

## WHY U.S. INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA MUST BE STOPPED

1. U.S. intervention in Angola may well prove as tragic and costly as in Indochina. Thousands more will be killed, wounded or made homeless for ill-defined, unrealizable goals. The same shopworn "domino" theory which proved so disastrous in Vietnam is being trotted out again. Ignoring African realities, Secretary Kissinger defines the struggle as a fight against Communism and the spread of Soviet power into Africa. While no U.S. troops are yet involved officially, hundreds of mercenaries are being illegally recruited in the United States. U.S. supplies and planes are involved. United States involvement will mount unless Congress says a firm "no".
  2. The invasion of Angola by South Africa has redefined the struggle in Angola for many African countries, who are less afraid of Soviet than South African domination. By collaborating with South Africa, the United States is offending important black African countries normally regarded as pro-U.S. On January 1st, Nigeria denounced U.S. anti-MPLA pressure as "crude bullying" insulting to the intelligence of Africans. Close to a majority of the OAU including Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania and Ethiopia have recognized the MPLA. None have recognized FNLA/UNITA.
  3. By intervening the U.S. will have damaged prospects for mutually beneficial relations if an MPLA-led government comes to undisputed power, and at the same time driven the MPLA to rely more and more heavily on the Soviet Union for aid, thus increasing the chance of the very domination which we say we fear.
  4. An MPLA government is not likely to fall under Soviet domination simply because it has received Soviet aid. Soviet aid has not led to any permanent influence in other African countries such as Egypt, Ghana, Sudan, Tanzania, Mali or Mozambique. MPLA has stated that it does not intend to offer bases to any foreign government and will resist Soviet domination just as it fought Portuguese domination.
- The MPLA favors a form of African-style socialism similar to that advocated by Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, with which the U.S. is now seeking good relations. MPLA stands for national control and technical skill transfer to Angolans, especially in strategic industries. Such demands are reasonable for a country whose resources and people were exploited for years by outsiders. They do not threaten the security of the U.S.
5. If the U.S. succeeds in installing a "friendly" government, such a government will probably be as unpopular, foreign-oriented and extremely repressive as Chile, the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Iran. A UNITA/FNLA government beholden to South Africa will be bound to discourage the fight for freedom in Namibia and South Africa.
  6. The Angolan intervention is just one more chapter in the sordid history of secret CIA-engineered assassinations, chaos and military adventures. By being asked to be silent, Congress is being invited to shirk its Constitutional responsibility to declare war.
  7. U.S. citizens may be asked to pay never-ending costs for Angolan intervention. U.S. intervention in the Belgian Congo has already cost U.S. taxpayers over \$400 million without any perceptible gain to the average citizen of Zaire or the U.S.
  8. At a time when many Americans have no jobs, proper health care or housing, Congress should not fund Mobutu's government or its Angolan ventures. While Zaire faces a genuine economic crisis, its intervention in Angola is a waste of its resources needed for development. Zaire has mismanaged its economy, squandered foreign exchange and is hopelessly in debt. Mobutu has made himself one of the richest men in the world while the average urban worker earns only 68% of his 1961 income. U.S.-aided military power is necessary to repress popular discontent.

# The Need To Control

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, Dec. 21—When the Vietnam war came to its inevitable end last spring, Henry Kissinger said that Congress's refusal to try to drag it on proved America's unreliability as an ally. Now President Ford is doing the same on Angola. The Senate vote to stop covert intervention there, he said, "is a deep tragedy for all countries whose security depends on the United States."

Why do these men want to exaggerate the impact of distant events on their country's reputation? Why do they invite the world to judge American strength by our position in Angola, a land that has no historical tie to the United States and has never depended on us for its security? Exploring those questions may afford some insight into the real, as opposed to the advertised, premises of United States policy.

One reason given by Mr. Ford for taking the Senate vote so seriously was that it "deprived us of our ability to help the people of Angola." He said the United States should be able to help any people "decide their own fate. We have over a period of time helped to maintain free governments."

Talk of helping countries to "decide their own fate" has rather a mocking sound these days. Does Mr. Ford think people have forgotten the massive and conspiratorial United States efforts to upset the Democratic process in Chile? Can he use the word "free," without gagging, for such objects of United States support as the Governments of Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines?

In fact, hardly any official pretends that our Angolan policy has anything to do with the people of Angola. It is

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justified, instead, as necessary to maintain our influence in Africa against that of the Soviet Union. If we let the Soviet-supported faction prevail in Angola, Mr. Kissinger told Senate leaders privately, Africans would think of the U.S.S.R. as the superpower that matters.

Recent history goes against the notion that Soviet military aid in Africa leads to permanent influence. In Egypt it was counterproductive. Experts think the U.S.S.R. would reap more trouble than joy from neocolonial activity in black Africa. The specter of a Soviet naval base in Angola, raised by Mr. Kissinger, does not alarm the Pentagon.

Nor is there good reason to believe that the United States will win respect for itself in Africa by intervening in Angola. The effective way to gain influence would have been to condemn the South African army's intervention. Instead, the United States is on the same side as South Africa—a coincidence, we say, but one that could hardly be more fatal to our reputation in most of the continent.

The ultimate political argument is that failure to act in Angola will hurt our image with the Russians, making them think us weak everywhere. To the contrary, after Vietnam a shrewd Soviet leader might want to see America involved in remote quarrels outside her experience. He might also care less about Angola than about continued American willingness to be forthcoming on such matters as grain supplies for the U.S.S.R.

Altogether, the political arguments seem to me dubious. At best they cannot explain President Ford's overdone reaction to the Senate vote. Twice in a brief statement he called it a threat to America's greatness. "A great nation," he said, "cannot escape its responsibilities." The hyperbole suggests that the premises of the policy are as much psychological as political.

After Vietnam it was widely said that the United States had learned one basic lesson: It cannot be a global policeman. But the Angolan affair

shows that Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger have not learned that lesson. For them, "greatness" depends on the will to be involved anywhere and everywhere in the world—and to see that events follow the script we write.

In the magazine *Foreign Affairs* last January Prof. Richard R. Fagen of Stanford examined what was then known about Chile and said United States covert activities were "the symptoms and consequences of a foreign policy which attempts to manage conflict and change on a global scale." The activities would continue, he said, as long as American leaders thought our interests were "threatened by almost any Third World experiment in socioeconomic transformation not directly under our control."

Control: That is the end so deeply, even irrationally, desired. The feeling stems in part from the personality of our dominant policymaker, Mr. Kissinger. He is authoritarian by nature and finds it more congenial to deal with the predictability of authoritarian regimes than with the disorder of democracy. But there is more to it than that. For years now, the highest levels of American Government have been fixed on the status quo, mortally fearing change in a world irresistibly changing.

It is the mark of the insecure to become hysterical at change. Great countries, like mature individuals, understand that life is complicated—and that they cannot make everyone else conform to their vision.

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## THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA

110 MARYLAND AVENUE, N.E.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002  
(202) 546-7961