial Mail of South Africa, June 5, 1977.
12. Financial Mail, Nov. 19, 1976.
13. Bulletin of Statistics, various issues.
14. Sunday Express, 17 August 1977.
15. Based on data from Dept. of Statistics, Pretoria, as reported in South African Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1977, p. 206.

16. Charge Sheet of the "SASO 9", June 27, 1975, Southern Africa Perspectives, p. 2.
17. Christian Science Monitor, "Apartheid: A Plea to the West," Feb. 2, 1978.
18. Interview, Africa News, Nov. 22, 1976.
19. Interview; Issues and Answers; American Broadcasting Corporation, January 8, 1978.