




Namibia

28 January 1986

PRETORIA'S WAR AGAINST THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE



At 3 am on 23 January, the offices of the Council of Churches in Namibia - a large rambling building in Namibia's chief city, Windhoek - were heavily damaged by arson. Neighbors heard the 'whoomp' of a gasoline explosion, saw flames leap into the night sky and observed a vehicle racing from the scene.

The Namibia Communications Centre in London reported the attack immediately. The US press appears not to have noted this assault on the churches in the South African-occupied Territory. The incident is a serious escalation of Pretoria's war against any entity that stands in opposition to its rule - in Namibia, in the independent countries in southern Africa, in South Africa.

The fire severely damaged the development, finance, non-formal education and reception offices. According to Council staff the smell of petrol was evident in filing cabinets in the reception area in the front of the building. The fire department arrived shortly after the explosion and was able to contain the fire before it consumed the entire structure. The Rev Dr Abisai Shejavali, general-secretary of the CCN, stated that police and fire officials said the fire had been started by the use of gasoline and kerosene. Dr Shejavali added: 'The Council of Churches in Namibia and its staff will continue to strive for the true freedom and independence for this country.'

The London-based Namibia Communications Centre also reports that at night on 18 January a bomb blast extensively damaged the generating system at the Lutheran Oshigambo high school in northern Namibia. Bishop Kleopas Dumeni said he suspects members of the South African Defence Force for the bombing. The bishop, in a detailed statement to the South African Police, said he 'totally rejected' an army assertion that 'SWAPO terrorists' had perpetrated the act. Bishop Dumeni declared: 'I suspect members of the South African Defence Force at the Oshigambo army base to be responsible for this bomb explosion.'

On Sunday, 26 January, South African Police in occupied Namibia repeatedly assaulted people at a festive gathering in Windhoek's Katutura township. They used batons, tear gas and attack dogs against men, women and children celebrating the United Nations International Year of Peace at an occasion organized by the SWAPO Youth League. Police charged again and again into the crowd which kept regrouping. At least 56 people were arrested including Ms Ida Jimmy, SWAPO Women's Council leader who was only released last October after serving a five-year sentence for giving a militant speech. (While in prison, Ms Jimmy gave birth to a son; the infant died and Ms Jimmy was not allowed to attend the funeral.)

The detained SWAPO prisoners smuggled out a message from their jail cell, where 46 were confined in a 6 x 4 metre room: 'We of SWAPO make clear that we will resist and challenge the draconian laws imposed upon us in our country. We will not be broken!'

AFGHANISTAN: THE NEW BATTLEFIELDS

THE WASHINGTON POST

The Arms Pipeline

It is here, among the parched hills of Pakistan's tribal territories, that the pipeline ends. Dust-covered trucks roll into guerrilla bases along the Afghan border and unload arms to be cleaned and repacked on donkeys and horses for the trip into Afghanistan.

Accounts pieced together from Afghans, Pakistanis and westerners said that the CIA secretly buys weapons—in China, Egypt and elsewhere—and ships them to the Pakistani port of Karachi and isolated points along the coast of Baluchistan, to the west. One source said shipments in recent months included 40 tons of Soviet equipment captured by South Africa.

Winnie Mandela Assails U.S. Policies on Pretoria and Angola

By ALAN COWELL

Special to The New York Times

CAPE TOWN, Jan. 24 — Winnie Mandela sharply criticized the Reagan Administration today, accusing Washington of supporting "the racist white regime in South Africa" and of ignoring the country's black leaders.

The anti-apartheid campaigner also denounced a plan within the Administration to seek military aid for Jonas Savimbi, who is leading a guerrilla war against the Marxist Government of An-

gola. Mrs. Mandela said United States aid to Mr. Savimbi would associate Washington with South Africa's attacks on neighboring black-ruled nations.

Mrs. Mandela, the wife of the jailed black nationalist Nelson Mandela, was speaking at a hotel near Johannesburg where she received the Robert Kennedy Memorial Human Rights Award, a prize awarded by a family foundation set up in his name.

The Reagan Administration "refuses

any assistance to the true representatives of the people in this country, the African National Congress," she said. "We can only conclude from this that the American Government is determined at all costs to maintain and support the racist white regime in South Africa."

The outlawed African National Congress is fighting to overthrow white minority rule. Mr. Mandela is the organization's most senior imprisoned figure and is viewed by many blacks as the nation's leader.

'The Bandit Savimbi'

Mrs. Mandela, who has been under various forms of official restriction for more than 20 years, is free on bail, charged with breaking an order that forbids her from returning to her home in Soweto.

"The South African regime continues with impunity to attack neighboring countries," she said. "The American Administration not only approves of this conduct but has now followed the examples set by the racist regime by giving aid to and receiving officially in Washington the bandit Savimbi."

