STATEMENT OF JOHN E. LIND, Ph.D.

Contents: THE NEW INTERIM ARRANGEMENT • APPENDIX I. THE THIRD INTERIM ARRANGEMENT • Table I. The Repayment Schedule for the Principal of the South African Debt under the Third Interim Arrangement • APPENDIX II. ESTIMATED REPAYMENT SCHEDULE FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S TOTAL DEBT • Table II. Repayment Schedule for the Total South African Debt under the Third Interim Arrangement with an Estimate of the Total Debt as of 31 December 1989 • NEW LENDING AND ROLL-OVERS • TABLE III. RETIRED DEBT AND NEW CREDITS GUARANTEED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, exclusive of the Government itself, for 1987 and 1988 by Currency • TABLE IV. TOTAL SOUTH AFRICAN DEBT BY CURRENCY • U.S. BANK EXPOSURE IN SOUTH AFRICA • TABLE V. Estimates of the Distribution of U.S. Bank Exposure in South Africa as of 30 September 1989 as Given by Bank and Loan Category • TABLE VI. Estimates of the Exposures of Major U.S. Banks in South Africa by Category in Millions of U.S. Dollars for 30 September 1989 • Figure I. U.S. Bank exposure in South Africa projected through 1993 • APPENDIX III. ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS • THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 1985 THROUGH 1988 • TABLE VII. BASIC DATA ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 1985 - 1988 • THE EFFECT OF GOLD PRICES ON SOUTH AFRICA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS • TABLE VIII. CAPITAL ACCOUNTS AND THE EFFECTS OF GOLD PRICES FOR 1985 - 1988 • TABLE IX. EFFECT OF GOLD PRICE ON AVERAGE ANNUAL CAPITAL FLOWS FOR THE PERIOD 1985 - 1988 • TABLE X. MENU OF POSSIBLE DEBT REPAYMENT SCHEDULES • SOUTH AFRICA'S GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT • Figure 2. Quarterly Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product • Figure 3. Quarterly Gross Domestic Fixed Investment • Lind's testimony concerns the South Africa Financial Sanctions for Democracy Amendment Act, H.R. 3458. Lind explains that he has served for the past 18 months the coordinator between churches, and church federations in the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Switzerland, and France, which have been conducting dialogues with the banks in their countries that sit on the bank negotiating committee which recently rescheduled $8 billon of South Africa's foreign debt. The churches suggested that the banks seek 15% repayment under the new arrangement, and that this agreement have a term of only one year. The biggest "stick" as well as the biggest "carrot" available is the international capital market. South African's current financial straits were triggered in September 1985 by U.S. banks' refusal to roll over large outstanding short-term loans after more than a year of unrest in the townships. U.S. banks had been sensitized to the issue by years of anti-apartheid concern in this country. Lending may have peaked in 1985 anyway, but the crash landing that the South African economy underwent in 1986 was certainly induced by the U.S. banks and the anti-apartheid efforts within the U.S. Without U.S. banks' demands for immediate repayment, the South African economy might have had a soft landing instead. The testimony mentions Bishop Kruse, the Evangelical Church in in Germany, The Rev. Bernard Thorogood, the British Council of Churches, James Andrews, the Presbyterian Church (USA), political change, ending the state of emergency, the release of all political prisoners and detainees, unbanning of all political organizations, the Group Areas Act, Separate Amenities and Population Registration Act, flagrantly racist legislation, a convention to negotiate a new constitution for a democratic, non-racial and unitary South Africa, State President F.W. de Klerk, the South African Reserve Bank, Dr. Gerhard de Kock, the growth rate of the South African economy, the exit loan conversions, divestiture of debt by U.S. banks, Citibank, reforms, no net outflow of capital, a ban on trade credits, European banks, domestic interest rates, foreign sources of trade finance, the U.S. policy on banking relations, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), the Country Exposure Lending Survey, Gross Domestic Fixed Investment, exports, imports, manufacturing, and mining.