The Reagan Administration has not formally proposed that Mr. Savimbi receive American aid. But conservatives in Washington are arguing strenuously for such aid, and the White House has indicated that Mr. Savimbi will probably meet with President Reagan after the Angolan arrives in Washington on Tuesday for a weeklong visit.

Mr. Savimbi lost to the Marxist faction in the civil war that followed Angolan independence from Portugal in 1975. At the time, Mr. Savimbi was supported by several countries, including China, France and South Africa.

South Africa has since then sustained a bush war by Mr. Savimbi against the Cuban-backed authorities in Luanda. The Angolan Government, in turn, supports the African National Congress and is said by South African intelligence officials to provide training to its operatives.

U.N. Plane to Carry Rebels

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Jan. 24 — Fifty-seven members of the African National Congress will be flown from Lesotho to Zambia on Saturday in a



Agence France-Presse

Winnie Mandela receiving human rights award from John Buchanan, a former Republican Representative from Alabama, in Sandton, South Africa.

plane chartered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a spokesman for the Secretary General said today.

The move comes four days after a military coup toppled the Government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan, whose policy it was to shelter members of the African National Congress exiled from South Africa.

The leader of the military uprising, Gen. Justin Lekhanya, said Thursday that Lesotho would fly African National Congress supporters out of the country "as quickly as possible" but would not hand them over to the South African Government.

500 Mourn Slain Policemen

KRUGERSDORP, South Africa,

Jan. 24 (AP) — About 500 whites filled a Dutch Reformed Church in this Johannesburg suburb today to mourn two police officers, the first white policemen slain by black rioters in 17 months of South African unrest.

The Rev. J. H. Breytenbach, a police colonel, appealed at the ceremony for a spirit of love, not revenge. "The word of God is that we may not answer anger with anger," he said.

Sgt. Daniel Pretorius, 25 years old, and Constable Frederick Koekemoer, 27, were stabbed and beaten to death Tuesday when they tried to break up a meeting by about 500 blacks in Bekkersdorp township, near Krugersdorp.

Reinforcements arrived soon afterward, and nine blacks were shot dead by the police in fighting over the next few hours.

Angola Bars Coalition With Rebels

By David B. Ottaway

Washington Post Staff Writer

Angola's Marxist government is not prepared to enter a coalition with noncommunist opposition forces led by Jonas Savimbi, an Angolan envoy said yesterday, warning the Reagan administration that it would be backing "a loser" if it decides to provide him with military or other assistance.

A national coalition government is "out," Angolan Foreign Trade Minister Ismael Gaspar-Martins said, because Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is regarded by the government as "an offshoot of South Africa" and is not a "national" movement.

"It's like telling you, 'All right, let's form a world government, bring Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan together and let them create a national government.' It cannot be done," Gaspar-Martins said.

The Reagan administration has been seeking a reconciliation between the Angolan government and UNITA as part of an overall settlement of various conflicts in southern Africa.

In addition, several senators have indicated that their decision on whether to back an administration proposal for military and other aid to UNITA would depend partly on the government's willingness to negotiate with Savimbi.

Gaspar-Martins, a foreign-policy adviser to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, said his visit only a few days before Savimbi's arrival here to lobby for U.S. military assistance was purely a "coincidence."

But he went out of his way to make known his government's views on the congressional debate under way over the administration's proposal to begin providing covert aid to UNITA.

Gaspar-Martins warned that such a U.S. commitment to Savimbi is bound to have a negative impact on U.S.-brokered negotiations between his government and South Africa for withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and independence for South African-administered Namibia. But he did not say Angola would break off the talks.

He said Angola, in the latest discussions with Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker, has renewed an offer to withdraw Cuban troops from the southern part of the country and send most of them home but is not ready to make more concessions.

Angola is awaiting word from Crocker, who has just returned from South Africa, as to whether South Africa has new proposals regarding its withdrawal from Namibia and a schedule for independence elections there.

Gaspar-Martins also sought to dissuade Congress and the administration from making a commitment militarily or politically to Savimbi. He said UNITA forces have repeatedly engaged in the kind of terrorist activities against civilian targets in a guerrilla war against the central government that the Reagan administration has been condemning elsewhere.

He noted that, at its summit last summer, the Organization of African Unity criticized Savimbi's movement and U.S. proposals to begin aiding it. U.S. aid would be condemned as "a very unfriendly act not only against Angola but the rest of Africa," he said.

"I think the United States is backing the loser. Savimbi is a loser. He cannot win," Gaspar-Martins said.

"To us, you know, he is called 'Judah' Savimbi because of his treason, linking himself to South Africa," he said.

Weinberger Urges Aid to Anticommunist Guerrillas

By Fred Hiatt

Washington Post Staff Writer

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger said yesterday that the United States should find ways to help guerrilla movements fight communist governments, but he again advocated caution before committing U.S. forces.

In a speech prepared for delivery at Fort McNair here last night, Weinberger kicked off a high-level conference on low-intensity warfare, which Secretary of State George P. Shultz is scheduled to address today. Defense Department officials said the conference is intended to underline the Reagan administration's commitment to those it considers "freedom fighters" in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and elsewhere.

Citing those four nations and "others who look to us," Weinberger said that Americans "cannot ignore their aspirations without betraying our own."

"If it is proper and just that we should help those who wish to remain free," he said, "then we can hardly turn our backs on those who have lost their freedom and want it back."

But Weinberger, resuming a debate that he and Shultz have waged on the use of force, said that the military must be only one component of a strategy to defeat communism. That strategy must include "diplomacy, and economic leverage, and the proper management of our technological riches, and the prop-

er, unshamed and unremitting willingness to make our case at the bar of public opinion," he said.

Shultz has argued in speeches that the United States should be more willing to back diplomacy with military muscle and to strike back at terrorists. Weinberger responded with a speech in November 1984 laying down six conditions for the use of force, including "reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their representatives in Congress."

The defense secretary acknowledged yesterday that some have criticized that condition, but he said it is particularly important that U.S. soldiers enter low-intensity conflicts only with clear public support.

"What is important is that we never lose sight of the fact that the military is an instrument of the national will, and not a substitute for it," Weinberger concluded.

Weinberger's prescriptions appeared to fall short of those advocated by some conservative strategists. Later this month, for example, the Heritage Foundation will conduct a seminar entitled, "How to Roll Back the Soviet Empire Through Low-Intensity Warfare."

Weinberger acknowledged that even the term, "low-intensity conflicts," which has become increasingly fashionable among defense analysts, is fuzzy. Such Third World conflicts are sometimes labeled insurgencies; guerrilla wars or, in Soviet literature, wars of national liberation.

The defense secretary said "there is a place for power" in responding to low-intensity wars, particularly for special operations forces such as the Army's Green Berets. Even there, however, he stressed the value of special forces in training local fighters and per-

forming "civic action," such as digging wells, building roads and offering medical help.

The Reagan administration has pushed fitfully for a more active role, both open and covert, in Third World conflicts, from which the United States pulled back after the Vietnam war. U.S. dollars are flowing to antigovernment forces in Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Cambodia, and Washington may soon resume aiding Angolan rebels as well.

The administration also has increased support for governments threatened by leftist insurgencies, as in El Salvador. Weinberger said last night that such aid should not go to a government that will use it only to "sustain itself in power," but he added, "We cannot permit our disdain for some imperfect regimes to bring forth far worse alternatives."

THE WASHINGTON POST

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1986 A7

American Ends Visit To S. Africa

Crocker Criticizes 'Economic War'

By Allister Sparks

Special to The Washington Post

JOHANNESBURG, Jan. 14—Chester A. Crocker, U.S. assistant secretary of state for Africa, left here tonight saying he had a better appreciation of the gap between the country's race groups but still did not believe in economic sanctions as a way to end its apartheid system of segregation.

A return to economic growth and stability, Crocker said at an airport press conference, was the only way for South Africa to get back on the road to building a just and equitable political system.

"We don't seek to wage economic war on South Africa and its people. We don't think that is going to help. We don't think reform can flourish in a climate of economic decline and deterioration, so our view on that hasn't changed," Crocker said.

The assistant secretary was non-committal when asked to predict what President Pieter W. Botha, with whom he talked for 90 minutes yesterday, might say in his crucial state-of-the-nation speech to Parliament Jan. 31.

Six U.S. congressmen, led by Budget Committee Chairman William H. Gray III (D-Pa.), told reporters after meeting with Botha Thursday they believed he would have no substantial reforms to announce.

Three days later Fritz Leutwiler, a Swiss banker appointed to help negotiate a rescheduling of South Africa's foreign loans, said after meeting Botha he was optimistic about the prospects of a major reformist statement. South Africa's loans were frozen when international banks demanded repayment following pressure from opponents of apartheid.

"I don't wish to contribute to speculation about what President Botha may say or give the impression that I know," Crocker said.

"I think we leave with a somewhat better information base as to what some of the possibilities are and what some of the obstacles are



CHESTER A. CROCKER
... "where the action is"

but I am not going to declare myself anything more than a realist," he added.

Crocker said he had delivered a letter from Reagan to Botha, and this had provided the basis of his discussion with the South African government.

The assistant secretary did not disclose the contents of the letter, except to say it covered internal developments as well as regional issues in what he described as the "frankly dangerous" southern African region.

In an oblique criticism of widespread condemnation of South Africa by Americans, Crocker said it was now time "for the world to pay attention to what South Africans think, what South Africans are prepared to do, what risks they are prepared to take for peaceful progress."

"Here in South Africa is where the action is," Crocker added.

South Africa's different racial groups needed to find each other, and the United States wished them well as they tried to do this, he said. "We want South Africans to succeed. That is the side we are on," Crocker said.

Crocker's visit was welcomed by the progovernment Afrikaans language press as indicating warmer relations between Washington and Pretoria after the U.S. administration's temporary withdrawal of its ambassador and imposition of limited sanctions last year.

Crocker, who has been criticized for meeting few blacks during his visits here, this time visited one of the strife-torn black townships, Duduza, east of here, where one of the community leaders he was due to meet was killed before he arrived.

"Obviously there is more interest and there is more going on in the townships than was the case in the past, so perhaps it is not surprising that their situation received more attention," Crocker added.

INTERNATIONAL

US begins new round of negotiations on Namibian independence

By Louis Winitzer
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Diplomatic efforts to gain independence for Namibia seem to be back to Square 1. But some analysts see a glimmer of hope in the apparent political strengthening of Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, whose agreement is essential to any independence settlement.

Mr. dos Santos seems more inclined toward a compromise agreement on Namibia (South West Africa) than other members of his government. His position was apparently strengthened at the recent congress of his ruling Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA).

The United States is resuming its push for a Namibia agreement. Chester Crocker, the US assistant secretary of state, arrived in Angola Wednesday for talks on Namibia. For four years, Mr. Crocker has been trying to get Angola to send 30,000 Cuban troops home; in exchange, South Africa would withdraw from Namibia and permit UN-supervised elections to take place. South Africa administers Namibia in defiance of the UN.

But thus far, Crocker's initiative has, in the words of a West European diplomat, "failed miserably." The Reagan administration says there has been progress.

In his earlier talks, Crocker had persuaded the Angolans to accept a linkage between Namibian independence and the departure of Cuban troops from Angola.

Slowly the gap between the South African and Angolan positions narrowed. Angola offered to send its estimated 25,000 Cubans home over a period of three years, keeping 5,000 Cubans around the capital. Pretoria

demanding that all Cubans leave within six months.

There was room for further compromise. But last May, when a top-secret meeting between South African President P. W. Botha and Angolan President dos Santos was about to take place, South African commandos were captured trying to sabotage American-owned oil installations in the northern Angolan province of Cabinda. Pretoria said the commandos were gathering intelligence data.

Despite South Africa's action, dos Santos agreed to continue talks both with the US and with South Africa. But in a meeting last November, Crocker added a new condition, linking Namibian independence to the establishment of a reconciliation regime in Angola that would include Jonas Savimbi, whose insurgents (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, or UNITA) are waging civil war against the Angolan government. According to a senior Angolan diplomat, the US said that, unless Mr. Savimbi was made co-leader of Angola, it would continue to provide him with aid.

The US Congress has lifted its ban on such aid, and in a speech last fall President Reagan for the first time included Savimbi's insurgent group among the "freedom fighters" which "the United States felt morally obligated to support." Savimbi is expected in Washington later

this month where he will meet with high administration officials and key senators.

US Secretary of State George Shultz has delayed providing covert aid to UNITA in the hope that dos Santos would agree to the new terms which, one Angolan source here, calls "political hari-kari."

Angola has been able to deal severe blows to UNITA in recent months. Savimbi had been put on the defensive and South Africa felt a need to intervene late last year. Pretoria wanted to create a situation that would freeze diplomatic efforts and allow South Africa to move its forces back into Angola to bail out Savimbi, according to a West European diplomat recently stationed in Luanda. Pretoria, however, said it went into Angola in pursuit of SWAPO guerrillas.

At the recent party congress, dos Santos filled the Central Committee with personal supporters (by enlarging it from 67 to 90 seats). Though he professes to be Marxist, he has spoken out against dogmatism and in favor of He dismissed several pro-Soviet



Chester Crocker in Angola renews search for Namibia settlement

"pragmatism." hardliners.

"All domestic obstacles to a negotiated settlement have now been removed and dos Santos has a free hand to work out a compromise solution with South Africa," says one African pro-Western source.

Smith He FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1985 / PAGE 3D

The Washington Times

Reagan's Angola strategy

Instead of blundering into the 10-year-old Angolan civil war with guns blazing to rescue Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas, President Reagan has chosen a sophisticated strategy of carefully-planned sequential steps.

This approach is designed to maximize the chances of a negotiated departure of Cuban troops from Angola, while at the same time ensuring broad bipartisan support from Congress if American armed assistance to Mr. Savimbi eventually proves necessary.

The first tactical move in the implementation of this strategy was the meeting that Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost had with President Eduardo dos Santos of Angola at the United Nations last month. The leader of the unelected Marxist MPLA regime was told time is running out on five years of stalled negotiations to get the Cubans to leave.

Although Mr. dos Santos was not given a specific deadline, he was clearly warned that within a limited

time his regime would have to come up with a more acceptable schedule for the final departure of Cuban troops as a way of getting the South Africans to withdraw their forces from Namibia.

It was also made clear to the Angolan leader that the U.S. government could not passively stand by and permit an attempt to destroy UNITA with Soviet weaponry and Cuban troops. A negotiated national reconciliation with UNITA, leading to free elections, was urged as the only way to end the civil war and prevent the superpower rivalry from spreading.

The second stage in the administration's strategy started last week in the Zambian capital of Lusaka, where Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker met with Angolan Minister of the Interior Rodrigues Quito. With both sides claiming the talks were "useful," another session is scheduled for Luanda after the Dec. 8 meeting of the MPLA party congress. With demands for armed assistance to UNITA increasing in Congress, American negotiators have for the first time been able to use a credible threat of U.S. intervention

as a bargaining lever. As these talks continue, State Department officials also claim that recent discussions with the South Africans on their departure from Namibia show some progress. Both the South African and MPLA regimes share powerful economic incentives to end the fighting, and it may just be that the time is ripe for a negotiated settlement that would

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provide for the withdrawal of both Cuban and South African forces.

But hard-liners in the MPLA Politburo argue that so long as Soviet weapons and advisers and Cuban forces are available to protect them, they can indefinitely hold Luanda and the oil in the Cabinda enclave, while enjoying the fruits of one-party power and privilege.

If these MPLA hard-liners, with Soviet and Cuban support, succeed in sabotaging the current negotiations, as seems only too likely, the White House is prepared for the next step. After the Christmas recess, when Congress reconvenes toward the end of January, the administration plans to invite Mr. Savimbi to Washington, where he will be given an opportunity to plead his own eloquent case.

Having exhausted in good faith the current possibilities of playing the honest broker, the administration would then be in a strong position to request congressional approval of American assistance for UNITA as the only way to offset massive Soviet and Cuban intervention and to prevent the extension of Communist control throughout the region. By providing this aid directly to Mr. Savimbi, the U.S. would make UNITA less dependent on South Africa and strengthen the hands of the MPLA moderates, who seek a negotiated settlement with UNITA.

This coherent Reagan strategy

If these MPLA hard-liners, with Soviet and Cuban support, succeed in sabotaging the current negotiations, the White House is prepared for the next step.

has a good chance of winning enough bipartisan support to avoid the worst possible outcome: defeat of an administration request for aid to UNITA.

As Mr. Savimbi's representatives in Washington point out, there is some danger in delaying the provision of aid to UNITA for two months. In spite of the heavy rains that have started in Southern Angola, the Soviets continue to use an air bridge of Antonov transport planes to build up the armaments of the MPLA forces on the southern front. As a Soviet gamble to knock Mr. Savimbi out before American aid can reach him, the threat of a rainy-season offensive cannot be dismissed.

But on balance Reagan officials are probably right in assuming that rainy-season road conditions are so bad the Soviets would be foolish to push their battered MPLA allies into an offensive before next April. By that time, either negotiations will have succeeded in forcing a Cuban withdrawal or sufficient American aid will have reached UNITA to ensure its survival.

..... SPOTLIGHT ON UNITA

The changing faces of Jonas Savimbi



What else could they say? In 1982 the files of the PIDE (renamed DGS) were opened to the international press. This event was reported in the British paper, The Times (23.8.82) under the headline 'Secret Files in Lisbon Compromise Savimbi'.

To quote The Times: 'In one dusty file, a telegram from the DGS branch in Luso, Angola, marked Top Secret and dated September 19 1972, gave an account of a report from Dr Jonas Savimbi, who at that time was supposed to be fighting the Portuguese. According to the DGS, Dr Savimbi said his Unita had successfully ambushed a 30-man force of rival MPLA. He now wanted arms, ammunition, syringes, medicines, and a safe passage for his men through Portuguese army lines'.

Contacts with the PIDE were maintained through settler timber merchants in the small area of eastern Angola where Unita was sheltered from the war, and through a Catholic priest.

These contacts were again used when Unita hastened to sign a 'cease-fire' with Portugal in June 1974, racing to seek political advantage from being able to establish itself legally in Angola and start to recruit new members.

It badly needed to. On June 18, 1974, while hailing the 'cease-fire' with Unita, the Portuguese daily, Diário de Lisboa, wrote: 'Unita is the smallest of the three guerilla organisations operating in Angola' and estimated that it had 'approximately 300 men under arms'.

In an article published in The Guardian in May 1974, Portuguese commander, Jose Martins e Silva, at the Portuguese army headquarters in Luanda, commented on the three Angolan organisations which, with Portugal, were later to form the transitional government under the terms of the Alvor Agreement: 'We are not worried about the guerillas belong-

ing to Unita because they are not strong.

'The (Portuguese) Army wants peace. We want the people to decide the future - the six million people who live inside Angola. Organisations like Unita and FNLA are unwilling to accept peace because they know they don't represent more than a small number of people in a small section of the country.

SOUTH AFRICA's latest intervention in Angola on behalf of the rebel movement, Unita, has once again raised the question of Pretoria's intentions in Southern Africa, particularly in Angola and Namibia.

However, while South Africa's support for Unita has been an open secret for many years, very little is generally known about the background of the rebel group which South Africa is seeking to promote as a legitimate factor in the Angolan/Namibian equation.

We reproduce below extracts of a paper presented by MARGA HOLNESS, director of the Angola information office in London, to an international conference on Namibia in September last year.

'The MPLA is different. It is the only one with sympathisers in all the urban centres of Angola. The greatest number of them were known before the revolution. We know that all the black intellectuals are MPLA'.

The FNLA was a militaristic body which, with neighbouring Zaire's strong backing in arms and men, as well as the military support of the CIA, sought to impose itself in Angola solely by force of arms.

Unita, unable to do this because of its military weakness, set out to establish for itself a base in Angola by drawing on two essential sources - the population of the Central Highlands and the most reactionary sectors of the white settler population.

In recruiting the former, it used outright regionalism, tribalism and racism - always the lowest ideological common denominators - and to the settlers it presented a peacemaker image and advocated gradualism in granting independence.

This crude opportunism had its contradictions as when speeches made in Umbundu in Huambo or Bie Provinces - in which the killing of all whites was advocated - were understood by local settlers who spoke the language.

Abroad, Unita's image was promoted through black American groups heavily infiltrated by the CIA.

Even after independence in Angola, we saw such US civil rights organisations as Roy Innes' Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) recruiting black mercenaries to fight with Unita.

CENTRAL TO THE Unita image, is its leader Savimbi, all the other figures in it remain somewhat shadowy. A number of the once better-known names have disappeared without a trace as the rigours of exile and outlawry led to internal disputes and the summary settling of scores.

So the public image depends entirely on the PR job done by Savimbi.

The PR image serves to conceal a relatively short political history marked by what might appear to be a remarkable agility when switching allegiances, but is in fact a consistent allegiance to his personal ambition to rule Angola.

In 1961 - the year the MPLA launched the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism - Savimbi was a student in Switzerland. He had given up medical studies in Portugal to enroll in the faculty of Political Science in Lausanne. Having apparently decided to involve himself in nationalist politics, he joined the MPLA.

But he was not to remain in it for long. Shortly after a trip to Africa, where he met Tom Mboya, the Kenyan politician with strong American ties, he abandoned his studies and went to join the FNLA in Kinshasa.

The CIA, which was already backing FNLA, doubtless regarded him as quite a catch. As a man from Central Angola, he might give a more national, a more Angolan image to the FNLA, a tribally-based group centered on connections with the old Congo Kingdom Royal Family who did their recruiting among exiles from Angola in what is now Zaire.

Savimbi became 'foreign minister' in the so-called 'government in exile' set up by the FNLA.

But that allegiance did not last long either. In July 1964 at the All African Meeting of Heads of State held in Cairo, Savimbi publicly resigned from the FNLA, accusing it of tribalism.

He could have joined the MPLA had he really wanted to fight for his country's independence, but his terms were that he should be made its vice president with responsibility for foreign affairs and without any democratic decision by MPLA.

He then returned to Europe and nothing more was heard of him for the next two years, apart from the fleeting creation of something called 'Amangola' (Manifesto of the Friends of Angola) in Switzerland.

Following Zambia's independence, the MPLA was preparing to open a new fighting front in the east, the Third Politico Military Region. When the First Region was opened in northern Angola, the CIA-backed FNLA had emerged to direct the bulk of its activity against the MPLA.

When the Second Region was opened in Cabinda, FLEC - a series of groups supported by conflicting oil interests and recruited mainly from the Portuguese army's armed forces - had appeared to oppose the MPLA in Cabinda.

In 1966, when the Third Region was about to be opened, Savimbi re-emerged and announced the creation of Unita in the east.

The alliance Unita formed with members of the Portuguese High Command has been well documented.

His correspondence with General Luz Cunha, commander in chief of the colonial army in Angola, and other officials of the Portuguese colonial regime, came to light after April 25, 1974, when young officers of the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement gained access to the secret files of PIDE (Portuguese Political Police).

In this correspondence, the 'enemy' referred to by both Savimbi and the Portuguese officials, was the MPLA. In a letter to General Luz Cunha dated September 29, 1972, Savimbi outlined what he regarded

as the way to achieve peace in eastern Angola: 'The weakening of the MPLA forces in Angola, leading to their liquidation. This task can be accomplished through the combined efforts of the (Portuguese) military forces and Unita's forces'.

This damning evidence of collaboration with the colonial enemy was rebuffed as a forgery by Unita and its mentors.

..... SPOTLIGHT ON UNITA



South African soldiers in action in Angola.

South Africa's apartheid system pulls the strings

UNITA IS AN INSTRUMENT of the South African apartheid government. More than that, it is an instrument of imperialist strategy in southern Africa.

A succinct account of the role reserved for the group was given in documents leaked to the New York Times after South African Foreign Minister Rieff Botha's visit to Washington in May 1981.

To quote the International Herald Tribune reporting on the documents recording Botha's talks with US officials, the joint US-South African strategy agreed on at that time was: 'Use the prospect of getting South African troops out of Namibia ... as leverage on the Soviet-backed government of Angola.'

'Demand from Angola both a withdrawal of Cuban forces from its territory and a sharing of power with Savimbi ... the Angolans would be told that Moscow cannot help them economically, that Washington can, that they can get US diplomatic recognition only by acceding to the two conditions and that Washington would consider resuming military aid to Savimbi if necessary'.

It is in the illegally-occupied territory of Namibia that South African army personnel are alleged to train Unita members.

South Africa is also alleged to carry out illegal flights to Angola from Namibia to land supplies for Unita. It is clear that Namibia's independence under Security Council Resolution 435 and the consequent with-

drawal of the South African Armed Forces from Namibia would totally change the situation.

Even without this, the offensive of the Angolan armed forces to wipe out the armed bands is clearing large areas of country of bandit activities.

Unita also uses Namibia as a theatre for plundering the Angolan economy. Press reports have revealed an illegal trade in timber, ivory, rhino tusks and other riches stolen from Angola with the alleged assistance of the South African armed forces.

According to the reports, this trade is organised from a villa in Baganim in the Caprivi Strip, which is one of Savimbi's residences, the other better known one being his villa in Rabat, Morocco.

THE EVENTS AFTER the signing of the Alvor Agreement in January 1975 are wellknown.

Unita was too small a force to matter. The FNLA, finding that it had no political support in Angola, tried to seize control of the capital of Luanda by force.

The population of Luanda was massacred, MPLA supporters were hunted down, tortured and killed, and the most horrible atrocities were committed during which was virtually the military occupation of Luanda by Zairean and FNLA forces.

With support from the population of Luanda, the MPLA launched a counter-offensive and by July 1975 the capital had been cleared of the forces, most of whom did not even speak any Angolan language or Portuguese.

Unita officials, who had consistently supported FNLA positions in the transitional government opposing the MPLA, also left the capital.

The FNLA and Unita then sought to establish their own spheres of influence in areas where their leaders had tribal affinities - the FNLA in the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire, and Unita in the Central Highlands. On August 13, the MPLA issued a statement denouncing these attempts to carve out spheres of influence. The statement spoke of forces which 'under cover of nationalist facades, are entering our country from permanent rear bases abroad, and which have found it necessary to carry out all kinds of violence, culminating in monumental massacres of the people in almost all the regions of the country where they can establish themselves.'

By August 1975, the MPLA had established its control over 12 of Angola's 16 provinces. Its watchword was 'one nation, one people'. In sharp contrast to the tribalism and divisive slogans of the FNLA and Unita.

But it was in August too, that the first contingent of South African troops entered Angola, allegedly to protect the Calueque hydro-electric scheme on the Namibian border.

This was merely a prelude to the South African invasion by an estimated 6000 troops which resulted in the occupation of the whole of the centre and south of Angola.

There was a simultaneous invasion from the north, the aim being for the invading forces to converge on Luanda and take the capital before independence on November 11.

In the wake of the South African armoured column, Unita was established in Angolan towns, enjoying the South African military protection which it has continued to enjoy to this day.

The attempt to take the capital and to prevent the proclamation of independence by the MPLA, failed.

The MPLA appealed to a number of countries for assistance. Some African countries sent small contingents of troops to help Angola's threatened independence. On November 5 1975 the Cuban Central Committee decided to send Cuban combat troops to help drive out invaders. Since October there had been small numbers of Cuban military personnel to help train the Angolans flocking to join the MPLA forces, and so leave the experienced former guerrilla fighters more free to deal with the combat tasks.

It was after independence on November 11, that the Cuban contingents arrived and helped in the counter-

offensive which resulted in the expulsion of the South African Army in March 1976.

After independence, the FNLA and Unita tried to seek recognition for the short-lived government they set up in Huambo under the umbrella of the South African Armed Forces.

And while Western governments were calling for a government of 'national unity' in Angola, - meaning that FNLA and Unita should be brought into the central government - the two groups proved they were not able to maintain unity, even among themselves.

Fighting broke out in Huambo between the FNLA and Unita. On December 22, Huambo Radio broadcast impassioned pleas for peace, and by December 23, the fighting had spread to Benguela, also still occupied by South African armed forces.

The fighting, which caused widespread destruction, especially in Huambo, showed the inability of the two tribally-based organisations to achieve even a modicum of unity.

During their short reign in Huambo, they made no attempt to establish any kind of administration. And when Huambo was liberated in early February, there were charnel houses of dead bodies and mass graves.

Everywhere banks, vaults and safes had been broken into, and, in their flight, the FNLA and Unita leaders had taken with them millions of Escudos.

But by mid-January, Jonas Savimbi had already made his headquarters in Kinshasa, capital of neighbouring Zaire.

From there he made the following typical statement: 'We do not need either American advisors or soldiers, but we do need arms. We ask for help from the United States and our friends in the West. It would be a pity if the US were not to help our cause.'

'We know that the US was demoralised by its defeat in Vietnam but it would be a pity if it did nothing to defend its interests in Angola. We are fighting for the interests of the West in Angola'.

On March 1 1976, the late President Agostinho Neto, said that FNLA and Unita members who had fled to neighbouring countries should have no fear of returning to Angola.

He said: 'Even here in the capital of Angola, there are people who were FNLA and others who were Unita, and they have jobs and we know who they are ... therefore there should be no fear on the part of those who are in Zaire, those in Zambia, in Namibia and Botswana, about returning to their country.'

'So long as they accept the laws of the country, we accept them. Let us work together. We are not exclusive people. We do not want Angola to be solely for MPLA members.'

In the light of propaganda today, presenting Savimbi as a man seeking 'national reconciliation' it is important to recall this amnesty offered to all Angolans who had fought against the Government, so long as in future they respected the law.


This call for national reconciliation was ignored by Savimbi, who declared his intention to continue 'guerrilla warfare', showing that he had no desire to see national reconstruction in his country.

Assurances of continued support from the US and other Western mentors sustained Savimbi's overriding ambition to be president of Angola one day.

'Everything in the way of positive opposition to racial discrimination is of value, as you will know, and I am sure that in the world of chess this is especially so because of its international character.'

- Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, CR
president, British Anti-Apartheid
Movement.

CHESS AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID



The South African Chess Association - the only non-racial national umbrella organization for the promotion of chess in South Africa - will celebrate its second anniversary at a chess congress to be held in a 'township' near Cape Town at the end of March 1986.

This congress will be held in a 'township' because SACA does not hold its congresses in 'international' venues in 'white' areas, nor does it request 'permits' from the apartheid authorities for 'multi-racial' activities, as does the apartheid South African Chess Federation.

SACA celebrates two years of non-racial chess in the land of apartheid even though its playing halls have been closed to it by the apartheid allies of the South African Chess Federation - even though members and officials have lost their jobs and been consigned to the concentration camps called 'homelands' - even though many of its members have suffered detention under the emergency declaration of Pretoria. SACA members choose the non-racial chess of their organization over the government sanctioned 'multi-racial' activities of the apartheid SACF.

It is important that the people of South Africa know that the 'outside world' recognizes those who struggle for a democratic, unitary, non-racial society. For those in the world of chess this occasion presents the opportunity to greet our sisters and brothers in the spirit of FIDE's glorious slogan, GENS UNA SUMUS. (FIDE stands for Federation Internationale des Echecs, called in English, World Chess Federation).

Send your messages of solidarity and celebration to:

South African Chess Association
P O Box 217
Athlone 7760
SOUTH AFRICA

The United States Chess Federation has pressed FIDE to revoke its stand against apartheid in chess. You can protest this action by the USCF:

E. Steven Doyle, president
Gerard Dullea, executive director
U.S. Chess Federation
186 Route 9W
New Windsor, NY 12550

Please send copies of your messages both to SACA and USCF to SACA's international representative:

Jerome Bibuld
377 Westchester Avenue
Port Chester, NY 10573

Leave
Apartheid
Sittin' by the
Dock of the Bay



Protesters march in front of the building housing the Pacific Maritime Association.

(Photo: Richard J. Brown)

ECSA
339 Lafayette Street
New York, N.Y. 10012

